



THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Press Release!

**Investigation Committee Report on thefts in Office of the President**

**JUBA, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2013** – Two separate theft instances occurred in the Office of the President's (OoP) West Wing (WW) on the 15<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2013 respectively. H.E. the President issued a *Republican Order No 01/2013* forming a Committee to investigate into the thefts. The mandate of the Investigation Committee were:

- (a) *To identify, summon, interview and investigate all the concerned members of the staff involved;*
- (b) *To establish and ascertain the exact amount of stolen money; and as to how the said money was stolen, despite the fact that there is heavy security in and around the office of the President; and why was such amount of money kept in a building which was not serving as a strong room, instead of keeping it in a Bank;*
- (c) *To establish what legal measures and steps were taken there from;*
- (d) *To request the production of all the relevant documents for audit by the Committee; and*
- (e) *To investigate the hereunder members of the staff in the Office of the President, namely: the Chief Administrator in the OoP, Mr. Mayen Wol Jong; the Executive Director in the OoP, Mr. Yel Luol Koor; and the Controller of Accounts in the OoP, Mr. Nhomout Agoth Cithiik.*

The Committee listened to testimonies from witnesses and examined documents pertaining to the case. The findings of the investigation revealed that in the first theft, SSP 176,169 and USD 14,000 plus two laptop computers were stolen. The burglary took place allegedly through a hole dug into the office. During the second theft SSP 32,374 in an iron box was stolen from office No. 21 purportedly taken through a window. The total amount of money stolen in the two thefts is **SSP 208, 543** and **USD 14,000** respectively.

The manner of the thefts suggests that they were a colluding syndicate. For instance, in the first theft the hole was too tiny for the commission of the theft; and equally in the second theft there was only a minute cut on the window's wire gauze suggesting that the thieves must have had access to the offices through the doors. The thefts were a product of a combination of factors that consist of staff incompetence, gross negligence and lack of inter-departmental communications in the OoP. The accountants work under very little guidance and supervision. In addition, the force that provides premises

protection in the OoP is too small and poorly equipped posing further security risks to the OoP.

In spite of the gravity of the crime, there was a remarkable indecision from the senior staff in the OoP to report the matter to the authorities or even enhance security on site. Hence, a week later the second theft, which could have been averted, occurred. The senior officials were more concerned with containing the theft within the OoP rather than tackling it or its underlying causes. The case was belatedly reported to the Police on the 29<sup>th</sup> March 2013. Hence, vital evidence was compromised by this lapse of time.

Although there is circumstantial evidence which can be used to secure conviction, the delay in the Police investigation meant that important evidence was compromised or lost. The report recommends administrative actions against some of the officials in the OoP whom we felt were negligent. The report also makes other recommendations to enhance OoP's administrative and security infrastructures. We believe that if these recommendations are implemented such incidents will be averted in the future, and public confidence in the OoP will be restored.

**End of Press Release**