Thursday, February 25, 2010

Blogging in Morocco...And Bureaucratization of Religion

Just back from Morocco, where I had the pleasure to meet various young and upcoming bloggers from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Conversations were inspiring and informative. Exploring the blogosphere in the Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria seem to be relatively freer than Tunisia subject to a stifling environment. Whereas in Morocco, one knows the red lines and taboo subjects outside the limits of freedom of expression, Tunisia's guidelines are arbitrary. Recently, fellow blogger Lina Ben Mhenni's blog (Tunisian Girl بنية تونسية) and facebook page were censored by "Ammar," name 'affectionately' given by Tunisian bloggers and activists to state Internet censorship in Tunisia. The authorities' actions are an attempt to silence Lina's writing on the plight of political prisoners and the dwindling space for freedom of expression in Tunisia.


While in Morocco, I attended the Friday prayer, where I thought the Imam was a public announcer speaking for the virtues of driving safety. I kept waiting for Islamic predication, instead what I heard were the enumerable casualties of Morocco's roads. I, by any means, minimize the issue, but the whole purpose of the Friday sermon in my opinion is not to serve as a mouth piece for any state ministry. This episode is indicative of the larger process of the bureaucratization of religion, which is common place in the Muslim world. Some (see Noah Feldman's "the Fall and Rise of the Islamic State) have traced this process back to the Ottoman's codification of Shari'a law, and the effective relegation of the 'Ulama to mere state functionaries, serving as pawns in the apparatus of the regime. Feldman, for instance, argues that it is this subjugation of the religious class to the state, which is at the center of the decline of the Islamic state. The 'Ulama served as an independent check and a legitimizing force of state authority, forcing a sort of horizontal accountability over the state.

Back to Morocco, religion has been integral to regime hegemony. The monarch is considered the protector of the faith, a fact codified in the Moroccan constitution and monitored by the state through the ministry of religious affairs, which supervises the mosques, religious institutions, and appoint imams. The monarchical interpretation of Islam dominates Morocco’s political discourse and religious legitimacy is the basis of the power of the monarch. This claim is buttressed by the monarch’s claim of ancestral descent from the prophet’s family, which makes him “God’s shadow on earth.” This quasi-holy stature is consecrated in the bay’a (allegiance), which Moroccan monarchs command from their subjects every year and is done following an old Islamic tradition of political succession. The centrality of the monarchy in the religious realm has led to the monarch's dominance of religious discourse, proving crucial in the monarch's confrontation with Islamists.

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Friday, February 5, 2010

On the Upcoming Western Sahara Talks


Morocco and the Polisario Front will resume informal talks about the Sahara next week in Westchester County, north of New York City. On the table is Morocco's plan for Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The plan has US, France and Spain's support so far, but the Polisario and its benefactor Algeria have rejected the plan as a mere Moroccan attempt to tighten its de facto control of the territory. The talks between the two parties (some say three parties including Algeria) to work on confidence-building measures have led nowhere over the last three years, so it is likely the current round of talks will yield no results either.

In an earlier comment, I was critical of the application of the self-determination concept in the Western Sahara, notably its neglect for Morocco's historical ties to the territory. The historical past of the Western Sahara consisted of the colonial intrusion in North Africa and its indelible marks on culture, the people and the politics of the region. In fact, I argued that the United Nations application of self-determination in the Saharan territory completely ignored the colonial powers’ process of re-drawing the borders of the region and how that affected identity of the local population. Furthermore, colonial powers brought both Bled el Makhzen and Bled es Siba together as one unit within a state much like European states, therefore, diluting the historical political system that existed prior to the colonial invasion.


In addition to identity and historical factors, the conflict involves regional and international dimensions. Past non-interventionary strategies followed by major international powers and lack of international urgency of the issue contributed to prolonging of the conflict. Only targeted pressure and active diplomatic engagement from the United States, France or the European community as a block can provide a window of hope in the resolution of the dispute, and a much needed relief to the plight of the thousands of Sahrawis in the camps of Tindouf.



Regional issues also hampered any resolution of the conflict. The nature of inter-Maghrebi politics, especially, the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, fueled the conflict and exacerbated the situation in the territory. Domestic issues have further fomented this rivalry namely the role of the military in Algeria, its hard line strategy vis-à-vis the conflict in the Western Sahara, and the intransigency of the Moroccan government backed by public opinion and a staunch mass support for the "Moroccanity" of the Western Sahara and the territorial integrity of Morocco.



For the last 35 years, the Maghreb has been plagued with the conflict in the Western Sahara, which greatly stalled any prospects of regional integration and cooperation necessary to face the challenges of the rapidly globalizing world. As the de facto ruler of the Western Sahara, Morocco has looked into the long-term benefits of reaching a compromise with Algeria over the Western Sahara. It has provided a serious plan for resolution of the conflict. Alas, Algeria's military and its political obsession with its larger geo-political ambitions in the region have hindered any attempt at a meaningful consideration of the Moroccan plan.



If the plan is not to their liking, which is obviously the case, then it is incumbent upon Algeria and the Polisario to step up to the plate and propose a non-obstructionist, realistic alternative. The blind rejectionism of anything Moroccan will only lead to maintaining the current status-quo largely in favor of Morocco at this point. Any meaningful compromise between Morocco and Algeria is beneficial, not only to the two countries, but also to the other three countries in the Maghreb region, as it could be a tremendous step towards full economic and political integration.

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Saturday, January 30, 2010

Le Journal Hebdomadaire n'est plus!

Another one bites the dust in Morocco's increasingly restricted press landscape. Moroccan weekly in French Le Journal was dealt a final blow Wednesday, when the court ordered its closure due to charges of unpaid taxes in the amount of $1 million. The editor of Le Journal, Abu Baker Jama'i reportedly wrote the following to fellow blogger the Arabist:

Le Journal Hebdo has been shut down. Yesterday, 5, yes, 5, bailiffs showed up armed with a court decision to take over Le Journal Hebdomadaire and the company behind it, Trimedia. The only link is the title: "Le Journal Hebdomadaire" but the title is owned by the publisher himself not the company. Although we are waiting to get a clearer legal picture, we can already officially announce the death of Le Journal Hebdomadiare.
The closure marks an end to the magazine's tumultuous 12 years of conflict with the authoritarian apparatus of the state in Morocco. Le Journal's assets were seized in 2002 after the court ruled in favor of former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ex-Ambassador to the U.S., on whom the magazine published an article contending his purchase of a house in Washington DC. The ruling is the final death nail in the coffin of the much maligned and bold magazine.

Since its first issue appeared in November 1997, Le Journal and its editor Abu Baker Jama'i left no sensitive political or social issue unperturbed. From its highly controversial reportage on the Western Sahara conflict to the sluggish pace of political reforms, the weekly magazine quickly established itself as a watchdog calling for greater government accountability, and more meaningful political and democratic changes. Le Journal engaged in several bouts with the state in its attempt to exercise freedom of expression and the press. and it was banned several times notably after its publication of a letter by former Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) leader alleging the complicity of the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) (then party in power of PM Youssoufi) in the failed putsch against late King Hassan II in 1972.

The closure of Le Journal is yet another indication of the dwindling threshold for journalistic expression and dissent in Morocco. In addition to excessive fines and seizure of assets, the strategy of the state to stifle freedom of the press was perfected through a repressive press code and an advertising boycott against the magazine that drove Le Journal and Jama'i to bankruptcy. As political and economic reforms continue to be anemic, the state appears to be less tolerant vis-a-vis any form of dissent, and perhaps the state has also finally settled its account with the 12-year thorn of Le Journal in its side.

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Friday, January 29, 2010

New Page on Facebook against Fassi Fihri's abuse of Power!


UPDATE: Still on the Facebook page ban. Moroccans are so resourceful. After the state has blocked access to the old Facebook page denouncing Fassi Fihri's nepotistic excesses, a new page on the same topic has been created.

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Thursday, January 28, 2010

Anti-Nepotism Facebook Page closed in Morocco

Last week, I posted a comment about the new facebook page (this is the updated link to the new facebook page--the old one was deactivated) denouncing the abuse of power and nepotism perpetrated by Fassi Fihri family in Morocco. It turns out that Facebook has closed that page for Moroccan users based in Morocco. This is a regrettable act and I continue to marvel at the complicity of these global corporations' propensity to aid and abet authoritarian forms of governments around the world. The facebook page named "together against the exploitation of political power by Fassi Fihri Family" (now accessible here) has planned a valentine's day protest in front of the Moroccan parliament.


Facebook and the state in Morocco seemingly complicit in this blatant abuse of freedom of expression should know that this only adds to the popularity of the page. What is the harm in naming some of those that threaten to derail Morocco's path towards true political and social reforms? towards greater transparency and accountability? Fassi Fihri clan has been under increasing scrutiny from the Moroccan media, but they seem oblivious that their family's assault on the public service is not subject to resistance because of Moroccans' "envy and jealousy" as Minster of Health, Yasmina Badou (wife of Ali Fassi Fihri, Nephew of the PM) advanced on Moroccan TV 2M.

Badou invoked colonial times and the French use of the Berber Dahir (Decree) to divide Moroccan society along ethnic lines in the 1930s, in a failed analogy to victimize the Fassi Fihris as a target of discrimination. This supposed discrimination and jealousy, in the words of Badou "set the country backwards." No Madam Minister, it is nepotism and abuse of power that are driving the country every day down the path of political corruption. Moroccans are not racists, nor are they discriminating against your family. Rather, the facebook page and the media's concern are mere attempts to expose abuses by those that put personal and family interests above those of the public good.


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Sunday, January 24, 2010

Western Sahara: Identity and Self-Determination

Thus far, I have resisted giving my own analysis on the Western Sahara conflict, but the whole Aminatou Haidar saga helped crystallized for many the sensitive nature of the issue. Morocco, Algeria, and Spain were involved in a diplomatic showdown, with each trying to win points for seemingly human rights reasons. The blogosphere was virulent with pro- and anti-Western Sahara self-determination, a concept that has long dominated the discourse on the conflict. In addition to regional rivalry, a solution to the conflict has been defined in terms of a rightful modicum for identifying who is considered Sahrawi, and henceforth eligible to vote in the ever so elusive referendum. Though talks of referendum have been de-emphasized given the recent Moroccan plans for granting Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the quintessential issue, at least, in my estimation is an issue of identity, and how it has been conceptualized within the modern self-determination discourse.

As I wrote elsewhere, modern self-determination could grant people in the Western Sahara a choice for autonomy and sovereignty. However, it does not lay down the parameters of defining such people. A simple theoretical discussion on the evolution of the norm of self-determination leaves us with the contentious question of who is entitled to take part in deciding the future of the Western Sahara through the UN sponsored referendum? To be sure, the dizzying number of UN resolutions, as the Western Sahara conflict shows, fail to demarcate the contours within which an identity exists, while clearly positing the right of self-determination as sine qua non to self-governance. However, such conceptualization of the Western Sahara case also reflects the United Nations’ lack of historical knowledge of the territory, which could have enriched its understanding of the complex identity issues that are at stake for all parties involved in the conflict.


The issue of self-determination, specifically a Wilsonian conception of it, would have granted a vote for minorities in the region. however, this is difficult as we try to ascertain the legal ties since the territory was not demarcated and may local tribes paid allegiance to different powers. It is also disingenuous to distance said allegiance away from the context of the Sherifen State, which exerted a pseudo-control over the territory. In fact these Sahrawi tribes led an autonomous life and paid allegiance to the central authority of the Makhzen. Each tribe had an internal governance structure. This is in fact not far from what Morocco is offering today, which is located between paying allegiance to the central power and leading an autonomous lifestyle from within the tribe.



The interplay of power within the Makhzen between Bilad al-Makhzen (territories firmly under state control in terms of rule and taxation) and Bilad es-Siba (territories paying allegiance to the Sherifien Sultan, but not necessarily paying taxes) is often de-emphasized by analysts of the conflict and the international community's attempt to force a self-determination referendum. Boundaries of the territory itself are colonial creations and were drawn with no respect for existing nomadic tribes that roamed the whole sub-Saharan region. Self-determination of peoples, only in the Western Sahara (as demarcated now) legitimizes colonial structures that were imposed in the first place. In other words, the international community through the United Nations is trying to implement the referendum for self-determination in the Western Sahara based on the colonial imposed demarcations of the region. Morocco has been opposed to such practice simply because such discourse of self-determination completely denies its historical ties with the region.


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Saturday, January 16, 2010

Facebook Group against PM Nepotism in Morocco

A new facebook page entitled "Together against the abuse of political power by the al-Fassi Fihri Clan" has called for a Valentine's day protest in front of the Moroccan parliament against prime minister 'Abbas Fassi Fihri's nepotistic excesses.


'Abbass Fassi Fihri has steadily populated public service positions with his own kin. The list of high level officials from the Fassi Fihri clan is egregiously expanding, to the point where the opposition in the upper chamber in the Moroccan parliament is calling for an investigation into recent government hires made by the PM. Nepotism and clientelism have always been part of the socio-political fabric of Morocco. similarly the stronghold that Fassi (from the city of Fes) families have had over the apparatus of the state is historically undeniable. However, the current PM has taken it to a whole new level appointing his family members and friends at random to positions they are seemingly unqualified to hold.

Let us consider some of the high level political officials and public servants affiliated and benefitting from their ties with clan Fassi Fihri:

*Abdelmajid Fassi al-Fihri, son of the PM, allegedly slated to take over the presidency of the Moroccan news channel al-Ikhbaria.
*Nizar Baraka, son-in-law of the PM, Minister of Economic and General Affairs
*Mounir Chraibi, nephew of the PM, former governor of Marrakech and ex-head of the CNSS.
*Ali Fassi al-Fihri, nephew of the PM (from his step-brother Mohammed Fassi Fihri), Director of the ONEP and head of the Royal Football Federation.
*Yassima Badou, wife of Ali Fassi Fihri, current Minister of Health
*Taieb Fassi Fihri, Brother of Ali Fassi Fihri, current Minister of Foreign Affairs

It seems the PM is using state institutions to construct a fiefdom for his family and friends, while thousands of qualified educated Moroccans are loitering in squalor and unemployment. Nepotism and political corruption have long offset Morocco's potential for socio-economic and political development, its ability to provide for its citizens, and to guarantee a life of dignity and hope. it behooves Morocco's political elite to hold itself to higher standards of transparency and accountability, in order to build a meritorious and impartial public service. The opposition's demand for an investigation of Fassi Fihri's abuses will fall on deaf ears, but the facebook group and other outlets can at least serve to name and shame the practice.

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