Syria-Iraq Dispute Could Be Ending

On August 19, 2009 twin bombings occurred at Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries. Three days later, the Baghdad Operations Command announced that it had arrested a suspect, and his taped confession was later played on television. He said he was a Baathist and former policeman who put together one of the truck bombs in the Muqdadiya district of Diyala under orders from two Baathist officials in Syria. On August 25, Iraq demanded that Syria turn over the two alleged masterminds, and withdrew its ambassador, with Damascus following suit. That was the beginning of a war of words between the two countries. Baghdad demanded that Syria turn over or expel all terrorists in the country, it showed another confession on television of an Al Qaeda member who said that he was trained and financed by Syrian intelligence, called for the United Nations to conduct a criminal investigation into the bombings, and sent troops and police to patrol the Syrian border. On September 9, however, at a meeting of the Arab League, it was announced that the Syrian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers had come to an agreement to ease tensions, stop the recriminations, return the ambassadors, and form a joint security committee.

This dramatic escalation of tensions between Iraq and Syria covered over the fact that Baghdad issued two contradictory stories about the bombings. On August 29, the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 Al Qaeda members in Baghdad who it said was responsible for the August 19 attack. Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq also claimed they carried out the bombing four days earlier on a website. The government has never reconciled these two versions of events.

The Arab and Iraqi press however, were full of ideas about why Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chose to confront Syria. What seems most likely is that Maliki wanted to defer blame for the bombings on a believable target, Baathists in Syria. First, the Baath Party and insurgents openly operate in Syria. For example, in 2008 Baath members and insurgent groups held a televised conference in Damascus, and in July 2009, militants held a summit in Syria. That made Damascus an easy target for Maliki. The Prime Minister is also running on law and order again for the 2010 elections, so he needed to blame someone other than himself for the attack. Another possible reason is that Maliki has been upset that the United States has held off and on negotiations with Baathists in Syria. It was reported that Baghdad demanded that Syria deport over 200 Baath members, which would’ve disrupted any deals with Washington as well as gotten rid of some of the most militant opponents of the Iraqi government.

If the Arab League announcement is followed through with, then this whole episode may be wrapping up. Maliki will have achieved his goal of distracting public attention away from his rule and the Iraqi security forces, to Syria and the Baathists. With all the fury and announcements, people will also probably forget that the government came out with two contradictory stories of who was responsible for the August 19 bombings. Maliki will then be able to return to the campaign trail claiming that he stood up for Iraq against the terrorists, even if he probably accused the wrong ones.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Qaeda militant says trained in Syria for Iraq attack,” 8/31/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “90% of terrorists came to Iraq through Syria – PM,” 8/31/09
- “Cabinet urges Syria to hand over suspected bombers,” 8/25/09
- “Footage of “confessions” by Wednesday bombings’ prime suspect broadcast,” 8/23/09
- “URGENT/Syria rejects Iraq’s remarks, recalls ambassador,” 8/25/09
- “Wednesday attackers Baathists – BOC,” 8/22/09

Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/19/09
- “Iraq Presses U.S. on Pact With Sunnis in Turkey,” New York Times, 7/24/09

Iraq The Model, “Iraq has satellite imagery of Syria training camps,” 9/7/09
- “Iraq postpones census until October 2010,” 8/31/09

Lynch, Marc, “The Syrian-Iraqi spat,” Foreign Policy, 9/1/09

Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “Al-Maliki Turns His Back on Iran, Embraces Iraqi Nationalism,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 9/2/09

Sands, Phil, “A safe haven in Damascus,” The National, 8/29/09

Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09

Sly, Liz, “Al Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 8/26/09

Xinhua, “Iraq, Syria agree to stop media campaigns, speed up returning ambassadors,” 9/9/09

U.S. Holds Talks Between Al-Hadbaa And Kurds In Ninewa

Iraq The Model recently reported on a story from al-Sharq al-Awsat on U.S. sponsored talks between the ruling al-Hadbaa party in Ninewa and the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List. The meeting included two members of al-Hadbaa who hold 19 of the 37 provincial seats, two members of the Fraternal List who have twelve seats, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party who have three seats, and several American officials. The U.S. was said to be working on these negotiations since at least August 2009. The Kurdish emissaries were quoted as saying that they welcomed the discussions.

Currently the Fraternal List is boycotting the provincial council since they got no positions after the 2009 elections, and 16 administrative units controlled by the Kurds in Ninewa are refusing to follow the directives of al-Hadbaa. The war of words between the two sides has only gotten worse in recent weeks. The dispute is also giving the insurgents room to operate as they are playing up Arab fears of the Kurds, and the lack of cooperation between al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List is creating security holes, which militants have been able to exploit with attacks. The question now is how much of an effort will the Americans put into these talks, and whether al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List are willing to compromise. So far, several Iraqi parties have tried to mediate, but to no avail. It seems for now the two sides are willing to talk, but little else.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Mosul parties’ intransigence encumbered IIP initiative – spokesman,” 8/16/09
- “Sadrist delegation in Mosul to defuse crisis,” 6/13/09

Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Qaeda stronger as blasts feed Iraqi Kurd-Arab feud,” Reuters, 8/16/09

Dagher, Sam, “Minorities Trapped in Northern Iraq’s Maelstrom,” New York Times, 8/16/09

Iraq The Model, “U.S. sponsored talks between Nineveh’s Arabs and Kurds,” 9/7/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Wed: A Wounded Country,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/23/09

Salahaddin’s Governor Dismissed

On September 3, 2009 on a vote of 17 for, 7 against, and 3 abstaining, Salahaddin’s provincial council dismissed Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi. The council said that the governor refused to appear before them for questioning. No other reasons were provided. The governor and council have only been in office since April 2009.

The next several days saw demonstrations for and against the council’s decision. On September 4, people gathered in Samarra, and the next day in Tirkrit to let the governor know that he should step down. On September 7, the Iraqi Islamic Party organized a counter demonstration in the city of Dalouiya, and another march was held in the Ishaqi district on September 9. The Governor has said the council’s ruling is illegal, and he is going to the courts to make his case.

Aliwi is a member of the Iraqi Accordance Front, which is led by the Islamic Party. The Accordance Front tied for first place in the 2009 provincial elections. Former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List was the other first place winner, and they, along with other smaller parties, formed a ruling coalition with the Accordance Front. Some member of that group had to vote for Aliwi’s removal for it to be successful.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Demonstration in Salah el-Din against dismissal of governor,” 9/9/09
- “Demonstration in Samarra against sacking Salah el-Din’s governor,” 9/4/09
- “Demonstrators in Tikrit want governor out,” 9/5/09
- “Salah al-Din residents protest removal of governor,” 9/7/09

Oil Companies Exporting From Kurdistan May Not Be Paid For Years

An executive from Talisman Energy of Canada said that companies exporting oil from Kurdistan might not be paid for years. In May 2009 it was announced that the two fields that were producing oil in Kurdistan, Tawke, operated by Norway’s DNO, and Taq Taq run by Turkey’s Genel Enerji and Canada’s Addax, could export their products. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) agreed to deposit all of the profits with the central government in return for the right to sell its petroleum internationally. This was seen as a major breakthrough between Baghdad and the KRG who have been arguing over who has the right to explore, produce, and export oil for several years now. There continues to be one main sticking point however, Baghdad refuses to pay the companies, and the Kurds have not paid them either. The Talisman executive, whose company has begun exploration work in Kurdistan, told Reuters that at the earliest, Iraq could work out a payment deal after the January 2010 parliamentary elections. At the latest, he warned that it could take years. This could have a severe impact on the Kurds’ plan of creating their own independent petroleum policy. Unless the companies get paid, they will only agree to small-scale exploration and drilling work, because any larger investment will not be compensated. In the meantime, Baghdad is benefiting because the extra revenue is going into its coffers at no cost.


SOURCES

Bergin, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Iraq may not pay for Kurdish oil for years-exec,” Reuters, 9/8/09

Ciszuk, Samuel, “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 4-Kurds say will launch oil exports, Iraq denies,” Reuters, 5/8/09

Too Many Costs and Corruption To Develop Iraqi Economy

While on a trip to Ninewa province, Planning Minister Ali Baban said that the government had too many costs and too much corruption to develop the economy. The Minister noted that of the $58.6 billion in the 2009 budget, 80% went to operational costs such as salaries, pensions, and the food ration system, leaving only 20% for investment in infrastructure and development. He said that wasn’t near enough to finance the amount of projects Iraq needed. Another major problem he mentioned was the rampant corruption in the government. This was just seen at the beginning of September 2009 when the Deputy Transport Minister was arrested for trying to extort money from a foreign security firm. The official wanted a bribe to ensure that the company would get its contract renewed, and was caught trying to take $100,000 from them. A government official also told the Azzaman paper in June that $4 billion was unaccounted for in the budget.

Together, the problems of corruption and rising government costs are starving Iraq of the money needed to rebuild after years of wars, sanctions, and occupation. The Planning Minister called on the Iraqi private sector and foreign investors to help, but that’s not likely to happen soon. Iraq’s business sector is very small, and investment is just beginning. The instability and lack of an investment law has kept many foreign firms away as well, although some are slowly entering Iraq. Services and business are likely to suffer as a result, leading to more dependence upon the government and petroleum to keep the Iraqi economy going.

SOURCES

Abdulzair, Kareem, “$4 billion unaccounted for in this year’s Iraqi budget,” Azzaman, 6/25/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Minister says govt. unable to cover projects, eyes private sector,” 9/3/09

Levinson, Charles, “Leaders have vision of burgeoning Baghdad,” USA Today, 9/9/08
- “Safer Iraq draws foreign investors,” USA Today, 9/9/08

Reuters, “Iraq deputy transport minister arrested for graft,” 9/3/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Iraq's Provinces Still Having Budget Problems

Iraq's eighteen provinces are still struggling with their finances this year. In 2008 when the price of Iraqi crude was soaring, Iraq's budget increased with it. Iraq's governorates signed dozens of new development projects as a result. Few of those were finished however, so the bills rolled over into the new fiscal year. That coincided with a collapse in world oil prices with the recession. That means the new provincial councils elected in January 2009 are now faced with the outstanding obligations of their predecessors, leaving little to no funds for their own plans.

In 2008 Iraq's parliament passed a $49.9 billion budget. Later in the year a supplemental budget was added to that for a total of $72.2 billion. That was a post-war high, and almost equal to the 2007 $41 billion and 2006 $34 billion budgets combined. Flush with money, Iraq's provincial councils went out and signed a large number of reconstruction contracts. 2008 was an election year with balloting due at the beginning of 2009, so many politicians wanted to show that they were doing something to get re-elected. At the end of the year, the world economy collapsed and so did the price of petroleum. As a result Iraq's 2009 budget was reduced to $58.6 billion even though parliament knew that amount would cause a deficit. Again, campaign politics probably played a role in that decision.

All of Iraq's eighteen provinces had their budgets cut this year. In 2008, the governorates got a total of $5,861.3 million for their capital budgets that goes towards infrastructure and investment. For 2009 they are scheduled to receive $4,113.1 million, a $1,748.2 million decrease.

Capital Budgets By Province

Provinces	2007/% Spent	2008/% Spent	2009
Anbar	$107 mil/3.7%	$183.33 mil/69%	$112.4 mil
Babil	$127 mil/49%	$200.67 mil/58%	$134 mil
Baghdad	$560 mil/31%	$883.3 mil/12%	$551.1 mil
Basra	$195 mil/21%	$306.67 mil/37%	$201 mil
Dhi Qar	$138 mil/40%	$216.67 mil/38%	$142.6 mil
Diyala	$100 mil/N/A	$168 mil/18%	$103.7 mil
Karbala	$71 mil/41%	$113.33 mil/33%	$77.8 mil
Kurdistan	$1,560 mil/95%	$2,528 mil/N/A	$1,952 mil
Maysan	$76 mil/51%	$120 mil/79%	$80 mil
Muthanna	$52 mil/19%	$83.33 mil/36%	$56.2 mil
Najaf	$588 mil/64%	$143.33 mil/95%	$92.9 mil
Ninewa	$226 mil/26%	$356.67 mil/7%	$235.6 mil
Qadisiyah	$64 mil/39%	$133.33 mil/25%	$86.4 mil
Salahaddin	$93 mil/34%	$146.67 mil/49%	$97.2 mil
Tamim	$91 mil/34%	$143.33 mil/54%	$99.4 mil
Wasit	$83 mil/41%	$134.67 mil/50%	$90.8 mil
TOTAL	$4,131 mil	$5,861.3 mil	$4,113.1 mil

Note: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) gave several different numbers for the 2008 capital budgets for the provinces and the amount spent. The latest figures provided by the SIGIR from a January 30, 2009 report were the ones used.

Not only that, but the incoming provincial councils found that their predecessors' spending left them with nothing. In Dhi Qar for example, 600 projects had to be put on hold because there was no money for them. Sometimes these deals were very questionable. The head of the reconstruction committee in Qadisiyah recently reported that the previous council issued $43 million in frivolous contracts tied up with tribal politics, corruption, and political favors. As reported before, many members of the former provincial governments are being charged with corruption since the January election.

Even without those problems, Iraq's provinces have had a very hard time spending all of their money. Last year, Najaf did the best spending 95% of its $143.33 million capital budget, while Ninewa, one of the most violent areas of the country, only spent 7% of its $356.67 million capital budget. Those numbers only tell part of the story however, as provinces that expended a lot like Maysan did not spend it well. For 2008 they spent 79% of their capital budget, but that only completed 41 of 241 projects. Some of the causes of these difficulties are lack of capacity, lack of trained staff, inexperience, and corruption. With many brand new politicians taking office it's likely that these issues will continue.

SOUCES

Aswat al-Iraq, "41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan," 12/30/08

- "Diwaniya previous Council proscribed $43 million," 8/26/09

- "ID75bn in supplementary budget for Thi-Qar," 7/26/09

Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," June 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/08

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols Okayed In Ninewa Objected To In Kirkuk

August 2009 saw a sharp increase in mass casualty bombings across Iraq. After Baghdad, Ninewa was the hardest hit. On August 9 a suicide bomber struck a mosque in Mosul killing 23 and wounding 130. The next day two truck bombs hit the village of Khazna in eastern Ninewa killing 20 and wounding 110. Finally, on August 13 a suicide truck bomber attacked a café in Sinjar killing 20 and wounding 35.

Tensions were already high in the province due to the divide between the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List and the ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the two sides blamed each other for the violence. In response the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno suggested creating joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the head of the Fraternal List initially welcomed the idea, and on September 1, 2009 it was announced that the joint operations would go ahead in the Mosul suburbs, the capital of Ninewa. The Americans have already set up similar patrols outside of Kirkuk in Tamim province, and are seen as a way to foster cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, so they could be a positive move in Ninewa as well since things have only gotten worse there politically since the January 2009 provincial elections.

In neighboring Tamim however, Arabs have protested against expanding the program to Kirkuk itself and other parts of the province. On September 3, the Arab bloc on the provincial council said they would conduct a boycott if joint patrols were created within the city of Kirkuk. Then on September 5, 500 people in the town of Huweija demonstrated against the patrols being formed across the rest of the province. The Arabs are probably afraid that the policy will give the Kurds a larger presence in Tamim and Kirkuk then before, and thus upset the delicate balance between groups.

The joint patrols when implemented have apparently helped relieve tensions, but they are only a band-aid. American troops are drawing down so the operations can only last for a set amount of time. The bigger problem is the growing divide between the Fraternal List and al-Hadbaa, Baghdad and Kurdistan, and Arabs and Kurds. This needs U.S. mediation, but Washington doesn’t seem to be giving it much priority. Only the American military seems to be taking the initiative, and that’s not enough.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Humdreds protest against proposed US-Iraq-Kurd force,” 9/5/09

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Demonstrations in Huweija against tripartite force,” 9/5/09
- “Iraqi-Kurdish-U.S. security teams in Mosul-source,” 9/1/09
- “Mosul mosque blast death toll up to 38, wounded 90,” 8/7/09
- “Mosul truck bombs casualties rise to 153,” 8/10/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09
- “Truck bombs kill 20, wound 110 in Mosul,” 8/10/09

Graeber, Daniel, “arab-kurdish divide dominating u.s. agenda,” Niqash, 9/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Juhi, Bushra, “Iraqi Arabs protest US plan for Kurdish patrols,” Associated Press, 9/5/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09