Obsidian Wings

by publius

Many things annoy me about the calls to "slow down" on health care coverage.  But what most annoys me is the idea that we should wait for a "bipartisan" result, as the latest letter from the "Gang of Moderates Protecting Really Rich People" suggests.

In the abstract, these requests sound reasonable.  But these requests assume that Republicans are interested in passing real reform -- which they're not.  They've never made any serious efforts -- institutionally speaking -- to enact reform, and there's exactly zero reason to think that they will.  They're slowing things down to kill reform -- and the Gang is facilitating them.

My hope is that this reality will eventually color the coverage of the Gang, who are often portrayed as Platonic statesmen, high above the fray of nasty partisanship.   More broadly, I wish the reality would sink in that Republicans (again, institutionally) aren't interested in passing meaningful policy reform on either of the two most pressing issues of the day -- health care and energy.

Exhibit A for this argument is the good Senator from Arizona, John McCain.  One frustrating aspect of McCain's campaign coverage was that it often treated him as a strong environmentalist.  Several editorials said something to the effect of "We're so lucky to get to choose between two candidates who embrace cap-and-trade."  Here's the LA Times:

And the Post:

And David Simon's favorite paper:

John McCain was good at saying enough to get Sunday morning talk show praise.  But when the real effort was needed, "national leader" McCain has been almost uniformly critical.  He's referred to the plan as "cap and tax," and has provided no muscle whatsoever in building political support for this effort.  And remember -- he's supposedly the best one.

And that's the larger problem.  Republicans aren't serious about doing anything on either front.  A McCain administration wouldn't have pushed for a real cap and trade; neither would it have pushed for real health care reform beyond nibbling at the edges of the status quo.  The GOP just isn't interested -- and all the debates about "costs" shouldn't obscure this fundamental reality.

The Dems should hold together on the procedural votes, and then oppose the ultimate bill if they want.  But there's no reason to bend over backwards to appease the GOP.  Let Olympia Snowe and Chuck Grassley and Richard Burr take their chances on voting no. 

This opportunity is likely fleeting -- and so the Dems shouldn't hold up the process under the pretense that Republicans are going to shift on anything.  When they do, I'm all for bipartisan compromise.  But given the lack of real effort, for decades really, the strong presumption should that they will not.

by hilzoy

by hilzoy

"The House bill would create an internet accessible database that includes all health-related payments to physicians by corporations including gifts, food, or entertainment; travel or trips; honoraria; research funding or grants; education or conference funding; consulting fees; ownership or investment interests; and royalties or license fees. If I'm reading the bill correctly, it says anything over $5 must be reported. (From pg. 635 of the bill.)"

by von

A couple commentators to my recent post on health care reform are citing a study by Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin and David Cutler at the Center for American Progress, a liberal advocacy group:  The Buntin-Cutler report is being used as push back against the CBO's claim that the current Democratic proposals are going to add to the deficit, not reduce it:  "'The curve is being raised.' [CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf's] remarks suggested that rather than averting a looming fiscal crisis, the measures could make the nation's bleak budget outlook even worse."

Supposedly, the Buntin-Cutler Report shows that the CBO's concerns are all bunk, because the Democratic bills will clearly result in two trillion dollars worth of savings.  But y'all should read the report, which I have now done, and not simply take CAP's Wonk Room at face value.  (Digby, that includes you.)  The Buntin-Cutler Report is here. 

Candidly, I'm still trying to make heads or tails of it.  That's in large part because the Buntin-Cutler Report doesn't address the actual bills under consideration.  It's an aspirational document that lays out a bunch of possible "strategies" that might be used to pay for health care reform.  This seems to be a critical flaw in using the Buntin-Cutler Report to rebut CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf's testimony:  the Buntin-Cutler Report relates to different issues.  

Also frustratring is that the Buntin-Cutler Report seldom shows its math.  Here is just one example:

Recent research documents that 20 percent of hospitalized Medicare patients are rehospitalized for the same or a related condition within 30 days, and that a majority of these rehospitalizations could have been prevented with good follow-up care. [footnote citing NE JofM article.] Those preventable hospitalizations cost approximately $12 billion per year—$12 billion that a well designed payment system would allocate between government savings and the hospitals successfully reducing readmissions. [No footnote.]

I am so totally for eliminating preventable hospitalizations via "a well designed payment system." I am completely in favor of saving $12 billion.  What's missing from this discussion -- aside from a critical missing footnote -- is how we are going to do these things.

And, then, there is this introductory passage: 

Based on a wide array of research, our best guess is that fundamental health system reform involving just three of these strategies will lead to federal savings of about $550 billion over the next decade. First, investments in health information technology and other types of health care-provider infrastructure could bring direct federal savings of $196 billion between 2010 and 2019, primarily through administrative simplification and the more productive use of time by physicians and nurses.

Second, creating insurance “exchanges,” local or national organizations designed to act as clearinghouses for health insurance policies, could foster competition and drive down administrative costs for individual and small group policies. We estimate these reduced costs could bring in additional federal revenues of $64 billion over the next 10 years.

Finally, payment system reforms based on the idea that quality care should be rewarded rather than just more and more expensive care would create incentives to improve quality and efficiency. This could save the federal government $299 billion over this period, primarily by reducing the frequency and intensity of hospitalizations.

These three sets of policies together would yield overall system savings of $1.5 trillion over the coming decade ....

*My initial read, by the bye, was perhaps that if one added all the numbers together, it equaled $1.5 trillion.  But that's not right:  first, it makes no sense whatsoever and, second, it only equals $1 trillion.  (My error is reflected in this and prior comments on this thread.)

**Perhaps the Buntin-Cutler Report is making a much more modest claim, namely, that if its policies are implemented we'll generate some level of private savings and also have $550 billion in deficit offsets at the federal level?  But isn't that worse than the projections used by CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf's testimony and the AP estimate of the cost/offsets of the plan?

by hilzoy

"I agree, in a perfect world - Glenn, in a perfect world, yes. And if you could also guarantee me, that this wouldn't become a show trial, and wouldn't be put, and created so that we had nightly debates about it, that is the ideal way to handle this."

by publius

Well, this isn't exactly a post I've looked forward to writing, but I wanted to say thanks and godspeed.  I've already written Hilzoy privately, and there's really nothing I can add that hasn't already been said.

But it has been an honor to write with her.  I've learned so much.  And I think what I admire most is just her basic decency and kindness to everyone -- I think that really came through in the comments, and in the various posts around the 'sphere.  It's easy to think "oh, that person is nice," without thinking of how much effort and determination actually goes into being that nice.  It's hard to be generous in the heat of political debates that you care passionately about it.  I certainly can't pull it off.  But she can, and always has.

And I've also considered Hilzoy -- like Steve Benen -- a "blogger's blogger."  Everyone who reads her appreciates the thorough research, but I'm not sure everyone realizes just how long it takes to do that volume of research -- and to do it consistently for years and years.  It's been an inspiration to me on many occasions.

And to echo Von, I consider this her blog.  She kept it going by herself for a long time, and has built it up.  I know I speak for everyone else in saying that we are fully aware that it's a gap that can't be filled.

That's all I got.  Hilzoy -- I will miss the hell out of you. 

And I'm not going to try to talk you out of it.  Nope, not going to do that at all.  I'll just say that, if the mood strikes you, you should maybe watch minutes 2:15-2:44 of this scene from Almost Famous from time to time.

by von

We will hear a lot more on the healthcare debate in the coming days.  Consider three matters while you're listening to it. 

The Heel

First, the central weakness of the blogosphere will be on full display throughout this debate.  What is this Achilles' heel of our Army of Davids, you ask?  Laziness, pure and simple.  Most bloggers don't do the work.  They fall into generality and make errors that contradict their source material.  This very same argument is made by bloggers against the the MSM, but it applies to all media, new and old.

That's what makes bloggers like Hilzoy and Tom Maguire (whom Hilzoy rightly praises in a recent post) so valuable:  They might be right or they might be wrong in their analysis of the facts, but they consistently do the work to get the facts.

The Turn

Second, the current Democratic Plan will not do what its backers say it will do.  The bill's backers pledged a new system that reduced the deficit over the long term* without cutting benefits. The critics warned that this was wishful thinking.  The critics appear to have been right.  Whatever dreams you may have regarding health care reform, the reality is messier.  The actual Democratic plan is projected to increase the deficit in both the short and long term: 

Congress's chief budget analyst delivered a devastating assessment yesterday of the health-care proposals drafted by congressional Democrats, fueling an insurrection among fiscal conservatives in the House and pushing negotiators in the Senate to redouble efforts to draw up a new plan that more effectively restrains federal spending.

Under questioning by members of the Senate Budget Committee, Douglas Elmendorf, director of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, said bills crafted by House leaders and the Senate health committee do not propose "the sort of fundamental changes" necessary to rein in the skyrocketing cost of government health programs, particularly Medicare. On the contrary, Elmendorf said, the measures would pile on an expensive new program to cover the uninsured.

Though President Obama and Democratic leaders have repeatedly pledged to alter the soaring trajectory -- or cost curve -- of federal health spending, the proposals so far would not meet that goal, Elmendorf said, noting, "The curve is being raised." His remarks suggested that rather than averting a looming fiscal crisis, the measures could make the nation's bleak budget outlook even worse.

Elmendorf's blunt language startled lawmakers racing to meet Obama's deadline for approving a bill by the August break. The CBO is the official arbiter of the cost of legislation. Fiscal conservatives in the House said Elmendorf's testimony would galvanize the growing number of Democrats agitating for changes in the more than $1.2 trillion House bill, which aims to cover 97 percent of Americans by 2015.

Elmendorf is fundamentally right, here, but the issue is a lot more complex than this Washington Post article describes.  That's because the Washington Post's report fails to account for all the costs of the proposed health care reform, and at least some Democratic bills are circulating that would offset some of those costs.  And so we come to issue number three:

The Numbers

As I discussed a month ago, the CBO did a partial analysis of the Democratic plan and pegged the cost at about $1 trillion over 10 years.  That figure included certain projected offsets, however, and doesn't include the proposed expansions of Medicare coverage. The AP has put the total, raw cost of Democratic health care reform at $1.65 trillion:

Costs of expanding Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program; providing subsidies to help people buy care; associated effects on tax revenues; and providing tax credits to small employers who provide care: $1.28 trillion. (Source: CBO)

_New costs in Medicare, including for reforming payments to physicians: About $370 billion. (Source: CBO)

TOTAL PROJECTED OUTLAYS: $1.65 trillion

That's enormous.  Supporters of health care reform point out that the Democrats have offered a series of proposals -- some integrated, some separate -- that would offset this cost by approximately $1.3 trillion.  The AP lays out these proposed tax increases and benefit cuts here.  Assuming that all of these other bills get past, supporters claim that Democratic health care reform will increase the deficit by "only" $350 billion. 

There are some problems with this line of argument, however.  Foremost is that the current package is not the package that was promised:  it does not reduce the deficit under any measure.  This should give even supporters of the health care reform a reason to pause.  There are a 1000+ pages in the primary bills, and hundreds (if not thousands) of pages in the other related bills.  Does anyone -- supporter or opponent -- really know what is being proposed?  Why the rush to leap into the unknown?

Secondarily -- but only by a smidge -- these alleged offsets and savings are scattered over a variety of bills covering a variety of subjects, some of which are still in committee and haven't been scored by the CBO.  Assuming that all of bills will pass in their current forms with their current estimated revenue impacts is assuming far too much.  Expanding benefits is a relatively easy thing for Congress to do; cutting services and raising taxes is not. 

This is going to be a costly undertaking.  The only thing I've become certain of is that no knows whether we're getting our money's worth -- including, ironically, the most vocal backers of reform.

*Mickey Kaus isn't/wasn't exactly a backer, of course, but his post is useful to illustrate that the most prominent blogospheric booster of health care reform will reduce the deficit (Ezra Klein) sometimes went well beyond even the official (highly optimistic) line. 

UPDATE:  Last paragraph (before the footnote) inadvertently omitted in first-published version.

by hilzoy

"The treaty's success depends on the maintenance of a status quo that will be disrupted as the world warms. Traditionally, Kashmir's waters have been naturally regulated by the glaciers in the Himalayas. Precipitation freezes during the coldest months and then melts during the agricultural season. But if global warming continues at its current rate, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates, the glaciers could be mostly gone from the mountains by 2035. Water that once flowed for the planting will flush away in winter floods. 

Research by the global NGO ActionAid has found that the effects are already starting to be felt within Kashmir. In the valley, snow rarely falls and almost never sticks. The summertime levels of streams, rivers, springs, and ponds have dropped. In February 2007, melting snow combined with unseasonably heavy rainfall to undermine the mountain slopes; landslides buried the national highway -- the region's only land connection with the rest of India -- for 12 days. (...)

Water is already undermining Pakistan's stability. In recent years, recurring shortages have led to grain shortfalls. In 2008, flour became so scarce it turned into an election issue; the government deployed thousands of troops to guard its wheat stores. As the glaciers melt and the rivers dry, this issue will only become more critical. Pakistan -- unstable, facing dramatic drops in water supplies, caged in by India's vastly superior conventional forces -- will be forced to make one of three choices. It can let its people starve. It can cooperate with India in building dams and reservoirs, handing over control of its waters to the country it regards as the enemy. Or it can ramp up support for the insurgency, gambling that violence can bleed India's resolve without degenerating into full-fledged war. "The idea of ceding territory to India is anathema," says Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at Indiana University. "Suffering, particularly for the elite, is unacceptable. So what's the other option? Escalate."

"It's very bad news," he adds, referring to the melting glaciers. "It's extremely grim."

by hilzoy

"It didn't take long to run into an "uh-oh" moment when reading the House's "health care for all Americans" bill. Right there on Page 16 is a provision making individual private medical insurance illegal. (...)

Under the Orwellian header of "Protecting The Choice To Keep Current Coverage," the "Limitation On New Enrollment" section of the bill clearly states:

"Except as provided in this paragraph, the individual health insurance issuer offering such coverage does not enroll any individual in such coverage if the first effective date of coverage is on or after the first day" of the year the legislation becomes law.

So we can all keep our coverage, just as promised -- with, of course, exceptions: Those who currently have private individual coverage won't be able to change it. Nor will those who leave a company to work for themselves be free to buy individual plans from private carriers."

by hilzoy

If we go into Iraq, how many casualties do you expect to see (on the side of the US and our allies)

John Hawkins: "Probably 300 or less"
Charles Johnson:"Very few"
Henry Hanks: "Less than 200"
Laurence Simon: "A Few hundred"
Rachael Lucas: "Less than three thousand"
Scott Ott: "Dozens"
Glenn Reynolds: "Fewer than 100"
Tim Blair: "Below 50"
Ken Layne: "a few hundred"
Steven Den Beste: "50-150" 

"John Hawkins: If and when do you see the United States hitting Iraq? How do you think it'll work out?

Tim Blair: It all depends on Iraq’s fearsome Elite Republican Guard. Why, those feisty desert warriors could hold out for minutes. Dozens of US troops will be required. Perhaps they’ll even need their weapons."

by Eric Martin

Quotable Stephen Walt:

One of the great triumphs of Reagan-era conservatism was to convince Americans that paying taxes so that the government could spend the money at home was foolish and wrong, but paying taxes so that the government could spend the money defending other people around the world was patriotic. Ever since Reagan, in short, neoconservatives supported paying taxes to promote a U.S.-dominated world order, while denouncing anyone who wanted to spend the money on roads, bridges, schools, parks, and health care for Americans as a “tax and spend liberal." But if I'm right about the emerging fiscal environment, that situation may be about to change.

What if it were possible to show that thousands of Americans die each year because of a lack of health insurance?  Actually, back in 2002, the Institute of Medicine conducted a study which estimated that 18,000 Americans died in 2000 due to a lack of insurance.  The number of uninsured has increased greatly since 2000, so one would imagine that the number of applicable annual deaths would have since increased, or at least remained the same (or dropped slightly).

Now imagine if 18,000 Americans were killed in a terrorist attack, and the then-sitting President said that a ten year military campaign that would cost $1 trillion or more and lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths was necessary (Iraq and Afghanistan have already led to that number of casualties - and more - and cost in that neighborhood in direct expenditures, and will likely cost two or three times that amount overall when all is said and done). 

Now what if 18,000 Americans were killed every year in a terrorist attack and the President made the same appeal?  Would any "serious" pundits object to such a military campaign (or two)?  Not a chance. 

And yet when the President proposes spending $1 trillion to save the lives of tens of thousands of uninsured Americans, the proposal is decried as socialistic, an example of reckless spending, a deficit-busting giveaway to the undeserving delivered via a soak-the-rich form of class warfare (because to fund it, effective tax rates would be raised to the levels that prevailed during the Communist 90's).

Funny that.

by von

I haven't posted in a while -- for various boring professional reasons -- but I wanted to comment on Hilzoy's decision to leave the blog.

I am last remaining original member of ObWi (Moe Lane and Katherine were the other original members, and have since departed).  I write "original member", not "founding member", for a reason.  There's a crucial distinction between the two.  Hilzoy is the founding member of ObWi as it exists today:  she created ObWi's voice, generated most of its content, and earned the respect and praises of her co-bloggers and the readership.  Those were enormous tasks (among other things, we have some of the best and toughest commentators out there). That she succeeded in making ObWi what it is today is a credit not only to Hilzoy's talent, but also to her seriousness of purpose.  ObWi wasn't a diversion for Hilzoy: it was work, and Hilzoy worked hard to give her readers the best.

Although I have had my share of disagreements with Hilzoy, I can't dispute that her success here was in the every sense of the word:  not only in crafting good posts, but in maintaining her humanity and sincerity throughout.  It was always a pleasure working with her -- even when she wrote something that made me want to pull my hair out.  I wish her only (and all) the best for her retirement. 

All the best, Hilzoy.  I'll miss you.

And if I harbor secret hopes that Hilzoy reconsiders and comes back, who would know of them? (Except y'all, of course.) 

by publius

See if you note a contradiction here.  The Hill reports:

I was thinking of a writing a snarky post about how these concerns are completely contradictory -- the Blue Dogs complain about costs, but then object to the best cost controls.  But Yglesias beat me to the punch, and lays everything out in more detail.  Here's the key quote:

by Eric Martin

Peter Bergen penned a piece in the Washington Monthly in which he argues that, with a substantial dedication of time and resources by the United States and the international community, Afghanistan could, eventually, become a "relatively stable and prosperous Central Asian state."  In short, Afghanistan is a "winnable" war. 

The entire first half of Bergen's piece is dedicated to shooting down "facile" historical comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam and between the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and ours (Bergen contrasts the tactics and professionalism of the respective armies), as well as correcting the history of other imperial efforts in the region.  But Bergen's is an unnecessary and, ultimately, irrelevant exercise.

Clearly, Afghanistan is not the same as Vietnam, and the argument that they are parallel episodes is as misguided as any prior argument that the Iraq war was a replication of our Vietnam campaign.  But so what? The Iraq war wasn't the Vietnam war, and it didn't have to be Vietnam in order for it to be a grievous foreign policy debacle whose costs (in terms of human suffering and US interests) are almost immeasurable.  Proving Iraq and Vietnam were different did little to inform us of the wisdom of invading or perpetuating the occupation of Iraq.

In fact, the same metrics that Bergen uses to show why our Afghan effort has a better chance of succeeding than our prolonged Vietnam mission (less costly as a percentage of GDP, fewer casualties, no support for insurgents from a powerful foreign benefactor, insurgent force relatively small and lightly armed) could have just as easily been used by those arguing that Iraq wasn't Vietnam, going on to suggest our prospects in Iraq were thus brighter.  They wouldn't have been correct, of course. 

Further, there is little comfort to be had from recognizing that the US military is more professional than, and tactically superior to, the Soviet version that suffered a crushing blow in Afghanistan decades ago.  While this is true, it was the US military, not the Soviet military, that was dropped in the middle of Iraq and asked to do the near impossible to little avail.  So a superior military is not exactly a sufficient condition to success as there are certain obstacles that even the most professional army, employing optimal tactics and rules of engagement, cannot overcome.  Pacifying foreign populations is like eating soup with a knife, even if the knives come in different shapes and sizes, and no two soup recipes are the same.

So, points conceded to Bergen: facile historical comparisons distract from the more germane analysis of the scenario at hand, and in general lead to sloppy reasoning by analogy.  Oddly enough, after scoring these points rather deftly, Bergen goes on to make a couple of...equally facile historical comparisons!

Skeptics of Obama’s Afghanistan policy say that the right approach is to either reduce American commitments there or just get out entirely. The short explanation of why this won’t work is that the United States has tried this already—twice. In 1989, after the most successful covert program in the history of the CIA helped to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration closed the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The Clinton administration subsequently effectively zeroed out aid to the country, one of the poorest in the world. Out of the chaos of the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s emerged the Taliban, who then gave sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2001, the next Bush administration returned to topple the Taliban, but because of its ideological aversion to nation building it ensured that Afghanistan was the least-resourced per capita reconstruction effort the United States has engaged in since World War II.

But the US has not, in fact, tried this twice.  In Bergen's first example of the US having previously withdrawn tens of thousands of troops from Afghanistan after a 7 year military campaign, the US didn't actually have any troops in Afghanistan at all to withdraw - just funding for insurgent groups squaring off against the Soviets.  So it's hard to see how this is analogous in even the most strained sense. And withdrawal (or reduction) of military forces does not necessitate shutting off all forms of aid (far from it).  In fact, Bergen is using this as a rebuttal to those that merely want to "reduce American commitments" (to quote him), not eliminate them.

In Bergen's second prior example of the US ending a prolonged military campaign in Afghanistan, the US actually invaded Afghanistan and kept tens of thousands of troops in that country for over 7 years (and counting).  Somehow that counts as a military withdrawal?  Only in a world in which US military intervention is the norm, and the only question is to what extent and how deep the military commitment should manifest.

In another segment, Bergen seemingly continues under the rhetorical framework of "military intervention as the norm":

Another possible objection to the introduction of more U.S. soldiers into Afghanistan is that, inevitably, they will kill more civilians, the main issue that angers Afghans about the foreign military presence. In fact, the presence of more boots on the ground is likely to reducecivilian casualties, because historically it has been the overreliance on American air strikes—as a result of too few ground forces—which has been the key cause of civilian deaths. According to the U.S. Air Force, between January and August 2008 there were almost 2,400 air strikes in Afghanistan, fully three times as many as in Iraq. And the United Nations concluded that it was air strikes, rather than action on the ground, which were responsible for the largest percentage—64 percent—of civilian deaths attributed to pro-government forces in 2008.

While Bergen might be right that more boots on the ground will lead to fewer civilian casualties from coalition forces because of the reduction in the reliance on air strikes (at least in as much as the increase in overall military operations don't negate those reductions), there is a third way that is guaranteed to reduce civilian casualties from coalition forces: withdraw coalition forces from Afghanistan.  That option, and its impact on deaths by coalition forces, is ignored, however.

Regardless, it is unclear to what extent those same airstrikes will, in fact, be scaled back on an appreciable scale.  There has long been talk about the negative impact of these tactics, especially from senior commanders such as General Petraeus who has been overseeing CENTCOM for several months now.  And yet the airstrikes have persisted.  Not that it's Petraues' fault - there are internal divisions, institutional biases and other complicating factors that lead to resistance from various military actors.  Yet it is this inconsistent application of counterinsurgency doctrine, as blended with counterterrorism and conventional tactics (which often work at cross purposes), which calls into question the overall likelihood of success.

Cognizant of the importance of the issue of civilian casualties, in his Senate confirmation hearing in June the new commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, testified that their avoidance "may be the critical point" of American military operations, adding, "I cannot overstate my commitment to the importance of this concept." McChrystal, generally regarded as one of the most effective officers of his generation, has now put the avoidance of civilian casualties at the core of his military strategy in Afghanistan, and that message will undoubtedly filter down the chain of command.

Let's see if it does. 

While Bergen does raise some reasons to be encouraged about the game plan (the switch from poppy eradication to targeting the drug lords themselves for one), he saves the biggest obstacle for the very end - the one that renders much of his prior optimism arguably moot.

This brings us to the one skunk at this garden party, and it is a rather large one: Afghanistan’s nuclear-armed, al-Qaeda- and Taliban-headquartering neighbor to the east. The Pakistani dimension of Obama’s Af-Pak strategy is his critics’ most reasonable objection to his plans for the region. It is difficult for the United States to have an effective strategy for Pakistan when Pakistan doesn’t have an effective strategy for Pakistan. There is a set of interwoven problems that the country must face if it is to effectively confront the militants in its own territory. If it fails to do this, the regional insurgency that encompasses both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border will continue to gather strength.

So, in a nutshell, everything that we are trying to achieve is dependent on Pakistan getting its house in order.  In order to do so, it must tackle a series of long-standing, fundamental, interwoven and fraught problems that call into question the nature of Pakistani society/government structure, that have withstood myriad prior efforts to address, that have proven resistant to outside pressure from the US (its chief benefactor) and that threaten to plummet the nation into civil war.  What could possibly go wrong? 

The nuclear-armed unstable Pakistani specter looming right across the border is another way in which our present Afghan war is different than Vietnam.  But does that make you feel any better about our chances? 

by publius

One issue Sotomayor has been dealing with in the hearings is the so-called "incorporation" of the Second Amendment.  The background here is that the original Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government, not to the states. 

Over the course of the 20th century, however, those rights have become progressively "incorporated" into the 14th Amendment, which does apply to the states.  In short, most but not all of the Bill of Rights now apply to state governments, but the Second Amendment isn't currently one of them under Supreme Court precedent.

For instance, the Establishment Clause (which is analytically distinct from the Free Exercise Clause) is arguably intended to prevent Congress from imposing an established church on states.  That is, it's a protection of states, not individuals.  Indeed, some states maintained established churches even after the Constitution was ratified.

So while I'm not arguing that states should establish churches as a policy matter, I am saying incorporating that particular right against states doesn't make much sense.  It was intended to protect the states, not apply to them.  (It's makes much more sense to see, say, Fourth Amendment rights through a more individual-centric lens).

by publius

One interesting book that I hope someone writes one day is about the informal norms of the blogosphere.  My last post -- wrongheaded as it was -- raises some potentially interesting questions on this front.  (Gary Farber's detailed comment got me thinking about this stuff -- plus the desire to take that stinker off the top of the page).

Anyway, the question is this -- how long should writers have to edit or even remove posts without notifying readers?  My general view is that I have about a 10 minute window to remove a post entirely for any reason.  After that, I start feeling queasy about it -- and, to my knowledge, I've never removed one after about 10-15 minutes (much as I've wanted to).

I think the window is longer for wordsmithing.  But after a half hour or so, I tend to think strikeouts or "Updates" are more appropriate unless they're very minor typos.  Why that is, I'm not entirely sure.

And that's what I find interesting.  How and why exactly have these norm developed?  If I'm just trying to avoid punishment by the audience, why do you care?  It seems clear that, if I had just deleted the post with nary a peep, then something would be wrong with that.  But if I had written, "I had a post here, but it was stupid so I deleted it," well, that doesn't seem quite right either. 

Anyway, consider this an open thread on this stuff, or whatev's.

by publius

In the original version of this post, I misread Megan McArdle -- I thought she was claiming that wealthy Italians pay a higher income tax rate than Americans.  On closer read, I don't think she was -- she was saying that Americans actually pay (i.e., comply with law) at a higher rate.  So my apologies.  But anyway, the chart is still kind of interesting -- and puts the surtax debate in context.  Plus, the post has probably been up too long to pull.  Blogger ethics and all that.  So here's the original post:

___________

McArdle:

I know, it's common to claim that Americans are tax haters.  But actually, Americans, even the wealthy, pay their taxes at a rate that would shock an Italian.  We grumble, but in the end, we pay.

Economist (chart of top income tax rates internationally):

Note Italy versus America, along with the salary at which the top rate kicks in.  Yes, local taxes effectively increase that rate a bit.  But still.

This chart is also worth keeping in mind during the debate over the eminently reasonably health care surtax proposal. 

by publius

Blog-sitting for Sullivan, Conor Friedersdorf raises a couple of interesting criticisms against "comprehensive" reforms.  The upshot is that uber-complex legislation is (1) impossible for citizens (and politicians) to read and understand; and (2) more prone to special interest capture. 

His proposal:

I actually agree with a decent chunk of this.  For instance, it's true that each additional subclause of new legislation creates more shadows for interest groups to hide in.  That's why I'd like to see a waiting period between the final release of legislation and the vote.  The public could then go all "Army of Davids" on the legislation, which would enhance transparency, democratic deliberation, etc.

Where I part ways with Conor, though, is that I think the government sometimes has to pass big complex legislation.  Assuming you accept that premise, then you should prefer Congress to go ahead and spell all this detail out.  Otherwise, the questions would be shifted to the agencies -- where non-transparency and capture are a trillion times worse.

The 1996 Telecom Act is a good example.  Considering the comprehensive changes it enacted, the text could have been much longer and more complex.  Instead, Congress just kicked the can on several key issues to the FCC -- which resulted in a decade of byzantine rules, litigation, and general uncertainty.  It also resulted in a sea change in policy when the Bush FCC replaced the Clinton FCC.

Assuming health care must necessarily be long and complex, I'd prefer Congress to do it now.  Interest group capture will still be there.  But more eyes are on Congress than on the agencies.  Plus, Congress can make the law more stable from administration to administration by answering these questions now.

by Eric Martin

I don't envy President Obama's predicament in Afghanistan.  It's hard to think of a region that has been less hospitable to foreign interlopers throughout ancient and modern history (earning itself the moniker "Graveyard of Empires").  And yet despite this foreboding track record, it is unclear that President Obama is willing to deviate from that familiar, if tragic, path traveled most recently by Britain and the USSR.  Not that Obama's options are all that attractive.  Bush left him with a mismanaged and directionless occupation to unwind (or not).  The exact nature of the hoped-for success via a continued military occupation is hard enough to define, let alone achieve, yet withdrawal has its downsides as well - including the potential for an intense civil war and the return of repressive elements such as the Taliban. 

While entirely too much has been made of the importance of Afghan safe havens in terms of conducting successful terrorist attacks (just as too little has been made of the ability to replicate similar safe havens elsewhere and our inability to disrupt any such haven from afar now that we are making such interdiction a priority), there is little doubt that Obama would pay a steep political price if he were to withdraw and an attack occurred that had some traceable connection to Afghanistan.  While an attack emanating from hubs in, say, Europe or Yemen may be just as (or more) likely, those connections would not prove as damaging despite the underlying reality of the terrorist threat.

So it is that Obama seems to be trading Bush's muddled vision of Afghanistan for his own, with a vague yet grandiose (if often contradictory) recitation of implausible goals and exaggerated fears, all buttressed by a refusal to acknowledge the costs of continuing our occupation.  As if they were trivial (think trillions of dollars - less than the costs of health care that has Washington in a tizzy, but then wars never seem to count as spending).  As Rory Stewart suggests, it's almost impossible to decipher an actual policy direction from the pomp and flourish: 

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.

It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. [...]

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’

These connections are global: in Obama’s words, ‘our security and prosperity depend on the security and prosperity of others.’ Or, as a British foreign minister recently rephrased it, ‘our security depends on their development.’ Indeed, at times it seems that all these activities – building a state, defeating the Taliban, defeating al-Qaida and eliminating poverty – are the same activity. The new US army and marine corps counter-insurgency doctrine sounds like a World Bank policy document, replete with commitments to the rule of law, economic development, governance, state-building and human rights. In Obama’s words, ‘security and humanitarian concerns are all part of one project.’

This policy rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state. Even if the invasion was justified, that does not justify all our subsequent actions. If 9/11 had been planned in training camps in Iraq, we might have felt the war in Iraq was more justified, but our actions would have been no less of a disaster for Iraqis or for ourselves. The power of the US and its allies, and our commitment, knowledge and will, are limited. It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya – control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment and a credible local government – are lacking in Afghanistan.

He continues, highlighting some points that I have been making regarding the mythic importance of "safe havens":

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?

Furthermore, there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy). Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism. Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harbouring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).

It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms – not as an end in itself but as a means towards counter-terrorism.

With so convoluted a policy, with its mosaic of cross-purpose justifications and strategies, it is no surprise that Obama's choice of McChrystal (a noted counter-terrorism practitioner - aka, a "killer") was curious given the underlying rhetoric and nod in the direction of counterinsurgency ("COIN", noted for its population centric concern and restraint in terms of the use of force).  As Judah Grunstein suggests to explain this apparent contradiction:

...[It seems that] the COIN rhetoric is simply a scaffolding that's been slapped over a strategy that has neither the resources, the political will, nor the local support necessary to succeed.

Those limitations are real.  Even the Afghan optimists (the COIN experts that think that we must "succeed," and that we have a shot at succeeding) think that our only hope is to commit tens of thousands more troops for at least the next decade at a price tag (when combined with non-military outlays) in the neighborhood of several trillions of dollars.  Oh, and even then we'll only succeed if we also eradicate the poppy crop and reorder Pakistan's society while we're creating a stable Afghanistan.

As unrealistic an allocation of resources (and set of goals) as that may seem, it actually gets worse.  Back to Stewart:

In pursuit of this objective, Obama has so far committed to building ‘an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000’, and adds that ‘increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed.’ US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain’s). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.

Some policymakers have been quick to point out that this cost is unsustainable and will leave Afghanistan dependent for ever on the largesse of the international community. Some have even raised the spectre (suggested by the example of Pakistan) that this will lead to a military coup. But the more basic question is about our political principles. We should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state. The security that resulted might suit our short-term security interests, but it will not serve the longer interests of Afghans.

Given the unappetizing, politically unpalatable menu of options available in terms of crafting an Afghanistan policy, Obama seems to be picking and choosing ala carte, while vastly overselling the risk of starvation, as well as the sumptuousness of the feast - a meal that is doomed as much by the basic ingredients as by their haphazard combination.  If the recent escalation is part of one last push to try to set a decent stage for fuller withdrawal, so be it.  But mission creep is an omnipresent concern with so amorphous and ambitious a set of goals (already there is talk that McChrystal will request thousands more troops from Obama in the near future - one wonders what the response will be and under what rationale?).

Unless and until Obama scales back his goals, and takes a more measured reckoning of the actual costs of withdrawal (total or partial), the policy manifestations will continue to be plagued by an incoherent blend of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, targeting segments of the Afghan population while ostensibly under the rubric of population centric protection, air strikes and hearts and minds, nation building and piecemeal aid, erecting a centralized state and showing sensitivity to the local culture of decentralization, etc., all sold using the ominous rhetoric of an existential threat and the resource allocation of a middling concern. 

by publius

The notion of "empathy" has been taking a beating over the past few weeks.  And to be honest, it's not the most compelling political message -- as evidenced by Sotomayor's decision to distance herself from "empathy" at the hearing yesterday.  And while I concede that the linguistic framing could be better, let me try to take a stab at defending Obama's larger point about empathy. 

The main point to remember is that Obama's "empathy" is not so much a positive vision of progressivism, but instead a critique of conservative jurisprudence (a topic upon which he has legitimate expertise).  Specifically, I think "empathy" is better understood as two distinct types of attacks on conservative jurisprudence:

The first is a higher-level theoretical attack.  Two of the main conservative schools of thought today -- originialism and textualism -- assume that consequences are generally irrelevant.  Law is the law, and how law affects the outside world is someone else's problem.  This conceit is particularly strong in originalism, which interprets constitutional text as it was understood at the time -- consequences be damned.

The reality, of course, is much different.  It's no accident that originalism tends to align with modern conservative political preferences (with occasional, but fairly rare exceptions).  For instance, the Bill of Rights is obsessed with strong criminal procedural rights.  But Republican judges aren't exactly known for their devotion to the procedural rights of the accused. 

In short, originalism often masks policy preferences behind a cloak of "this is what the law says."  In this respect, Obama's "empathy" comment simply makes explicit what originalism tries to hide -- that is, we should pay attention to consequences.

The second sense in which "empathy" is an attack on conservative jurisprudence is less theoretical.  It's an attack on conservative judges' tendency to rule for business and the state, at the expense of employees, the environment, and the criminally accused.  To me, Obama was essentially saying that he wants judges who focus more specifically on how our courts' decisions affect these specific individuals.

There are a million different indeterminate areas of the law where multiple plausible outcomes exist.  And so if you've lived in a bubble world where the reality of discrimination, or harsh drug laws, or mountain top mining has never affected you personally, that isolation will necessarily (and even epistemically) influence your decision at these various points of indeterminacy.  If, however, you know these realities more viscerally (i.e., if you have "empathy"), then that too will influence your decision the other way.

To me, Obama was simply saying that courts have been coming down too often on the side of businesses and the state in recent years, while ignoring the real-world effects of those decisions on parties with less power and less political influence.

[One sidenote -- I'm still in denial about Hilzoy, but will give her a proper farewell later this week, if I can bear it.]

by hilzoy

"The United States' top fighter jet, the Lockheed Martin F-22, has recently required more than 30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the skies, pushing its hourly cost of flying to more than $44,000, a far higher figure than for the warplane it replaces, confidential Pentagon test results show. (...)

"It is a disgrace that you can fly a plane [an average of] only 1.7 hours before it gets a critical failure" that jeopardizes success of the aircraft's mission, said a Defense Department critic of the plane who is not authorized to speak on the record. Other skeptics inside the Pentagon note that the planes, designed 30 years ago to combat a Cold War adversary, have cost an average of $350 million apiece and say they are not a priority in the age of small wars and terrorist threats. (...)

There have been other legal complications. In late 2005, Boeing learned of defects in titanium booms connecting the wings to the plane, which the company, in a subsequent lawsuit against its supplier, said posed the risk of "catastrophic loss of the aircraft." But rather than shut down the production line -- an act that would have incurred large Air Force penalties -- Boeing reached an accord with the Air Force to resolve the problem through increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air Force.

Sprey said engineers who worked on it told him that because of Lockheed's use of hundreds of subcontractors, quality control was so poor that workers had to create a "shim line" at the Georgia plant where they retooled badly designed or poorly manufactured components. "Each plane wound up with all these hand-fitted parts that caused huge fits in maintenance," he said. "They were not interchangeable."

Polidore confirmed that some early parts required modifications but denied that such a shim line existed and said "our supplier base is the best in the industry."

The plane's million-dollar radar-absorbing canopy has also caused problems, with a stuck hatch imprisoning a pilot for hours in 2006 and engineers unable to extend the canopy's lifespan beyond about 18 months of flying time. It delaminates, "loses its strength and finish," said an official privy to Air Force data. (...)

There has been some gradual progress. At the plane's first operational flight test in September 2004, it fully met two of 22 key requirements and had a total of 351 deficiencies; in 2006, it fully met five; in 2008, when squadrons were deployed at six U.S. bases, it fully met seven.

"It flunked on suitability measures -- availability, reliability, and maintenance," said Christie about the first of those tests. "There was no consequence. It did not faze anybody who was in the decision loop" for approving the plane's full production. This outcome was hardly unique, Christie adds. During his tenure in the job from 2001 to 2005, "16 or 17 major weapons systems flunked" during initial operational tests, and "not one was stopped as a result.""

by hilzoy

by publius

I suppose it would sink her nomination.  But it would be sort of hilarious if Sotomayor came in early and placed a cardboard cutout of herself in the chair during Day One of opening statements.

I'd put the over/under on when a Senator would notice at Minute 143.  And then I'd take the over.

by hilzoy

"The Obama administration announced Monday that it would seek to ban many routine uses of antibiotics in farm animals in hopes of reducing the spread of dangerous bacteria in humans.

In written testimony to the House Rules Committee, Dr. Joshua Sharfstein, principal deputy commissioner of food and drugs, said feeding antibiotics to healthy chickens, pigs and cattle -- done to encourage rapid growth -- should cease. And Dr. Sharfstein said farmers should no longer be able to use antibiotics in animals without the supervision of a veterinarian.

Both practices lead to the development of bacteria that are immune to many treatments, he said.

The hearing was held to discuss a measure proposed by Representative Louise M. Slaughter, Democrat of New York and chairwoman of the Rules Committee. It would ban seven classes of antibiotics important to human health from being used in animals, and would restrict other antibiotics to therapeutic and some preventive uses.

The legislation is supported by the American Medical Association, among other groups, but opposed by farm organizations like the National Pork Producers Council. The farm lobby’s opposition makes its passage unlikely, but advocates are hoping to include the measure in the legislation to revamp the health care system.

The Union of Concerned Scientists has estimated that as much as 70 percent of antibiotics used in the United States is given to healthy chickens, pigs and cattle to encourage their growth or to prevent illnesses."

by hilzoy

"President Obama is facing new pressure to reverse himself and to ramp up investigations into the Bush-era security programs, despite the political risks.

Leading Democrats on Sunday demanded investigations of how a highly classified counterterrorism program was kept secret from the Congressional leadership on the orders of Vice President Dick Cheney.

Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, who is the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, on Fox News Sunday called it a “big problem.” Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, on “This Week” on ABC, agreed that the secrecy “could be illegal” and demanded an inquiry.

Mr. Obama said this weekend that he had asked his staff members to review the mass killing of prisoners in Afghanistan by local forces allied with the United States as it toppled the Taliban regime there. The New York Times reported Saturday that the Bush administration had blocked investigations of the matter.

Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is also close to assigning a prosecutor to look into whether prisoners in the campaign against terrorism were tortured, officials disclosed on Saturday.

And after a report from five inspectors general about the National Security Agency’s domestic eavesdropping said on Friday that there had been a number of undisclosed surveillance programs during the Bush years, Democrats sought more information."

"Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said on “Meet the Press” on NBC that despite his dismay at the Central Intelligence Agency’s past interrogation methods, including waterboarding, he opposed a criminal inquiry into torture, which he said would “harm our image throughout the world.”"

by publius

Tomorrow's NYT takes a look at the fall of Sarah Palin over the past few months.  The theme that emerges is that Palin simply wasn't ready for the glare of the spotlight.  In particular, the NYT describes Palin as overly obsessed with -- and distracted by -- criticisms.  She apparently felt the need to answer them all.

To me, this hair-trigger sensitivity was a function of her inexperience.  It's easy to forget just how meteoric her rise was.  She went from a small-town nobody mayor in 2006 to governor.  And even then, most people had never heard of her until McCain picked her.  Basically, she went from nobody to world celebrity in 24 hours.  As a result, she never had time to develop the thick skin that successful politicians must eventually acquire. 

Indeed, one of the overlooked benefits of political experience is that you develop scars.  Sure, experience helps you learn issues and the media game and all that.  But it also hardens you.  You learn over the years to take your blows, pick your battles, and adjust to reading savage attacks on you and even your family.  You learn not to be debilitated by it.

This proven toughness was always Clinton's strongest virtue.  Whatever her flaws, I had no doubt that she could take a punch and punch back.  With Obama, I was never 100% sure.  But even Obama developed scars before it was all over.  He took his lumps over a grueling two year period and excelled.  Palin, by contrast, had a few days.  She needed more time -- and more battles. 

It's a lot like childhood vaccines.  Children don't get all their vaccinations at once.  They get them progressively over years -- and they become progressively more resilient.  Seasoned politicians have to learn to be resilient.

And that, ultimately, was Palin's problem (well, one of them).  Everything came at once, and too fast.  And she simply folded under the pressure. 

I'm not saying I could do better -- it's an insanely difficult game to master.  But it is a reason why she should have never been picked in the first place.

by publius

I've been having this debate with friends, but it's a matter of such weight and importance that I wanted to include you too.

After careful study, I have concluded that Bad is a significantly better album than Thriller.  Yes, Thriller is more iconic.  And yes, Billie Jean is the best single.  But song for song, Bad is the musically superior album. 

Thriller has too many throwaway songs, while Bad is solid throughout.  Consider the lineup:  Bad, The Way You Make Me Feel, Speed Demon, Man in the Mirror, Another Part of Me, Dirty Diana, Smooth Criminal, Leave Me Alone.  It's good stuff.

Resolved:  Bad is significantly better than Thriller.  Discuss.

by publius

This week's narrative is that the weak economy is dragging Obama down at bit.  The bad economic news has also re-energized Republican attacks against the stimulus.  And while those attacks are absurdly premature, I can't say I blame Republicans.  Pounding a weak economy is what opposition parties do.  In Wire-speak, that's part of the game.

A couple of thoughts though:

First, if the GOP is going all in hoping for a weak economy in 2010, Obama and the Dems need to punish them if things do turn around.  The GOP opposed the stimulus almost unanimously -- they preferred instead to do nothing or to give more money to wealthier people.  The united opposition was a risky move, but one that will pay dividends if the economy is still weak in 2010 and beyond.

If, however, the economy improves, the Dems need to make it perfectly clear where the Republicans stood.  The attacks they're enduring today must be answered in full.  Live by the stimulus attacks, die by the stimulus attacks.  That too is part of the game.

Second, these developments illustrate the foolishness of postponing reform efforts under the theory that the Dems will add seats in 2010.  If you have the numbers, you should push for reforms now.  Politics is unpredictable, and events can change on a dime. 

Frankly, the country would be better off if Dems were 100% certain that they would lose seats in 2010.  That would light a fire to get this stuff done -- and would convince the "centrists" to quit being so wankerous.

by hilzoy

"Supporters of Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor are quietly targeting the Connecticut firefighter who's at the center of Sotomayor's most controversial ruling.

On the eve of Sotomayor's Senate confirmation hearing, her advocates have been urging journalists to scrutinize what one called the "troubled and litigious work history" of firefighter Frank Ricci."

by hilzoy

"Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is leaning toward appointing a criminal prosecutor to investigate whether CIA personnel tortured terrorism suspects after Sept. 11, 2001, setting the stage for a conflict with administration officials who would prefer the issues remain in the past, according to three sources familiar with his thinking.

Naming a prosecutor to probe alleged abuses during the darkest period in the Bush era would run counter to President Obama's oft-repeated desire to be "looking forward and not backwards." Top political aides have expressed concern that such an investigation might spawn partisan debates that could overtake Obama's ambitious legislative agenda. (...)

Holder's decision could come within weeks, around the same time the Justice Department releases an ethics report about Bush lawyers who drafted memos supporting harsh interrogation practices, the sources said. The legal documents spell out in sometimes painstaking detail how interrogators were allowed to subject detainees to simulated drowning, sleep deprivation, wall slamming and confinement in small, dark spaces.

Any criminal inquiry could face challenges, including potent legal defenses by CIA employees who could argue that attorneys in the Bush Justice Department authorized a wide range of harsh conduct. But the sources said an inquiry would apply only to activities by interrogators, working in bad faith, that fell outside the "four corners" of the legal memos. Some incidents that might go beyond interrogation techniques that were permitted involve detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are described in the secret 2004 CIA inspector general report, set for release Aug. 31.

Among the unauthorized techniques allegedly used, as described in the report and Red Cross accounts, were shackling, punching and beating of suspects, as well as the waterboarding of at least two detainees using more liquid and for longer periods than the Justice Department had approved. That conduct could violate ordinary criminal laws, as well as the U.N. Convention Against Torture, which the United States signed more than a decade ago."