Hamas

Hamas In Power

After Hamas took office, it faced increasing turmoil. Israel withheld tax revenues it collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and Western assistance to the Palestinian government was cut off until Hamas renounced violence and agreed to recognize Israel. After months of negotiations, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah of Hamas and President Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Fatah, agreed in March 2007 to form a national unity government in an attempt to end the Palestinians' international isolation. The pact did not succeed in restoring the flow of aid and did not last. Clashes between the two groups steadily escalated until gunmen loyal to Hamas took control of Gaza in June, ousting the remnants of Fatah.

Hamas now was in sole control of a territory, but one of the poorest in the world, and conditions in Gaza quickly went downhill. Israel sealed off its borders, causing businesses to wither. Hamas remained defiant, and increased the rate of rocket attacks against border communities within Israel. For months, what followed was a steady cycle of Gazan rockets, Israeli retaliation, more rockets and more Israeli raids.

By June 2008, Hamas and Israel were both ready to reach some sort of accommodation, and the six-month truce was declared, although never formally defined. Their job, the Hamas officials said, was to stop the rocket attacks on Israel not only from its own armed groups but also from others based in Gaza, including Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

It took some days, but they were largely successful. Hamas imposed its will and even imprisoned some of those who were firing rockets. But the shipments of goods, while up some 25 to 30 percent, never approached what Hamas thought it was going to get. Israel said it planned to increase the shipments in stages, and noted that the rockets never stopped completely.

Hamas at War

After the truce lapsed on Dec. 19, rocket firing stepped up quickly, with more than 60 rockets and mortar shells falling on Israeli border towns on Dec. 24 alone. On Dec. 27, Israel began a sweeping campaign of airstrikes across Gaza, targeting not only military installations but the infrastructure of Hamas’s control. On Jan. 3, 2009, Israel opened a ground war, sending tanks and troops across the border into Gaza.

On Jan. 18, 2009 Israel, then Hamas, announced unilateral cease-fires, ending a devastating 23-day battle in which more than 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis died.

In May, Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas's political wing, who is based in Damascus, declared in an interview that rocket attacks against Israel had been stopped for the moment. In April, only six rockets and mortar rounds were fired at Israel from Gaza, a marked change from the previous three months, when dozens were shot, according to the Israeli military.

Mr. Meshal said his group was eager for a cease-fire with Israel and for a deal that would return an Israeli soldier it is holding captive, Cpl. Gilad Shalit, in exchange for many Palestinian prisoners. He also appeared to reach out to the Obama administration, which has refused to talk with Hamas, saying that his movement only wanted to return to the land occupied by Israel in 1967, and that it was open to negotiating a 10-year truce.

By July 2009, Hamas's Gaza leaders had clearly opted for a switch from rocket attacks to what they call a "culture of resistance," which was the topic of a two-day conference focused on the plight of Palestinians there. In June, a total of two rockets were fired from Gaza, according to the Israeli military, one of the lowest monthly tallies since the firing began in 2002.

In that tactical sense, the war was a victory for Israel and a loss for Hamas. But in the field of public opinion, Hamas took the upper hand. Its leaders have noted the international condemnation of Israel over allegations of disproportionate force, a perception they hope to continue to use to their advantage. Suspending the rocket fire could also serve that goal.

A Clumsy Assassination

On January 19, 2010, at least 11 professional assassins, some wearing wigs and fake beards, tracked Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a senior Hamas official, to his Dubai hotel in January and killed him with cold precision, fleeing the country afterward on European passports.

Mr. Mabhouh had played a role in the kidnapping and killing of two Israeli soldiers in 1989, and was involved in supplying Iranian weapons to Hamas.

The murder was straight out of a cheap spy thriller. But even as the Dubai authorities called for an international manhunt on Feb. 16, questions emerged about the identities of the suspects, deepening the mystery around the killing.

Because the victim was a senior Hamas official, many suspected that Israel was behind his assassination. Hamas accused Israel and vowed revenge. Israeli officials would not confirm or deny the accusations.

Dubai officials suggested that the killers — whoever they were — practiced poorly executed tradecraft. Although the assassination was carried out without attracting notice, the suspects allowed themselves to be photographed repeatedly on surveillance cameras, sometimes ducking into bathrooms and emerging with fake beards but still recognizable, the Dubai police said.

Amid mounting evidence of a remarkably clumsy operation, Israelis wondered whether Mossad, their once-famed spy service, could have been behind such a sloppy job or, in a John Le Carré-like twist, if Israel could have been framed.

Hide