The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of crises during
an era of upheaval in the Middle East: revolution in Iran, occupation
of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by militant students, invasion of
the Great Mosque in Mecca by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet
Union's occupation of Afghanistan, and internecine fighting among
Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians in Lebanon. The war followed
months of rising tension between the Iranian Islamic republic
and secular nationalist Iraq. In mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked,
in the mistaken belief that Iranian political disarray would guarantee
a quick victory.
The international community responded with U.N. Security Council
resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all member states
to refrain from actions contributing in any way to the conflict's
continuation. The Soviets, opposing the war, cut off arms exports
to Iran and to Iraq, its ally under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries
resumed in 1982). The U.S. had already ended, when the shah fell,
previously massive military sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke
off diplomatic relations with Iran because of the Tehran embassy
hostage crisis; Iraq had broken off ties with the U.S. during
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war,
and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran depended on U.S.-origin
weapons, however, and sought them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and
South America. Iraq started the war with a large Soviet-supplied
arsenal, but needed additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was
driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive
against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that
an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting
Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations
were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in
February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list
of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been included
several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian
nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda.
Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa,
was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's
Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination
of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received
massive external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance
through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State
Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with
financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain
loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S.
Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for
purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S.
grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984,
but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with
intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this
country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives
from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to
his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82)
asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only
in a highly redacted version [Document
21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle
East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between
Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts,
and economic and military improvements, "to strengthen regional
stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic
planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab
states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the
implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted
following promulgation of the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using
chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that
the international community respond to chemical warfare, but a
diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to
its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified
its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked
for a United Nations Security Council investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with
extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations,
and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical
weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support
Iraq in the war [Document 24].
The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against
"Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document
25].
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department
account indicates that the administration had decided to limit
its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring
because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity
of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results."
But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with
the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able
to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large reserves
of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq
may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran
threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack"
[Document 25]. The State Department
argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain
the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare,
and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the
issue.
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November
26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq
war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it
calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil
facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities
in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and
defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take
appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states,
"Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment
in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international
economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly
with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not
mention chemical weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions
in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President
Ford's defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational
pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to
the Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour
of regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish
"direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and
President Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing "his close
relationship" with the president [Document
28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional
issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria,
and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to transport
Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down
by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported
Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to
chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the meeting [Document
31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and
the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests."
Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness
to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear
that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that
made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons,
possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He then
moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document
32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests
section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased"
with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his
way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document
36 and Document 37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time,
the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating,
"The United States has concluded that the available evidence
substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons"
[Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's
meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since
his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because
"bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5
condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings
that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document
48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the
Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import
Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts
to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared
by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former
NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq
an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected
[Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S.
military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't
ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests
section asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's
negotiations to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be
"in any way configured for military use" [Document
55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed
the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq
to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied
government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it
had received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional
aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to
Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State Department official
replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and
had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the
sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its
"preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include
Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document
57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency
analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to
"continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical
capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document
58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and
Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without
international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high
priority of the Reagan administration - throughout the 1980s it
downplayed Pakistan's nuclear program, though its intelligence
indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in order
to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have
impeded the administration's massive military assistance to Pakistan
provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian
attack, issued a warning that "the invaders should know that
for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating
it whatever the number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide"
[Document 41]. On March 3, the
State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from shipping
22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor,
to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section to protest
to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation
of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and
that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire
the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical
weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts
to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document
42].
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While
condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States
finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate
from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government
of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms
of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which
it claims" [Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department briefed the press on
its decision to strengthen controls on the export of chemical
weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence
and media reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated
in Western countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion
that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any effect
on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships
with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open
diplomatic relations," the department's spokesperson said
"No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested
in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document
52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn
Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was
instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a
general motion of "no decision" on the resolution. If
this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the
issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N.,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding
to the issue - as did the representatives of both France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding
mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians
may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves
if [the] international community does not condemn Iraq. He said
Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements
to this effect" [Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that
Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement
to a resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions
on the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify
any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use.
Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security
Council went along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in
avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted
that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral
relationship" [Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential
statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming
Iraq as the offending party. A State Department memo circulating
the draft text observed that, "The statement, by the way
contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document
51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive
(NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access
to military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the
director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense
to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified
U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse."
Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous"
condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while
including the caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress
on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless
and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives."
The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical
warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S.
support for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said
that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November
1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February
1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic
relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for
the formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George
Shultz. When their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz
said that his country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis
of the war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement in
principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts
to cut off international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's
superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz,
with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that superior intelligence
must also be an important factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq
Aziz had to agree [Document 60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic
terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that
a preemptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should
be supported as a "just war." The documents included
in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that determined
this country's policies during the years when Iraq was actually
employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than rhetorical opposition
to such use was evidently not perceived to serve U.S. interests;
instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from its determination
that Iraq was to serve as the instrument to prevent an Iranian
victory. Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing
public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance.
The Iraqi government's repressive internal policies, though well
known to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all
in the presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward
the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to
project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil
flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines,
has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in contemporaneous
news reports; a few investigative reporters uncovered much more
- especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt
is owed to the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000),
Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively investigated U.S. policy
toward Iraq during the 1980s and who would not be deterred from
making information available to the public [Note
2]. Almost all of the primary documents included in this
briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive through
the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995 [Note
3].
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: United States Embassy
in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the Department of State.
"Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq," November
21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy
in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting
transshipment to Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli
goods transit Turkey for "Islamic belligerents," including
Israeli chemical products for Iran. It remarks on "Israeli
acumen" in selling to both Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting
in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage.
It was sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum
of foreign governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian,
French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean,
Chinese, South African, Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc.,
who found both combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition,
and military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons compatible
with the military infrastructure created by the U.S. during the
shah's reign, could not buy them directly, and had to rely on
third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 2: United States Embassy
in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the Department of State.
"Conversation with [Excised]," December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while
Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers
were providing it with weapons with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September
1979 to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for
medical treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response,
the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other
sanctions. The hostages were not released until January 20, 1981,
the inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 3: Department of State
Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern and South
Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for Iran and
Iraq," February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export
policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the "U.S.
position has been to avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent
widening the conflict, bring an end to the fighting and restore
stability to the area."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 4: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary]
Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4, 1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have
formal diplomatic relations at this time - they were restored
in November 1984 - they were represented in each other's capitol
by interests sections) says that the U.S. now has "a greater
convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the
revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis overthrew the conservative
Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under British colonialism.)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit
Baghdad, "the first visit by a senior department official
since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 5: Department of State
Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests
Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi Foreign Minister,"
April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to
Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important
that "our two countries be able to exchange views, freely
and on a systematic basis," paving the way for Deputy Assistant
Secretary Morris Draper's meetings in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 6: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,"
April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations
with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more
information from Washington "so as to be able to take up
with the Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide array of issues of
mutual interest."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
[Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under
Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary
of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper's visit, supports
discussion of strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances
that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 8: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter"
from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig,
the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with foreign ministry
official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way correspondence
had been established between the U.S. and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M.
Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in the United States.
"Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar" [For Eagleton from
Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures
the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely
pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations
and increased trade. He takes the opportunity to make a "strong
pitch" for a U.S. company bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 10: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department
of State. "Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28, 1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests
section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary
Command Council representative Tariq Aziz, the "highest level
in the Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since
the 1967 break in relations." Eagleton informs Aziz of "the
U.S. government's satisfaction with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi
relations." After the meeting, he tells Washington that "we
are in a position to communicate directly with the leadership
should we have any sensitive or particularly important message
to convey."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 11: Department of State
Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests
Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers
to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it
"has no specific information" regarding Iran's reported
acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks the interests
section head to assure Iraqi officials that "the U.S. has
not approved nor condoned any military sales to Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 12: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable to the Department of State. "Staffdel
[Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad," September
27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf
of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's parliament, and has
discussions during which "the atmosphere was pleasant and
friendly," reflected in expressions of support for improving
U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 13: Department of State
Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests
Section in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq as Supporter of
International Terrorism," February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions
regarding removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support
international terrorism. The guidance says that the decision has
no implications for U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 14: National Security
Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S.
Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia," March 19,
1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle
East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement,
arms transfers, and intelligence planning. Revised guidelines
are needed because of regional diplomatic and global oil market
developments.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 15: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of Commerce. "Helicopters and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry
of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," September 20, 1982.
Iraq's director of agricultural aviation invites U.S. crop-spraying
aircraft manufacturers to provide information about helicopters
and pilot training, noting problems with its existing equipment
because pilots have been inhaling insecticide fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by
this time. According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times,
American-built helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical
weapons attacks; according to the Central Intelligence Agency,
Iraq experimented with using commercial crop sprayers for biological
warfare.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 16: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister," January
15, 1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad
to inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of State George Shultz
would welcome a visit by Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, but
notes congressional criticism of Iraq and the "sensitivity
of the terrorism issue" (Iraq supported several Palestinian
nationalist factions.) The department suggests Iraq "contribute
to the positive atmosphere of the visit" by curtailing its
support for terrorism, mentioning specifically the Palestinian
groups Black June and May 15.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 17: Department of State,
Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George P. Shultz
to the Department of State. "Secretary's May 10 Meeting with
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11, 1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He says that
the U.S. is neutral toward the war but observes that Aziz knows
that "we had been helpful to Iraq in various ways."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 18: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "Message from the Secretary for FON MIN Tariq Aziz:
Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, commenting on the "very important common interests"
between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz obliquely encourages Iraq to
disassociate itself from the Palestinian groups it supports by
evoking conservative Shiite militants opposed to both the U.S.
and to Iraq's secular government: it "appears that at least
the inspiration for certain terrorist acts against Iraq and against
the U.S. emanates at times from the same sources. By working together
to combat terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In
observing Iraqi policy, it had begun to appear to me that Iraq
was approaching the conclusion that its national interests are
never served by international terrorists."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 19: Central Intelligence
Agency, Directorate of Intelligence Appraisal. "The Iraqi
Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks," June 1983.
In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central Intelligence
Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain
nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not identified such a program,
but remarks that Iraq "has made a few moves that could take
it in that direction," while noting the difficulty of clandestine
research and development and procurement of the necessary technology
and fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 20: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Bodine to the Department
of State. "Militarization of Hughes Helicopters," June
8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government official from (presumably)
South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to militarize
Hughes helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in 1983.
The request was turned down.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 21: National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Reagan. "United
States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia"
[Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July 12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action plans
for the Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 22: Department of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum
from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq
War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality,"
October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq
in the Iran-Iraq war and related practical concerns. The analysis
notes that the U.S. "policy of strict neutrality has already
been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed
into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We assume that other actions
not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would
continue as necessary.)"
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 23: Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Transcription. "IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime
Using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV," October 22,
1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian
troops.
Document 24: Department of State,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from
Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz. "Iraq Use of Chemical
Weapons," November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional
information confirming Iraq's "almost daily" use of
chemical weapons. They note, "We also know that Iraq has
acquired a CW production capability, presumably from Western firms,
including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary." The issue
is to be added to the agenda for an upcoming National Security
Council meeting, at which measures to assist Iraq are to be considered.
The officials note that a response is important in order to maintain
the credibility of U.S. policy on chemical warfare.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 25: Department of State,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S.
Eagleburger. "Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" [Includes
Cables Entitled "Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons"
and "Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons"],
November 21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing the use of chemical
weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order to deter further use
and "to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public
positions we may have to take on this issue." A background
cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in October 1982
and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and August 1983 "and
more recently against Kurdish insurgents."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 26: National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S.
Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26, 1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin with
regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on measures
to protect Persian Gulf oil production and its transshipment infrastructure.
The U.S. will give the highest priority to the establishment of
military facilities allowing for the positioning of rapid deployment
forces in the region to guard oil facilities.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 27: Department of State
Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7, 1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour
of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan,
but notes that he does not think his visit will be worthwhile
unless he meets directly with Saddam Hussein.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 28: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State [et al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December
10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells Iraqi
Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that "perhaps the greatest
benefit" of Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming visit to Baghdad "will
be the establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President
Reagan and President Saddam Hussein." The planned topics
of discussion are the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Lebanon, Syria, and any other issues that the Iraqis might want
to raise.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 29: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United
States Embassy in Jordan. "Talking Points for Amb. [Ambassador]
Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein," December
14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential envoy
Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be Saddam Hussein's first
with a representative of the U.S. executive branch; therefore,
a major goal will be "to initiate a dialogue and establish
personal rapport." In the meeting, "Rumsfeld will want
to emphasize his close relationship with President Reagan . .
." Talking points for the meeting include the Iran-Iraq war
(the U.S. "would regard any major reversal of Iraq's fortunes
as a strategic defeat for the West"), expansion of Iraqi
pipeline facilities, Lebanon, Syria, strengthening of Egyptian
and Iraqi ties, and the threat of terrorism, which targets both
countries.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 30: United States Embassy
in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State.
"Rumsfeld's Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister]
and FM [Foreign Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19,"
December 20, 1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi
officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S. and Iraq have both
differences and "a number of areas of common interest."
Aziz says that he was heartened by a line in President Reagan's
letter to Saddam Hussein stating, "The Iran-Iraq war could
post serious problems for the economic and security interests
of the U.S., its friends in the region and in the free world."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable
from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld
Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,"
December 21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein evinces
"obvious pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld brought from
President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss common U.S.-Iraqi interests,
including Lebanon, Palestine, opposition to an outcome of the
Iran-Iraq war that "weakened Iraq's role or enhanced interests
and ambitions of Iran," and U.S. efforts to cut off arms
sales to Iran. Rumsfeld says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly
about terrorism and says that it has a home - in Iran, Syria,
and Libya, and that it is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages
arrangements that might provide alternative transshipment routes
for Iraq's oil, including pipelines through Saudi Arabia or to
the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State Department calls the meeting
a "positive milestone."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 32: United States Embassy
in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department
of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet for two
and one-half hours and agree that "the U.S. and Iraq shared
many common interests," including peace in the Persian Gulf,
the desire to diminish the influence of Iran and Syria, and support
for reintegrating Egypt, isolated since its unilateral peace with
Israel, into the Arab world. Rumsfeld comments on Iraq's oil exports,
suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition
to international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli
peace. He and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war "in detail."
Rumsfeld says that the administration wants an end to the war,
and offers "our willingness to do more." He mentions
chemical weapons, possible escalation of fighting in the Gulf,
and human rights as impediments to the U.S. government's desire
to do more to help Iraq, then shifts the conversation to U.S.
opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 33: Department of State,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S.
Eagleburger. "EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq"
[Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper,
Dated December 24, 1983], December 22, 1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration's policy of increasing
support for Iraq, the State Department advises Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to urge the
U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financial credits.
Eagleburger signs a letter to Eximbank saying that since Saddam
Hussein had complied with U.S. requests, and announced the end
of all aid to the principal terrorist group of concern to the
U.S., and expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), "The terrorism
issue, therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM financing
for U.S. sales to Iraq." The financing is to signal U.S.
belief in Iraq's future economic viability, secure a foothold
in the potentially large Iraqi market, and "go far to show
our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context."
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 34: Department of State
Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan.
"Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London,"
December 23, 1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld
discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King
Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein
and Tariq Aziz and says they had "more areas of agreement
than disagreement." He also reviews the status of a proposed
pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for
several years during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried
oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating
the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from
Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian
Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported
Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme nervousness
about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq
war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations
in planning the project. International financier Bruce Rappaport,
a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure
in the proposed deal. (The final report of the independent counsel
for the Iran-Contra "arms for hostages" scandal cites
reports indicating that Rappaport's bank in Geneva was the recipient
of a mysterious $10 million payment from the Sultan of Brunei
to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared.
Rappaport denied this; the final report says that the issue remained
unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House Banking
committee hearing on corruption in Russian financial transactions,
but declined.) The project was complicated by demands that the
U.S. arrange for ironclad security guarantees from the Israelis,
since the pipeline would have been vulnerable to their attack.
The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees that pipeline
facilities would not cause environmental damage.
All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest
in the project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of
improved U.S.-Iraq relations - they wanted as much U.S. financial
and other involvement in the proposed deal as possible. For the
U.S., it would have provided an alternative, theoretically secure
outlet for oil and created a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests
with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to
create a wider consortium of Arab countries that would cooperate
with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel
dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new oil
facilities in its vicinity, and won points with the Reagan administration.
Also, according to internal documents from a friend of Reagan
administration Attorney General Edmund Meese, brought in as an
intermediary because of his Israeli ties, payoffs would have been
skimmed from complex financial guarantee arrangements for the
Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties
dragged on, until the several private companies that had been
brought in to plan the project backed out, questioning the motives
of all involved. Iraq, however, revived the concept in 2000, presumably
for its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 35: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,"
December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf
to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit. Eagleton discusses U.S.
efforts to coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian
Gulf states, its campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its
wish to see Iraq's oil exports increase. He informs the Iraqi
official of the degree of U.S. interest in Iraq's economic situation,
mentioning the "high level policy review which had established
the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed to
the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated
U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically
important and practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 36: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq's Oil
Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq Aziz
tells William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased
with the visit and with the positive atmosphere it created.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable
from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "[Excised]
Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan," January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the
Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit.
Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person
. . ."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 38: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General,
Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran" [Includes
Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales
to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country.
However, it does not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian
oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy
for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin
armored ambulances, communications gear, and electronic equipment
for the protection of Saddam Hussein's personal aircraft. The
Reagan administration was continuing efforts to persuade the Export-Import
Bank to provide financing for Iraq -- a positive Eximbank determination
would improve Iraq's credit rating and make it easier for it to
obtain loans from international financial institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 39: Department of State,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to George P.
Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq," January
30, 1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls
on exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The department
is concerned specifically with an application to export dual-use
heavy trucks, the sale of which to either Iran or Iraq has been
banned under the Export Administration Act. Secretary of State
Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 40: Export-Import Bank
of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division Memorandum
to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa and Middle
East Division, Board of Directors. "Country Review and Recommendations
for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract; Includes Document Entitled
"Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because
of its very high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created
by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists U.S. companies that would
be potential exporters to Iraq if credits were available, including
Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 41: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive," February
22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits to Iraq
to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures
to assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement
declaring that "the invaders should know that for every harmful
insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever
their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 42: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq," March 4,
1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride
to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of "concern
over Iraq's possible intention to use the chemical in the manufacture
of chemical weapons." Washington asks the U.S. interests
section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.'s grave concern about chemical weapons, and to inform
it that the U.S. will publicly condemn their use in the near future.
The interests section is to reiterate the request that Iraq not
use chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq's
attempts to acquire chemical weapons related material from the
U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will
act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 43: Department of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Memorandum from
James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S. Condemnation
of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.
The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement
and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical
weapons. The statement says that "While condemning Iraq's
chemical weapons use . . . . The United States finds the present
Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed
objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring
Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among
nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 44: Department of State
Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale,"
March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs
staff member that the department has not objected to the sale
of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in
part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan.
The official policy of the U.S. is that it does not export military
related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended
for military purposes, the official responds, "we presumed
that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 45: United States Interests
Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW
[Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State Department's
condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests
section comments that "The Iraqis apparently have been stunned
by our public condemnation."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 46: United States Embassy
in Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of
State. "Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a
Belgian laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin
in the blood of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical
treatment.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 47: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office
of the United Nations and Other International Organizations. "U.N.
Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of
Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United
Nations to get the support of other Western missions for a motion
of "no decision" regarding Iran's draft resolution condemning
Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain
on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department
press conference, including the assertion that "The USG evenhandedly
condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 48: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Sudan.
"Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page Missing],"
March 24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's March
1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials
by the U.S.'s public condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons
"despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge
sooner or later." Most of the cable is concerned with the
Reagan administration's interest in reassuring Iraqi officials
that U.S. financing might be available for the proposed pipeline
to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests.
The cable notes that Iraqi officials are "confused"
by the administration's "means of pursuing our stated objectives
in the region."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 49: United States Embassy
in Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department
of State. "Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms
Transfers to Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials
in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that
the U.S. has approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms
sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 50: Mission to the United Nations
Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. "U.N.
Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration
in Security Council," March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations
resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use,
and passes on the observation by a U.N. official that "Iranians
may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves
if international community does not condemn Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 51: Department of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from
Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United Nations Security Council
Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised
Working Paper], March 30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text
of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as
a presidential statement. "The statement, by the way, contains
all three elements Hamdoon wanted."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 52: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Lebanon
[et al.]. "Department Press Briefing, March 30, 1984,"
March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy
controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors.
It responds to questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding
the Iran-Iraq war, and a department spokesperson says Iraq's chemical
weapons use will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq
relations.
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 53: National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan. "Measures
to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments
in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S.
military capabilities and "intelligence collection posture"
in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey
are to prepare a plan to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq
war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government's
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while
placing "equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran
from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized
recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 54: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to United States Embassy in Jordan.
"Chemical Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge," April
6, 1984.
Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke
discussed a draft United Nations' resolution on chemical weapons
use in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi interests section representative
Nizar Hamdoon on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer
a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution. Placke
indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals regarding
points that should be included in the resolution if the Security
Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the Iraqi
government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that would
lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]"
regarding chemical weapons use, but noted that the U.S. did "not
want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to
detract from our common interest to see war brought to [an] early
end."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 55: United States Interests
Section. Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Bell Discusses Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq,"
April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised
of developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter
Textron about its sale of helicopters to Iraq's Ministry of Defense
that "can not be in any way configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 56: Letter from Richard
M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture
to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President
Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan,
his former aide and chief of staff, and former attorney general
John Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured military uniforms
for export to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had
exported weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed
to have connections with former U.S. government officials.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 57: Department of State,
Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and
Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard
T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions"
[Includes Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to Iraq"
Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates that the government
is reviewing policy for "the sale of certain categories of
dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities," and the review's
"preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include
Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 58: Defense Intelligence
Agency Intelligence Report. "Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects
for Iraq," September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic,
and military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue
to develop its conventional and "formidable" chemical
capabilities, and will "probably pursue nuclear weapons."
It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical weapons against
Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi
relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, including
its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 59: Department of State,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. "Iraqi
Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq had
used "domestically produced lethal CW" in the Iran-Iraq
war, developed in part through "the unwitting and, in some
cases, we believe witting assistance" of numerous Western
firms. The State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in response to
a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed their use in February
1984.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 60: Department of State
Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Iraq.
"Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary's Meeting
with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November
26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.," November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between
the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz and emphasizes
"the U.S. desire to base these relations on the presumption
of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity." After Aziz
says that Iraq's advantage in weaponry was enabling it to defend
itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz comments "that superior
intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense.
Aziz acknowledged that this may be true." (The U.S. had been
secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support for
several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming the candor
of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that "Iraq
can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use
and production of chemical weapons. This position is not directed
specifically at Iraq . . . "
Source: Declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act
Document 61: United States District Court (Florida: Southern
District) Affidavit. "United States of America, Plaintiff,
v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that Teledyne Wah Chang
Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance, Zirconium, to
Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31, 1995.
Former Reagan administration National Security Council staff
member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan signed a national
security decision directive calling for the U.S. to do whatever
was necessary to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director
of Central Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to
ensure that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs,
and that the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits, intelligence,
and strategic military advice. The CIA also provided Iraq, through
third parties that included Israel and Egypt, with military hardware
compatible with its Soviet-origin weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a number
of prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, of U.S.
companies charged with illegally delivering military, dual-use,
or nuclear-related items to Iraq. (In this case, a Teledyne affiliate
was charged will illegally selling zirconium, used in the manufacture
of explosives, to the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries,
which used the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.)
Many of these firms tried to defend themselves by establishing
that providing military materiel to Iraq had been the actual,
if covert, policy of the U.S. government. This was a difficult
case to make, especially considering the rules of evidence governing
investigations involving national security matters.
Source: Court case
Notes
1. <http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/Geneva.htm>
2. <http://www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp>
3. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>;
<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/introx.htm>
