THE THREAT OF DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS
Two basic challenges confronting Muslims in America inform
the present essay. The first has to do with the enterprise of self-definition,
that is, of defining for oneself who one is and which actions and non-actions
are therefore consistent with one’s choice of selfhood. The second has to do
with the problem of self-determination, or how to gain the requisite control or
influence over the social and political institutions that affect one’s life.
These challenges are intimately connected to each other. They are also
connected to the issue of Muslim participation in American society, socially
and politically. This latter point is obvious in the case of
self-determination. It becomes equally obvious, however, in the case of
self-definition, once it is recognized that the real goal of any act of
self-definition is both to affirm one’s subjectivity vis a vis the world around
one and to gain public recognition for one’s subjectivity chosen self.
Self-definition, in other words, is always and fundamentally a social cum
political act; it is never a purely intellectual one.
From the outset, the enterprise of Muslim self-definition is
complicated by the fact of the heterogeneous make-up of the Muslim community in
America. American-born converts (the majority of whom are African-Americans)
are a product of American history, as are their hopes, fears, fantasies and
proper ambition. They are both repelled by the American experience, by virtue
of their history as a marginalized minority, and attracted to it, by the virtue
of their connection to a uniquely rich Afro-American historical and cultural
tradition. Their search for a boa fide Muslim identity is still in its
exploratory stage. To this point, however, the record of successive turns and
turnabouts has proved one thing if nothing else: Whatever this
Afro-American-Muslim identity turns out to be as a final product, if it is to
be life-affirming as opposed to a paralyzing agent, it will have to embrace,
however discriminately, rather than ignore the reality and history of
African-Americans, just as effectively as it fortifies for them the boundaries
between Islam and non-Islam.
Foreign-born Muslims, on the other hand, are the heirs of a
much older tradition of Muslim identity formation. For them, a basic feature of
self-definition is in fact the very preservation of the cultural tradition that
has been handed down to them. To be sure, they too are engaged in a process of
exploration, as they seek to determine which aspects of the received tradition
are essential and which coincidental. But this is done with extreme caution and
in the context of a conscious rejection of the proposition that their coming to
America imposes upon them any obligation to assimilate. In fact, as one
observer has recently noted, coming to America is now seen by many immigrants
as the greatest ensurer of the right to remain themselves!
1. Thus, even as the notion of an “American-Islamic” identity
gains acceptance among foreign-born Muslim (and especially their children),
whatever this “American-Islamic” identity turns out to be, it will have to
accommodate, and in part confirm, received tradition. It will not be accorded
the authority to override or negate that tradition.
As these two groups of Muslims move closer, then, to their
respective choices of Islamic identity in America, one wonders if they are not
at the same time moving away from each other, seeing how vastly different the
sources of their respective new identities are. Both groups are engaged,
meanwhile, in a battle against what W.E.B. DuBois referred to as
“double-consciousness,” i.e., the seemingly inescapable tendency to look at
oneself through the eyes of some other, to “measure one’s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt...” DuBois saw this phenomenon as contributing to the
ineffectiveness (largely perceived as weakness) among blacks, because it
foisted upon them a “contradiction of double aims”. The black craftsman, for
example, had to struggle, on the one hand, to escape white contempt for being
a mere draftsman, while, on the other hand, striving to turn his skills to the
needs of his people. This, DuBois observed, could only result in making him a
poor craftsman, because “he had but half a heart in either cause”. This
double-consciousness and contradiction of double aims are an even greater
threat to the Muslim, black, white or immigrant. For the simultaneous struggle
against being a Muslim along with the struggle to be a Muslim necessarily
reduces the amount of energy devoted to the latter. As such, the threat of
double-consciousness has a direct bearing on the matter of salvation and how
successfully Muslim can live a life that earn’s God’s pleasure in the
Hereafter! Like George Orwell’s, “How
many fingers am I holding up Winston?,” this kind of psychological pressure can
turn even the clearest Qur’anic verses into matters of doubt and speculation
and even the most basic religious obligations into matters of choice. What greater threat could
there be to the Muslim and Islam in America?
We are brought, then, back to the issues of self-definition
and self-determination in the most serious and meaningful sense. And given that
both of these are always and necessarily socio-political activities, both
foreign-born and American-born Muslims are equally confronted with the question
of how they should seek to influence American social and political institutions
to the end of gaining public recognition and respect for themselves as Muslims
and contribute to the creation of a social reality that is free of double consciousness.
Whether in concert with each other, or as distinct and separate movements,
American-born and foreign-born Muslims will have to think about and develop
approaches to this task.
MUSLIM IDENTITY BETWEEN CULTURE AND POLITICS
No serious discussion of the role to be played by Muslims in
shaping or influencing social and political institutions in America can avoid
the prior question of whether it is legitimate for Muslims to participate in
the social and especially the political life of a non-Muslim polity. At the
same time, I would like to warn against the all-too-common fallacy or perhaps
the ruse - of over politicizing matters to the point that legislative politics
(i.e., voting, nominating candidates, holding political office) emerge as the
only or even the main means of affecting social and political life in America.
For, legislative politics are neither the only nor in every instance the most
effective means of influencing society. As such, we should be careful about how
uncritically we surrender to the loaded, zero-sum proposition: Either get
involved in legislative politics or forfeit the opportunity for
self-definition, not to mention self-determination.
What is needed is a balanced approach in which the potential
benefits, functional limitations and possible religious impediments to Muslim
participation in American social and political life all receive their due. For
some time now, however, the
main trust
of Muslim attention has been in the direction of legislative politics. Some
have stressed the practical benefits of Muslims involvement. Both sides,
however, seem to be fixated upon the same object: legislative politics. In the
meantime, very little attention has been paid to the functional limitations of
legislative politics, or to other possible means of effecting social and
political change. This, I think, is a telling oversight that provides some
useful insights into some of the inadequacies of Muslim though in the West, as
well as some of the obsessions and biases that tend to limit the scope of its
vision. Before entering, therefore, into the main issue of Islamic law and
participation in American legislative politics, I should like to register a few
points about the limitations of that enterprise, with the aim of excavating a
few conceptual tools that might aid us in our thinking about the proper
modality of political participation and its relationship to other means of
effecting social and political change.
ON THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
I begin with an insight borrowed from the Italian
neo-Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (d.19-). Gramsci had witnessed the collapse of the
American economic system during the Great Depression of 1929. He also observed
that despite the economic ruin that came to many among the elite, there was
virtually no change in the social cum political relations among America’s haves
and have-nots. Whereas one would have expected the haves’ loss of wealth to
reduce them - socially and politically - to the status of have-nots, in the end
they lost virtually nothing of their status as premier citizens who both
assumed and received the right to deferential treatment. On this observation,
Gramsci developed his concept of “hegemony,” via which he concluded that it was
not control over the means of material production that determined relations of
power and authority in society but control over the means of material
production that determined relations of power and authority in society but
control over the means of producing and disseminating intellectual products,
namely, ideas and images. It was the educational, cultural and religious
institutions along with the media and entertainment industry, that held the
keys to how people saw themselves and interacted with each other in society.
And where there existed no challenge to the views and images created by these
institutions, politics and economics would do little to change the status quo.
Gramsci’s theory goes a long way in establishing the fact
that he attitudes and assumptions, the stereotypes and habits of deferential or
contemptuous treatment, which form the basis of how people see themselves and
interact with others in society are far more the product of how effectively
ideas and images are manipulated through cultural and educational institutions
then they are the product of pure politics or economics. One of the most
glaring confirmations of this can be gleaned from developments in the United
States during the 1960s, when black cultural figures like Muhammad Ali (I am
the greatest!) and the singer James Brown (Say it loud; I’m black and I’m
proud!) succeeded in altering the language and categories through which white
supremacy had sustained its status as normal. By smashing the boundaries
between the imaginable and unimaginable, between the valued and the valueless,
their contributions to the American cultural landscape paved the way for
blackness to take on meanings and to occupy psychological spaces therefore
unknown to it. Legislative politics would in turn confirm this transformation
in the 1970s with the unprecedented proliferation of black elected officials
and other beneficiaries of such government initiatives as Title and Affirmative
Action.
Even the more overtly political successes of figures like
Martin Luther King Jr. were ultimately indebted to developments outside the
realm of legislative politics. The touch-stone of King’s genius lay in his
success at developing what Hobbes referred to as a political “trump-card,”
i.e., a legally sanctioned activity outside of legislative politics via which
concessions can be forced from a government. Trumps operate outside the realm
of legislative politics precisely because governmental systems are not in the
business of legislating themselves out of existence. As such as long as one
works within the system, change is almost always slow, almost never radical,
and usually perceived as necessary to the health and survival of the system.
“Dissidents,” meanwhile, who wish to bring about more fundamental change must
recognize and act in accordance with one basic rule: Where there is no
recognized political trump-card, clubs become trumps, and the government
assumes the right to put down dissent through violence. Martin Luther King Jr.
located his trump card in the ability to subject the government to public shame
and embarrassment. The daily images, televised and printed, of police-dogs,
billy clubs and hoses turned against peaceful, unarmed blacks literally
embarrassed the United State government into instituting change.
But the secret behind
King’s success actually runs much deeper than this. For, shame is not a
sensibility into which the sponsors of unjust social and political orders are
easily coerced. How was it, in other words that actions and attitudes that had
for centuries been accepted as part of the “normal” operation of the regime of
white supremacy suddenly came to constitute a public embarrassment? It is here,
in this new attitude toward the meaning of blackness and, concommitantly, toward
the unjust treatment of blacks that we come to appreciate the aforementioned
role of such cultural figures as Mohammed Ali and James Brown.
If the aim of any would-be Muslim participation in U.S.
legislative politics is to promote a dignified existence for Muslims in
America, to contribute to the fight against the plague of double-consciousness
- not to indulge inflated egos or to feign inclusion in the American melting
pot - the parallel necessity of effecting cultural change in America, i.e., of changing
the language and categories of thought and common experience, of developing and
effectively using a Muslim trump-card, must certainly be accorded at least
equal importance. For the effectiveness of the former depends fundamentally on
success in the latter. And it is here, to my mind, in the cultural realm, that
Muslims face the greater challenge. For it is here, more than any place else,
that essentialism and the politics of identity among Muslims (American born and
immigrants) tend to obliterate the distinction between the successful
indigenization of Islam or the successful appropriation of aspects of American
culture - as positive achievements, and assimilation into the ways of the
slavemaster/colonizer, as a proscribed capitulation to Stephen Carter’s
“culture of unbelief”. And as long as this remains the case, there will be no
unleashing of the kind of God-given talent and cultural imagination that will
enable Muslims to engage in the kind of cultural production that is not doomed
to be marginalized and treated as a spectacle. In a real sense, the future of
Islam in America will depend not on whether Muslims can arrive at an
understanding of scripture and tradition that allows for home-mortgages or
inheritance between Muslims and non-Muslims, but on whether that understanding
will liberate the Muslim cultural imagination and allow it come into its own, here in America For the fact is - and every honest Muslim knows it - that one can
live with a lot of broken rules of
shari’ah. But what repentance can there be from a broken soul or psyche?
And how can the latter be avoided if the world outside the
masjid
reflect nothing of the Muslim’s thoughts and creative spirit? If Muslims are to
establish a real existence here in America, one that will enable them not only
to consume but to shape American reality, the Muslim cultural imagination will
have to be liberated. Once this is done, Muslims will be able to move beyond
the relatively safe arena of sports (Hakeem Olajuwan, and until recently,
Mahmud ‘Abd al-Ra’uf, etc.) into those of literature, poetry music,
fashion design, comedy, interior decorating, etc., just as has
existed throughout Islamic history, and just as exists in virtually every
Muslim country in the world!
All of this has serious implications, of course, for such
questions as “Muslim identity,” “Islamic culture,” and the legitimacy of Muslim
involvement in American society as a whole. This may explain why such issues as
cultural production have received such scant and inadequate attention to date.
It may be that the growing consensus among Muslims on the necessity of
participating in legislative politics is in the end a cop-out, a safe haven
into we have begun our retreat from the more difficult task of penetrating,
appropriating and redirecting American culture. Muslims may enjoy the initial
warm feeling that goes along with this; but it may not be long before this
cools and we are forced to acknowledge that we wet our pants! For, even the
most successful incursions into American law and politics will not change the
reality of what it means to be a veiled woman (or girl!) in America. And who
can deny that blacks in America did more to change their reality during the
1960s, when the doors to legislative politics were virtually closed to them,
than they have in the subsequent era of black political empowerment?
MUSLIMS AND AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
The foregoing should be understood, however, only as an
attempt to point out some of the limitations of legislative politics, to insist
that there is a dialectical, give-and-take relationship between culture and
self-determination, that power (or politics) contributes to but does not
determine the shape of society. At the same time, there are laws and policies
in this country that have a real or potentially devastating effect on Muslims,
practically and religiously. One need only consider, e.g., the RICO act, or the
new Anti-Terrorism bill, or banking regulations, or divorce and inheritance
laws; or one could look at such policies as the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s use of “secret evidence” against alien Muslims, or Child Protective
Services’ discriminatory intervention into Muslim family life. No amount of
isolation will place Muslims beyond the reach of these laws and policies. And
it is only through the medium of legislative politics that laws and policies
are made and unmade. On practical grounds, then, there would seem to be no
question about whether Muslims should get involved in legislative politics. The
question, however, is whether such involvement can be legitimized on the basic
of
shari’ah.
ISLAM AND AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
The question of the legitimacy of Muslim involvement in
American legislative politics raises two important prior question. The first is
whether or nor Muslims are permitted to live in a non-Muslim land. For, if it
is not permissible for Muslims to live in a non-Muslim polity, it is a
fortiori, not permissible for them to participate in its political system. The
second question arises out of the assumption of a positive answer to the first.
If it is permissible for Muslims to reside in a non-Muslim polity, what are the
conditions and circumstances that warrant such a permission? What, if any, are
the Muslims’ obligations towards effecting self-determination once they have
decided to live in a non-Muslim land? These two questions enjoy a rich and
lively pedigree among pre-modern-and even modern-jurists. Some of them have insisted that it is not permissible for Muslims
to live in a non-Muslim land, that is not permissible for Muslims even to
travel to non-Muslim lands, and that it is incumbent upon those who convert to
Islam in a non-Muslim land to migrate to the lands of Islam. Others have had
taken a more lenient approach, concluding that, depending on circumstances, it
may not only be permissible to migrate to a non-Muslim country, it may even be
forbidden to leave it! Between these two poles there is a lot of detail, much
of which underscores the role played by history and experience - above and
beyond interpretations of scripture - in informing the conclusions of the
various schools and individuals. One thing, however, seems to emerge clearly
from all of this: No school and no jurist has ever held (to my knowledge) that
is permissible for Muslims to reside in a non-Muslim land and remain completely
passive, doing nothing to promote the safety and welfare of the Muslims and the
dignity of Islam! This amounts, in effect, to what some jurists have construed
to be a type of consensus (
ijma) to the effect that if Muslims do decide to take up
residence in a non-Muslim land they must, as a community (
ala wajh
al-kifayah), do everything that would appear necessary to ensure the safety
and welfare of the Muslims and, above all, the dignity of Islam. This may or
may not include participation in legislative politics. But once the
permissibility of Muslim residing in a non-Muslim territory is conceded, as a
matter of
shari’a-law, as is the obligation upon those Muslims to act in
a manner appropriate to their circumstances, the question of the propriety of
their involvement in legislative politics becomes a question of fact that is
subject to the discretionary judgments of Muslim individuals and groups. It
cannot be treated as a question of law that is subject to a permanently binding
assessment of
wajib (obligatory) or haram (forbidden). This is a crucial
point that is often confused in the minds of many. And since an adequate
assessment of the positions taken in traditional Islamic law depends on a fair
understanding of this distinction, I shall take a moment here to digress for clarification.
THE LAW-FACT DICHOTOMY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
In
a number of his
jurisprudential works, the great
Maliki jurist, Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi
(d.684/1285) takes up the issue of the distinction between jurisdiction of law
and jurisdiction of fact. Basically speaking, jurisdiction of law is the
authority to interpret the meaning of scripture (including
hadith).
Jurisdiction of fact, on the other hand, is the authority to determine the
existence of facts. Now, it is obvious that say, a medical doctor’s authority
to speak on the existence of certain diseases does not render him an authority
when it comes to interpreting scripture. What is equally true, however - and
this was al-Qarafi’s point - is that a jurist’s mastery of scripture does not
render him an authority when it comes to the determination of facts. According
to al-Qarafi :
There is a difference between Malik’s statement, Engaging in
homosexual relations necessitates stoning, and his statement, “So and so
committed a homosexual act.” We may follow him in the first statement but not
in the second. Rather, this second statement falls into the category of
testimony (
shahadah). If three other upright witnesses testify along
with Malik, the ruling is established; if not, it is not. And in this regard,
the testimony of any other upright witness would be absolutely equal to that of
Malik. His status as a
mujtahid would be of absolutely no consequences
in this regard. Nor would the status of any of the other
mujtahids.
When it comes, in other words, to questions of fact, i.e.,
Did X occur? or Does X exist?, the views of a jurist are not authoritative and
should not be treated as such. Al-Qarafi indicates that many errors had been
committed as a result of overlooking this distinction. As an example, he holds
up the position upheld in the
Maliki school on the status of public
lands and utilities in Egypt following the coming of the Muslims.
According to Malik, agricultural lands and public works of territories
conquered by force are public trusts (
waqf) for the general benefit of
the community. As such, they are exempt from private ownership. It was also
Malik’s view that Egypt had been conquered by force. Based on these two views,
Maliki
jurists in al-Qarafi’s day upheld the ban on privately owning public utilities
in Egypt. Now, according to al-Qarafi, it was proper (though not obligatory) to
accept Malik’s opinion regarding the status of lands conquered by force. For
this was a legal interpretation, based on Malik’s reading of scripture. But it
was wholly improper for
Maliki jurists to accept as authoritative
Malik’s opinion to the effect that Egypt (or any other territory) had been
conquered by force. For, this was a question of fact of which a followers of
Malik (or any historian) might have greater knowledge than Malik. The position
of al-Qarafi’s contemporary
Maliki jurists on this question was thus
neither correct nor permissible to follow.
If a jurist, then, states that such and such is permissible
or impermissible because of the existence of this or that fact, it remains the
right - indeed the responsibility - of individuals to ascertain for themselves
(or through other qualified determiners of specific facts), whether or not the
jurist’s pronouncement of permissibility or impermissibility applies to the
matter at hand. This may or may not lead to consensus within a community. But
the fact remains that when it comes to observable facts, every individual
Muslim is his or her own authority.
THE DISCUSSION AMONG THE SCHOOL OF LAW
We may turn now to the legal discussion among the
Sunni schools of
law on the permissibility of Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands. Of the four
schools of law, the
Maliki school is by far the strictest and least
compromising on this question. We might begin, therefore, with the
Maliki
school, since any concessions or insights gained from them may be justifiably
assumed to apply to the others.
The
Maliki tradition on Muslim residence in non-Muslim
territory goes all the way back to Malik himself (d.179/769). In the
Mudawwanah,
Suhnun (d.240/854) asks the long-time disciple of Malik, Ibn al-Qasim
(d.190/805) if Malik disapproved of merchants travelling to non-Muslim
territory for the purpose of conducting business. Ibn al-Qasim responds, “Yes,
he strongly disapproved of this. And he used to say, “They should not go to
their lands where they will become subject to the laws of polytheism (
ahkam
al-shirk)”. Subsequent
Maliki scholars confirm this position, and the basic prohibition on
Muslims residing in non-Muslim territory is sustained in the
Maliki
school for over a millennium, right down into modern times. The great Spanish
authority, Ibn Rushd (the grandfather) (d.520/1122) for example, insisted that
not only was it forbidden for Muslims to travel to non-Muslim territories, but
that anyone who converted to Islam in a non-Muslim land had to leave and
migrate to a Muslim polity. Such a danger did Ibn Rushd consider Muslim
residence in non-Muslim lands that he proposed that check-points be built on
land and sea to prevent Muslims from leaving the lands of Islam for non-Muslim
territories. These sentiments are repeated several
centuries later in the
fatwas of the great North African jurist, Ahmed
b. Yahya al-Wansharishi (d.914/ 1508). Writing after the fall of Granada in
1492 C.E., al-Wansharishi rejects, time and again, what would seem to be even
the most plausible excuses and insists categorically that the Muslims must
leave Spain for Muslim-controlled territory. At one point, for example,
al-Wansharisi is asked about a Muslim-controlled territory. At one point, for
example, al-Wansharisi is asked about a Muslim who stayed behind in Spain and
acted as an intermediary between the Christian authorities and the Muslim
community, often gaining for the latter concessions that they would otherwise
not have enjoyed. Al-Wansharishi rejects this as a justification and insists
that this man, and all other Muslim residents of Spain, must migrate,
regardless of whatever material losses they might suffer.
The great Nigerian
Maliki
jurist and reformer,
Shaykhu Uthman b. Fudi (d. 1233 /1817) eloquently
laid out his position on the matter in a well-known book entitled
Kitab bayan
wujub al-hijrah ala al-ibad wa bayan wujub nasb al-imam wa iqamat al-
jihad,
i.e., Clarifying the Obligation Upon the Muslims to Migrate (from the lands of
unbelief) and to Install an Imam and to Prosecute the
Jihad. Here
shaykhu,
citing several other
Maliki authorities to authenticate his stance,
insists emphatically that it is absolutely forbidden for Muslims to reside in
non-Muslim territory. He states, in fact, that this is a point of consensus (
ijma)
on which no two scholars disagree. All the way down through
shaykh Muhammad
Ulaysh, who died in 1299/1882-, this uncompromising
Maliki position is
repeated with astonishing fidelity.
Again, the basic reason underlying this position was the fact
that residing in non-Muslim territory would subject Muslims to the laws of the
polytheist unbelievers (
ahkam al-shirk, ahkam al-mushrikin). It is
important, however, to understand exactly what this implied for these jurists.
Falling under “the laws of the polytheist unbelievers” was not simply a matter
of Muslims being subject to engaging in activities forbidden by Islam, e.g.,
certain criminal laws or certain commercial transactions, while at the same
time enjoying the right to maintain their faith and their basic religious
institutions. Rather, “the laws of the polytheist unbelievers” was a much
broader construct that assumed, first and foremost, the precariousness if not
impossibility of remaining Muslims.
This is clearly born out by the position of none other than
the above-cited Ibn Rushd, who argues, for example, that it is permissible for
Muslims to deal in
riba with non-Muslims in a non-Muslim territory. Such an activity, in other
words, though normally forbidden, would not constitute a violation of Islamic
law for Muslims in a non-Muslim land. Thus, this could clearly not have
been the object of Ibn Rushd’s fear. Similarly, in the staunch
shaykhu
Uthman b. Fudi, there is a clear sense that syncretism, or the mixing between
Islamic and pagan beliefs and customs, was feared to be the inevitable result
of African Muslims residing in non-Muslim African lands. This was apparently
based on what
shaykhu understood to be a cultural-political reality,
namely, that where African Muslims lived under non-Muslim African rulers they
generally followed the latters cultural-religious ways and customs.
For this reason, even lands
where the overwhelming majority was Muslim, were not considered by
shaykhu
Uthman to be Muslim lands, if the rulers were not Muslims.
Nor were lands, however, where the rulers were Muslims if the
majority of the population was not. For in this
case, it was feared that the Muslims would be overwhelmed by popular pagan
culture. Thus, for
shaykhu Uthman, only in lands where both the
overwhelming majority and the rulers were Muslims was it permissible for
Muslims to reside.
Turning to al-Wansharisi, here again there are clear signs
that his thinking was informed not simply by fear of the imposition of
un-Islamic laws on Muslims but by fear of the humiliation and possible forced
apostacy that the Muslims might suffer at the hands of Christians. In one of
his
fatwas, for example, in which he insisted that all Muslims must
leave Spain following the Christian take-over, al-Wansharishi lays down the
following list of reasons:
1) that the word of Islam and the testimony of truth (
kalimat
al-islam wa shahadat al-haqq) would not be honored and respected but
humiliated and debased; 2) that the prayer (
salah) would not be openly
displayed but would be subject to humiliation, being scoffed at and made fun
of, which could lead to its abandonment; 3) that the
zakah would be
nullified, since there would be no Imam to collect it; 4) that the fast of
Ramadhan
would be subject to nullification, since there would be no Imam to oversee and
validate its beginning and end; 5) that the
hajj would be rendered
defunct, since it would fall outside the capability of the Muslims (
li adam
istita atihim); 6) that the Muslims would suffer contempt and humiliation,
while the Prophet (
alayhi’s-salam) has said, “The Muslim should not
subject himself to humiliation”; 7) that the Muslims would suffer ridicule of a
type and magnitude that no self-respecting person would needlessly tolerate; 8)
that the honor and integrity of the Muslims, and may be their person and
property, would be jeopardized; 9) that the Muslims would be constantly exposed
to all manners of vice, impurities (
najasat) and religiously
questionable foods.
Clearly, for scholars like Ibn Rushd,
shaykhu Uthman,
and al-Wansharisi, a world in which Muslims could live under non-Muslim rule
and not be subject to official (and non-official) pressure to renounce their
faith, or where the cultural affinities between the Muslims and non-Muslims did
not threaten to blur the boundary between Islam and non-Islam was part of the
unimaginable. Their thinking, however, was perfectly consistent with the
reality of their time and place. Thus, rather than being criticized or scoffed
at for being “rigid,” or “reactionary,” or “conservative,” these scholars
should be commended for being the realists that they were. Having said this
much, however, rather than uncritically accepting and applying their views to
present circumstances, these views should be examined in light of the
above-cited distinction between law and fact.
The views of these scholars was clearly informed, if not
dictated, by what they understood to be the customs and habits obtaining in
non-Muslim lands in their time. This, however, is clearly a question of fact,
and the only question that remains is whether contemporary Muslims should
themselves to the views of these men, even if they differ with the latter in
their assessment of these facts. The answer to this question is provided, once
again, by the
Maliki jurist, Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi. At one point,
al-Qarafi is asked:
What is the correct view concerning those rulings found in
the
madhhab of al-Shafi, Malik and the rest, which have been deduced on
the basis of habits and customs prevailing at the time these scholars reached
these conclusions?
When these customs
change and the practice comes to indicate the opposite of what it used to, are
the
fatwas recorded in the manuals of the jurisconsults rendered thereby
defunct, it becoming incumbent to issue
fatwas based on the new custom?
Or is it to be said, We are
muqallids (lay followers). It is thus not
our place to issue new rulings, as we lack the qualifications to perform
ijtihad
(independent interpretation). We issue, therefore,
fatwas according to
what we find in the books handed down on the authority of the
mujtahids
?
Al-Qarafi’s response is both clear and pointed.
Holding to rulings that have been deduced on the basis of
custom, even after this custom has changed, is a violation of consensus (
ijma)
and an open display of ignorance of the religion.
To acknowledge, then, that America, or any other country for
that matter, is a place where Muslims enjoy constitutionally guaranteed rights
to freedom of religion, protection of life and property and the opportunity to
contribute to the shape of American society does not at all involve a challenge
to the integrity of these
Maliki jurists as jurists. At the same time,
once the right of contemporary Muslims to assess their own reality is
acknowledged, the application of these pre-modern
Maliki views to the
question of Muslims residing in modern America can be seen to be a
misappropriation of an otherwise valid tradition.
Turning to the views of the remaining schools, we find a different
situation. While
Maliki-dominated territories had suffered great losses
at the hands of pagans and Christians, two of the greatest Muslim communities
in history, Spain and Sicily, being irretrievably lost to Christian conquerors,
this differed from the situation in the East, where the
Shafi and
especially the
Hanafi schools dominated. It is true that the Eastern
lands of Islam also suffered losses at the hands of both the Mongols and the
Crusaders. But in both cases, these lands were subsequently returned to Islam,
through voluntary conversion in the case of the Mongols, through military
re-conquest in the case of the Crusaders. During the interim, however, between
the time these Eastern lands were lost to these non-Muslim conquerors and the
time they were returned to Muslim control, Muslims lived, as a simple matter of
fact, under non-Muslim rule, including a three-year during which there was no
caliph! This did not lead, however, to any sustained syncretism or to any mass
exit from Islam, and it seems that this informed the perspective of the
Shafi,
Hanfi and
Hanbal jurists, just as the historical reality in the
West (
al-maghrib) informed that of the
Malikis.
Generally speaking, for the
Shafi’s,
Hanafi’s
and
Hanbali’s, the operative issue is whether Muslims living in a
non-Muslim polity are safe and enjoy enough freedom to practice the rudiments
of their religion. Such Muslims should seek to conduct their affairs in such a
way that they do not contribute to the military strength of their host-country,
such that other Muslims would suffer at the latters’ hands. But, unlike the
Malikis,
these three schools do not begin with the premise that it is not permissible
under any circumstances for Muslims to reside in non-Muslim territory and that
it is incumbent upon those who convert to Islam while in a non-Muslim country
to migrate to a Muslim land.
Hanafi jurists, for example, appear to be
generally unopposed to Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands, assuming that
Muslims are able to establish congregational prayers there, especially
Jumu’ah
and
Id, fast
Ramadhan, and they can work to procure the
appointment of Muslim governors to oversee their affairs.
The
Hanabali’s by and large hold a position similar to
that of the
Hanafis.
Shafi’i jurists, meanwhile, take
matters a step further, as is demonstrated in the position of the great Shams
al-Din al-Ramli (d.1004/1596), also known as “Little al-
Shafi’i. At one
point, al-Ramli is asked about a community of Muslims residing under a
Christian king who exacted taxes from them but allowed them to practice their
religion, i.e., to build mosques, hold Friday prayer, fast
Ramadhan, and
generally apply the laws of Islam. Al-Ramli’s questioner indicates that
although this was the situation at present, there were no guarantees that this
would last and that the Muslims would not subsequently come under the
jurisdiction of Christian laws or pressure to apostacize. Al-Ramli’s answer is
that not only is it not incumbent upon these Muslims to migrate but in fact it
is forbidden for them to do so, because in leaving this territory it was less
likely to be guided to Islam.
In sum, the majority (i.e., three of the four schools) hold
it to be permissible for Muslims to live in non-Muslim territories. This
license was conditioned, however, albeit implicitly, by the assumption that
these Muslims would be in a position to promote and protect their interests and
that they would in fact do just that. Even among the
Maliki’s there are
signs that where this was understood to be the case, the general prohibition
might be relaxed. The real issue, then, was the concrete
situation of the Muslims on the ground, a situation for which the Muslims-not
the non-Muslim-must assume responsibility. On this understanding, it would seem
to me that there are only two tenable positions on the matter of Muslims
residing in America: Either the Muslims are obligated to migrate; or they must
actively pursue the welfare and dignity of Islam and the Muslim. Inaction -
even inaction that hides behind rhetoric or dogmatic and uncritical
appropriations of tradition - is not a justifiable choice.
MUSLIMS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The issue of the active pursuit of Muslim interests brings us
finally to the question of Muslims and the U.S. Constitution, since, obviously,
the constitution provides the legal framework within which any such activity
will have to operate. This is a huge topic which no single essay could hope to
do full justice. In the space remaining, however, I would like to direct a few
remarks towards two aspects of the relationship between Muslims and the constitution.
The first of these is the Muslim attitude toward accepting the provisions and
advantages afforded by the Constitution. The second concerns the challenge that
operating within this constitutional framework poses for Muslims.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
freedom of religion. Muslims, however, are often hesitant, if not hostile,
toward accepting or acknowledging the validity of this provision. This is
because such acceptance and acknowledgment raises in the minds of many Muslims
the question of sovereignty and authority, what Sayyid Qutb often referred to
as
al-hakimiyah. If part of the meaning of the
shahadah is that
God and God alone has the authority to confer rights and impose obligations,
then certainly a man-made constitution that does not derive its authority from
God must be illegitimate, as a violation of God’s rightful monopoly on
authority. By the same token, any Muslim who recognizes the validity of such a
constitution is guilty of attributing legal authority and sovereignty to
someone other than God. To be sure, there is a certain forcefulness to this
logic that renders it difficult at times to resist, at least at face-value.
Closer examination, however, suggests that while this might apply to Muslims
who arrogate to themselves the right to rule independent of god, this is by no
means the only or even most plausible construction to be put on the
relationship between Muslims and the U.S. Constitution.
To begin with, the U.S. constitution was the result of an
agreement among a group of non-Muslims about how to distribute political rights
and power within a non-Muslim polity. Not being Muslims, it was only natural
that this agreement not be based on Islamic law. To recognize this fact, and
concomitantly the validity of such an agreement, is not necessarily a
recognition of the right to ignore or flaunt God’s law. Rather, it is more akin
to the jurists’ recognition of the validity of a formerly Christian or Jewish
couple’s Christian or Jewish marriage even after the couple has embraced Islam.
Obviously, this marriage
did not take place in accordance with Islamic law; in fact, it may have
explicitly violated specific rules of
shari’ah e.g., by not having witnesses
present or including a bride-price consisting of some Islamically banned
commodity, such as wine or pork. Still, the marriage of this couple is
recognized by Muslim jurists as a valid marriage, both in the event that the
couple remains Jews or Christian, and if they convert to Islam. Or, take the
issue of buying from and selling to non-Muslims. Obviously, this entails a
recognition of the property rights of these non-Muslims, since both of these
transactions assumes a legal transfer of property. This obtains despite the
fact that this right could not have acc to these non-Muslims on the basis of
their recognition of any divine authority. And if they do not recognize God’s
authority, how is it that such rights accrue to them? Yet, when, shortly following
the fall of Mecca, the Prophet (
alayhi’s-
salam) asked Safwan b.
Umayyah if he could borrow some tools and weapons and Safwan asked whether the
Prophet was in fact borrowing these things or simply taking them, the Prophet (
alayhi’s-
salam)
responded that he was borrowing them. In other words, the Prophet acknowledged
Safwan’s right over his belongings. Of course, it could be argued that what is really
going on here is that this right is effectively being established by God’s
command to the Prophet not to confiscate the Meccans’ property. But if this is
so, then recognition of these non-Muslims’ right can in no way be seen to
constitute an affront to God’s monopoly as Right-Giver.
The Qur’an and
Sunnah are full of exhortions to the
Muslims to honor treaties and agreements brokered by non-Muslims. Again,
however, this implies a tacit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of non-Muslims
as bargaining parties. In other words, were it not legitimate for non-Muslims
to broker agreements (since such agreements are neither derived from divine
authority nor likely to be based on the law of Islam) it would not be
legitimate, a fortiori, for Muslims to honor these very agreements. Yet, we
find that even agreements to which the non-Muslims attached stipulations that
appeared to curtail or infringe upon certain rights of the Muslims, as
occurred, for example, in the Treaty of Hudaybiyah, where Quraysh stipulated
that Muslims who leave Mecca to join the Prophet (
alayhi’s-
salam)
at Medina must be sent back to Mecca, were honored and recognized by the
Prophet as legally binding. Clearly, however, none of this in any way implied
any acceptance - as a matter of conscience - of the right of non-Muslims to
challenge or violate God’s rightful monopoly as Law-Giver.
All of this is reminiscent of a very rich discussion in
classical Islamic jurisprudence over the question of whether non-Muslims are
responsible for the concrete rules (
furu)- as opposed to the basic
principles (
usul), such as
tawhid, the prophethood of Muhammad,
belief in the Hereafter, etc. - of Islam. The well-known position of the
Hanfi school was that they were
not. This was also the view of the
Shafi’i,
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and, with
some important qualifications, the
Maliki, Shihab al-din al-Qarafi.
On this view, contracts,
property rights, etc. that non-Muslims enjoyed over each other (or with Muslims
in a non-Muslim territory) were accorded full legal validity, even if they had
not been carried out in accordance with the stipulations of Islamic law. Yet, none
of this implied the belief on the part of these jurists that these instruments
were religiously valid, and that by recognizing their legal validity, they were
somehow attributing to someone other than God the right to confer legal rights
in any ultimate sense.
It would seem, then, to be problematic, at the very least, to
insist that Muslim recognition of the validity of the U.S. Constitution implies
a violation on their part of God’s rightful monopoly as Law Giver. How can a
decision among non-Muslims to confer certain advantages upon Muslims be said to
amount to an act of shirk? The U.S. Constitution defines the parameters of a
non-Muslim state, not a Muslim state. How can Muslims be shouldered with the
responsibility for these parameters? If in the future America becomes a
predominantly Muslim country (politically or numerically) then Muslims will be
responsible for ensuring that its legal and political order are consistent with
the dictates of Islam. In the meantime, this becomes a questionable demand at
best. The kind of confusion that has been generated over this issue is, I
think, another example of what happens when Muslims in the West blindly import
views and ideologies from the modern Muslim world.
A more profitable approach for Muslims would be to look at
the opportunities the Constitution affords them to promote their interests as
Muslims and to take full advantage of those opportunities. According to the
Constitution, the U.S. government cannot force a Muslim to renounce his or her
faith; it cannot deny him or her the right to pray, or fast, or perform the
pilgrimage; it cannot force him or her to eat pork, shave his beard or remove
her hijab; it cannot deny Muslims the right to build mosques or to hold public
office; it cannot deny them the right to criticize government officials and
policies, including the person and the policies of the president. The U.S.
government cannot even force a Muslim to pledge allegiance to the United State!
Surely it must be worth the Muslims’ time and energy to ask if these (and many
other) rights and opportunities should be squandered in the name of dogmatic
minutae and uncritical readings of Islamic law and history, rather than turned
to the benefit and welfare of Islam and the Muslims.
MUSLIMS, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The U.S. Constitution does, however, pose at least one
challenge to Muslims, namely, in its insistence on the separation between
religion and state. Many Muslims understand this to mean that Islamic law (or
Jewish or Christian law for that matter) is, as a permanent constitutional
provision, disqualified form becoming the basis of law and or public policy.
Could therefore never become the law of the land. This, in their view, renders
the Constitution unacceptable from their perspective as Muslims.
My understanding, however, of the so-called separation
between church and state is somewhat different. On my understanding, the real
challenge resides not so much in the Constitutional ban on admitting religious
values and rules into the public domain but in the inability or unwillingness
on the part of Muslims to articulate Islamic law in terms that show its benefit
and utility to American society. The doctrine of separation between church and
state in American Constitutional discourse does not means that religion can
play no role in public policy, or even that religious rules cannot be applied
as law. What it means is that religious rules cannot be applied simply because
someone’s religion says they should. Law, in other words, is conceived of as a
being both secular (i.e., this-worldly) and a public trust. A such, only those
laws that prove serviceable to the public here and now can qualify as law. In
other words, the doctrine of separation between church and state might be
likened in many ways, to use the language of Muslim jurists, to a ban on
treating
mu’amalat (matters of public utility and civil transactions) as
if they were
ibadat (matters of religious observances).
In Islamic law, there is a basic distinction between
mu’amalat
and
ibadat.
Ibadat are generally identified as those rules
through whose application the primary benefit (
maslahah) accrues to
humans in the Hereafter, not in this world. These would include such things as
prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and the like. Mu’amalat, on the other hand,
consist of those rules through whose application humans enjoy some benefit in
the here-and-now, in addition to the reward they receive in the Hereafter for
complying with God’s command. These would include such rules as those governing
sales, contracts, theft, drinking, divorce, etc. It is precisely because the
worldly benefits contained in these rules are apprehensible by human reason
that the Law can be extended to cover cases not explicitly addressed by
scripture. This is done through the use of analogy, or
qiyas, a basic
application of
qiyas would run something like the following. Drinking
wine is forbidden; the reason (known in Arabic as the
illah) for this is
that drinking wine corrupts one’s faculties for reasoning; by extending the
prohibition on drinking wine to any substance that contains the
illah of
corrupting one’s mind, a substance like crack-cocaine can be adjudged
forbidden, even though it was not around at the time of revelation. Obviously,
the key to all of this is the ability to analyze the rules of
shari’ah
in order to be able to penetrate the reason or
illah underlying them.
For without this
illah, there can be no analogy, and numerous social and
other problems would go unaddressed.
Now, all of the four
Sunni schools of Islamic law
recognize analogy as a valid mechanism for deducing the law. In addition, they
all recognize that virtually all of the rules of
mu’amalat contain
illahs
or reasons that can be known to man. Moreover, there is a general recognition
of the idea that all of the
mu’amalat are legislated for the purpose of
promoting the worldly welfare and happiness (
masalih) of man. It is
because of this that Muslim jurists are able to debate the application,
modification, suspension, etc. of rules of
mu’amalat depending on
whether or not the purpose, or
illah, for which they were legislated is
likely to be served. It was on this basis, for example, that Ibn Taymiyah once
reportedly stopped one of his disciples from interrupting a group of Mongol
Muslims who were drinking wine. Ibn Taymiyah’s explanation was that the ban on
wines was issued because intoxication turns people away from prayer and from
the remembrance of God. But when these Mongols drink, it turns them away from
looting, rape and murder.
It is precisely through this ability to penetrate and
articulate the rules of Islamic law in ways that clearly define their benefit
and utility to society at large that Muslims are likely to be able to influence
the legal order in America. And it should be understood that once this is done,
there are no Constitutional impediments to having these laws applied in the
public domain. Muslims must be vocal and confident in articulating the public
utility underlying the rules on things like
riba, adultery, theft,
drinking, contracts, pre-marital sex, child-custody and even polygyny. This
should all be done, however, in the context of an open acceptance of American
custom (
urf) as a legally valid source in areas where the shari’ah
admits the reliance upon custom. Muslim Americans to take them. And they should
be willing to recognize areas of common interest and concern.
This much said, it would be foolish to deny that the
prospects for American acceptance of such institutions as stoning, or flogging
or amputation are virtually nil, at least for the foreseeable future. Here,
however, two things, I think, should be born in mind. The first is that the
specific punishments for criminal offenses in Islamic law are precisely the
ibadah
aspects of these rules. In other words, while many other forms of punishment
(e.g., jailing, fines, public announcement) could have served the purpose of
deterring from these acts, God chose these specific punishments. Since,
however, there is no necessary or exclusive relationship between these
punishments and deterrence, these punishment are assigned a status akin to that
of ritual acts of worship. This “ritualistic” aspect is captured in the
jurists’ common reference to these punishments as “right of God (
huquq Allah)”.
Meanwhile, the primary
maslahah, or worldly aim, behind
these rules remains the avoidance of the harm and evil contained in the
forbidden acts. Now, where there is a conflict between these two aspects of
these rules, jurists differed over whether or not the rights of man (e.g.,
protection of property) should take precedence over the rights of God (e.g.,
amputation of the hand). Many, if not most, gave precedence to the rights of
man. Al-Wansharisi, for example, stated openly that if a Muslim has a choice
between living in a land where there is injustice while the rights of God are
observed, the Muslim should choose the land where there is injustice while the
rights of God are observed, the Muslim should choose the land where there is
justice. In other words, if it is not possible to
ensure the rights of God, this should lead Muslims to give up on trying to
ensure the Islamically sanctioned rights of man.
The second thing to keep in mind is that notions of what is
cruel and unusual, of what is barbaric, of what is barbaric, of what is
draconian (which is the real basis upon which America rejects these
punishments) are a function of culture, not law. It is only through changes in
American culture that American attitudes towards such things are likely to
change. Thus, in the end, as in the beginning, we are brought face to face with
the inextricable connection between American culture and Muslim
self-determination. May God grant us the courage and the vision to rise to the
task before us.
End Notes
1. See S.P.
Huntington, “The Erosion of American Identity,” Foreign Affairs, vol 76 no. 5
Sept. - Oct. (1997) : 33.
2. See W.E.B.
Dubois, The Souls of Black Folks, 8th ed. (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett
Publications, 1969), 17.
3. Souls, 17.
4. Souls, 17.
5. In George
Orwell’s classic novel, 1984, there is a scene where the state wants to be
assured that the protagonist, Winston, sees reality in whatever way it
interprets it. To this end, Winston is placed in a “pain-chair,” and an
official holds up three fingers. Then, Winston is asked, “How many fingers am I
holding up, Winston?” When Winston responds, “three,” the official tweaks up
the dial on the pain-chair and asks the question again. This continues until
Winston finally sees four fingers.
6. Ron Borges, a
white writer for the Boston Globe, wrote back in 1996. “My father, who is
eighty years old now, isn’t the most liberal person in the world. He was a
construction worker for most of his life and never liked people who talked a
lot. But when Ali was willing to go to jail for his beliefs, that got my
father’s attention. He told me, You know, I don’t agree with what this guy is
doing, but he’s alright. You get very few chances to be a man in life, and this
guy takes advantage of them. And I’ll tell you something else. My father voted
for (the then racist, segregationist) George Wallace in 1968 and for (the
social liberal) George McGovern in 1972. That’s quit a change, and I have to
believe that watching Ali was part of what influenced him. See T.Hauser,
Muahmmad Ali in Perspective (San Francisco: Collins Publishers, 1996), 104.
7. King himself
openly acknowledged this. Following the failed non-violent demonstrations in
Albany, Georgia in 1962, for example, he stated that the success of non-violent
resistance actually depended on a combination of attacks by whites, full
coverage by the media, consequent national outrage and then government
intervention. See J. White, Black Leadership in America: 1895-1968, 134-35.
8. I think it is
important to understand that, outside the area of religious observances,
shari’ah is basically a code of limits, beyond which the Muslim should not
venture in pursuing his or her worldly ambitions. It is not a “blue-print” for
life that outline everything the Muslim should (or should not) do. Within those
limits, in other words, Muslims should not be looking to shari’ah to tell them
what to do. For example, the shari’ah is not going to describe in any detail
for a man who the woman of his dreams would be or what activities are likely to
bring him pleasure in his spare time. This s up to him to figure out. What the
shari’ah will do is simply let him know if his desires and activities fall
within the scope of what God permits. In short, in the same way that it is
necessary to understand the limits of legislative politics, Muslims need to
understand the limitations of the shari’ah as well as those who
represent it. While adherence to the shari’ah is not inconsistent with
the Muslim’s pursuit of happiness, it will not relieve individual Muslims of
the responsibility for pursuing their own individual happiness. If there is (or
is going to be) such a thing as “Islamic culture,” it can only be the product
of Muslim cultural imagination that is sanctioned or approved of by the shari’ah.
It is not (nor has it ever been) the result of simple adherence to shari’ah,
in the sense of Muslims keeping their religious duties.
9. This is
actually a larger point than space permits me to explicate here. Suffice it for
now to point to the universally agreed-upon rule among the fuqaha, to
the effect that “necessity renders the impermissible permissible,” (ad-darurat
tubih al-muhzurat). Or, outside the area of what may be perceived as
necessities, one need only consider issues like binding oaths (ayman sg.
yamin) and how many of them are daily broken and not expiated for.
10. The question
to music is, of course, a controversial one, the majority of pre-modern (and
modern) jurists holding it to be forbidden. My inclusion of music here is not a
veiled attempt to slip it in under the rug. But if the content of American
culture is as important for Muslims as I have presented it here, then music can
no more be omitted from the purview of “matters that require study,” than, say,
riba or inheritance, or, for that matter, participation in politics!
11. Which
suggests, again, that the problem is not fashion or literature per se but with
involvement with fashion or literature in the West!
12. Blacks
suffered as well from a phenomenon I call “Qarunism” or (al-Qaruniyah),
after the Qur’anic figure, Qarun, who, upon arriving at a position of wealth
and power, disassociated himself from the legitimate aspirations of his people.
Muslims will have to devise ways of resisting this temptation, especially since
ethnic differences among Muslims blurs (or perhaps answer) for many the
question of who “one’s people” are.
13. In this
regard, professor Khaled Abou EI-Fadl has written an excellent and absolutely
indispensable study, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse
on Muslim Minorities From the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth
Centuries,” Islamic Law and Society, 1:2 (1994) : 141-187. This article should
serve as the starting point for anyone interested in the topic.
14. Ihdath
qawl thalith
15. Tamiyiz, 201.
16. See his
Tamyiz, 207-08.
17. The Prophet (alayhi’s-salam)
alluded to this reality in a famous hadis: “You people present your
disputes before me, and I judge according to what I hear. And some of you may
be more eloquent at presenting matters than others. So if I should award to one
of you a right that properly belongs to his brother, let him not take it. For
in such a case I shall have but cut out for him a piece of the Hell fire!”
18. I have not
included the Shi’ite contributions in the present essay only out of fear
that doing justice to that tradition would require a framework much broader
than space permits here.
19. Al-Mudawwanah
al-kubra, 3:278.
20. Muqadimmat
ibn Rushd (on the margin of Mudawwanah), 3:345-47.
21. See, e.g., al-Mi’yar
al-mu’rab, 2:137-41
22. Kitab
bayan wujub al-hijrah ala al-ibad wa bayan wujub nasb al-imam wa iqamat al-
jihad, ed. Fathi Hasan al-Misri (Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press,
1977). See, pp. 12-17, 100, 112-13.
23. Muqadimaat
ibn Rushd. 3:28-39. Among other things, Ibn Rushd bases his opinion on his
interpretation of the Prophet (alayhi’s-salam) having allowed his uncle
Abbas to deal in riba in Mecca prior to Mecca’s conversion to Islam.
This, Ibn Rushd acknowledges, is based on the view that Abbas was a Muslim who
concealed his Islam throughout the time he remained in Mecca, following the
Prophet’s (alayhi’s-salam) migration to Medina. This is disputed among
scholars, some holding that Abbas did not become a Muslim until shortly before
the conquest of Mecca, in year 8 A.H. Here, however, Ibn Rushd points to the hadis
of the Companion, al-Hajjaj b. Ilat, which occurred at Khaybar, which was after
the conquest of Mecca. Here the Prophet confirmed the riba-based
transactions of Abbas, who was now definitely a Muslim, that had been
contracted prior to Mecca’s fall. It was only the riba-based
transactions that came after Mecca’s fall that the Prophet overturned during
his Farewell Pilgrimage.
24. Bayan Wujub,
14-15
25. Bayan Wujub,
14.
26. Bayan Wujub,
13-14. This was clearly related to the fact the shaykhu was operating in
areas that shared a common cultural background, such that the threat of
“lapsing” back into pagan ways or conflicting the meaning of Islamic with pagan
ideas and ways was a constant threat. This, I submit, is actually similar to
the situation of the Prophet (alayhi’s-salam) in Arabia, which
suggests to my mind that the exaggerated obsession with bid’ah is later
development, i.e., arising after Islam had spread outside of Arabia. Prior to
that, the primary concern was far more likely to have been with sliding back
into the already familiar Arab paganism, as opposed to the introduction of new
ideas and customs.
27. See Mi’yar,
2:138-40.
28. Tamyiz, 231.
See also, for a more detailed explanation of this principle, my Islamic Law and
the State, 130.
29. Tamyiz, 231.
30. Abou El-Fadl,
Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities, 172.
31. See, e.g.,
Abou El-Fadl, 157.
32. Abou El-fadl,
Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities, 160.
33. See, e.g.,
al-Wansharisi, Mi’yar, 2:133-34
34. I know of no
disagreement among the four Sunni schools that if a Christian or Jewish
couple convert to Islam, their marriage remains valid and they do not have to
be re-married Islamically.
35. See the
record of this incident in Malik b. Anas, Muwatta 2 vols. ed. Muhammad F. Abd
al-Baqi (Cairo: Dar Ihya al-kutub al-Arabiyah, 1336/1918), 2:543-44.
36. In other
words, if a non-Muslim refused to pray or fast, could he or she be punished as
could a Muslim?
37. See, e.g.,
Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad Shaykhzadah, Majma al-anhur sharh multaqa al-abhur,
2 vols, (Istanbul?: Uthmaniyah Press, 13271908/), 1:660.
38. See al-Mahsul
fi ‘ilm usul al-fiqh, 6 vols. ed. Taha Jabir Fayyad al-Alwani (Beirut: Mu’assasat
al-Risalah, 1412/1992), 2:237-42. Al-Shafi’i
himself, however, and according to al-Razi, the majority of Shafi’is
strongly disagreed with this position. Even they however, did not argue that a
non-Muslim could be punished, e.g., for not fasting or praying.
39. See Sharh
tanqih al-fusul, ed. Taha Abd al-Ra’uf Sa’d, (Cairo: al-Maktabat
al-Azhariyah, 1393/1973), 162-67.
40. See the discussion
by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Fiqh al-ma’rakah...fiqh al-awraq,” Majallat
al-amal, May-June (1991):63. Ibn Taymiyah’s argument is actually based on
what jurists commonly refer to as the hikmah, which is really ‘the
reason behind the reason or illah”. In other words, the reason (illah)
that wine is forbidden is because it intoxicates. But why in intoxication bad?
It is bad because it promotes violence, licentiousness, etc. This is the hikmah.
Ibn Taymiyah’s example, then, actually demonstrates the tendency among jurists
to go farther than the illah in considering the application of the law.
41. This is why,
for example, once a theft has been reported to the Muslim authorities, the
punishment cannot be set aside, even if the victim wishes to pardon the perpetrator.
Because this specific punishment is a right of God and not a right of man, it
cannot be forfeited, unlike, say, a woman’s right to maintenance or a
creditor’s right to be paid a debt.
42. Mi’yar,
2:121: “Baladun fihi ma asin fi huquq allah fa huwa awla min baladin fihi
ma’asin fi mazalim al-ibad.”