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Austin Bay Blog » 2005» May

Austin Bay Blog

5/31/2005

Watergate Template?: No, Real Watergate News

Filed under: General — site admin @ 5:20 pm

Yes, a couple of weeks after Newsweek falls flat with its Vietnam/Watergate templated “Koran flushing” story, we have..real Watergate. (Courtesy MSNBC.) Conspiracy? Of course not. Former FBI-number 2, W. Mark Felt, was Woodward and Bernstein’s tipster– and that’s a high quality source (as the MSNBC story notes).

Key quote:

The identity of the source has sparked endless speculation over the last three decades. Nixon chief of staff Alexander Haig, White House press aide Diane Sawyer, White House counsel John Dean and speechwriter Pat Buchanan were among those mentioned as possibilities.

Felt himself was mentioned several times over the years as a candidate for Deep Throat, but he regularly denied that he was the source.

“I would have done better,” Felt told The Hartford Courant in 1999. “I would have been more effective. Deep Throat didn’t exactly bring the White House crashing down, did he?”

Felt had expressed reservations in the past about revealing his identity, and about whether his actions were appropriate for an FBI man, his grandson said.

According to the article, Felt once told his son, Mark Jr., that he did not believe being Deep Throat “was anything to be proud of. … You (should) not leak information to anyone.”

His family members thought otherwise, and persuaded him to talk about his role in the Watergate scandal, saying he deserves to receive accolades before his death. His daughter, Joan, argued that he could “make enough money to pay some bills, like the debt I’ve run up for the children’s education.”

But conspiracy theorists of another era would have a field day with a J. Edgar Hoover protege bringing down a president.

Likewise, there’s a bet to be made that if the president involved were anyone other than Nixon, the “pay some bills” angle of this revelation would get tons of negative media attention. I don’t brook the old man his notoriety or reward for his story.

But there is this richly ironic note, one worthy of a Greek tragedy:

Felt was convicted in the 1970s for authorizing illegal break-ins at homes of people associated with the radical Weather Underground. He was pardoned by President Reagan in 1981.

5/30/2005

The Shame of Amnesty International

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:34 am

This essay by Dennis Byrne in the Chicago Tribune states it well. The “moral equivalency” game Amnesty plays is as pathetic as it is adolescent.

I’ll quote at length:

By labeling the U.S. anti-terrorism prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the “gulag of our times,” the people of Amnesty International must think we’re stupid or ignorant.

Stupid or ignorant enough to fall for the assertion that whatever is happening at Guantanamo is the legal and moral equivalent of what happened in the hundreds of slave labor and concentration camps scattered throughout the former communist Soviet Union. Equivalent to a system that brutalized tens of millions, of which untold millions died of starvation, exposure, exhaustion, torture, illness or execution.

OK, maybe in light of this generation’s dismal ignorance of history, we deserve to be treated like dummies. But Amnesty International, which purports to speak on behalf of human rights everywhere, ought to know better. And if we let it get away with this historical obscenity, then we are stupid.

Amnesty International might as well have compared the treatment of a few hundred detainees at Guantanamo to the Holocaust. To review the gulag’s history: Millions of political dissenters, victims of police state terror, assorted “undesirables,” ethnic minorities (e.g. Chechens and Crimean Tartars) and others guilty of doing nothing wrong were shipped to the gulag to mine, build railroads, dig canals, toil in factories, clear forests and perform other slave labor. Until they were too sick to continue or just dropped dead, left to become a part of the permafrost. Millions more were shot or died in Holocaust-style cattle cars before getting there.

Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum, in her Pulitzer-Prize winning book, “Gulag: A History,” figures that from 1928 through 1953, about 24 million people passed through the various camps, many in brutal Siberia or other remote regions. That’s more than twice Cuba’s entire population. Among them were hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of prisoners of World War II. She estimated that 600,000 were Japanese, who were kept in the slave camps for years after the end of the war. Few ever made it home.

Either Amnesty International isn’t aware of this history, or it knows of it but is lying for the sake of a good sound bite. In either case, the group has lost credibility to speak on behalf of the victims of human-rights violations. Moreover, Amnesty International has dishonored millions of gulag victims…

Byrne adds this:

…Am I making too much of the misuse of a single word? First, the group’s use of gulag wasn’t a casual slip of the tongue; it was calculated. As the left is pleased to often remind everyone, “words have consequences.” And the unacceptable consequence of the gulag comparison is the debasement of the word “atrocity” and a general desensitizing of moral outrage.

Read the whole thing.

UPDATE: Criminal action by US troops, intelligence agents, and government workers needs to be punished. When murder and torture are discovered, prove murder and torture in court and send the guilty to jail. I support capital punishment for murderers and torturers. Ultimately, Amnesty is guilty of a self-inflicted wound. Documenting evil, barbarity, and cruelty is to be lauded. But –just like Hitler comparisons cheapen the Holocaust, “gulag” comparisons cheapens the grand, immense, state-directed evil of Stalinism. Amnesty uses “gulag” to get a headline and to energize KosKidz — it’s a tawdry act of PR, a carny gimmick. FWIW, I belong to Amnesty International. It’s one of the few organizations that tries to keep poets out of political prisons.

5/29/2005

UPDATED: So the French say “Mais non”– Time for a Greater NAFTA

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:00 pm

The French vote’s in and the break is (according to the AP) 56 percent against the EU constitution, 44 percent for the rambling, anti-democratic text. (Here’s a link to a later Reuters report, which may be a more permanent link.)

I know, the vote wasn’t against Big Brother Brussels per se, as this comment from a British commenter noted on an earlier post:

If they vote “Non” it hardly means the EU is kaput. It probably does mean the proposed treaty is kaput though.

The irony is that if they vote no it’ll be for all the wrong reasons. Social democrats, liberals and mainstream conservatives are all in favour of it. The main people pushing against it are the far right who love foreigner bashing (especially on the matter of the supposed potential threat of Turks swarming in an pinching all the jobs) and the hard left and Commies who reckon it’s all part of an Anglo plot to take over the EU and bring our ghastly capitalistic ways with us.

The AP report says:

The rejection could kill any hopes Chirac may have had for a third term. His approval ratings have plunged to 39 percent in recent weeks, and there was widespread speculation a “no” vote would prompt him to fire unpopular Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin.

There’s also this juicy remark from Britain’s Jack Straw:

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called for a “period of reflection” after the vote.

“The result raises profound questions for all of us about the future direction of Europe,” Straw said in London.

We’ll get back to Jack in a moment.

It’s clear that a disgruntled and discombobulated French electorate expressed various types of outrage and enrage (an odd construction but given France’s constant straddling act, strikes me as appropirate). However, if the Communist Redshirts and Le Pen’s fascist Brownshirts are politically determinative in France –and that’s an argument one can make based on this plebiscite– then let’s recognize France as the politically sick society it truly is. If “sick” is a push word and too therapeutic for the pragmatic set, then call it the “lost” society. In some ways the news that the Cold War really is over has finally reached Paris. Granted– the EU’s founders had reason to be wary of rabid nationalism, given the 20th century slaughters of WWI and WWII, but the EU was as much a creature of Cold War collective threat as it was a child of economic rationalism. The economic “super market” component made fundamental sense. Free trade makes sense, particularly when your neighborhood is one of the planet’s nicest pieces of real estate — well-heeled, well-educated, and intellectually-creative Western Europe.

But political unification, beyond a loose confederation of democratic states? That pitch was always suspect, something of a canard. Well hello French duck. The French electorate has damned the intellectual product of D’Estaing and his cohorts, and stung The Crook In Chief, Jacques Chirac. At one level this is a deserved domestic slap at M. Chirac. Good deal. God smiles on drunks and the United States of America. So garcon, while you’re up, bring me the head of Jacques Chirac and I’ll give your the ten franc note and the five-mark piece I’ve stashed in my dresser drawer as curios. And if you can’t bring me his head, tell’im us cowboys are gettin’ ourselves a posse. We’re going have fun and games and some damn long yucks at the expense of Chirac and the Euro-elites for, say, the next ten, twelve, fifteen years?

As Reuters says:

France overwhelmingly rejected the European Union constitution on Sunday, pitching the EU into crisis and dealing a potentially fatal blow to a charter designed to make the enlarged bloc run smoothly.

Canada’s CTV says:

The result is a slap in the face for the French political establishment, which pioneered the idea of Europe’s integration…

…Philipped de Villiers, a leading French ‘No’ campaigner, declared: “There is no more constitution.

“The people have massively said ‘No.’ It is necessary to reconstruct Europe on other foundations that don’t currently exist.”

The charter was designed to pull European nations together, but it has left people divided. Backers say it would strengthen the EU economically and allow the continent to speak with one voice politically, while opponents say it will strip nations of national identity and trigger an influx of cheap labour.

The anti-constitution vote may have an impact on Chirac’s political future.

In recent weeks, his popularity ratings have plunged to 39 percent, and there is widespread speculation that a ‘No’ vote would force him to fire unpopular Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin.

Chirac has warned that ‘No’ would mean “Europe would be broken down, searching for an impossible consensus.”

The Dutch vote on Wednesday, with polls indicating 60 percent of Dutch voters intending to vote “No.”

For years the French elites have said “There is no Plan B” — meaning there is no fall back position to a Euro-super state.

But on reflection (per Jack Straw) there is a Plan B, and that’s a Euro-zone free market — independent nations sharing a currency and benefiting from free trade and the free flow of labor. Hold the comments– I’ll amend that to read “freer flow of labor.” It’s far tougher for a Spaniard to move to Poland than it is for an Arizonan to move to Maine.

But Mr. Straw said the French vote raises questions about the future direction of Europe.

If the Dutch reject the EU constitution, I see a potential Plan C. It’s more than an ultimate revenge for the dirty anti-American games Chirac and his pal, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, have played during the War on Terror– for Great Britain and Holland it may make a great deal of economic and political sense.

Several years ago Conrad Black suggested that Great Britain join NAFTA– the North American Free Trade Association. He thought Britain’s liberal economic tradition was a better fit with the US and Canada than with French and German statist economies. (Black wasn’t the first to make the suggestion, but he did so with more of a public splash than earlier advocates.)

The Dutch have an Anglophilic streak and a pro-US bent. (The Dutch put a battalion in Iraq. I met with Dutch officers in Baghdad several times– and was impressed.)

So let’s offer NAFTA membership to Holland and the United Kingdom. If you’re Dutch or British, why be stuck in the floundering lost cause of a Franco-centric Greater Europe? We’ll call it the North Atlantic Free Trade Association. Heck, we don’t even have to change the acronym.

UPDATE: Comments 8 and 9: Great comments. “Counter-democratic” is a very descriptive term and the analysis of how it ultimately dovetails with “anti-democratic” is on point. Thanks.

The London Times says Chirac may blame Tony Blair. (Read the entire Times article.)

And here’s The Guardian’s intial take on the French rejection. It’s a long article, but I think these are the key points:

It is too early to say whether Europe’s leaders will be going back to the drawing board after France’s stunning rejection of the EU constitutional treaty. But it is already clear that Sunday’s resounding “non” by 55% of voters plunges the union into a grave and unprecedented crisis.
No one is suggesting that the EU is about to fall apart. Denmark, Sweden and Ireland have said “no” in previous European referendums and life went on pretty much as before, in some cases after a second vote. But these were all small countries and relatively late arrivals on the scene. If a large founder member of the club, such as France, is so deeply disenchanted, pretty much everyone else has to sit up and listen - whether they like it or not.

Indeed– there will be Euro-denial, followed by Euro-therapy; there will be Euro-accusations, there will be endless Eur-opinions, until, at some point, America will be blamed– for capitalism, hyper-puissance, etc.

The Guardian indirectly addresses a commenter’s point that the EU is “counter-democratic”:

The burning question for now is whether the process of ratifying the treaty will, or indeed should, continue. Under EU law, it has to be approved by every one of the 25 member states in order to come into force. Nine countries, including Germany, Italy and Spain, have already ratified it by the simple procedure of parliamentary vote - no risk there of an outpouring of popular opinion. Should the views of close to 200 million people be ignored?

Or should member states which say “no” - like Denmark and Ireland in the past - be asked to vote again until they come up with the “right” answer. “What part of ‘no’ don’t you understand?” enraged Irish sceptics asked when they threw out the Nice treaty. They were asked to repeat the exercise anyway, losing to a better-organised yes campaign next time round.

There is an obvious tension between the formal position and what makes political sense. Formally, the ratification should go on, and may well do so. But politically, many argue, it is pointless…

Here’s a cut and splice of various other key quotes from the article:

…And asking people to vote a second time seems both wrong and pointless. Why would French voters change their minds if an identical text were re-submitted for their approval in a few months’ time? A different treaty might be a different matter, but most governments recognise that re-negotiation is out of the question. Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president who chaired the convention that drew up the constitutional text, has insisted that it simply cannot be done. …

….Still, as in any negotiation, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. And reopening the whole package would almost certainly lead to total collapse -”detricotage”, as the French say. So the most likely option may be to consign the whole 448-page text to the filing cabinet, or the dustbin, depending on your view. Either would be an ignominious end to a project that began with such high hopes and concluded to the triumphant strains of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, Europe’s anthem…

…All in all, surveying the European scene the morning after France’s extraordinary vote, the view is bleak and prospects uncertain - and may remain so for months, and perhaps years, to come.

It’s a good read — remarkably sober for the Guardian, and indicative of the the rejection’s heavy political punch.

5/28/2005

Radioblogger: Transcript of my Thursday night appearance on Hugh Hewitt

Filed under: General — site admin @ 4:06 pm

Ah, the risks and joys of live radio and tv– and nowadays you can read the transcript on the Internet, in perpetuity. My answer to Hugh’s last question should have been a bit tighter, but he asked a very interesting question and my last sentence provides a decent answer.

The Iraqi army of the Iran-Iraq War was motivated by fear of both its traditional Iranian enemy and Saddam’s secret police. The Iraqis and Iranians fought a WWI infantry mass-killing slugfest– dirty and grinding battles of attrition, but not that complex. They would try to use combined arms tactics and occasionally succeed, but coordination was very iffy. The use of ballistic missiles was reminiscent of WWII V-2 attacks: target a very big city and let’er rip. (As it is, SCUD’s an updated V-2.) The idiotarians of 1991 who talked on and on about Iraq’s “hardened and experienced desert army” hadn’t looked at too many maps. The Iran-Iraq war had some desert fighting, but much of the fighting was in mountains, on plains near the Tigris River, or in marshy areas. Several huge battles were fought on the Al Faw peninsula, which lies at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab (confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers).

Memorial Day Speech– for Tejanos in Action

Filed under: General — site admin @ 2:52 pm

This morning I spoke at a Memorial Day ceremony held at the Travis County International Cemetery. A group of Hispanic vets tends the graves of indigent American veterans buried in the cemetery. The place is one of those plots of ground with a decidedly checkered past. In the 19th century it was a “paupers graveyard.” The county buried small pox victims at the site, and –according to one of the officers in Tejanos in Action– victims of a plague that struck in the early 20th century were buried there as well. I suspect the land served as “a Negro cemetery” and “a Mexican cemetery.”

Approximately twenty years ago Tejanos in Action started fixing up the cemetery and handling the burials of indigent veterans.

In early May Tejanos in Action asked me to speak at this year’s Memorial Day ceremony, held today, May 28. At events like these I always wonder what I need to say–but I know what I must say. They asked me to wear my uniform– it was raining so I wore my DCUs instead of greens. My wife also tagged along– she was dressed to the nines, despite the bad weather.

Note the mother of Lance-Corporal Nicholas S. Perez, USMC, was in attendance. Lance-Corporal Perez was killed in action on September 3, 2004, in Iraq. (He was 19 years old.) My wife and Mrs. Valdez had a nice chat before the service. A number of Lance-Corporal Perez’ family members and friends also came. They wore t-shirts with his picture on it.

An honor guard from Tejanos in Action conducted the flag ceremony. A bugler played taps and the honor guard fired a 21-gun salute. Tejanos in Action commander Jose Montoya introduced me. Another honor guard –this one composed of high school students from a school service club and drill team– stood to my side and behind me. This isn’t the first time I’ve had to give a speech “in the round,” and it a peculiar kind of challenge.

Here’s the text of today’s speech:

I am honored to be asked to speak on behalf of Tejanos in Action here at the Travis County International Cemetery.

At one time this cemetery is what another era called a Potter’s Field or Pauper’s Graveyard – a grave site for the destitute, for the disenfranchised, for the socially disdained, for those grand society might conveniently forget.

Of course Tejanos in Action has changed that sad legacy,–flipped it completely — and much for the better, for this cemetery is now dedicated to remembering, not forgetting. Thank you and your organization for this gift which enriches our history and in doing so enriches our spirit and in doing so enriches our democracy. The mission of each generation is to take what we have and do better, do more with it. Liberty gives us this chance, to choose to take a sad and forgotten plot and turn it into a beautiful, peaceful place.

We know why we are here to remember—it’s out duty as citizens, as veterans, and as free men and women.

Memorial Day is about taking a moment to reflect and to remember, to reflect and to respect the special gift of those who did their duty.

Memorial Day is a time to recall the personal and shared sacrifice, recognizing what the dead we honor did for each of us individually and for America as a nation, recognizing what those who serve us today are risking for our sake.

Military service is hard service. Everyone who’s ever worn the uniform knows that. It is a special burden, particularly in a free society.

In some ways it is the hardest job as well as the most necessary job. It is the job of the soldier that makes our liberty possible, and it is our liberty that makes everything else possible.

I want to thank Yolanda Valdez, mother of Lance Corporal Nicholas Perez who served in Iraq last year with the 3/7 Marines and was killed in action last September. Thank you Mrs. Valdez for your son’s bravery and sacrifice, and your bravery and sacrifice.

I never knew the men and women we are here to honor today. I only know they were Americans who wore the uniform of soldiers, sailors marines, and airmen. But that is enough, in fact, that is more than enough for all of us who come to this cemetery.

For the service of these men and women buried here we are thankful. God Bless them ––and may God grant us peace.

copyright Austin Bay May 27, 2005 all rights reserved

After the ceremony we stood around and talked. Many of the men in Tejanos in Action are Vietnam vets. One of the girls in the high school honor guard will be a freshman this Fall at the University of Texas. She wants to go to law school and eventually become a judge. My wife got her name– my wife’s firm is always looking for quality summer hires and quality “runners” during the school year. This young lady has quite a resume’ and she looked extra sharp in her camouflage drill team uniform.

Alas, Newsweek and Al Jazeera didn’t send reporters. I didn’t see Linda Foley there, either, or Eason Jordan. Believe me, Tejanos in Action would have been glad to have them.

UPDATE: Nice post from neo-neocon. She says the speech inspired her. Note how she carefully examines — and gently excoriates– the reactionary Left’s utopian solipsism. She calls it a dreamworld. Okay, fair word, but I think the “dreamworld” is more aptly described as a hideous kind of selfishness and self-absorption.

Her comments about courage remind me of a conversation I had in 1996 at the Texas Book Festival. Actually, it was a conversation I overheard. A man who had just been on a Texas history panel was fuming in a hallway and complaining to a couple of friends standing with him. From what I gathered, a woman (either on the panel or in the audience) had started calling the Alamo’s defenders racists and sexists, etc., and made a comment about the “sexist focus” of history. (And when I say I gathered that, I’m paraphrasing what the man said.)

I do no know why I asked him this, I guess it was because he was suddenly looking at me. I asked him “Why do you think she said that?”

He replied: “Because what those men did took courage, physical courage. And she doesn’t have it, she’s petty and afraid. So she has to diminish them so she doesn’t have to confront her own cowardice. ”

Then he asked me: “Do you know what kind of courage it takes to face bullets?”

I was taken aback a bit, but I replied: : “I know soldiers have to do what they have to do.”

He gave me a curt nod, turned back to his friends, and continued to fume.

My reply wasn’t the most articulate of observations, but that is what I said and I’m in a position to guarantee it’s true enough.

I have no idea who this man was, I have no idea who his antagonist was, and I only have a second-hand story in the hallway.

Yes, the man was angry. He may well have been angry with an academic sparring partner he couldn’t stomach at the personal level. He may have unfairly characterized her comments– and I think that is likely. Let’s take those possibilities, or probabilities, into account. But we’ve all heard those kind of comments, and they reflect an establishment position in much of liberal academia. I think the angry man in the hallway hit on a fundamental factor in a lot of the elitist Left’s condescending treatment of soldiers and disdain for the military. I’d be interested in neo-neocon’s assessment.

UPDATE 2: Neo-neocon responds. Her post is extremely thoughtful. This is a difficult subject to treat, since it has so many emotional tangents. Both the “right” and the “left” are deeply suspicious of “the other guy’s motives.”

5/27/2005

It’s never over ’til it’s over: Japanese soldiers discovered in southern Philippines

Filed under: General — site admin @ 1:08 pm

You think World War Two ended with a Hollywood conclusion?

This is from the Daily Telegraph. The headlines reads: Sixty years on, Japanese soldiers found on island

The Telegraph reports:

Two men claiming to be World War II Japanese soldiers have been found hiding on a Philippine island.

Japan is sending embassy officials to Mindanao to meet them.

“Embassy officials will check whether they were truly former soldiers” of the now defunct army, Japan foreign ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima said.

Japanese media said the two men had been living in guerilla-controlled mountains until late this month.

It is not known if they knew of Japan’s surrender in August 1945 to Allied forces.

The two men contacted a Japanese national who was on the island collecting the remains of dead Japanese soldiers.

They said they wanted to return to Japan.

But Japan’s Sankei Shimbun daily said the men were afraid of facing a court martial for deserting the front lines.

Japan was stunned in 1974 when former imperial army intelligence officer Hiroo Onoda was found in the jungle on the Philippine island of Lubang. He did not know of Japan’s surrender 29 years earlier.

After being repatriated, Mr Onoda emigrated to Brazil.

Another former soldier, Shoichi Yokoi, was found on Guam in 1972. He returned home and died in 1997.

Syria Confesses

Filed under: General — site admin @ 7:24 am

At least Tigerhawk argues Syria’s announcement –that it has stopped 1200 infiltrators into Iraq– amounts to a confession that Saddam’s and Zarqawi’s reactionaries are propped up by democratic Iraq’s regional enemies.

Key quote:

…Syria announced yesterday that in recent weeks it had arrested 1,200 would-be insurgents who were attempting to cross from its territory into Iraq.

“We gave a lot of information to the United States on these issues, which prevented many attacks, but regrettably, the United States did not recognize such kind of help,” [Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations, Fayssal Mekdad,] said in an interview.

The Associated Press, it seems, has written this story upside down. If Syria has, in fact, been able to arrest more than a thousand insurgents in just the last few weeks, why hasn’t it been doing that for the last two years? Syria, in its braggodocio, has implicitly confessed that it has been able to stop insurgents from crossing the border all along, and effectively admitted the charges against it.

5/26/2005

A French “NON”: Is the EU kaput?

Filed under: General — site admin @ 8:46 am

I will have a post on this tomorrow. The Times On-Line reports as France prepares to vote on the EU Constitution.

Remember– this is rumor and speculation, private comments, though the Times does name names. The popular vote is what really counts. [ED: or should count, remember, this is France and the French elite only understand “Non” when the guillotine’s in place.] The Times’ lede:

The leader of France’s ruling party has privately admitted that Sunday’s referendum on the European constitution will result in a “no” vote, throwing Europe into turmoil.

“The thing is lost,” Nicolas Sarkozy told French ministers during an ill-tempered meeting. “It will be a little ‘no’ or a big ‘no’,” he was quoted as telling Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the Prime Minister, whom he accused of leading a feeble campaign.

Although Europe would be thrown into disarray, the Government would be greatly relieved if M Sarkozy were right.

Ministers have privately told The Times that Britain is prepared to ditch its commitment to a referendum if France, or the Netherlands next Wednesday, vote against the constitution. They believe that if the French say “no”, President Chirac will have to declare the constitution dead or promise a renegotiation. ..

Zarqawi As Myth, Ghost, and Damaged Goods

Filed under: General — site admin @ 7:08 am

So yesterday’s rumor –that Abu Musab al -Zarqawi had been wounded– moves up a notch on the reliability scale. The Iraqi government (Interior and Defense Ministries) says it believes that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been wounded, though the extent of his wounds are unknown. Fox TV just reported that Zarqawi may be in a hospital in a neighboring country. That rates as a rumor.

Zarqawi is a master-terrorist, at the tactical level. He’s cunning. He can attract fanatics and turn fanatic desire into front-page mass murder. Strategically, however, he’s in the process of engineering his own movement’s defeat. His “bloodbath tactics” have backfired in Iraq and –according to several analysts– are in the process of turning Arab public opinion against Al Qaeda. He’s brought Islamist terror to the center of the Arab world, and Islamist terror kills Arabs and Muslims without mercy. As for operational success? That’s a tougher call. He’s failed to ignite any kind of mass uprising against the Iraqi government. Instead of baiting Shias and Kurds into a civil war he’s hardened their political resolve– a Kurd is now Iraq’s president. He has played a key role in sustaining Iraq’s Sunni holdouts– in part terrorizing Sunnis who might consider a deal with the Iraqi government. That’s a “negative” kind of success (ie, he’s not inspiring, he’s enforcing).

Has Zarqawi been wounded or is he dead? Or is he being “withdrawn from the combat zone?” I raise these questions because at this point in time Zarqawi may be more valuable to Al Qaeda as a “mythic warrior” or “ghost.” It’s tough to kill a myth and darned hard to kill a ghost. Here’s the argument: Zarqawi’s damaged goods, physically and politically. From Al Qaeda’s point of view, and possibly Saddam’s henchmen, it’s time to get Z-Man out of Iraq, and then have Al-Jazeera and Newsweek turn him into Robin Hood.

From the AP (via AT&T’s website, so the link may not be permanent):

Iraq’s interior and defense ministers said Thursday that they have information that Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been wounded.
“We have information in the Ministry of Interior that al-Zarqawi was wounded, but we don’t know how seriously,” Interior Minister Bayan Jabr said during a news conference. “We are not sure whether he is dead or not but we are sure that he is injured.”

An Internet statement claimed Tuesday that al-Zarqawi had been wounded in recent fighting. The statement, posted on a Web site known for carrying extremist material, could not be immediately authenticated.

“Yes, it is true,” said Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Duleimi when asked if al-Zarqawi had been wounded. Asked how he knew, he said: “It is my job.”

The speculation over al-Zarqawi’s health deepened Wednesday after reports that two Arab doctors in another country were treating Iraq’s most wanted militant, who has claimed responsibility for the country’s deadliest attacks.

Here’s a trackback to my post of May 25th for background.

UPDATE: From StrategyPage’s FYEO daily email. StrategyPage thinks Al Qaeda is preparing the faithful for Zarqawi’s death:

May 25, 2005; While thousands of Iraqi police and troops round up hundreds of terrorist suspects in Baghdad, American troops have begun another sweep west of Baghdad, where al Qaeda has established bases since they were driven out of Fallujah late last year.

Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi was wounded in action about a month ago, shot in the chest, and hastily treated. The wound didn’t heal, and al Zarqawi has been taken to a foreign country for treatment. Now al Qaeda members are being told that al Zarqawi had been wounded and should be prayed for. A web site announcement appears to be an attempt to prepare al Qaeda supporters for al Zarqawi’s death. Because al Qaeda has invested so much in building up al Zarqawi’s image and stature, his demise would be a major blow to the terrorist cause. Just admitting, on a known al Qaeda web site, that al Zarqawi was wounded, is bad PR. Al Qaeda lives and dies by its public image. In the last few months, that image has been taking a major beating throughout the Arab world.

The political scenario I’m suggesting goes a step beyond the “bad PR” StrategyPage notes — Al Qaeda has to try to make lemonade out of Z-Man’s putrid, decayed lemons. We’ll stay tuned.

5/25/2005

What do we know and when do we know it?: Zarqawi, Al Qaeda, and Saddam

Filed under: General — site admin @ 7:45 am

I just finished an appearance on a local radio program (KLBJ-AM) and “Hey, is Zarqawi really wounded?” was the question du jour. Of course the real question being asked is “What do we really know about Al Qaeda, and when will we know it?” That’s not as fine a soundbite as “what did he know and when did he know it?” (from the press’ Watergate template), but it is a fundamental question (perhaps the fundamental question) in The Millennium War. (Another candidate for “the fundamental question” is American will to stick out “the long, hard slog” of war, police duty, and nation building.)

Let’s consider Zarqawi’s wound. In late April the rumors began– that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been wounded in a scrape with either US or Iraqi forces. Now a website linked to Al Qeada claims Zarqawi was wounded “for the sake of God.”

This is from the AP, via the Houston Chronicle:

The statement was posted on a Web site known for carrying prior statements by al-Qaida in Iraq and other militant groups. The Arabic word for injury or wound used in the statement, jarh, could mean that al-Zarqawi suffered either a wound in an attack or an accidental injury. But the context implies that he was wounded in an attack or battle.

“Let the near and far know that the injury of our leader is an honor, and a cause to close in on the enemies of God, and a reason to increase the attacks against them,” said the statement, posted in the name of the group’s media coordinator, Abu Maysarah al-Iraqi.

It ended with prayers for al-Zarqawi, calling on the nation of Islam to “pray for our Sheik Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to recover from an injury he suffered for the sake of God.”

Sure, spreading the rumor of a wound could be a smokescreen, to try to sidetrack coalition intelligence (ie, direct assets to search for a wounded man). The rumor might also be political preparation on Al Qaeda’s part. Shiek Zarqawi may be in a bad way and Al Qaeda has a “mythic investment” in Z-Man. At some point we’ll know.

As for Saddam and Al Qaeda: terrorists, tyrants, and criminals all inhabit the same sewer of illicit money, covert communications, and blackmarket weapons. Though secular fascists (like Saddam) and theo-fascists (like Osama bin Laden) have very fundamental philosophical differences, they share a common enemy: the US.

As I mentioned in a recent post, Saddam and Zarqawi: Al Qaeda’s Shellgame, Jordan’s King Abdullah and his intelligence services certainly believed Saddam and Zarqawi connected. Now Roger L. Simon points to information that former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has evidence of Saddam-Al Qaeda connections (via Mystery Achievement blog).

Who was Saddam’s visitor in 1999, according to Allawi? : Al Qaeda bigwig Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

The quote is from Italy’s AKI, with Mystery Achievement providing an English translation. Here’s the lede and key information from Allawi:

Baghdad, 23 May - (Aki) - “Al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, visited Iraq under a false name in September 1999 to participate in the ‘Ninth Islamic People’s Congress’”: revealed former Iraqi Premier, Iyyad Allawi, to the Arab daily, “Al-Hayat”. The Shiite political figure supplied to the newspaper certain information discovered by the Iraqi Secret Service in the archives of the previous regime which clarify the ties between Saddam Hussein and Islamic terrorist organizations. “Al-Zawahiri was summoned by Izza Ibrahim Al-Douri,” said Allawi, “[who at the time] was vice president of the Council of the Direction of the Revolution, in order to participate in the congress along with 150 Islamic authorities coming from 50 Islamic countries.”

According to Allawi important information was also gathered about the presence of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi[’s presence] in the country. “The Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi secretly entered Iraq in the same period,” he affirmed, “and began to form a terrorist cell, although the [Iraqi Secret] Service did not have precise information about his entry into the country.”

These revelations were released only following those made by the Jordanian king, Abdallah II (also to “Al-Hayat,”) concerning the refusal on the part of Saddam to transfer Zarqawi to authorities in Amman. Regarding those revelations, Allawi said: “The words of the Jordanian king are precise and important. We have proven [the fact of] the Zawahiri’s visit to Iraq, but we do not have the exact date of Zarqawi’ entry into the country, even though it probably took place during the same period.”

According to the ex-Iraqi premier, Saddam’s government would have thus sponsored the birth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as coordinating other terrorist groups, be they Islamic or Arab. “The Iraqi Secret Service had communications with these groups through someone named Faruq Hajizi,” Allawi continued, “who was the ambassador to Turkey and was then arrested after the fall of Saddam’s regime while trying to sneak into Iraq. The Iraqi Secret Services were helping the terrorists enter Iraq and taking them to the Ansar Al-Islam camps in the Halbija. area.” In sum, the ex-premier maintains that Saddam’s government also tried to involve Abu Nidal in its terrorist network, and his refusal to cooperate with the Islamist groups became his death sentence, which was carried out in the summer of 2002…

I googled “AKI” and “Allawi” and turned up this link to AKI’s own English-language version (Mystery Achievement did a pretty good job.)

Unless I missed a column, William Safire of the NY Times still insists on an Al Qaeda-Saddam connection. I certainly do and I base my conclusion on the ugly way of the covert world. Saddam was a Middle Eastern tyrant, a terrorist and he employed terrorists. Al Qaeda is terrorist organization with Middle Eastern roots. At some point –a moment of mutual convenience, perhaps– the thugs connect.

Unfortunately a vast swath of the US national media “concluded” in the run up to the 2004 presidential campaign that “Al Qaeda-Saddam connections weren’t proven.” “Not proven” is accurate, at least not proven to support a court case– but we’re in a war and operating inside the fog of war. I use the verb “concluded” instead of “argued”: the cynical tone and intensity of the MSM “argument” vis a vis Iraqi-Al Qaeda connections left the impression that these connections didn’t exist at all. The truth is there were numerous indications of connections and possible collaboration, indications that would have raised eyebrows prior to 9/11 but would not have raised alert levels. But “not proven” echoed “no WMD,” and both worked into the 2004 press template “Bush lied, people died.”

A covert, terrorist organization survives via stealth. It has to cover its tracks. Some information about Al Qaeda, its people, its connections, its intentions, will take years to uncover. King Abdullah and former PM Allawi now offer evidence of Saddam-Al Qaeda connections and Allawi’s suggests potential collaboration. Abdullah’s information implies a tangential connection, but Allawi’s indicates direct dealing. Where’s the front-page reporting and 24/7 cable chitchat? Newsweek needs to follow this lead. Will Dan Rather –while he’s looking for Lucy Ramirez– try to find Faruq Hajizi, the “former ambassador” Allawi names? That’s a 60 Minutes interview we all need to hear.

UPDATE: Comment 5– Thanks for the comment. I’m sure I’ve read about that case. Al Qaeda’s left a number of “tracks.” What I’m arguing for is follow-up by major news organizations. King Abdullah and former PM Allawi are reputable leaders and a major news organization can contact them quickly. There has been no “tidal wave of interest” in their claims. There hasn’t be a rip tide. Allawi says al-Zawahiri connects to Saddam’s regime, via al-Douri. The “Islamic conference” scenario’s as simple as it is obvious — Zawahiri comes to Iraq and Saddam’s intelligence officers have the chance to chat with him about common issues and common interests. One of their common interests is the Kurds. Heavens, the Kurds had cooperated with the Israelis. Hence the Ansar al-Islam connection in Kurdistan. Saddam gets a “terror force” to fight the Kurds, Al Qaeda gets to either influence or help direct an “operational unit” of Islamist militants that might be of use to it in the future. Sure, that’s a scenario following the “rogue state with tyrant intersects terrorists” schematic. Now add the threat of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam’s WMD track record– he’d used WMD. Now include 9/11, with aircraft used as ballistic missiles: the next step is a nuclear 9/11. King Abdullah’s and Allawi’s evidence should interest anyone who wants to understand Al Qaeda.

This Week’s Column: DIME and North Korea

Filed under: General — site admin @ 6:32 am

The acronym is “DIME” — a quick verbal coin for the four elements of national power: “Diplomatic,” Information,”" “Military” and “Economic” power.

The column addresses America’s “DIME ballet” with China– over the nuclear nut case of North Korea.

The link is to StrategyPage’s on-line version.

5/24/2005

“Fake, but not totally implausible”

Filed under: General — site admin @ 6:28 pm

The Lebanese Political Journal fisks the Washington Post. This is a first-class fisking– a detailed critique with basic facts at issue. The Washington Post owes its readers an answer to the Lebanese Journal’s fisking or a darn good explanation.

Security Training For Aid and Assistance Workers in Iraq

Filed under: General — site admin @ 7:19 am

Security Management Magazine’s April 2005 issue ran an article by Scott Ast on security training for workers in Iraq. The link goes to the home page– for some reason the page won’t give me a direct link to the article. {ED: See update below, with working link.]

The information iis solid– a quick suvival manual. But here’s the real bonus: This article also gives a reader the “feel” of Iraq –and for that matter, a dozen other hard corners where aid workers are at risk– without sensationalizing hype.

Ast has been there:

Iraq is a country of extreme beauty, but it also presents extreme challenges, both natural and manmade. Thus, arriving in Baghdad can be a physical and psychological shock and personnel should be prepared. It starts with how the plane lands. As a defensive maneuver, approaching planes typically corkscrew down to a landing strip that appears to be directly below where the planes began their descent. The drop can be harrowing as well as nauseating, and stepping off the plane with a full airsickness bag in hand is not the best way to start an assignment.

As the operational security manager for Black & Veatch, an engineering and construction firm in Overland Park, Kansas, I visited Iraq several times, most recently in May of 2004, to provide security inspections and oversee the security operations of my employer, which has been contributing to programs called Restore Iraqi Electricity and Restore Iraqi Infrastructure. My responsibilities included training our engineering and construction personnel, who volunteered to deploy to Iraq, for the challenges of the mission. I have had the chance to see firsthand what worked best in terms of the pre-mission training and what needed improvement. While elections have occurred since that time, the violence has not abated. Consequently, the lessons learned are still valid for anyone headed to Iraq in the future.

Ast stresses physical and mental preparation (prior to deployment). In a section titled “Beware Loose Lips” he stresses “op sec” — operational security. The less said about where you’re going and what you’re doing, the better. Expect extremes in temperature (no kidding). It’s tough to get there from here– so plan for transportation. And when moving:

…It pays to be “consistently inconsistent” in Iraq, never traveling at the same times and on the same routes if possible. I also encourage our professionals to practice the “buddy system” with colleagues. That is, when they are up and around, traveling in PSDs or in other settings, they should check up on each other. ..

For background read my column on “Route Irish Racing”– I don’t mention jumbling travel times, but that’s the way you do it if you intend to keep doing it.

Ast says workers must have emergency plans in place– know what you’re going to do:

I have always operated on the “Six P Principle,” which is shorthand for “Proper Planning Prevents Pretty Poor Performance.” Relying on the U.S. government or military is not always an option, so internal readiness, coupled with mutual assistance and contingency arrangements with others, is mandatory.
It is critical to have self-explanatory emergency action plans in Iraq and for workers to be well-acquainted with them so that all players will know their roles and be ready to act after being shaken out of bed by a missile, mortar, or small-arms-fire attack. ..

This is a civilian version of military SOP and immediate action drill.

Have plans for (1) Medical assistance. (2) Evacuations. (3) Communications.

Ast adds this detail (and it’s a real concern):

An important precaution before entering any shelter is to check for desert pests such as scorpions and camel spiders. This is especially true in the hottest part of the day; they love the shade.
Poor attention to evacuation procedures left me with an extremely sore jaw in one case. When a Katyusha rocket whizzed over our camp early one cool morning, two workers in a panic sped face first into each other. After the impact, one of them continued running, crashing his forehead into my jaw.

The “Physical Security” section is worth quoting in detail:

Physical security.

Even nonsecurity personnel should at least be familiar with the basics of effective physical security in the Iraq environment. They should understand what security purposes are served by equipment and personnel. These include the role of barriers, staffing, and protection from projectiles. They should also understand the proper use of security lighting.

Barriers. Barriers, such as Jersey and Hesco (collapsible wire-mesh containers with a heavy-duty plastic liner, filled with sand, dirt or gravel, as described by the Army News Service), are an important piece of a layered defense system. Hesco barriers, single rows or double-stacked, are quickly installed economical protection that provide peace of mind.

In addition, preformed, tall concrete walls can be stood on end and fused together to form barriers. Topping these and existing walls with concertina wire and adding observation towers provides for solid reinforcement, protection, and response. Concrete barriers forming vehicle entry points and reinforced guardhouses provide protection for checkpoints.

Manpower. Observation towers and vehicle entry posts must be staffed with properly trained, equipped, vetted, and supervised security officers who guard specific posts. Additional backup and mobile security guards should operate in tandem to form a proper security force. Concerns include training and drills, standard operating procedure, weapons proficiency, and rules of engagement, to name a few.

Projectile protection. Interior layers of defense include sandbags or Hesco barriers surrounding mobile units/trailers serving as offices or living quarters. Wherever possible, units should be constructed without windows to limit the potential for glass projectiles resulting from blasts.

Personnel should keep work areas away from windows, and if there is window glass, it should be taped over or laminated for protection from flying fragments after a blast.

Steel plating is often inserted into mobile unit walls, roofs, and flooring to provide additional protection from projectiles. In those cases, staff need not be as concerned with being near a wall. Stacking sandbags along any structure provides additional peace of mind.

Lighting. As opposed to a security setting in a stable society, lighting in Iraq is less a deterrent than a risk. Personnel should be informed that lighting actually provides targets for insurgents’ small-arms fire, mortars, or rockets. And too much lighting allows insurgents to observe the numbers of protective personnel, their equipment, and level of expertise.
Night-vision equipment is useful for those tasked with watching for signs of movement outside of the perimeter. There are, however, times when lights must be used. Emergency lighting and generators are indispensable, and spotlights, whether portable for vehicles or mounted in observation towers, are handy as well.
In a theater of war, of course, personnel must continually update risk analysis and reevaluate the security posture. Countermeasures must constantly be refined to correspond to threat levels and enemy tactics. Thus, personnel should expect constant readjustment of security measures…

Read the whole thing. It’s a keeper.

UPDATE: Here’s a link to page one of the article (thanks to Commenter 2).

5/23/2005

StrategyPage Looks At War on Terror Metrics

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:09 am

How do you measure success in the War on Terror? In World War Two geography provided a clue– in the Pacific one Japanese-held island fell, then another, in Europe the Nazi-lines slowly compressed. In a recent column I argued that Iraq’s January election was something of a “geographic and demographic” metric, an analog for taking a darn big island.

Today StrategyPage’s FYEO email discusses US strategy in the war on terror and then addresses the difficulty of measuring success in this intricate war. Measurements matter– how many new stories did you read in October 2003 about the number of hours electricity was available (or not available) in Baghdad? Though a crude stick, the number of hours on and off is a measure of eletrical generation capacity and reliability. At some point there is a connection (albeit indirect) between reliable electric power and a popular, stable, secure government. I recall reading an article last year that looked at local security issues in Iraqi towns. Some of the factors the article mentioned are common sense “measurements” of security anywhere: the number of police in a town, the quality and type of police equipment, the “level of training” of police forces ( a judgment call, but one that can be readily scaled), and the ability of the local police force to communicate “vertically” (to higher authorities) and “laterally” (with other local police forces) . This past January I heard a senior US officer (on Fox or CNN) talking about Iraqi security force training and he mentioned these same points. Are other factors in play in determining if a neighborhood or town is “secure? Absolutely, factors like loyalty to the new Iraqi government, tribal affiliations, family affiliations, etc. I’ll bet these are what StrategyPage refers to as metrics “too complex for snappy headlines.”

WHO WINS: Measuring Progress in the War on Terror

May 23, 2005: Keeping track of who is winning in the war on terror is complicated by the other “wars” that have become entangled with the conflict against Islamic terrorism. Party politics in the United States, and ideological, commercial and cultural differences with Europe and other parts of the world have made difficult to agree on what is victory, and what is defeat.

There is a lot of disagreement over Iraq. Taking the war to Iraq was a decisive move, in that it brought the war on terror to the terrorist homeland (the Persian Gulf in particular, and the Middle East in general.) Al Qaeda was forced to declare Iraq a major battleground, and eager terrorists have flocked to Iraq. There, the terrorists have made themselves thoroughly unpopular with most Iraqis, and an increasing number of Moslems outside Iraq. But much of world opinion has decided (for a cluster of ideological, commercial and cultural reasons) that the war in Iraq is illegal and wrong. The United States is pretty much ignoring world opinion, and a lot of Americans who share that opinion (largely liberals and Democrats). Because the left in the United States has decided that the American government has no plan and is without a clue, you cannot even discuss war on terror strategy without getting put down straight away. But there is a strategy, and it is working.

Taking the war to the Islamic heartland wasn’t easy. Most of the world was unwilling to offend Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, with accusations that Arabia was the source of most of the increasingly lethal Islamic terrorism. But Iraq provided a better target, because the Baath Party in Iraq had made itself a pariah state because of unprovoked attacks on neighbors Iran and Kuwait. Everyone believed that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons, and was trying to get nukes. While many now deny this was the case, anyone can check the news stories before 2003 to see the near unanimous agreement that Iraq was not in compliance with UN demands to come clean about its “weapons of mass destruction.”

Iraq brought Islamic terrorism to the Islamic heartland, and the locals don’t like it. Before 2003, Islamic terrorism was popular in this part of the world. Expatriates in Saudi Arabia were unnerved by how many Saudis seemed happy and pleased about the September 11, 2001 attacks. Many Moslems had convinced themselves that their problems with local tyrants and poor economic performance were caused by external forces. This, “it’s not my fault” attitude has been a problem for centuries. A serious problem as can be seen by the lack of economic progress, despite trillions of dollars in oil sales and decades of development efforts. Even the Turks, who ruled the Middle East for centuries, despaired of ever curing the Arabs of their delusions, and self-destructive habits.

That attitude was slowly changing before the September 11, 2001, Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. But once Islamic terrorists began killing Iraqis and Saudis on a large scale, the “maybe it’s our problem and we should fix it” school of thought became a lot more popular. Unfortunately, because most mass media have a vested interest in disaster and defeat, this aspect of the war on terror is little discussed. Good news is not welcome.

No matter, the war goes on, and increasingly it’s being fought, and run, by SOCOM (the U.S. Special Operations Command.) This organization has more experts in the language and cultures of Islamic countries than the rest of the United States government combined. This irritates the State Department, and a lot of other organizations both foreign and domestic. But that’s not considered a major problem by SOCOM.

SOCOM has learned a lot about what works, and to what degree, in Iraq, Afghanistan and dozens of other countries where it is operating. One major finding is that it will be easier to stop, or greatly diminish, Islamic terrorism, than it will be to fix the social and economic problems in Moslem nations. The biggest weakness of Islamic terrorists is their intolerance. Islamic terrorists will freely kill fellow Moslems, and not just those who are, or appear to be, “collaborating” with the enemy. Islamic terrorists had tried to avoid this sort of thing, as they realize their source of money and new recruits comes mainly from Moslem nations. But the Islamic radical movement is on a Mission from God, and there is a competition to see who is the more terrible terrorist. Killing Moslems is not considered a problem to many of the Islamic terrorists. Thus, as Islamic nations get a dose of Islamic terrorism, attitudes shift. The result is a larger proportion of the terrorist recruits and money support are now coming from Islamic communities in Europe, where local laws and customs make it easy for transplanted Moslem communities to survive, safe from the effects of Islamic terrorism. It’s easier for a Moslem to support Islamic terrorism as a spectator, rather than as a victim.

Nearly all Islamic nations are willing to fight Islamic terrorists, although most are less eager to work on the underlying problems (mostly political and economic) that created Islamic radicalism in the first place. But the United States has managed to get everyone, especially the worldwide mass media, to agree that democracy and clean government in Moslem countries is a good thing. This in itself is a major victory. But reversing thousands of years of bad habits (especially tolerance for despotism and corruption) won’t happen quickly. However, because of the growing availability of international media, most Moslems are at least aware that there are better ways to run a country, and an economy. This provides an opening for reform.

SOCOM, and other elements of the Department of Defense, have developed some detailed methods for measuring progress in the war on terror. Unfortunately, these metrics are too complex for snappy headlines, and too dependent on sensitive sources for wide distribution. But even without access to all that, you can see the strategy, and the progress. As was said, early and often after September 11, 2001, it’s going to be a long war.

5/22/2005

Hugh Hewitt: Jay Rosen and Jeff Jarvis, Roger L. Simon and Austin Bay

Filed under: General — site admin @ 1:36 pm

Transcripts from Hugh’s Friday night show, with a “thank you” to Radioblogger. Jeff Jarvis and Jay Rosen lead off, followed by “Roger and me” .

“This moment of possibility for the Arabs…”

Filed under: General — site admin @ 10:48 am

Fouad Ajami (who else?) writes a superb column on the Middle East’s “democratic tsunami.” (The article appears in The Opinion Journal. Hat tip realclearpolitics.)

What a brilliant, telling phrase: “This moment of possibility for the Arabs…” — that’s Ajami quoting a Kuwaiti merchant.

(But for tempering background read Tom Nichols’ series on “How does freedom spread?” published May 19-21 on this website.)

Ajami’s lede:

“George W. Bush has unleashed a tsunami on this region,” a shrewd Kuwaiti merchant who knows the way of his world said to me. The man had no patience with the standard refrain that Arab reform had to come from within, that a foreign power cannot alter the age-old ways of the Arabs. “Everything here–the borders of these states, the oil explorations that remade the life of this world, the political outcomes that favored the elites now in the saddle–came from the outside. This moment of possibility for the Arabs is no exception.” A Jordanian of deep political experience at the highest reaches of Arab political life had no doubt as to why history suddenly broke in Lebanon, and could conceivably change in Syria itself before long. “The people in the streets of Beirut knew that no second Hama is possible; they knew that the rulers were under the gaze of American power, and knew that Bush would not permit a massive crackdown by the men in Damascus.”

My informant’s reference to Hama was telling: It had been there in 1982, in that city of the Syrian interior, that the Baathist-Alawite regime had broken and overwhelmed Syrian society. Hama had been a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fortress of the Sunni middle class. It had rebelled, and the regime unleashed on it a merciless terror. There were estimates that 25,000 of its people perished in that fight. Thenceforth, the memory of Hama hung over the life of Syria–and Lebanon. But the people in the plazas of Beirut, and the Syrian intellectuals who have stepped forth to challenge the Baathist regime, have behind them the warrant, and the green light, of American power and protection.

Ajami wryly calls the Middle East “Bush Country.”

Why?:

…The weight of American power, historically on the side of the dominant order, now drives this new quest among the Arabs. For decades, the intellectual classes in the Arab world bemoaned the indifference of American power to the cause of their liberty. Now a conservative American president had come bearing the gift of Wilsonian redemption….

For years my Arab friends have told me that in their countries “the radicals hold guns to the head of the moderates.” The US is in the difficult process of removing the tyrants’ and terrorists’ guns. Ultimately, the Arab people must complete that process, but in two sentences, welcome to 21st century Middle Eastern democratic strategy.

The good guys are winning. Don’t thank George Galloway or Ted Kennedy.

“Leaving The Left”

Filed under: General — site admin @ 10:31 am

I saw this link at powerline. From today’s San Francisco Chronicle, an essay by Keith Thompson titled “Leaving the Left.”

Thompson demonstrates (to paraphrase neo-neocon) that “a mind is a difficult thing to change” — but facts matter. Thompson remembers –with brutal honesty– his Ohio hometown and its legacy of discrimination. His sincere anger is at rank social injustice is palpable. Desire to right wrongs and seek justice motivated his activism.

But now, Thompson writes:

Eight-million Iraqi voters have finished risking their lives to endorse freedom and defy fascism. Three things happen in rapid succession. The right cheers. The left demurs. I walk away from a long-term intimate relationship. I’m separating not from a person but a cause: the political philosophy that for more than three decades has shaped my character and consciousness, my sense of self and community, even my sense of cosmos.

I’m leaving the left — more precisely, the American cultural left and what it has become during our time together.

I choose this day for my departure because I can no longer abide the simpering voices of self-styled progressives — people who once championed solidarity with oppressed populations everywhere — reciting all the ways Iraq’s democratic experiment might yet implode.

My estrangement hasn’t happened overnight. Out of the corner of my eye I watched what was coming for more than three decades, yet refused to truly see. Now it’s all too obvious. Leading voices in America’s “peace” movement are actually cheering against self-determination for a long-suffering Third World country because they hate George W. Bush more than they love freedom. ..

Here’s Thompson describing his reaction to rcial prejudice in his hometown. I’m going to quote at length:

grew up in a northwest Ohio town where conservative was a polite term for reactionary. When Martin Luther King Jr. spoke of Mississippi “sweltering in the heat of oppression,” he could have been describing my community, where blacks knew to keep their heads down, and animosity toward Catholics and Jews was unapologetic. Liberal and conservative, like left and right, wouldn’t be part of my lexicon for a while, but when King proclaimed, “I have a dream,” I instinctively cast my lot with those I later found out were liberals (then synonymous with “the left” and “progressive thought”).

The people on the other side were dedicated to preserving my hometown’s backward-looking status quo. This was all that my 10-year-old psyche needed to know. The knowledge carried me for a long time. Mythologies are helpful that way.

I began my activist career championing the 1968 presidential candidacies of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, because both promised to end America’s misadventure in Vietnam. I marched for peace and farm worker justice, lobbied for women’s right to choose and environmental protections, signed up with George McGovern in 1972 and got elected as the youngest delegate ever to a Democratic convention.

Eventually I joined the staff of U.S. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, D-Ohio. In short, I became a card-carrying liberal, although I never actually got a card. (Bookkeeping has never been the left’s strong suit.) All my commitments centered on belief in equal opportunity, due process, respect for the dignity of the individual and solidarity with people in trouble. To my mind, Americans who had joined the resistance to Franco’s fascist dystopia captured the progressive spirit at its finest…

His turning point:

A turning point came at a dinner party on the day Ronald Reagan famously described the Soviet Union as the pre-eminent source of evil in the modern world. The general tenor of the evening was that Reagan’s use of the word “evil” had moved the world closer to annihilation. There was a palpable sense that we might not make it to dessert.

When I casually offered that the surviving relatives of the more than 20 million people murdered on orders of Joseph Stalin might not find “evil’” too strong a word, the room took on a collective bemused smile of the sort you might expect if someone had casually mentioned taking up child molestation for sport.

My progressive companions had a point. It was rude to bring a word like “gulag” to the dinner table.

The “left wing trope” of moral equivalency between the US and USSR was simply too much for Thompson to take. I am struck by the phrase “the knowledge carried me for a long time” (refering to injustice in Ohio). Though he doesn’t use the term “liberal guilt” or its softer formulation “liberal embarassment,” it strikes me that Thompson knows this “dimmer side” of personal motive was also at work in his life. He was ashamed that his hometown was morally compromised. As an adult he’s learned the entire world is morally compromised and one has to weigh gray phrases like “greater good” and “lesser evil” in order to act sensibly and responsibly.

Thompson adds:

All of this came back to me as I watched the left’s anemic, smirking response to Iraq’s election in January. Didn’t many of these same people stand up in the sixties for self-rule for oppressed people and against fascism in any guise? Yes, and to their lasting credit. But many had since made clear that they had also changed their minds about the virtues of King’s call for equal of opportunity.

These days the postmodern left demands that government and private institutions guarantee equality of outcomes. Any racial or gender “disparities” are to be considered evidence of culpable bias, regardless of factors such as personal motivation, training, and skill. This goal is neither liberal nor progressive; but it is what the left has chosen. In a very real sense it may be the last card held by a movement increasingly ensnared in resentful questing for group-specific rights and the subordination of citizenship to group identity. There’s a word for this: pathetic. ..

And then he returns to the impact of the Iraq’s January election:

Leftists who no longer speak of the duties of citizens, but only of the rights of clients, cannot be expected to grasp the importance (not least to our survival) of fostering in the Middle East the crucial developmental advances that gave rise to our own capacity for pluralism, self-reflection, and equality. A left averse to making common cause with competent, self- determining individuals — people who guide their lives on the basis of received values, everyday moral understandings, traditional wisdom, and plain common sense — is a faction that deserves the marginalization it has pursued with such tenacity for so many years.

Thompson’s chosen to act his age instead of act out his rage– and written a thoughtful, honest essay, to boot. Read the whole thing.

UPDATE: Neo-neocon on the “tragedy of the Utopian.” She’s describing the philosophical tragedy, but she also mentions the heinous tragedy of millions killed in the pursuit of impossible social perfection.

Saddam and Zarqawi: Al Qaeda’s Shellgame

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:20 am

Now this is interesting. Did Saddam and Al Qaeda connect? Ask the Jordanians. The first report I found dates from May 19 (Khaleej Times, AP report).

The Associated Press:

CAIRO - The regime of Saddam Hussain rejected repeated requests from Jordan to hand over Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who now heads Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Jordanian king said in an interview published on Thursday.

King Abdullah II told the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat that Jordan exerted “big efforts” with Saddam’s government to extradite al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian sentenced to death at home for terrorist activities.

“But our demands that the former regime hand him over were in vain,” Abdullah said.

“We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn’t respond,” the king said.

Washington accuses al-Zarqawi, 38, of forming a network of terrorists to attack US-led forces in Iraq and has a US$25 million bounty on him.

I’ve snipped this from South Africa’s Business Day:

…Al-Zarqawi entered Iraq from a neighbouring country shortly before the downfall of the old regime. At the time, we made every effort to bring him back to Jordan to put him on trial, but our extradition request was unsuccessful,” the king told pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The Jordanian secret service had been informed of al-Zarqawi’s position and his operations in Iraq at that time, the king said. The terrorist’s presence in Iraq was cause for grave concern, he said.

Al-Zarqawi is the leader of a terrorist network in Iraq that has carried out numerous attacks and hostage murders. The network has been calling itself al-Qaeda for some months now.

Arabic newspapers reported yesterday that a taped message from al-Zarqawi has been published on the internet in which he said the deaths of innocent Iraqi civilians in car bomb attacks were a sacrifice for the greater good.

The victims would enter paradise as “martyrs”, the message is believed to say.

In Zarqawi’s sociopathic faith murdered innocents are martyrs. Pass that on to George Galloway.

Italy’s AKI added some depth to its wire service report:

…Al-Zarqawi was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan in connection with the assassination of an American diplomat there in October 2002. In 1994 he began a fifteen year jail sentence for plotting to overthrow King Hussein’s regime, but was released in 1999 under a general amnesty. He is also believed to have planned a foiled chemical attack in the country and - along with twelve other men, three of whom are also fugitives - faces charges of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks, manufacturing and possessing explosives and possession of automatic weapons for illegal use.

A thread in these reports: “Zarqawi now heads Al Qaeda.” (See this one from the Turkish Daily News, but it requires registration.) But was he Al Qaeda before 2003? Al Qaeda is a shell game of operational relationships, the common connection sociopathic militancy. Review the record. Osama declared war on the US in February 1998. Zarqawi is a militant Sunni Islamist and committed terrorist. Jordan and the US believe Zarqawi was involved in the assassination of an American diplomat. Zarqawi was operating out of Saddam’s Iraq — at least the Jordanians believe so. Saddam refused to extradite Zarqawi to Jordan, or, refused to respond. Why? Terrorists are an integral part of a tyrant’s tool kit; they are covert weapons to threaten neighbors (Jordan), as well as weapons to weild against internal rebels (eg., Ansar al-Islam against the Kurds).

Saudi Arabia’s Arab News commented on the murder of innocents in pursuit of jihad (read the whole report):

CAIRO, 20 May 2005 — Muslims yesterday dismissed the religious justification for killing innocents given by Al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq.

Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi defended the killing of innocent Muslims in suicide bombings against US forces in a message on a website. He said Muslim scholars permitted such conduct for the sake of jihad.

“This is a deviant notion and Zarqawi, with all due respect, is not an expert on Islamic jurisprudence. His views are illegitimate,” said Saudi Islamic researcher Youssef Al-Dayni.

“These people killed in Iraq are innocent and his description of them as martyrs is of no benefit. He is only trying to find justifications for his terrorism,” said Bahraini Shiite cleric Sheikh Ali Salman.

More than 400 people have been killed in an escalation of violence and suicide attacks since a new Iraqi government was named late last month. Zarqawi’s group has claimed responsibility for most of those attacks.

“Protecting religion is more important than protecting (Muslim) lives, honor or wealth,” said the man who sounded like Zarqawi. “The shedding of Muslim blood… is allowed in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting jihad.”

Zarqawi’s message, which could not be independently verified, appeared aimed at winning Sunni Muslim support for the insurgency. Sunnis lost influence to Iraq’s majority Shiites after the US war toppled Saddam Hussein…

The article includes quotes from Muslim leaders who point out coalition forces also kill civilians in their operations. I was struck by this quote from a Baghdad businessman:

“Any country that is occupied will have a resistance movement,” said Alaa Youssef, 67, a Baghdad soft drinks seller. “But you have to have an honorable resistance instead of one that kills and beheads innocent Iraqi civilians.”

“An honorable resistance.” Sounds like the title of an unwritten Eric Ambler novel.

5/21/2005

A Response to Powerline: My Editorial Stint At Newsweek

Filed under: General — site admin @ 11:03 am

The gents at powerline provide a wry chuckle. In the powerline scenario, Newsweek’s petulant staff asks “Who appointed Austin Bay its editor?”

Okay, I’ve got a lot on my plate at the moment, including a pending two week trip to the Middle East (as a writer– I’ve been re-retired as a reserve officer). Still, I’m up for a two-week stint as “reserve editor.”

Terry Moran’s interview on Hugh Hewitt will be the first cover story. Every story in the issue will feature– with respectful photos and generous details– the reporters and media magnates with the “anti-military bias” Moran mentions. The on-line edition will link to the “Bias Battalion’s” past reports and the consequences of those reports. I admit I have a mainstream model for this issue — my model will be the NY Times report of May 20 on the prisoner abuse in December 2002 at Bagram Airbase. Each story will sport a “chain of command” analysis similar to the one the Times ran at the bottom of Page 12A in its national edition. Every member of the”Bias Battalion” (and I may ask Mr Moran to help me get a gauge on membership) and his/her editors and publishers will get the same glorious face time as Bagram’s “chain of command.”

If I’m still alive, how do I follow that up?…If that issue’s Hiroshima…okay, this one may be Nagasaki.

The second issue will be devoted to American developmental aid projects and support for such projects around the globe. We’ll look at USAID (US government) but also the thousands (tens of thousands, actually) of privately sponsored relief, recovery, and developmental aid efforts funded and run by Americans. The cover story will have a simple, non-inflammatory, direct headline. “Who cares? America cares? Who acts? America acts.”

After those two issues, I’ll resign but ask the publisher if I can keep my Newsweek office for one additional week. Manhattan hotel rates are astronomical. I can save a ton of money as my wife and I take a few days to do the museum tour and catch up with old friends. We lived in Manhattan for eight years and it’s a fun place to visit. ..Except –on second thought– forget it. My wife will want to stay in a decent hotel. So I’ll request a one week extension on my editor-in-chief’s lux-level expense account. Let’s hope the publishers and owners at the Washington Post Co express their pleasure with my ground-breaking and horizon-raising editorial work— by being generous.

How Does Freedom Spread: Tom Nichols on Mark Kramer, Part Three

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:51 am

Here is the last of Tom Nichols’ (a comment in three parts,” reviewing Mark Kramer’s assessment of the collapse of the USSR. I’ll repeat a point made in Parts One and Two– this is historical background for assessing current events from Ukraine to Uzbekistan. The section discussing “Implications For Theory” provides a gauge for assessing the “democratic surge” in Central Asia and the Middle East.

Nichols writes:

Indeed, the concept of “spillover” is one of those elusive concepts — like “deterrence,” perhaps — that we seem to know somehow _happens_, but we don’t know how or why, and we usually only see it operating in its result, rather than in progress…

Again, a thank you to Tom for letting me re-post his commentary.

Now “read the whole thing.”

Who Gave You the Right to Mock a Great Power Like the Soviet Union?” From Reform to Collapse in Eastern Europe and the USSR, 1988-1991

Comment on Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union,” Parts I-III, Journal of Cold War Studies, 5 (4), 6 (4), and (7) 1.

by Tom Nichols
Naval War College and La Salle University

PART III: “That Such a Fortress Would Fall…”

In his final installment, Kramer discusses the recriminations and debates that broke out at the top ranks of the Soviet elite over the collapse of the Soviet alliance system in Europe. This is not merely to catalog the anguish of Soviet communists; rather he links this debate to an increasing loss of ideological faith among Soviet leaders and the consequent loss of the regime’s will to defend itself. He then considers the implications of his findings for the theoretical literature on democratization and change.

The Agony of the Armed Forces

Perhaps nowhere in Soviet society was the collapse of East European socialism felt more keenly than among the men of the Soviet armed forces. Not only were Soviet officers more ideologically orthodox than most of their fellow citizens, their view of Soviet history was also more sharply focused through the lens of the Second World War. For many of them, Eastern Europe was territory (as Leonid Brezhnev once told the deposed Czech leaders of 1968) that had been bought and paid for with the blood of the Soviet soldier. As Kramer notes, the loss of Eastern Europe generated deep tension in civil-military relations, and “was one of the factors that prompted the coup attempt” in 1991. (III, 5)

Actually, military officers were uncomfortable with Gorbachev’s defense policies well before 1991, as Kramer notes. Gorbachev’s “new thinking” came under attack as early as 1986, with Soviet officers objecting to it on both ideological and practical grounds. Everything from his nuclear disarmament policies to his decidedly un-Marxist belief that international relations should be conducted between states, rather than classes, came in for pointed military criticism. “Little did they imagine,” Kramer writes, “that Gorbachev would also soon preside over the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.” (III, 5)

With regard to Eastern Europe, the warning signs from the military were clear as the events of 1989 unfolded. There was increased public mention of the previously taboo subject of the invasion of Hungary in 1956, as well as open and laudatory discussion of the Polish military’s imposition of martial law in 1981. For the Soviet military, 1989 was nothing less than counterrevolution, and as such had to be dealt with as with all counterrevolutionary attempts: forcefully.

A sense of personal tragedy and profound humiliation ran high among senior officers in this period. Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov later said that he felt as if “his whole life was being betrayed” as the regimes of the Warsaw Pact imploded. (III _) Other officers expressed similar sentiments, and Kramer could well have filled an entire chapter with them. For example, Gen. Valentin Varennikov, head of Soviet Ground Forces and the only man tried (and acquitted) in the 1991 coup, told the extremist daily _Zavtra_ in 1994:

“In 1990 Gorbachev, as you know, accepted capitulation on the West’s terms…If I and my compatriots in ‘45 had ever thought that such a fate awaited us, that such a monolith, such a fortress, as our state [derzhava] would be overthrown without a battle… [ellipses in original]” [3]

These officers were predictably joined by CPSU cadres, and together the position this hardline bloc took was one infused by nostalgia and an inability to see the beyond the world of 1945. There were alarmed comments about the loss of “buffers” and the betrayal of the victory over Fascism–as if Germany were ready to roll her tanks eastward across the fields of Europe once more at any moment.

Gorbachev’s intellectual defenders, such as Viacheslav Dashichev, were deployed to counter these retrograde ideas, but they might just as well have saved the breath in their lungs and the ink in their pens. The Soviet military were still thinking in terms of the “combat readiness” of the Warsaw Pact even into 1990, a concern so detached from the reality of the situation as to be almost a source of comedy were it not held by men who at the time still commanded the second-most powerful military force in the world.

New Thinking and Old Thinking

What is particularly frightening about this period is the inability of Soviet officers to think in any terms but those of the coldest days of the Cold War. When asked in early 1990 about the developments in Eastern Europe, the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Igor Sergeev, answered this way:

“Parity was meant for the status quo. Our defensive doctrine takes account of the existing grouping and deployment of forces. If we lose our expanse [in Eastern Europe], we will be closer to danger. If, under conditions of parity, someone loses, that means someone else gains.” (III, 13)

But by 1990, one would have to ask: someone else gains _what_? What, exactly, was the concern of Soviet officers about a buffer in Eastern Europe? Did anyone in the USSR really fear a NATO invasion? (In fairness, I have asked this same question of advocates of NATO expansion eastward, which seems to me to be a solution in search of a problem. Does anyone really fear the Third Shock Army returning to roll over newly-independent Ukraine on its way into Poland or Germany? Why, exactly, is Romania or Bulgaria being invited to NATO? Are they in danger?)

Kramer notes that Sergeev seemed to speak for the large majority of senior officers. And so he did, but Col. Gen. Albert Makashov, the commander of the Volga-Urals military district, would turn up the heat in March 1990 by publicly referring to Gorbachev as a “pacifist” and “dilettante” who should be “required to undergo a three-month remedial course at the General Staff Academy.” This attack by so senior an officer, Kramer notes, “loosened the floodgates” and soon Gorbachev’s policies were openly condemned in the major Soviet media, including Pravda and Krasnaia Zvezda. (III, 14) Makashov, it should be noted, would later go on to be one of the most retrograde Soviet nostalgists in the new Russia, the man who stood with Ruslan Khasbulatov and the “red-black” bloc of authoritarians who took over the Russian White House in 1993, shouting that the supporters of Boris Yeltsin were traitors to the motherland and vowing that they would “wash in their own blood.”[4]

At the highest levels of the political leadership, Gorbachev’s chief critic was Egor Ligachev, a conservative who had begun his tenure on the Politburo in the 1980s more or less as a Gorbachev ally and who now emerged as a dedicated opponent, particularly of the new Soviet foreign policy line. Kramer details the fencing that took place between Ligachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, a man hated to this day by many former Soviet officers for what they see as his betrayal of the Union. Like the military, Ligachev saw the world primarily through the prism of Marxism-Leninism, and in fact blamed the loss of Eastern Europe on “certain [Soviet] officials” who tried to “gloss over the class nature of international relations.” He
also exhibited an utterly irrational fear of Germany, arguing that German reunification would “completely erase the results of the Second World War.” (III, 15)

Even in 1990, it had to be clear to even the dimmest observer that Germany was so knee-deep in helpless pacifism that it was hard to imagine the Germans defending _themselves_, much less attacking a powerful neighbor to the east (especially without American backing), but Soviet conservatives were lost in a haze of reflexive fear that had little to do with actual threats and everything to do with a lifetime lived in a closed propaganda system.

Against this, Shevardnadze and others tried to turn the tables and point out that the situation in Eastern Europe had become volatile by the 1980s precisely due to the kind of rigid and ideological thinking of conservatives like Ligachev. He also decried the history of Soviet heavy-handedness in the region, including “forcibly imposing leaders suitable to us.” (III, 16) But as Kramer points out, this just added fuel to the fire in Moscow, and the attacks on Gorbachev and his team escalated, with the predictions of imminent military disaster in Europe becoming at times nearly apocalyptic.

A mystery that Kramer does not attempt to explain is why Gorbachev didn’t take stronger action against some of these critics. In 1989, he finally did remove several high-ranking leaders from the Central Committee (the so-called “dead souls” who had already lost their state positions), and he had already fired some of the most obstinate military figures like Warsaw Pact chief Viktor Kulikov. But he continued to surround himself with people like Yazov, whom he promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1990, an act that was terribly misread by some Western Sovietologists as showing Gorbachev’s strength over the military rather than his weakness.[5]

Still, Kramer insightfully notes that even men like Yazov and the new commander of the Warsaw Pact, Piotr Lushev (who was a definite improvement over Kulikov) “increasingly sensed that their main task was simply to keep the Pact from disappearing.”(III, 17) Gorbachev’s advisors pressed this point, arguing that German membership in NATO was a done deal and that any further argument over it would emphasize Soviet weakness and push the Pact closer to oblivion. The nations of Eastern Europe were already inclined to dissolve their last bonds to the USSR, and Soviet thundering about threats from the West would only encourage them along a direction that would be impossible to stop short of outright war.

The military answer to this was to slow the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and this ideologically charged issue quickly became bound up in the much more practical matter of where tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers and their families were going to sleep once they returned to the Motherland. But now the conservatives were on the defensive; the host countries wanted Soviet forces out, and even at home, more liberal voices were questioning whether the Warsaw Pact itself was ever necessary in the first place.

Kramer describes how the debate came to a head at the founding congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1990, where conservatives like Makashov and Ligachev vented their rage at the loss of Eastern Europe and laid the blame squarely on Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and others. This prompted Shevardnadze to warn that what such people wanted were nothing less than “witch hunts” like those that had occurred in the U.S. during the McCarthy era, and he pointedly referred to people like Makashov as seeing Eastern Europe not as nations liberated from Nazism but virtually seized as “trophies of war.” (III 26)

The End Approaches

The story Kramer tells in this part of his narrative is interesting not only because of the window it provides into internal Soviet debates as the system collapsed, but also because it shows that this depth of political disagreement among the elite essentially guaranteed that the regime would be unable to defend itself either by force or argument in the face of increasing centrifugal tendencies. As the peoples of the USSR now began to emulate their former comrades in Eastern Europe, the regime was paralyzed by internal argument so severe that no compromise was possible. There was no way to find a common language with people like Makashov, who was still happily living in the Stalinist past.

Kramer spends a significant amount of time on the 28th Party Congress, held in July 1990 and destined to be the last such congress of the soon to be deceased CPSU. In fact, this section of his study is the only that I found too long; I don’t see the 28th Congress as a particularly important meeting. The debate broke down into predictable groupings, with Gorbachev’s allies opposing the military and party cadres, with the charges and countercharges much the same as had been heard throughout 1989 and 1990.

In any event, the Congress was already being overtaken by events in the republics, and so even at the time it seemed like a pointless (and powerless) gathering, especially now that Gorbachev had made the jump tothe new post of President of the USSR. Kramer notes that Gorbachev’s policies prevailed at the end of the Congress, but this was not a surprising outcome, as the conservatives by late 1990 were intellectually and ideologically a spent force, with only one option left to them–tte one they would exercise a year later to no avail.

Kramer sees the Congress as underscoring Gorbachev’s strength (especially since it spelled the end of Ligachev’s career when he crushingly lost his bid to be voted Deputy General Secretary), but Kramer’s observation sidesteps the point that the Congress showed only Gorbachev’s formal power over the Party itself. Gorbachev’s taming of the Party stood in stark contrast to his increasing weakness as the leader of the USSR itself.

Kramer makes much of the fact that Gorbachev moved quickly to end the argument over German unification, accepting a united Germany in NATO. In doing so, Kramer argues that “Gorbachev demonstrated his own strength and denied the anti-reformist group any opportunity to obstruct the process of German unification.” (III, 39)

This seems like an overly charitable interpretation in retrospect. At the time, it seemed more like Gorbachev had two choices with regard to German reunification: oppose it despite its inevitability, and thus be revealed to be utterly powerless, or accept it and appear more statesmanlike, while preempting any possible move by the Soviet opposition. In the end, Gorbachev met with Helmut Kohl, struck the best deal he could get from the German chancellor, and went on to gamely smile and accept something he had no chance of stopping anyway. (Or at least no chance short of nuclear war.) Why Kramer translates this as a demonstration of domestic strength is unclear, and he presents little evidence for this interpretation.

With the reunification deal finished in July, Kramer notes that this debate understandably went on the back burner, as it “seemed to become less urgent for many Soviet officials, who were preoccupied with the task of holding the Soviet Union together in the face of mounting economic and ethnic turmoil.” (III, 40)

But with German reunification now a reality, the issue for Soviet military leaders was to try to slow the increasing demands from the other Eastern European nations to simply liquidate the Warsaw Pact itself. Whatever their fears, real or otherwise, about the imperialist threat from the West, Soviet commanders simply had no place to put their people or equipment, and so they attempted, in effect, to blackmail countries like Hungary to gain material concessions for an orderly withdrawal.

In final, deliberate acts of spite (or more likely, paranoia), the Soviet military completely trashed the bases they left behind, making sure they contained nothing of worth and rendering them useless to “the enemy,” i.e., NATO. (III, 46)

The Conservative Retrenchment

Although the Soviet conservatives had lost just about every major policy battle between 1988 and 1990, Kramer points to the interesting fact that by late 1990, they had nonetheless effected a kind of political retrenchment in Moscow. Their ideas and their demands generally found few takers in the public at large either at home or abroad, but somehow, they had managed to increase the pressure on Gorbachev to alter course. Kramer does not explore how this happened, but implicit in his account is that the accelerating
humiliation of the USSR in Eastern Europe throughout 1990 had added at least some weight to their general criticism of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in foreign policy. The rapid collapse of the Soviet position gave them the weapon of outraged patriotism to use against people like Shevardnadze, who resigned suddenly in December 1990 with the warning that “dictatorship” was coming.

Although Kramer does not discuss them, there were realignments of personnel that should have been the tip-off of darker things to come, and it would be interesting to know how they happened. The clearest sign of danger is that in early 1991, Boris Pugo, known for his tough tactics as a KGB chief in the Baltics, was moved to the Interior Ministry; his new deputy was Boris Gromov, who had commanded Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Putting the Interior Ministry in the hands of a KGB leg-breaker, with an experienced Soviet Army combat commander as his deputy, should have set off alarm bells in both East and West. (On a personal note, I was working for a U.S. senator at the time, and advised him that this meant a coup was likely in the offing in the spring of 1991, so I will claim one right call among some bobbled ones — such as my mistaken support for the first President Bush’s “Chicken Kiev” speech in the summer of 1991.)

What is still unclear–not least because Mikhail Gorbachev will not explain how he stupidly allowed it all to happen–is just how the debate over the loss of Eastern Europe in 1990 turned into a sudden, last-gasp rally for the conservatives. Did Gorbachev panic? Was there a critical mass of opinion among even his own advisors that things were now dangerously out of control?

What we do know, as Kramer tells us in a revealing fact, is that the Soviet leadership directed the CPSU International Department in early 1991 to provide major policy recommendations regarding the situation in Eastern Europe. Kramer describes the resulting document as a “dour assessment” of Soviet policy since 1991 which called for “vigorous action” to ensure that “under no circumstances will a real or potential threat to the military security of the Soviet Union arise in the East European region.” (III, 51-52)

Again, this is almost hallucinatory language, given that the USSR itself was on the verge of collapse, and one can only imagine what tortured and silly military scenario Soviet planners would have had to cook up in which Eastern Europe threatens Soviet territory, but it is testimony to the enduring power of ideology and history on human thought.

The International Department should not have bothered with its report, for as Kramer notes, the Eastern European governments reacted to the resurgence of the hardliners by threatening to dissolve the Pact unless a meeting of its political body, the Political Consultative Committee, was held immediately. The Soviet military tried to paint dire pictures of a world without the Pact, but to little effect. On February 25, 1991, a meeting lasting only three hours resulted in an agreement to disband the Warsaw Pact within a month.

Needless to say, the broadsides against Gorbachev escalated, again rising to hysterical levels. Intelligent attempts by people like Aleksandr Yakovlev to argue that a nation’s “greatness” no longer could be measured in purely military terms fell on deaf ears; indeed, the new Chief of the General Staff, Mikhail Moiseev, argued that the Soviet loss of Eastern Europe would mean that “the correlation of forces between the USSR and NATO from 1-to-1 at present to 1.5-to-1 in NATO’s favor, and even 2-to-1 for certain types of weapons.” (III, 57-58)

This kind of accounting of relative East-West strength, in a theater where Soviet forces held an overwhelming advantage, can only be considered either mendacious or ignorant, and Moiseev was by all accounts an intelligent officer. But he was not alone in such thinking, or at least in taking such a position publicly: I once publicly challenged a Soviet Air Force officer in 1989 to provide me with the data that showed the Soviet General Staff genuinely believed that NATO, at something like a 1-to-6 disadvantage, could actually initiate an attack against the Warsaw Pact. He told me he believed it possible, and that he would provide me the information. (For the record, I never got it.)

In the end, the Soviets attempted to negotiate bilateral arrangements with their former “allies” that would prevent them from joining NATO. The Eastern Europeans would have none of it. By mid-1991, the Pact was to all intents and purposes dead, and the USSR was soon to follow.

Kramer persuasively argues that the loss of Eastern Europe was one of the issues that bound the August 1991 conspirators. Indeed, it would be shocking if it were otherwise. While the proximate cause of the coup was the Union Treaty, the underlying causes were many, and the collapse of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe, with the consequent damage to the entire Soviet _raison d’etre_ itself, had to be prime among them. As Kramer writes:

“It was not surprising that the reunification of German ‘on the West’s terms,’ the ’sacrifice of gains achieved in the Great Patriotic War,’ and the ‘loss of our fraternal alliance’ were among the concerns cited by the instigators of the attempted coup d’etat in Moscow in August 1991. The start of the putsch on 19 August sparked intense anxiety in Eastern Europe, where some officials worried that a new, hardline regime in Moscow might seek to reestablish a dominating presence in the former Warsaw Pact countries….Not until the rebuff of the coup on 21 August and the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a whole four months later was it clear that Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was gone for good. “(III, 67)

Implications for Theory

To read the democratization literature of the 1980s and early 1990s was often frustrating for scholars studying the events in Eastern Europe (and not just because so much theoretical work in political science is so painfully convoluted and arid). The literature tended to draw heavily from experiences in Latin America, making the resulting models difficult to apply to the collapse of the Soviet empire. Many influences, including the experience of Stalinism, the utter destruction of previous social institutions, and the warped effects of central planning made the Russian and Eastern European path to democracy difficult to compare to what had happened in other areas of the world.

But perhaps most important, in terms of Kramer’s study, is that other authoritarian nations were not part of an international _system_, in which events in one state were unavoidable linked to events the others. Kramer notes that the previous literature on democratization, including the seminal work done by O’Donnell, Whitehead, and Schmitter, focused on local actors who come “under little or no influence from events outside the country.”(III, 71) Other studies (such as Huntington’s Third Wave) tried to grapple with the issue of “snowballing” and “demonstration effects” but as Kramer notes, these kinds of terms (including “diffusion,” “contagion” and “spillover”) “have not always been well specified in the literature…”
(III, 72)

To say the least. Indeed, the concept of “spillover” is one of those elusive concepts — like “deterrence,” perhaps — that we seem to know somehow _happens_, but we don’t know how or why, and we usually only see it operating in its result, rather than in progress.

Kramer tackles this imprecision, although his definition of “spillover” boils down to (1) the spread of reform and democratization from the USSR to Eastern Europe, and then (2) the effect of the implosion of Eastern European Communism on the USSR. The first stage is fairly clear in its mechanics: it turns out that when offered a choice, people in the region did not want to live under Communist dictatorships and overthrew them when the Soviets opened the door to that possibility. More important, however, is that Kramer fills in the actual steps in the next phase of the interaction between the USSR and its former allies:

“Direct effects [of the collapse of the Eastern European regimes on the USSR] included the emergence of new actors and governments in Eastern Europe that provided support to separatist and pro-democracy groups; the measures adopted by hardline Soviet officials to try to prevent the spread of unrest from Eastern Europe to the USSR; the steps taken by Soviet opposition groups and by newly-elected leaders in some of the union-republics (especially Russia and the Baltic republics) to counter the hardliners’ rearguard actions; and the high-level recriminations and acrimonious public debate in Moscow about the ‘loss’ of Eastern Europe, a debate that led to ever greater political polarization in the USSR but also detracted from the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. These effects, in combination, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet state.” (III, 72-73)

This, Kramer notes, is the tracing of the “microprocesses” of cross-border diffusion of ideas and practices, and this alone makes his study of extraordinary value. Kramer then takes us through six broad theoretical approaches about why this kind of diffusion takes place:

1. The realist explanation that stronger states simply impose their own preferences on weaker ones.

2. Structural realist explanations that states will adopt practices from each other to become more competitive.

3. Models of “rational learning” that may not necessarily be tied to structural considerations.

4. Constructivist notions of diffusion via social mobilization in response to changed international norms.

5. Spatial models emphasizing “neighborhood effects” due to geographic proximity.

6. “Concrete” spillover, as in the case of ethnic violence, when refugees from one state physically flee to another.

Kramer sees his study clarifying these explanations in a number of ways, and without doubt he has made a significant contribution in several areas.

First, he makes the interesting observation that the Eastern European case turns the realist explanation on its head, as a group of far weaker states promoted changes they wished to see in a far more powerful neighbor. “The ability of East European leaders and groups to intervene, with impunity, in the USSR’s internal affairs underscored how drastically the Soviet-East European relationship had changed.” (III, 81)

But central to this is the puzzle of why the Soviet Union tolerated this behavior, and Kramer’s study answers that question: because Soviet leaders, for ideological as well as practical reasons, were intent on implementing a set of policies whose logical effect was to render the use of force impossible as a matter of first principles.

Kramer also makes much of an obvious, but still important point, about communication. In another of the many ironies of the situation, he notes that insistence by the Warsaw Pact regimes for years that all their citizens study the Russian language became a “policy that came back to haunt them,” as those same citizens now eagerly followed the daily events of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR. (III, 83)

Not only were Eastern Europeans deeply informed about changes in the USSR, the effect rebounded as Soviet citizens likewise began to follow events in Eastern Europe, thus bearing out, as Kramer notes, the theory that diffusion is likelier to occur when the sources of change and the adopters of those changes are linguistically and culturally similar (or at least see themselves as culturally similar.) Further along, Kramer makes the similar point that the geographic clustering of the Warsaw Pact states also lends support to the idea of “neighborhood effects.”

Likewise, Kramer believes that the effects of the events in Eastern Europe on the ideological foundations of the USSR “shed interesting light on constructivist notions of norm diffusion and identity change,” and he is correct, although he needn’t have brought constructivism per se into it. What primarily makes constructivism useful, in my view, is that it proceeds from a common-sense assumption that the beliefs and identities of human beings matter in international relations, a necessary corrective to the silly and soulless grand-strategic billiard balls of stubborn realists. (Realism, we should recall, is a school of thought that led one of its most
famous practitioners to make the bizarre suggestion that it would be a good thing if more states gained nuclear weapons. But cataloguing the strange recommendations of realist theory is a project for another time and venue.)

Kramer’s study, insofar as it relates to constructivist issues, brings into stark relief how changes in human beings make changes in states possible. Kramer describes how even diehard Communists found themselves increasingly drawn toward norms associated with Western European style social democracy. “By all indications, the acceptance of these democratic norms was, for many, a genuine process of social learning, rather than a mere tactical ploy.” This partly explains why the Soviet leadership did not just start shooting people left and right — as their Chinese colleagues were more than happy to do. “Gorbachev’s (and others’) reluctance to use large-scale force,” Kramer tells us, “to hold the USSR together was not simply a matter of expediency or an effort to avoid antagonizing the West. Rather it reflected a fundamental change in the reformers’ collective identity.” (III, 85)

Kramer does not investigate more deeply why the men in the Kremlin came to see themselves differently, but one possibility is that Communist leaders — who primarily always saw themselves as Europeans — were somehow convinced that their fellow Europeans (and even those cursed Americans) were right, and that they were wrong, and that they were increasingly nagged by the growing sense that they were doing something fundamentally wrong to other human beings. (Anatolii Chernaev once remarked that among a certain group of older Soviet leaders, for example, Reagan’s reference to the USSR as an “evil empire” truly stung them, not least because it was an insult they feared they might have genuinely have deserved.) [6]

The degree to which moral pressure by leaders like Reagan or Pope John Paul II, or the examples of virtue found in people like Havel, brought about change in the minds of Communist leaders is a tantalizingly interesting question, and ripe material for a future study (hopefully while these former leaders are still alive to be interviewed).

Kramer also notes that his study informs some of the previous work done on how protest movements can “spin off” into other regions, with the case of Solidarity providing a detailed look at how such spin-offs happen. Of particular interest in the Soviet case is that internal Soviet conditions had to change enough for a spin-off movement to take root, thus illustrating the interplay of external and domestic change in bringing about regime collapse. He also applies his data to the idea of Sidney Tarrow’s “cycles of protest,” although I found this to be a less interesting section, primarily because I see Kramer’s narrative as already having gotten inside the “cycle” and explained it usefully without a need for a theoretical apparatus to be appended.

Finally, Kramer reaches a conclusion that could almost be a word of advice to future dictators: when faced with protest, if you’re going to use violence, go all the way. Kramer’s findings validate the general findings in the literature that “violent repression can halt the spread of political unrest, provided that it is used consistently and decisively. The inconsistent and irresolute use of force is likely to stimulate, rather than diminish, the level of protest.” (III, 91)

Conclusion

In the end, Kramer is too modest about his findings. He refers to the spillover from Eastern Europe as only one of many factors that led to the Soviet collapse, but his study makes a good case that it was an incredibly important one. As Kramer notes:

“The momentous changes that Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union would have made it difficult for him to preserve the Soviet system (and perhaps even the Soviet state) under the best of circumstances, but the repercussions from the collapse of East European Communism greatly complicated his task.” (III, 96)

This is tremendous understatement. While I continue to believe that the ideological and military competition with the United States forced the USSR to seek a truce, and to retreat from its ambitions as a global revolutionary power, Kramer has presented us with an extremely powerful explanation of why, in the midst of this disengagement from global conflict with the West, the Soviet leadership suffered a truly existential loss of self-confidence that led to their accepting the collapse of their empire, and then the euthanizing of the Soviet state itself.

Mark Kramer’s study is a ground-breaking piece of scholarship that goes far toward answering the question of why Soviet leaders chose not to fight the end of their regime. It also illuminates important theoretical questions about how ideas find their way across borders and change people and institutions. He has shown us, at least in one corner of the world, how dictators begin to lose their stomach for rule, and how more virtuous ideas can displace fundamentally inhuman or corrupted ones, thus leading to change on a global scale.

The events in Eastern Europe demonstrated clearly to the Soviet leadership that their model of government was a failure more clearly than any insult that Ronald Reagan could fling at them; worse, the collapse of the Pact’s regimes opened the chilling possibility that Reagan, and others like him who had warned for years that Communism was unviable and even evil, were right. In 1989 and 1990, the men in the Kremlin, as well as ordinary Soviet citizens, were forced to face the terrible reality that their putative “allies” deeply hated the Soviet Union and everything it stood for. The trauma of seeing the lie revealed and the illusion dispelled was too much for many of them to bear, and years of carefully constructed self-delusion came crashing down in pieces. And when Soviet demonstrators began to emulate their Eastern European counterparts, their leaders had no compelling answer to give them about why the Union should even exist.

Some years ago, I visited an Israeli military commander on the West Bank during the Palestinian protests collectively called the Intifada. Pointing to the amount of military force at his disposal, he said: “I could end the Intifada tomorrow if I chose to.” Well, why didn’t you, he was asked. “Because I am a human being,” he said simply.

Mark Kramer has shown us how, and why, Soviet leaders similarly reached the decision to be human beings. I sincerely hope he intends to expand these three articles and then release a full volume. But even these three installments easily stand as one of the most important studies on how one of the most dangerous empires in history came to the quiet end it did, and he is to be commended for adding to our knowledge about a page in history that is far more important than we may have ever realized.

[3] Valentin Varennikov: “My srazhalis’ za Rodinu’”, _Zavtra_, 17(22), May 1994, pp. 1-2.

[4] Quoted in Thomas Nichols, _The Russian Presidency_, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 77.

[5] One of the best examples of this kind of continual optimism among certain Sovietologists came from Stephen Meyer of MIT, who dismissed Yazov’s promotion in a New York Times op-ed as likely to be “a gold watch for impending retirement” rather than any evidence of increased political power. Over a year later, he told the Senate Foreign Relations committee that “hints of military coups are pure flights of fancy” in testimony he gave on June 6, 1991–just nine weeks before Gorbachev’s temporary ouster. See Stephen Meyer, “The Army Isn’t Running Gorbachev,”
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/tt/1990/may30/23250.html, and Stephen M. Meyer, “Testimony Before The Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee,” in Theodore Karasik, ed., _Russia and Eurasia Armed ForcesReview Annual_, Vol. 15, 1991 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1999), p. 348.

[6] See Nina Tannenwald, ed., “Understanding the End of the Cold War,1980-1987: An Oral History Conference,” (Providence, RI: Watson Institute for International Studies, 1999), p. 251.

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