Austin Bay Blog

Via StrategyPage. I believe RCP will run it later this week.

Here’s the lede:

“War is hell,” Gen. Billy Sherman said. The hell of the American Civil War ended slavery and settled a constitutional question regarding a state’s right to secede from the Union.

Nominally over in 1865, civil rights activists of the 1960s knew the social and economic injustices they confronted were the unfinished business of Shiloh and Gettysburg. For a century, the Ku Klux Klan used terror tactics to murder innocents. The KKK’s fire bombings and lynching-assassinations pre-figure the tactics employed by Saddam’s holdout henchmen in Iraq.

For three decades, Sherman’s hell ruled Afghanistan. Communist invasion, Taliban tyranny and Al Qaeda-backed terror — the people of Afghanistan knew only oppression and destruction. Last week, I talked with Afghan farmers in a village near Bagram. They spoke of water and wheat. New elections loom. The economic and political battles — however difficult — point the way to peace.

The tyrannical grip of Saddam Hussein brought perpetual war to Iraq. The internal wars waged by his Tikriti elites against Shias and Kurds were hideous and merciless. The Iran-Iraq War, with its poison gas and human-wave attacks, echoed World War I at its worst. Recall Saddam started that war in 1980 with a quick tank strike, the same trick he tried a decade later in Kuwait.

But for 9-11, Afghanistan and Iraq would have stayed in thrall to tyranny, terror and war. And just perhaps, America would have remained asleep, jarred occasionally by the bombs of Islamo-fascist radicals, taking a Khobar Towers here, a USS Cole there, until …

The Saddamist holdouts and Zarqawi’s clan are “resistance groups” in the mold of the KKK. Self-styled “anti-fascist” lefties miss that connection.

Here’s a UPI report sent to me from a listserv where Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari characterizes Saddam’s Sunni henchmen as a gang who wants “to rule again.” The Ku Klux Klan-types sought to continue de facto Southern white rule, and used terror tactics to achieve their goals. (After googling the UPI report, here’s a link to the Washington Times’ version.)

(UPI) Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari lashed out at Arab media, accusing them of being biased and hostile to his country.
Speaking in an interview with the London-based Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Jaafari said, “Arab media are still hostile and biased, especially the satellite Arab televisions.”
He stressed that “Iraq is a country that has been stolen away for decades … and is now being returned to the Iraqis, but destroyed.”
Jaafari accused the remnants of the ousted Baath regime of Saddam Hussein of destroying Iraq. “They say either they will rule Iraq again or they will burn it,” he said.

Here’s a sobering article from Britain’s Independent. I am writing up a short opinion piece for StrategyPage based on this report. It should run on StrategyPage tomorrow (June 30).

Here’s the Independent’s lede:

Greece has launched a judicial inquiry to discover the extent of its involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, Europe’s worst atrocity since the Second World War.

An Athens prosecutor announced a preliminary investigation to find what role Greek volunteers played in the slaughter of 8,000 Muslim men, women and children in the UN enclave in Bosnia in 1995. With the 10th anniversary of the massacre on 11 July, and Bosnian Serb authorities admitting the extent of the massacre, any confirmed Greek involvement would embarrass Athens seriously.

Greece was a staunch ally of the Milosevic regime in the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s but the presence of Greek paramilitaries fighting with Bosnian Serbs has not been fully investigated. The part played by the so-called Greek Volunteer Brigade in the assault on Srebrenica was widely reported in Greece at the time but veterans of the brigade have gone to ground since the formation of the war crimes tribunal that indicted the former Serb and Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic.

The Independent adds:

Four members of the unit received medals of honour from the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, within a month of Srebrenica’s fall.

The Independent notes that it is relying on reports from the Greek press that appeared in 1995. The Greek newspaper Ethnos is specifically mentioned. The story says video footage proves that Greece shipped arms to Serbia in violation of weapons sanctions.

There were numerous rumors dating back to 1992 of “Orthodox volunteers” serving with Serb paramilitaries– Orthodox as in the “foreign” volunteer claimed to be a member of one of the Eastern Orthodox Christian churches. The rumors Jim Dunnigan (of StrategyPage) and I heard in the early Nineties suggested a few dozen “non-Serb” volunteers might be participating. Here’s the scenario I envisaged: A Greek “ultra-nationalist” who “hates Turks” decides to head north to Bosnia because he see “the Serbs are doing something about the Turks.” (In his mind “Bosnian Muslim” means “Turk.”) All this not-so-imaginary character has to do is take a bus from Athens to Belgrade and then ask for an automatic rifle. An investigation may reveal there were far more than a “few dozen” who took the bus to Belgrade (perhaps several hundred?).

If the Serb paramilitaries’ use of Orthodox volunteers echoes Al Qaeda’s appeals to fellow Islamist radicals– guess what, it’s the same dark stroke, though there’s no evidence the Serbs were ever as well-organized as Al Qaeda in terms of foreign recruitment. Greece appears to be investigating it’s own citizens’ possible participation in terrorist murder. When Saudi Arabia conducts similar prosecutorial investigations we’ll know the War on Terror has turned a major corner.

The trip from Bagram to Kabul to Delhi to London to Chicago to Dallas to Austin took fifty-one and a half hours. I managed to sleep six hours or so, not counting a doze or two. I am shaking off a heavy case of jet-lag with yoga and yard work.

Over the next couple of weeks I’ll have an interview up with General John Abizaid and I’ll add to my “trip report” posts. Instapundit and StrategyPage will (may?) also have some video I shot while en route. I examined about a half hour’s worth of tape last night. One segment from Afghanistan seems to work especially well– it’s an interview with Mike Hedges of The Houston Chronicle/Hearst newspapers. We’re riding in an SUV on the road between Bagram and Kabul and Mike is recalling his trip down the same road in November 2001. I’m no cameraman, the clip needs serious editing, but the discussion, body-rattling pot holes and background noise –as well as occasional snippets of the harsh terrain– are a historical essay of sorts. Run time, depending on edits, should be five to six minutes. Again, give us a couple of weeks to work through the material.

As for comments– comments were shut-off during the trip. The site has that information up in in four or five pre-trip posts. However, on three occasions I managed to get on-line with enough time to scan the moderation file. Perhaps 20 comments appeared. Commenters need to review the rules for this site.

I may be on Larry Kudlow’s CNBC cable program this afternnon, between 4 PM and 5 PM CDT (5PM and 6 PM EDT).

Again, many thanks to everyone who contributed via PayPal– I will get out individual email thanks yous to everyone. (About two-dozen have already gone out.) Your generosity and confidence is gratifying. I have already used the PayPal contributions to take care of extra digital tape and a memory card for the camera. The money will pay for the international phone bills generated on the trip, a boggling hotel laundry bill, and the extra night stuck in a Qatari hotel waiting for the flight to Djibouti. The PayPal contributions bridged the difference between the University of Texas’ travel grant and the Weekly Standard’s travel expenses. Glenn Reynolds and Roger L. Simon both told me to “ask the readers.” They were right. Reader power adds up.

I have started on the Weekly Standard article and sketched out an essay for New Criterion, so the bang for you PayPal buck extends beyond the blog.

The MP motor patrol left Bagram Air Base at 0800, four armored Humvees on a swing through the hard-scrabble farms along the Berq River. This particular patrol had a definite Alaskan slant, with the patrol leader, SSG Matthew Taylor, serving in the 164th MP Company (Fort Richardson, Alaska). The 164th is currently part of the 716th MP Battalion, Ft Campbell, Kentucky. I rode in the second Humvee, along with Major Dennis “DZ” Zink, XO of the 716th, Specialist Joshua Fisher, the driver, and Specialist John Reid, our machine gunner. I told Fisher I’d try and include him in a column since he’s from Wichita Falls, Texas, and his local paper, the Times-Record, carries my column. I think the most interesting member of our crew, however, was our gray and grizzled translator, who goes by the nom de guerre of Jdhooshi. Jdhooshi, he told me, is a city north of Kabul. It seems to fit this spry 69 year-old Afghan– or maybe I should call him an Angeleno. Jdhooshi has lived in Los Angeles for 27 years. He has three engineering degrees, and a comfortable life in Southern California. But when the War on Terror came to Afghanistan he knew he had to get involved. “This is a chance to change this place, my country, my first country,” he told me. “It has suffered so much. Thirty years of war has left it with nothing. Now we, America, we are giving Afghanistan a chance. I knew I could help by working as a translator.”

Jdhooshi also does a heckuva job passing out bottled water — Jemaa’s the brand, not LA Perrier. In the first hour out on patrol the temperature rose from the high seventies to the mid-nineties and I drank at least a liter of water. Dust swirled on the plain of Bagram as we approached the bridge over the Berq. Or what was the bridge over the Berq. The Taliban blew up the narrow metal bridge — to punish the locals and harrass coalition patrols, one soldier said. We stopped briefly and I walked across the bridge. It can still carry foot and goat traffic, but wheeled vehicles and wagons must use the ford. I pulled out my video camera and filmed the patrol as the Humvees dipped into the stream, churned mud and rocks, then climbed the muddy bank.

Our next stop was the village of Bakhshe Khil, a farm town growing wheat and rusted truck parts. The local farmers told our translator that the rains were very good this year. Jdhooshi produced a sack of candy and began giving it to the flock of children that appeared. The kids mobbed him but he’s an experienced candy man. He used a short stick –something like a British baton– to gently shoo the children as he plopped mints into their hands. One tiny little girl in a red dress couldn’t squeeze through the big boys –they kept bumping her to the rear. I pointed her out to Jdhooshi and Specialist Fisher. Jdhooshi ran the boys off and walked over to the saucer-eyed girl. He leaned toward her, his gray beard almost touching her head. Wham– there’s the candy. Talk about a small hand clamping a big prize.

We left Bakshe Khil and started kicking up dust again, until we stopped for a Code Yellow break. I walked off the road with Major Zink and a couple of other soldiers. The experts weren’t sure, but we may have fertilized a wild poppy. It looks like a weed topped by a boll. Twenty minutes later we checked out an abandoned farm. The main structure is a mud-walled fortress, possibly built sixty years ago. At one time it housed an extended family — parents, children, grand-parents. The family grew grapes, Jdhooshi said, pointing to a ventilated two-story house where the grapes (still attached to the plucked vines) ripened into raisins. At one time the Russians occupied the farm house–using it as a place to rest troops. It now lies empty, with the mud walls slowly collapsing.

Once back at Bagram we got a quick tour of the 74th Fighter Squadron’s operation. The 74th is the descendant of the AVG –American Volunteer Group, also known as the Flying Tigers. The unit is now an A-10 Thunderbolt II unit. USAF Captain Lee Gentile of Wrentham, Massachusetts, walked us down the flight-line. Yesterday –June 21– CPT Gentile was flying strikes missions near Qalat.

Tomorrow will be another long day. We will take a motor convoy to Kabul, and with any luck, head for the commercial airport and begin the long trek home.

Monday afternoon, June 20, we caught an operational briefing with Combined Joint Task Force-76 at Bagram Air Base then flew back to Kabul to spend the night. After take-off, our first CH-47 developed an engine problem so we made the long bank and returned to Bagram. It took twenty minutes to transfer to a second CH-47. The second night flight to Kabul went quickly. I spoke with one of the door gunners, though it’s difficult to speak with anyone on a CH-47. The door gunner wore a pair of the “new” binocular night vision scopes, but the moon light was so bright he flipped them back up on his helmet. The full moon put a definite edge on the mountains and we could see trucks moving on the main highway. The Ch-47 is well named: the Chinook. The twin-rotored giant chopper is a big wind. When it lands on a dry Afghan landing zone the chopper raises an instant dust storm– a sustained storm that turns dirt into pumice. Turn around and lean away, and if you don’t have goggles, cover your eyes.

Tuesday morning (June 21) we attended a couple of informal operations briefings (one discussing training Afghan military units) before flying on to Pol-e-charki, the headquarters of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) 201st Corps. The 201st Corps’ Third Brigade is also stationed there. (At the moment the ANA has five corps.) Third Brigade is –or perhaps I should say, will be– the ANA’s mechanized strike force. The unit has an interesting amalgam of weapons: ex-Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks, ex-Soviet BMP armored personnel carriers, and some US M-113 armored personnel carriers. We saw a mechanized infantry platoon demonstrate debarking from M-113s, forming a battle-line, launching an assault, then withdrawing to their personnel carriers. The ANA is focusing on building battalions –”kandaks” they’re called– of about 600 troops each. After the demonstration we got the chance to talk about training the ANA with the US commander in Iraq, Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry. The September 18 Afghan provincial and national assembly elections also loom large in Eikenberry’s current plans. Eikenberry says the ANA will assume a major role in providing security for those elections. The elections will be protected with “three rings” — Afghan police, Afghan military, and then coalition forces, with the Afghan police providing the first line of security at polling stations. (The Afghans say there will be over 3600 polling places open on September 18.) Eikenberry’s troops also work closely with PRTs– Provincial Reconstruction Teams– that are rebuilding Afghanistan. After the short chat with LTG Eikenberry we returned to the helicopters for a flight to Kabul. In Kabul Sally Donnelly of Time Magazine, Mike Hedges of The Houston Chronicle (Hearst), and I got a quick interview wit GEN Abizaid, then we split-off from his command group and returned to Bagram. I asked GEN Abizaid one question: “This is a long war. The military has played the central role in this war. What can the American people do to get involved and stay involved in this war?” (See my post “Iraqi Whirlwind” for some background on this question.) I’ll get his complete answer up when we get the transcript (tomorrow?), but the gist of his reply was this: Americans need to understand the stakes. Some time early tomorrow morning we go out on patrol with an MP unit from the Alaska National Guard.

We managed to work in the Djibouti leg of the trek, though we were only on the ground about two hours. I’ll provide details when I return to the States, but we had the usual kind of “equipment challenge” that delayed our flight from Qatar to Djibouti. We got an update from Colonel Craig Huddleston, USMC, the commander of the US task force in the Horn of Africa. We also got to talk with 1st Lieutenant Joe Cruz, 2nd Platoon, Alfa Company, 1/294 Infantry (Guam National Guard). LT Cruz had been directing a border security training operation in Ethiopia. He gave us a very thorough run-down on how border security training contributes to our efforts to monitor smuggling activity and terrorist movement in the Horn of Africa region.

We picked up GEN John Abizaid, who was already in Djibouti, and flew from East Africa to Afghanistan. While waiting for a chinook (Ch-47) helicopter to pick us up, I got a chance to check out the flight line. That included a quick look at the Dutch Air Force F-16s deployed to Afghanistan. At the moment I am north of Kabul at Bagram Air Base. The flight to Bagram is spectacular. At the moment the central valley is lush with crops. The Himalayas literally wall the valley, quickly leaping from rough, brown cliffs to the snow-capped peaks.

I’ve time for a quick post before a very long night begins. Tomorrow will be a hard night’s day.

Two hours ago we had the opportunity to hang out at the Qatar USO (on the As Sayliyah base). I chatted briefly with Marine Lance-Corporal Eugene Sims of Houston, Texas. Sims is a legal assistant with MWHS2 — Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron, 2nd Marine Air Wing. He’s been at Al Asad (in Iraq) for five months and got a four day R&R break in Qatar. Sims weighs in at 188 and has a set of prize-fighter’s shoulders — a sharp contrast to his soft voice and pleasant smile. When Mike Hedges of the Houston Chronicle asked him what the R&R break in Qatar meant, Sims told us: “It’s a chance to relax, not worry about having to carry a weapon, and there’s Chili’s.” As in a Chili’s restaurant. I didn’t ask him, but I suspect he needs a break from the KBR food. Sims signed up for the Marines in the Spring of 2002, as he graduated from The Woodlands High School (north of Houston). “Yes, that’s after 9/11,” he nodded. “I knew what I was getting into.” He told me his break in Qatar is refreshing. “When I get back (to Iraq) I’m headed for Fallujah,” he said with a flicker of a smile.

If all goes well I’ll report on the long night sometime late tomorrow evening.

Friday morning was a micro-tornado– another wall to wall day of activity in CENTCOM’s theater of operations.

We spent several hours Friday morning listening to senior US and British officers discuss Iraqi security training programs. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) commands the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) controls the Iraqi police, police commandos, and paramilitary security units. MOD and MOI cooperate closely –and this is a huge change from the ancien regime. Saddam structured his security forces to watch one another as well as oppress the Iraqi people. MOD and MOI have made a very rough division of security responsibilities. The Iraqi Army is assuming responsibility –in large measure– for security operations outside of Baghdad. MOI is taking the lead in the Baghdad region. That noted, one particular Iraqi Army battalion has had huge successes in Baghdad. Led by a Sunni colonel identified as “Colonel Muhammad,” in early 2005 this battalion “cleaned up” Haifa Street. Last week a platoon from this battalion found and freed the Australian hostage, David Woods. (I should mention a second hostage was freed in that operation, an Iraqi civilian who had been kidnapped and was held for $50,000 ransom. A military source told me that the hostage takers were “former regime elements,” not Baghdad criminals, but had taken the Iraqi hostage to raise money. He saw this as an indicator that this particular resistance group was running out of cash.)

We left the training cadre and visited the 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. When I walked into the briefing room I recognized a face– the assistant division commander, Brigadier -General Karl Horst gave me the same “We’ve met before” look I gave him. Turns out Karl was US Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan’s aide at one time. Back in the mid-90s I visited Sullivan’s Pentagon office and had a couple of long discussions with Karl. BG Horst filled in some details about Colonel Muhammad. Haifa Street is indeed an improved situation. BG Horst and Colonel Muhammad had shared a cup of tea in a sidewalk cafe on Haifa Street. The notorious “boulevard of resistance” has changed. Colonel Muhammad had been a professional soldier in the old Iraqi Army– an air defense artillery officer. I’ve written this before and I’ll write it again– so note, the following is my opinion, but I guarantee it will be the subject of post-War on Terror PhD theses for the next six or seven decades. We needed to off the leadership in the Iraqi Army — “de-Saddamize” to use a turn the Iraqis prefer to “de-Baathification”– but find and keep military talent like Colonel Muhammad in the system. Yes, I think disbanding the Iraqi Army the way we did was a mistake. The crooks and political killers had to go, but there were officers and NCOs like Colonel Muhammad who had the military experience, know how, and desire to build a new, responsible organization. Mike Hedges joked that Colonel Muhammad is the “Rudy Guiliani of Baghdad.” The man is getting that kind of reputation. He has also — so far– had 43 threats against his life. I’ve written about heroic Iraqis and we’ve seen the purple-ink stained fingers. Colonel Muhammad is a revolutionary hero. We didn’t have a chance to meet him. His battalion was out on an operation.

We left Baghdad by C-17 and flew back to Qatar. The Ritz-Carlton is almost tasteful in its excess — that’s where we’ve spent the night. I went swimming in the hotel’s outside pool, a winding lagoon with waterfalls and gorttoes. I felt like the jungle boat ride at Disneyland. Don’t laugh too hard — this is an opportunity to clean some clothes.

Saturday CENTAF (CENTCOM’s air forces component) gave us a tour of their command facility. I ran-down a few extra details on the new “Sniper” targeting pod — and advanced LANTIRN targeting system. A couple of weeks ago StrategyPage ran a report on the pod’s capabilities. It can detect rifle fire on rooftops and is a real intel asset for ground troops.

Unfortunately it looks like our Djibouti leg will be cancelled– I always expect changes in route and the Horn of Africa involves some diplomatic maneuvering. We had hoped to visit a humanitarian aid project and talk about intel and surveillance operations along the African coast. It would have been a six hour flight there, a few hours on the ground, then six hours back. I just received a phone call and we’re in the process of re-arranging the schedule. It looks like Afghanistan’s the next stop.

Once again, Internet access has been an iffy thing, and I have not been able to get to a place where I can dump multiple megabytes of video. We will get it out– I hope (pray) the Navy material in particular is as spectacular as the experience.

Today began at 0600 sharp. We moved from Baghdad to Fallujah by Blackhawk helicopter. A theater commander’s flight group doesn’t merely resemble a swarm– it is a swarm, with the Apaches definite wasps. With two door guns the troop-carrying Blackhawks have a sting as well.

The Marines gave us a briefing on the situation in Al Anbar province in general and Fallujah in particular. Suffice to say Al Anbar is Iraq’s Wild West, with Zarqawi’s terror clan and Sunni rejectionists a particularly violent bunch of outlaws. And that’s the new political key. Mass murder of Iraqis by these bad guys has made political cooperation by fence-sitting Iraqi Sunni Arabs an attractive alternative. Again, I will expand on this when I have time.

We received a briefing on new techniques and technologies for manning check points and inspecting vehicles and personnel for explosive devices. Of course the Marines conducted the briefing “on the job” — at the base gate leading to Fallujah. Lance-Corporal Joe Solis of Plainview, Texas, gave a briefing on a new “background scatter” scanner. I surprised Joe twice. I not only know where Plainview is, I recognized his street address. I have an uncle and aunt who live in Plainview and The Plainview Daily Herald carries my column. Our group also got the chance to chat with USMC Major-General Steve Johnson, the commander of II MEF (Forward). Some of what we heard in the field and in briefings was on the record, much of the information was not. I know a statement like that whets appetites but operational data and analysis has to stay off the record until ops are complete. As usual, I found the Marines to be candid and articulately blunt. One of the regrets I had last year was missing out on two trips to the Marine encampment outside Fallujah– both planning meetings were cancelled, or postponed. This trip as a columnist made up for those missed opportunities in some small measure.

We flew back to Baghdad and caught a C-17 hop up north to Tal Afar. The area is covered by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and a new Iraqi Army (IA) division. The area has seen a lot of action, including an operation that ran from June 7 through June 10. I got to interview SFC Gary Villalobos of Santa Maria, California (near Santa Barbara). I caught most of the interview on video and when I get to an internet connection where I can download video I’ll try to send this particular footage to a couple of interested websites (heads up Instapundit). On June 7 SFC Villalobos and four Iraqi soldiers defeated a close-in urban ambush. Villalobos is the mortar platoon sergeant in Fox Troop, 2nd Squadron, 3rd ACR, but he was working with a US team advising an new Iraqi Army brigade. An Iraqi Army battalion was conducting the raid with back-up provided by US troops. Villalobos described the intense action –where a US soldier died– in a careful, humble voice, but then so often that is the voice of extraordinary valor. Five insurgent fighters ambushed a US adviser in a narrow, twisting street. The resulting firefight lasted ten minutes. Part of the Iraqi platoon withdrew, but SFC Villalobos and an Iraqi Army fireteam returned fire and tried to reach the wounded US officer. Villalobos finally threw a heavy fragmentation grenade at the insurgent position, killing one and wounding three. Yes, part of this newly-minted Iraqi Army unit retreated, but part of it stood and fought. SFC Villalobos’ troop commander told me that the Iraqis followed the sergeant’s example– leadership by doing. Villalobos said that during the firefight the language barrier –his English, their Arabic– seemed unmanageable. He had to act. The Iraqi troops acted in concert. Villalobos is up for a major decoration– I have been spare on the details due to time but they will be provided. Mike Hedges of the Houston Chronicle is working on a full report which he hopes will be available Friday or Saturday.

Our last stop was Kirkuk and a visit to the 116th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 116th is an Idaho National Guard outfit. The Kirkuk area is one of the most ethnically complex areas in Iraq — Kurds, Arabs, Turkomen, and Assyrians collide in Kirkuk, and Sunni terrorists (Ansar al Sunna/Ansar al Islam) are active in the area. And then add huge oil fields. Coalition forces in the Kirkuk area (under the command of the New York Army National Guard’s 42nd Infantry Division) are working with Iraqi security forces to keep the area calm, encourage economic development, and protect the oil fields.

I find that this return visit to Iraq spurs thoughts of America– of American will to pursue victory. I don’t mean the will of US forces in the field. Wander around with a bunch of Marines for a half hour, spend fifteen minutes with Guardsmen from Idaho, and you will have no doubts about American military capabilities or the troops’ will to win. But our weakness is back home, on the couch, in front of the tv, on the cable squawk shows, on the editorial page of the New York Times, in the political gotcha games of Washington, DC. It seems America wants to get on with its wonderful Electra-Glide life, that September 10 sense of freedom and security, without finishing the job. The military is fighting, the Iraqi people are fighting, but where is the US political class? The Bush Administration has yet to ask the American people –correction, has yet to demand of the American people– the sustained, shared sacrifice it takes to win this long, intricate war of bullets, ballots, and bricks. Bullets go bang, and even CBS understands bullets. Ballots make an impression–in terms of this war’s battlespace, the January Iraqi elections were World War Two’s D-Day and the Battle of the Bulge combined. But the bricks– the building of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the other hard corners where this war is and will be fought– that’s a delicate and decades long challenge. Given the vicious, megalomanical enemy we face, five years, perhaps fifteen years from now occasional bullets and bombs will disrupt the political and economic building. This is the Bush Administration’s biggest strategic mistake– a failure to tap the reservoir of American willingness 9/11 produced. One afternoon in December 2001 my mother –after reading a column of mine in her local paper– called me long-distance. She told me she remembered being a teenager in 1942 and tossing a tin can on a wagon that rolled past the train station in her small Texas hometown. (Plainview– one reason I know Lanc-Corporal Solis’ hometown– it’s my parents birthplace.) Mom said she knew that the can she tossed didn’t add much to the war effort, but she felt that in some, small, token perhaps but very real way, that she was contributing to the battle being waged by our soldiers. “The Bush Administration is going to make a terrible mistake if it does not let the American people get involved in this war. Austin, we need a war bond drive. This matters, because this is what it will take.”

She was right then, and she’s right now.

This has been another wall to wall day. I am in Baghdad and I’ve traded jetlag for deja vu. Across the lake looms Al Faw Palace, the old III Corps HQ. Now XVIIIth Airborne Corps is in charge of Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

But back to yesterday– as my friend Mike Hedges of the Houston Chronicle opines, “Yesterday a firmament of stars fell upon us.” I think this means we were briefed by at least a covey’s worth of generals. We covered logistics, intel, and ops. I managed to meet a friend in Doha for dinner and we ate at a Lebanese restaurant– I’d call it toney but the food was much better than the kitsch fare “toney” spots in the US tend to produce.

Today –June 15– began at 0450 hours with a knock on the door. Beware the Ides of June, at least if you want to sleep late. We trucked out to the air base and caught a C-17 hop to Baghdad. One of the C-17 pilots was an RAF officer assigned to the USAF. Before I heard his accent I saw the Union Jack decal on his head set.

Once in Baghdad we drove from the airbase area to Camp Victory (where Al Faw Palace is located). The current chief of operations gave us a briefing in the Corps’ Joint Operations Center. I’ll comment on the difference in operational emphasis at a later date– but it’s clear the Iraqis are taking on a larger share of the operational burden. After the ops briefing we talked with the current corps commander, Lieutenant-General Vines, for about an hour. When asked about Iraqi participation in security missions, Vines gave us a rough percentage figure. In at least nine out of ten security operations, the new Iraqi military is providing half of the forces. The Iraqi units demonstrate tactical combat proficiency but –this is the short version– lack logistical support organizations and heavy weapons (eg, sufficient artillery).

I’ll update later. We’re off to another briefing.

This morning began on board the USS Normandy (Aegis class cruiser)– on patrol in the exlusion zone around Iraq’s “bank.” Well, not the bank precisely, but part of the bank, as in a key component of Iraq’s oil production system: the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT). ABOT can pump about 90,000 barrels of oil an hour, and that’s money in the bank for Iraq. ABOT is off-shore–hence the immediate presence of US Navy and coalition naval forces.

But to catch up on the junket, since Internet access is sporadic– and I must be quick and dirty since I’ve very little time at the moment.

I spent one night in Bahrain then caught a Navy C-2 (COD) transport out to the carrier USS Carl Vinson. Yes, we made a trap, which means I’m now an official member of Tailhook.

On the Vinson’s deck I watched some F-18s (with war loads) launch and then watched F-18s recover. I also met with the admiral commanding the carrier task force, the Vinson’s captain, and the deputy carrier air group commander (DCAG). At the moment the DCAG is a US Marine colonel, which is unusual, but may become “more usual.” (A Marine F-18 squadron was aboard the carrier.)

I caught a helo flight from the USS Vinson to the USS Kearsarge –an LHD, amphibious warfare ship with helos, Harrier jets, and a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on board. (A MEU has around 1200 Marines. It’s a Marine battalion landing team with tanks, artillery, helicopters, and Harrier jets.) I spent the night on board the LHD and in the morning watched as the ship recovered an LCAC ( hover-craft used to transport heavy Marine equipment). The Marine unit had been training on land at a site in Kuwait. The LHD is the centerpiece of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). The ESG is partrolling the northern Persian Gulf.

On the morning of June 13 I flew by helicopter to the USS Normandy (the Aegis cruiser). The ultra-hi-tech missile-carrying Normandy now sports M-2 heavy machine guns and 25 millimeter chain guns (the type on US Army Bradley infantry vehicles and USMC LAVs). They are “add-ons” for close-in defense from potential attack by small boats. Several of the M-2s are in dual-mounts that are reminiscent of World War II-era naval mountings (as in what you’d see on a PT boat). The Normandy’s captain pointed out that most of his crew is now “dual-hatted.” A sailor may be assigned as a cook or logistics specialists, but he or she is also assigned a gun position, or may participate in boarding parties using the cruiser’s RHIBs (rigid hull inflatable boats).

I spent the afternoon of June 13 scooting around the Persian Gulf on a Coast Guard RHIB and on the Normandy’s RHIBs. I was in the stand-off boat when a couple of dhows were boarded. These boardings were “information boardings” where local boat operators receive information in Arabic, Farsi, and English about the exclusion zone around the oil terminals. A Navy PC (the USS Chinook) was also part of the operation. I was only on-board the Chinook for about twenty minutes, but it was long enough to get a “feel” for the close-quarters on that ship. The PC is a real brown-water craft but with real agility and –for its size and given its mission– significant firepower.

I also visited ABOT and walked around part of the terminal with the commander of the Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) tasked with protecting the facility. The terminal itself may remind some of “Waterworld” — with weapons positions sprouting on platforms and on walkways. A number of Iraqi marines were on the platform, participating in a training exercise with the Navy MSD.

While on-board the Normandy I interviewed the Australian commodore (the rank is equivalent to a rear admiral, lower-grade, or an Army brigadier-general). The commodore is in charge of the coalition naval operations in the area. We spent some time discussing coalition naval ops. He pointed out that the naval coalition operation has been going on since 1990 (Desert Shield).

I spent the night on board the Normandy. On the morning of June 14 a helicopter arrived to pick me up and take me to Kuwait, where I transfered to a twin-engine prop transport (C-12).

The technology and operations are fascinating– but the people involved, the sailors and marines, make the tech work. Once again I was impressed by the young people in uniform, particularly the sailors on the RHIBs doing boarding party work. The sand-salt haze reduced visibility, bumping waves at high-speed hammered my knees and back, and –oh yes– the heat was a challenge. But the opportunity to see these young sailors in action — what a privilege.

After 26 hours of travel I de-planed in Bahrain. A USNR LT — who in civilian life is a reporter for at tv station in Tuscon– picked me up at the airport. When he asked me what I needed I replied “A meal and a mattress.” In retrospect that reminds me a bit of “dinner and a movie,” though I can think of racier associations. I got the meal, but had the urge to stroll the Internet before collapsing. The next two to three days will be Navy days. We will visit the USS Carl Vinson (CVN) and other naval vessels deployed in the Persian Gulf — or Arabian Gulf, as it it’s called in Bahrain.

I hope to get a fair if quick look at “Maritime Security Operations” (MSO) –Navy patois for defending coastal areas and ports, stopping suspicious vessels, monitoring airspace, and training coast guard and marine outfits to defend oil platforms.

On the flight from Dallas to Frankfurt I sat next to a German air-compressor specialist who had been on assignment in the US. He made two comments about the EU constitution and France and Holland’s recent rejection of the document. His first comment: “Our politicians voted for it.” (Germany did not hold a referendum– Germany’s elected reps voted for the EU Constitution.) His second comment: “No one has read it and knows what it says. Not completely. I certainly haven’t.” (Given that it’s 450 or so pages in length, his comment is an understatement.) This is posted as an anecdote — a tidbit, but nevertheless food for thought. “Our politicians voted for it.” I know Germany won’t hold a referendum, but I wonder if the EU Constitution would have passed in Germany, given Germany’s present political discontent and economic malaise.

Again, thanks to the folks who contributed via PayPal– I appreciate your faith and generosity. American Airlines and Gulf Air did excellent, professional work carrying me from Texas to Bahrain. I’m not certain when I’ll be able to post again, but stay tuned.

I head for the Middle East and Afghanistan in about twenty minutes. Thanks to everyone who dropped me a note or comment about the trip. And a big thanks to the PayPal brigade who hit the tip jar. Anyway else so inclined, please consider a donation.

I have written several email “thank you” notes (perhaps two-dozen) — the other “thank yous” will have to wait until the end of June when I return. I noticed that four “thank you” emails bounced because folks have tight spam filters. I will try to “work through” the filters at the end of June.

The web-host has turned off the comments. The comment function will return in late June.

Two days ago I received an email update from a friend in Bolivia. I rarely post emails and wanted to get permission before I quoted from it. Here’s part of that email report:

Bolivia is in a state of political unrest - the president has offered to resign, and he has warned of civil war. Demonstrators are having running battles with police in La Paz, and the airport has been closed. The State Department has called home non-essential US citizens from its embassy and consulates. ..There was a bloody demonstration on the outskirts of Santa Cruz several days ago, when some of the older farmers from the lowlands marched to Santa Cruz to hold a protest, and they were met by a gang of youth who didn’t want the protest - many of the older men were seriously injured, and some of the youth were arrested.

The letter quoted a witness to the trouble in Santa Cruz who described that town as “blockaded.” The letter concluded by saying the Catholic Church in Bolivia is trying to moderate the crisis.

This morning the Christian Science Monitor ran an article that provides excellent background on the situation. Bolivia has been deteriorating politically for quite some time. To say Bolivia has been deteriorating economically would be misleading — Bolivia is simply an economic tragedy.

Here’s the Monitor:

The protests in the capital, La Páz, that this week forced Bolivia’s president to offer his resignation and warn of civil war, are led largely by indigenous people. Making up at least 65 percent of the population, these subsistence farmers and miners live mostly in poverty.

Like other Latin American indigenous groups, they’ve gained political clout in recent years. With that, they want a larger share of the economy, especially from Bolivia’s natural gas reserves - the second largest in the Southern Hemisphere.

In some ways, the situation resembles that of South Africa as it emerged from apartheid, says Donna Lee Van Cott, a Tulane University expert on Latin American ethnic politics. Bolivia’s European and mixed-race elites “are absolutely horrified by the gains the indigenous have made.”

Racism is moving from the subsurface into the open, Ms. Van Cott says. She points to recent cases of light-skinned youths harassing Indian protesters and yelling racial slurs, and protesters pulling neckties from people, calling them “white men.”

And further background:

Many countries, including Bolivia, rewrote their constitutions to recognize indigenous culture and rights. Native people formed political parties and entered government.

As they’ve gained power, however, there’s been a backlash. Forced by extreme poverty to take extreme positions, Indians in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia have adopted socialist, sometimes militant, ideology, demanding their governments nationalize the oil and gas industries.

In Bolivia, that’s leading to schism. The fair-skinned, economically advantaged people who live in the lowlands want autonomy. They reject Indian socialist extremism, as they should.

The Bolivian budget also supports mostly white, elite institutions and people, while Indians rely largely on charities and foreign aid. One Indian demand is to take part in writing a new constitution. The constitutional reform of the ’90s, though benefitting Indians, was done by the elites.

ReliefWeb has a new bulletin up. Here’s how ReliefWeb sizes up the situation:

The dramatic social unrest in Bolivia which has worsened in the past weeks could potentially degenerate further declared President Carlos Mesa a day after he offered to resign from office in a television speech in which, together with the mayor of El Alto, he called for a humanitarian truce to provide the capital city, La Paz and its satellite, El Alto with basic food sources.

La Paz and El Alto are the main places in the country where most of the demonstrations are taking place and are also the most affected. Protestors are calling for economic reforms and, in particular, increased rights for indigenous peoples who make up the majority of the country’s population, clashing with those from the western and eastern areas of the country who are seeking nationalization of the gas industry and are demanding greater autonomy The road network in the country has now been blocked for three weeks with transportation reduced to 5 per cent of normal volume given a lack of fuel, limited water supply in several areas and food becoming more expensive and scarce day by day.

This is happening against a background of a political lack of governability where the main powers of the state are no longer in a position to provide stability to a divided country.

Note ReliefWeb’s comment about the “road network” being blocked and the comment in my email mentioning the blockade around Santa Cruz.

This is a very dangerous situation, with genuine demands for political and economic justice in the same pot with political opportunism, greed, and old grudges. I know– what else is new– but that kind of shrug answer is never an adequate answer. I think the State Department is right to pull out non-essential personnel.

Cuba’s Prensa Latina is using the crisis as an opportunity to plug for nationalization of Bolivia’s oil and gas resources. Today Prensa Latina adds a rant about the “need to restructure the neoliberal economic model. ” Fidel Castro certainly understands the benefits of “nationalization” Cuban style. Didn’t he make Forbes list of the world’s richest people?

I’m not making a statement for or against nationalization of natural gas in Bolivia or other economic decisions — the Bolivians need to find a common ground and the nation’s poor are wretchedly poor. It’s just a bitter joke for Cuba to use this brewing tragedy to tout its economic model.

UPDATE: From the AP this morning, June 10

The lede:

Bolivia’s new president pledged Friday to call early elections and take other steps to calm a country paralyzed by weeks of opposition protests that forced his U.S.-backed predecessor to resign.

Eduardo Rodriguez, the Supreme Court chief justice, automatically became president after Congress accepted the resignation of former President Carlos Mesa late Thursday and two congressional leaders first in line for the post declined the job.

Rodriguez must call elections within 180 days. As to the economic and political issues: ” Rodriguez declared he would work with lawmakers on key reforms to heal growing rifts in South America’s poorest nation.”

He will need prayers, aid, and lots of trust.

Norm Geras has an excellent post on Zimbabwe’s latest spate of Mugabe-led violence. Likewise Chester (ht Instapundit) and Wretchard at The Belmont Club.

StrategyPage’s archives on Zimbabwe document the turmoil — particularly the last five years following the stolen election in 2000. I wrote a number of those updates.

Here’s a link to a column from February 2002 — I dub Robert Mugabe the “Slobodan Milosevic” of Africa.

Here’s the lede:

He’s an ethnic cleanser, a “former Marxist” and a cynical thief whose greed and mismanagement has destroyed a once productive economy.

His scheme to retain power involves the dictator’s usual routines: stoking ethnic strife, inciting economic envy, silencing the press, physically intimidating his domestic opposition.

Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic? No, Slobo’s been nabbed and is on trial in the Hague. This time the scoundrel is Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. The local context is a March 2002 national election in Zimbabwe, where once again Mugabe’s election platform includes the murder of his democratic opponents in the black-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

Mugabe is never held accountable for his oppression and destruction.

I have friends who at one time worked in Zimbabwe (for an extensive period). It became clear in the late 1990s that Mugabe’s regime was decaying — which is a mild way to put it. Mugabe’s involvement in the Congo War (renting soldiers for access to resources) was an indicator StrategyPage noted early on (can’t find a link but it’s in the archives, somewhere).

I’m lifting this from StrategyPage — but then I wrote it a couple of days ago. StrategyPage has been trying to cover the “forgotten fronts” in the War on Terror. No, there isn’t a lot of action in Djibouti, but Djibouti provides logistical support and –we suspect– a listening post.

COUNTER-TERRORISM: With a Little Help From France

June 9, 2005: Lots of folks in sub-Saharan Africa snicker when they hear France’s president Jacques Chirac complain of US “unilateralism” and American imperial aims. France still maintains an empire and if you don’t think so, check out the way the Ivory Coast, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR) work — or don’t work.

And then there’s Djibouti, an independent ( at least nominally) nation located on the Horn of Africa. At one time know as the French colony of “Afars and the Issas”, the place has something State Department real estate agents understand– strategic location, strategic location, strategic location. It’s near the mouth of the Red Sea– and for the region it has excellent logistics capabilities. Djibouti got its independence from France in 1977, but the way France “de-colonialized” was something of a fiction. France and Djibouti maintain very “close ties.”

Since 2002, Djibouti has served as a base for U.S. military and intelligence operations against terrorist groups in east Africa and the Arabian peninsula.

Djibouti had a “minor” civil war that lasted from the early-1990s until 2001. Afar ethnics –chafing under an Issa dominated government– occasionally blew up things and ambushed convoys. That fracas seems to be settled, though settled in the way France likes to settle things. President Ismail Omar Guelleh was recently reelected president. In April 2005 Guelleh won 100 percent of the votes in the presidential election. He was unopposed.

Several analysts have suggested continued American use of Djibouti facilities is an example of France “hedging its bets.” Jacques Chirac has repeatedly played the anti-American card in French domestic politics, at the UN, and throughout the European Union. But it’s argued that encouraging Djibouti to provide a base in east Africa to bash Al Qaeda scores some covert brownie points from Washington.

After the French “No” to the EU constitution, Chirac can use all the brownie points he can scrape together.

Of Robert Fisk and John Pilger, to be precise. Courtesy Armavirumque (New Criterion). One chapter of my PhD thesis dealt with British Empire adventure fiction — and the points essayist Keith Windschuttle makes about the style and motifs are dead on.

Here’s a telling graf:

Between them, Pilger and Fisk represent the nadir of Western journalism in our time. They take us back to those apologists of the Soviet era in the 1930s, such as Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, who lavished praise on Stalin and the USSR at a time when hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians were dying of starvation or perishing before the regime’s firing squads. In his day, Duranty, who won the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for his efforts, was as celebrated as Pilger and Fisk are now, but what stuck in the long run was the epithet another Moscow correspondent, Malcolm Muggeridge, later gave him: “the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in 50 years of journalism.” Duranty and his successors betrayed their profession.

Windschuttle continues (this is so good it has to be quoted):

It is important to appreciate the scale of this betrayal because the art of war reporting goes to the very core of Western culture. The origins of journalism lie in exactly the same place as the origins of history. The first genuine historian was Thucydides, the Athenian who wrote The History of the Peloponnesian War around 420 BC. Thucydides did a remarkable thing. He set out to distance himself from his own political system and to write a work that examined critically what happened to Greece in the Peloponnesian Wars. He told not only of his own side’s virtues and victories but of its mistakes and disasters. Thucydides also distanced himself from his own culture and religion. Instead of the mythical tales that all previous human societies had used to affirm their place in the cosmos, he faced the fact that the Greek oracles could not foretell their future and that the Greek gods could not ensure their fortunes. Thucydides made a clean break with myths and legends and defined history as the pursuit of truth about the past.

The ability to stand outside your own political system, your own culture, and your religion, to criticize your own society and to pursue the truth, is something we today take so much for granted that it is almost part of the air we breathe. Without it, our idea of freedom of expression would not exist. We should recognize, however, that this is a distinctly Western phenomenon, that is, it is part of the cultural heritage of those countries—in Europe, the Americas, and Australasia—that evolved out of Ancient Greece, Rome, and Christianity. This idea was never produced by either Confucian or Hindu culture. Under Islam it had a brief life in the fourteenth century but was never heard of again. Rather than take this idea for granted, we should regard it as a rare and precious legacy that it is our job to nurture and to pass on to future generations. That is the reason why the practices of journalists like Fisk and Pilger are more disturbing than they look. The responsibility of the journalist is the same as that of the historian: to try to stand outside his own political interests and his own cultural preferences and to tell his audience what actually happened. This can never be deduced from some overarching political cause or social theory. It takes original, empirical research.

As for the War on Terror and the Iraq War, Windschuttle says this:

In the 1960s, the war in Vietnam became known as the first television war. The current war against militant Islam deserves to be recognized as the first Internet war. There has been so much material available on the Internet since September 11—news, information, comment, opinion—that you could literally spend twenty-four hours a day without reading the same thing twice. For a second nomination as one of the great pieces of journalism to come out of this war, I would like to propose a series of essays originally published online, but which have since been collected in book form under the title An Autumn of War.

The essays Windschuttle describes are by Victor Davis Hanson.

I agree with Windschuttle on Iraq/War on Terror as the Internet’s war. I wrote something similar last October in a column titled “The New Greatest Generation” (via StrategyPage):

A new greatest generation is emerging — in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the other, less-publicized battlegrounds of the War on Terror.

Focused on the U.S. political cycle, America’s press elites are missing the extraordinary story of the 19-through-35 year olds who are winning this war. The detailed history of this new cohort of American and Free World leaders — the people who will shape the 21st century — is being written by themselves, chiefly on the Internet, via email or web logs.

As for Fisk and Pilger, Windschuttle concludes:
“The choice is not between political left and political right but between sophistry and scholarship.”

Read the whole thing.

UPDATE: Another thank you to the readers who’ve hit the tip jar and are supporting my trip to the Middle East. I leave June 10 and should return by the end of June. I managed to send out a few “thank you” emails this morning. If anyone else is inclined to donate (via the PayPal button) please consider this a “thank you” in advance.

UPDATE 2: I meant to link to NYU prof Jay Rosen’s excellent post on Watergate– at least the “romantic interpretation” of Watergate and what it did to American journalism. It is an interesting complement to Keith Windschuttle’s essay. (via PressThink)

At StrategyPage. A look at 21st century slavery.

StrategyPage’s FYEO Express ran this interesting item on Iraqi marines:

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: Iraqi Marines in Training

June 8, 2005: The Iraqi navy is training its first battalion of naval infantry. This outfit will have 427 troops, who will provide infantry to go ashore from patrol boats monitoring the inland waterways and coastal waters of Iraq. The country has a lot of inland waterways, and rather than depend on the police or army for more armed manpower on the beach, this force will provide the troops needed. The first half of the battalion is undergoing its training now, modeled after the tough boot camp U.S. Marines undergo. The Iraqi naval infantry will learn how to get on and off various types of boat in the many different kinds of terrain found next to rivers and coasts. This includes everything from beaches (some of them containing quicksand), to swamps and marshes. Coalition marines and commandoes found out that some of this terrain is difficult to work in, even though they had lots of amphibious training. By the end of the year, the full battalion will be ready for service.

Next week I should get a chance to look at some US Navy operations and training in the Persian Gulf. I will inquire about Iraqi naval infantry training.

As I suggested Sunday, reflecting on John Burns’ coverage of Syrian-backed Saddam-Zarqawi infilitration routes, Balkan smuggling rings are a more appropriate comparison than “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” But the NY Times has to impose its Vietnam template. Burns’ report still provided a lot of useful detail.

Now the Washington Post has published an article on a Syrian smuggler . It provides a different perspective on the infiltration network– and I think it also illustrates that the Ho Chi Minh trail comparison was inappropriate.

The article is written and reported by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, with Aleppo, Syria as the dateline:

When the Americans led the invasion of Iraq, the men of Abu Ibrahim’s family gathered in the courtyard of their shared home in the far north of Syria. Ten slips of paper were folded into a plastic bag, and they drew lots. The five who opened a paper marked with ink would go to Iraq and fight. The other five would stay behind.

Abu Ibrahim drew a blank. But remaining in Syria did not mean staying clear of the war. For more than two years, by his own detailed account, the slightly built, shabbily dressed 32-year-old father of four has worked diligently to shuttle other young Arab men into Iraq, stocking the insurgency that has killed hundreds of U.S. troops and thousands of Iraqis.

The stream of fighters — most of them Syrians, but lately many of them Saudis, favored for the cash they bring — has sustained and replenished the hardest core of the Iraq insurgency, and supplied many of its suicide bombers. Drawn from a number of Arab countries and nurtured by a militant interpretation of Islam, they insist they are fighting for their vision of their faith. This may put them beyond the reach of political efforts to make Iraq’s Sunni Arabs stakeholders in the country’s nascent government.

The article elaborates:

Syria’s role in sustaining and organizing the insurgency has shifted over time. In the first days of the war, fighters swarmed into Iraq aboard buses that Syrian border guards waved through open gates, witnesses recalled. But late in 2004, after intense pressure on Damascus from the Bush administration, Syrian domestic intelligence services swept up scores of insurgent facilitators. Many, including Abu Ibrahim, were quietly released a few days later.

In the months since, the smugglers have worked in the shadows. In a series of interviews carried out in alleyways, a courtyard, a public square and a mosque, Abu Ibrahim was being visibly followed by plainclothes agents of the security service, Amn Dawla. In December, the service confiscated his passport and national identity card. His new ID was a bit of cardboard he presented each month to his minders; the entries for April and May were checked.

Few other details of Abu Ibrahim’s account could be verified independently. But the structure of the human smuggling organization he described was consistent with the assessments of U.S. and Iraqi officials who closely study Syria’s role in the insurgency. Other specifics jibed with personal histories provided by foreign fighters interviewed in the Iraqi city of Fallujah on the eve of a U.S. offensive in November.

Those interviews also echoed earlier accounts of Iraqi insurgents, including descriptions of the role of a Syrian cleric known as Abu Qaqaa in promoting a holy war, or jihad, against the West. Since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, the notion of jihad has “had a galvanizing impact on the imagination and reflexes” of many young Muslim men, especially those with the means and resources to travel, according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, based in Brussels.

This insight about Abu Ibrahim could be a separate article, titled “From Sufi to Salafist”:

His father was a Sufi Muslim, devoted to a tolerant, mystical tradition of Islam. But Abu Ibrahim said he was born a rebel, gravitating early in life to the other end of the spectrum of Islamic belief.

Salafism, or “following the pious forefathers,” is a fundamentalist, sometimes militant strain of the faith grounded in turning back the clock to the time of the prophet Muhammad.

The reason for his “conversion” isn’t given–the usual suspects will blame America, but if there’s a “probable cause” it’s Syria’s Assad clan. That’s the bitter game –and linkage– between tyrant and terrorist.

Abu Ibrahim met a group of Islamic militants, then went to Saudi Arabia and worked for seven years in Riyadh.

Abu Ibrahim is an “imperial restorationist” — a term I explored in November 2001. [I’ll add a quote from this particular column at the end of this discussion.]

But let’s continue with the Washington Post article and Abu Ibrahim’s war path:

At a private Saudi production company that specialized in radical Islamic propaganda, he said, he learned video editing and digital photography. The work channeled the rage of young Arab men incensed by the situation in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, angered by U.S. foreign policy and chafing under the repression of secular Arab rulers.

Their goal, he said, is restoration of the Islamic caliphate, the system that governed Muslims before the rise of nation states. Abu Ibrahim said he regarded Afghanistan during the Taliban rule as one of the few true Islamic governments since the time of Muhammad.

“The Koran is a constitution, a law to govern the world,” he said.

For those who think Iraq or Gitmo radicalized Abu Ibrahim, consider what he did after 9/11:

Two weeks after the attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, the group felt bold enough to celebrate in public in Aleppo with a “festival,” as it was called, featuring video of hand-to-hand combat and training montages of guerrillas leaping from high walls.

Afterward, Abu Qaqaa was arrested by the Syrian authorities, but he was released within hours. By 2002 the anti-American festivals were running twice weekly, often wrapped around weddings or other social gatherings. Organizers called themselves The Strangers of Sham, using the ancient name for the eastern Mediterranean region known as the Levant, and began freely distributing the CDs of the cleric’s sermons.

This report also adds a twist to the Al Jazeera-Al Qaeda claim that in late 2003 the US bombed an innocent Muslim wedding party near the Syrian border.

Abu Ibrahim admits another incident touted as a US mistake –an attack on a bus near the Syrian border– was in fact an Al Qaeda infiltration and supply operation:

“Once the Americans bombed a bus crossing to Syria. We made a big fuss and said it was full of merchants,” Abu Ibrahim said. “But actually, they were fighters.”

So US and coalition intel got it right (at least once).

Here’s another item addressing the infiltration operation:

Weapons were positioned. In the vast desert that forms the border with Iraq, passages through the dunes long used to smuggle goods now were employed to funnel fighters.

“We had specific meeting places for Iraqi smugglers,” Abu Ibrahim said. “They wouldn’t do the trip if we had fewer than 15 fighters. We would drive across the border and then into villages on the Iraqi side. And from there the Iraqi contacts would take the mujaheddin to training camps.”

And this about the effects of Saudi money and volunteers:

“Our brothers in Iraq are asking for Saudis,” he said last month. “The Saudis go with enough money to support themselves and their Iraqi brothers. A week ago, we sent a Saudi to the jihad. He went with 100,000 Saudi riyals,” or about $27,000. “There was celebration amongst his brothers there!”

This is a long article and well worth the read. Abu Ibrahim exhibits a lot of bravado, but take two steps back and there’s a case to be made this Al Qaeda fanatic has been suckered and frustrated.

The global war he so desired is being waged on his home turf, not in Manhattan, not in Los Angeles. Change has been brought to his world.

He also sees traitors (read the article for the full context of the following quote):

Abu Ibrahim said he now views the cleric (Al Qaqaa) with suspicion, suggesting that he is helping Syrian authorities track jihadi “rat lines,” as U.S. commanders refer to the smuggling chains. The same suspicion was voiced last autumn by a Yemeni fighter interviewed in Fallujah.

In January 2003 I suggested that Iraq would be a “fatal attraction” for Al Qaeda.

Here’s the main idea:

The massive American build-up around Iraq serves as a baited trap that Al Qaeda cannot ignore. Failure to react to the pending American attack would demonstrate Al Qaeda’s impotence. For the sake of their own reputation (as well as any notion of divine sanction), Al Qaeda’s cadres must show CNN and Al Jazeera they are still capable of dramatic endeavor.

This ain’t theory. Al Qaeda’s leaders and fighters know it, and the rats are coming out of their alleys.

Attacking Iraq “flipped” Al Qaeda’s strategy:

Strategy is always about applying one’s own strength to an opponent’s weakness. Al Qaeda’s historical pattern is to wait patiently, for years if necessary, and carefully prepare a terror operation until it’s certain of success. Prior to 9-11, with little pressure on its hidden network (succored by the Taliban, Wahhabi petro-dollars and, yes, Iraq), Al Qaeda could take its time to spring a vicious surprise attack — surprise and visionary viciousness being its strengths and the gist of its “asymmetric” challenge to America’s “symmetric” power. “Fear us, America,” was the message, “because Al Qaeda chooses the time and place of battle, and when we do you are defenseless.”

9-11’s strategic ambush sought to force America to fight on Al Qaeda’s terms, to suck the United States into a no-win Afghan war, to bait the United States into launching a “crusade against Islam.” Osama bin Laden believed he possessed an edge in ideological appeal, “faith based” strength against what he perceived as U.S. decadence. U.S. failure in Afghanistan would ignite a global “clash of civilizations” pitting all Muslims against America.

Bin Laden’s strategy flopped, for a slew of reasons. Chief among them, American liberty remains an ideologically powerful idea. The United States also pulled an “asymmetric” military move of sorts, using Green Beret-guided Afghan allies and hi-tech airpower to topple the Taliban.

Since the loss of its Afghan base, Al Qaeda has experienced extraordinary pressure. Time to plan is squeezed. The United States has used diplomacy, police work, better intel and military presence to exert the pressure.

Al Qaeda has attempted to adapt, with talk of a sleeper cell strategy while aggressively attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Bush Administration “suggested” this case but shied away from making it the center of its public diplomacy. In retrospect that was a political mistake. “The rats” are attracted to Iraq, and the US and coalition are building an Iraqi Army that will fight them. The US strategy has brought the War on Terror home to the Middle East– the politically dysfunctional Middle East where Assads, Zarqawi, Saddam, and radical Wahhabs mix. Abu Ibrahim is waging jihad of sorts, but not on his terms.

Here’s the material form the November 29, 2001 column on Al Qaeda’s goals. It’s Abu Ibrahim:

In soundbite format, the strategic collision between Bin Laden-type extremists and America may well be one of “imperial restorationist” versus “liberating reform.”

Bin Laden has complained of the terrible “80 years” of Muslim indignation and suffering since the end of the Islamic caliphate. Turkey’s reforming general and political genius, Kemal Ataturk, must rate a special place in any Hell designed by Bin Laden. Ataturk, as part of a program to replace Ottoman political structures and modernize Turkey, ended the caliphate in 1924.

In the angry babble of his psyche, Bin Laden just knows that should not have happened. History, going wrong for Islamic expansionists at least since the 16th century, really failed when the caliphate went poof.

In Bin Laden’s future, the caliphate is restored. The decadent modern world fades as American power dies, though techy bits of modernity are OK, such as videophones and nuclear weapons. Global rule of Bin Laden-interpreted Islamic law follows.

Don’t snicker. Violent “imperial restorationists” have an ugly track record. Benito Mussolini and his Italian Fascists dreamed of restoring the Roman Empire. The obvious choice for caesar was Benito. Who but Bin Laden serves as caliph? Add that title to Osama’s “end state.” It underlines the autocratic and despotic motives that lie behind the schemes of various religious absolutists, ethnic zealots, ultra-nationalists and eco-crazies around the world who reject the moderation and compromise that participation in the global system requires. Remember, violent eco-crazies battle for the “restoration of nature” — a green empire.

If the eco-terror comment seems far fetched– read this. (From Michelle Malkin.)

On another note– I leave for the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan Friday. The University of Texas has given me a travel grant (many thanks, UT), but the grant does not cover the entire cost of the trip. I intend to provide as many trip updates on this website as I can manage, and of course I’ll be writing several articles when I return. I intend to shoot some DV –and Roger L. Simon and I may try to turn it into a “blogosphere tv” report. We’ll see what happens with the video– like most Internet enterprises this is highly experimental and very free-lance. I say again– this is very freelance. If any reader is in inclined to hit the PayPal tipjar, your support for “blogworld field reporting” will be more than appreciated.

QUICK UPDATE: You can have both liberation and “fatal attraction”– and in fact we do. The Middle East is the real battlefield– and that’s where the fatal attractor is located. Liberation (liberty, freedom, democracy) is the long haul answer, for liberty breaks the cycle of tyranny and terror. In fact, a democratic Iraqi government is part of the “fatal attraction.” Zarqawi said as much in the CD he sent Al Qaeda (the one the Kurds captured in Feb 2004). “Imperial restoration” has a strong element of “golden age myth.” That a pan-human flaw (or characteristic?). “The Good Old Days” is no western template. Ask the Chinese about the Middle Kingdom. Read Bernard Lewis’ “What went wrong” for an Islamic version. I agree Bin Laden is something of a Kharjite– and I’ve said so. As for the shot a Michelle– nice retort. That line on my part in the Nov 2001 column had a bit of cheek. Michelle can certainly take care of herself. Her post on eco-thugs does bring together some useful links on recent eco-terror.

Good discussion, thanks for the comments. I suspect the comment function will be shut off Thursday.

UPDATE 2: Many thanks to the folks hitting the PayPal tip jar. I appreciate your generosity and I’ve had a chance to scan several emails wishing me “all the best” on the trip.

This is a great opportunity– I’m told by CENTCOM that there will be three of us on this “trans-theater” trip. Time Magazine and Hearst will both have reporters.

GT Distributors (a police and security equipment firm in Austin, TX) has lent me a flak vest for two weeks. (I gave a speech a couple of months ago at a fundraiser for a charity which helps educate the children of police officers killed in the line of duty and met a couple of GT’s reps at the dinner.) Thanks to GT Distributors for the loaner. Lance Bullington of Bull Tactical Outfitters also offered to loan me a vest (Lance is a reservist in 20th SF group). When I got off active duty I paid the US government right at two hundred bucks for the privilege of keeping my kevlar helmet and it looks like The Fritz will get further use. The Univ of Texas grant (from the Dean of Liberal Arts and the McKetta Professor of Aeronautical Engineering) made this grand excursion possible. UT purchased the ticket– and the University’s travel agents got a very good price. My biggest concern is changing the ticket enroute, which is a real possibility. We shall see.

I don’t have time at the moment to respond to each PayPal contributor individually but I will try to do so when I get back in late June. Thanks again.

UPDATE 3: Check out all three editions of A Quick and Dirty Guide to War and check in on Syria. Dunnigan and I followed the Alawite tyranny quiet closely– beginning in 1985. I had two Syrian Sunnis describe to me in detail (in 1981) what the Alawites had done to their families. While the Alawites may be classified as a Shia sect, there’s an interesting monograph out there that classifies them as syncretic, with aspects of Islam and other Levantine religions (including an ancient pagan cult).

UPDATE 4: And last update on this post, before I leave. Note to commenters: read the rules before you post. Here’s a thumbnail version: (1) no obscenities; (2) treat other commenters with civility ; (3) accusations must be backed up evidence; (4) no more than three links in a comment. Also, due to troll activity (identity theft) this site’s comments now go through a “moderation” folder. It seems to work fairly well. I know some comments (a dozen or so, and from a variety of posts) that met the rules were deleted (or lost)– that’s lousy, but blame the identity thief.

Heather Coyne in the Christian Science Monitor.

I’m preparing for a trip to the Middle East. The drill of the moment includes visas, videocam, tickets, and today– flak vest. I will have two or three posts up before I leave early Friday morning.