2006-07 Economics Seminars

Spring 2007

Date	Speaker	Title
Apr 2	John Van Reenen London School of Economics	Americans Do I.T. Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle
Apr 4	Tanjim Hossain Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	When Do Markets Tip? An Experimental Study
Apr 25	Attila Ambrus Harvard University	Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Space
May 2	Jason Hartline Microsoft Research	Prior-free Optimal Auction Design
May 9	John Morgan UC Berkeley	Information Aggregation in Polls
May 16	Steven Tadelis UC Berkeley	The Power of Shame and Rationality of Trust
May 23	R. Preston McAfee California Institute of Technology	A Theory of Bilateral Oligopoly
Jun 6	Michael Schwarz Yahoo! Research	Interviewing and Dating in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Jun 12	Michael Golosov MIT	Political Economy of Mechanisms
Jun 13	Dilip Mookherjee Boston University	Mechanism Design with Costly Communication: Implications for Decentralization

Winter 2007

Date	Speaker	Title
Jan 12	Yuliy Sannikov UC Berkeley	Agency Problems, Screening and Increasing Credit Lines
Jan 16	Parag Pathak Harvard University	Tie Breaking in School Choice Problems Related papers: Lotteries in Student Assignment Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Jan 25	Emi Nakamura Harvard University	Five Facts About Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models
Feb 26	Jon Steinsson Harvard University	Monetary Non-Neutrality in a Multi-Sector Menu Cost Model
Feb 1	Jesse Shapiro Harvard University	What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Newspapers

Feb 2	Emily Oster Harvard University	Does Increased Access Increase Equality? Gender and Child Health Investments in India
Feb 21	Dan Levin Ohio State University	Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small- Market Investment Game with Common Private Values
Feb 28	Peter Hammond Stanford University	Enlivened Trees and Other Heresies: Some Research Challenges in Game Theory Related papers: Schumpeterian Innovation in Modelling Decisions, Games and Economic Behaviour Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
Mar 9	Muriel Niederle Stanford University Joint with Applied Microeconomics	Gender Differences in Competitive Attitudes, and the Effects of Affirmative Action Related paper: Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?
Mar 14	Marko Tervio UC Berkeley	Difference that CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach
Mar 21	Ehud Kalai Northwestern University	Large Games and Markets

Fall 2006

Date	Speaker	Title
Sep 27	Christopher Phelan Federal Research Bank of Minneapolis	Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories Joint with Andy Skrzypacz
Oct 4	Hal Varian UC Berkeley	Position Auctions
Oct 18	Amanda Friedenberg Olin School of Business	Terminal Type Structures
Oct 25	Eric Van den Steen MIT	Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm
Nov 1	Adam Szeidl UC Berkeley	Trust and Social Collateral Joint with Markus Mobius
Nov 15	Jeff Ely Northwestern University	Common Learning Joint with Martin Cripps, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Nov 29	Daron Acemoglu MIT	Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World Joint with Victor Chernozhukov and Muhamet Yildiz
Dec 6	Matthias Blonski University of Frankfurt	Underpricing in Market Games with a Distinguished Player Joint with Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal
Dec 13	Christos Papadimitriou UC Berkeley	The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium Joint with Costantinos Daskalakis and Paul W. Goldberg