## 2011-12 Economics Seminars

## Spring 2012

Date	Speaker	Title
Apr 4	Ariel Rubinstein University of Tel Aviv	A Model of Persuasion with a Bounded Rational Agent
Apr 11	Arthur Robson Simon Fraser University	The Evolution of Theory of Mind
Apr 18	Navin Kartik Columbia University	Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games
Apr 25	Ennio Stacchetti NYU	Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method
May 2	<b>Dilip Abreu</b> Princeton University	An Algorithm for Two Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
May 9	Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania	Matching with Incomplete Information Joint with Qingmin Liu, George Mailath, and Larry Samuelson
May 16	Alfred Galichon Ecole Polytechnique	
May 23	Pierre Yared Columbia Business School	Political Distortions and Endogenous Turnover

## Winter 2012

Date	Speaker	Title
Jan 13	Gabriel Carroll MIT	A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules
Jan 18	<b>Treb Allen</b> Yale University	Information Frictions in Trade
Jan 20	Michal Fabinger Harvard University	Trade and Interdependence in a Spatially Complex World
Jan 25	David Berger Yale University	Countercyclical Restructuring and Jobless Recoveries
Jan 26	Anant Nyshadham Yale University	Learning about Comparative Advantages in Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Thailand
Jan 27	<b>Jonas Hjort</b> UC Berkeley	Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms
Jan 30	Michael Sinkinson Harvard University	Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones
Feb 1	Takuo Sugaya Princeton University	Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Feb 3	Aislinn Bohren UCSD	Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships
Feb 6	Paulo Somaini Stanford University	Spatial Competition and Interdependent Costs in Highway Procurement
Feb 8	<b>Joel David</b> UCLA	The Aggregate Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions
Feb 10	Michael Powell MIT	Productivity and Credibility in Industry Equilibrium
Mar 5	<b>Dean Karlan</b> Yale University	You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment
Mar 7	<b>Sergiu Hart</b> The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Joint with Finance	Comparing and Measuring Risks: An Operational Measures of Riskiness A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection
Mar 12	Meredith Fowlie UC Berkeley	Designing Markets for Pollution When Damages Vary Across Sources: What Are the Gains from Differentiation?
Mar 14	<b>Vasiliki Skreta</b> NYU	Transparency and Commitment

## Fall 2011

Date	Speaker	Title
Oct 5	Alessandro Pavan Northwestern University	Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
Oct 12	Lones Smith University of Wisconsin	The Economics of Counterfeiting
Oct 19	Scott Kominers University of Chicago	Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers
Oct 26	Sander Heinsalu Yale University	Universal Type Spaces with Unawareness
Nov 2	<b>Eduardo Perez</b> Ecole Polytechnique, France	Complicating to Persuade?
Nov 9	Federico Echenique California Institute of Technology	Complexity: Revealed Preference and Equilibrium
Nov 16	Mehmet Ekmekci Kellogg School of Management	Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring
Nov 30	Stephen Morris Princeton University	Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information