



Structural and Organizational Issues About Simulation in Healthcare

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- EIC, Simulation in Healthcare





It Is An Incredible Honor to Deliver the 2007 Peter & Eva Safar Lecture

- Peter Safar was a giant who created a prestigious organization
- Prestigious institution and audience
- Ultra-prestigious list of prior speakers

 Anesthesiologists & Physiologists: Too
 numerous to list some my teachers & colleagues
 Physicists: Bethe, Weisskopf, Dyson
 Bernard Lown, inventor of DC countershock



Electric Countershock Research My First Scientific Paper (+ 5 more til 1991)




Myocardial Damage Following Transthoracic Direct Current Countershock in Newborn Piglets

David M. Gaba and Norman S. Talner

1982







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A "Wannabe" Physicist





This Month is the 21st Anniversary of My Pioneering Simulation Work



But this talk is NOT about MY simulation activities... Pre-prototype Simulator -May, 1986 ... Gaba & DeAnda, VA/Stanford





Talking about Simulation in Pittsburgh This is Like:

-Carrying coals to Newcastle
-To bring owls to Athens {German}
-Bringing straw to Ofarayim {Hebrew}
-To carry water to the sea {Dutch & Spanish}
-To go to Tula & bring a samovar {Russian}

You know the rationale for simulation
You know how to do simulation
I'll talk about some of the bigger picture



Structural Features of the Health Care Industry Are Important

Structural and Organizational Issues in Patient Safety:

A Comparison of Health Care to Other High-Hazard Industries




California Management Review 43:83-102, 2000

David M. Gaba

CISL

Structural Features of the Health Care Industry



• Health care structures largely stem from "traditional" roles & organizations

-Autonomous "healers" – knowledge & skill were personal & idiosyncratic

-Few interventions, few acutely dangerous

-Hospitals were like "guild workshops" for the autonomous healers {Paul Starr: *Social*

Transformation of American Med.}



Structural Features of the Health Care Industry



- But... by now
 - <u>Many</u> interventions, many are highly lethal »(High lethality/m² in OR, ICU,ED, Chemo)
 - Complex care involving many personnel in many different work units
 - Knowledge & skill expected to be uniform & guaranteed
 - Yet, <u>structures</u> (not \$\$) still traditional



The Results of the Current System (Throughout the Western World)

- Huge variation in health care practices
 Some outstanding, some inadequate
- No clinician and no institution is as good as they could be or should be
 - Including our major academic centers
- Medical errors occur too frequently - See Institute of Medicine Report, 1999





Health Care is Intrinsically Hazardous How Do Others Manage Hazard?

- High Reliability Organizations
 Under the right circumstances, appropriate organizational control can yield <u>nearly</u> failure-free results despite incredibly high intrinsic hazard and high tempo
 Karlene
- Prototypical HROs
 A/C Carrier Flight Deck, Commercial Aviation, Nuclear Power



Aviation is clearly an HRO

Photo Copyright Jan Mogren

AIRLINERS.N

Fatalities – U.S. Scheduled Airlines (> 10 million departures per year) Year Fatal Accidents Deaths

2002	0	0
2003	2	22
2004	1	12
2005	3	22





HRO is not "Perfect Reliability" Nearly Failure-free is NOT Absolute

- High reliability organizations rarely <u>do</u> have accidents (sometimes catastrophically)
- Most accidents have substantial organizational roots even in an HRO
- High reliability/safety is a never-ending process





AND... Health Care <u>is</u> Different...





• We do not design or build people; we don't even get the instruction manual

- Stronger societal, moral, ethical aspects in health care than in other industries



Health Care <u>is</u> Different ---Industrial Structure is <u>Very</u> Different

•Health care is <u>extremely</u> decentralized, both in daily ops <u>&</u> in industrial structure

- \approx 22 million operations w anesthesia / yr.
- \approx 6000 hospitals, owned by ?>1000 firms)

•The <u>work</u> of clinicians is extremely unregulated (the \$\$ are regulated); loose organizational control



Key Principles From HRO Theory {adapted in part from Sagan}

- Maintain a powerful and uniform culture of safety
- Use optimal structures & procedures
- Provide intensive and continuing training of individuals and teams
- Conduct thorough organizational learning & safety management



Current Healthcare Training Not Optimized for Learning



- Not systematic has gaps
- **Training occurs nearly all on real people** - But nothing will <u>replace</u> apprenticeship
- Learners are very (too?) rapidly teachers - "See one, do one, teach one"
- Focused solely on individuals not teams
- Ends abruptly when formal training stops



Current Training Not Optimized for Learning

- Experience depends on the patients seen in a given period
- Many situations are handled repeatedly; others only rarely
- The inexperienced receive less hands-on experience to protect patients & their preferences







Five {good} "F"s of Training in High Reliability Organizations

- Frequent every year or more often
- For everyone regardless of discipline or domain
- Forever no matter how senior
- Focused about real challenges of individual and team performance
- Fit into routines of work not an "add on"



Education & Training is a Low Priority in Healthcare



Unlike in other industries, accidents

Occur 1 pt. at a time, not hundreds at a time
Are often considered personal failings of the individual healer(s) not systems problems
Do not often harm high-status workers
Do not destroy the means of production









Pedagogical Challenges to Applying Simulation Optimally



- Applying training (+sims) <u>comprehensively</u>
- Integrating different <u>types of simulation</u>based training
- Optimally integrating simulation <u>with</u> <u>other forms of training</u>





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Simulation is Theater: A Participant in a Simulation is Also an Actor

- Playing roles:
 - Primary participant (in the "hot seat")
 - "First helper"
 - Cross-disciplines
 - Suspension of disbelief
 - Staying in role





"Realities" are Interleaved {Dieckmann, Gaba, Rall, In Press *Simul Healthcare*}



- Participants in a {e.g. mannequin-based} simulation are:
 - Physically in a {real} place {sim ctr}, often with real human interactions, *but that is*
 - Instantiated by "instructors" for a {real} meaningful socially contextual purpose, *and*
 - That represents {real} patient care "as-if" the simulation were the "real thing"

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Simulation is a "Social Practice" {**Dieckmann,** Gaba, Rall, In Press: *Simul Healthcare*}



- There is a *social contract* between participants and instructors
- We are allowed to "manipulate them" for the higher purpose of teaching or performance assessment
- This is a serious responsibility

 Ethical issues in "simulations"
 Stanford Prison Experiment





What is Reality (or *Fidelity*) in Simulation?

Rehmann Beaubien & Baker

(Qual Safety in Healthcar: {Suppl} October, 2004)

 Uwe Laucken Dieckmann, Gaba, & Rall (Simul in Healthcare; In Press, 2007)







Why is Perfect "Reality" Not Always Necessary?

- Teaching goals may not require perfect reality at any level
- Engagement at a "higher level" is often accomplished with minimal reality at a lower level
 - Stories/books/movies are very engaging
 - Experienced people can fill in the gaps; the inexperienced may be blissfully ignorant



Why is Perfect "Reality" Not Always Desirable?

- Simulations aim to "complement" learning from "real" situations; thus, seek ways to leverage "unreality", e.g.
 - Cognitive Scaffolding: Instructor in Cues & Clues; Embedded assistance





- Stop/Pause/Restart/FF/Restore
- Time compression/expansion
- "Crash protection" {Fly underground} = "Death Spiral Disable" in pt. simulation



Cultural/Organizational Challenges to Simulation's Impact

- The (real) clinical world <u>must</u> reinforce what is taught in (simulation) training -*currently it often does not*
 - Design and culture trump training (always!)
 - Much more time spent in real world than in training sessions
 - Incentives and disincentives of various kinds play out in the real world





Center in the LKC

category summed across user fees from this X% entire block of users

this revenue source compared to all others

Y%



Simulation in Healthcare –2007 Where are We Today?

- <u>Many</u> hospitals/medical schools have sim centers or simulators (*in-situ*), <u>but..</u>
 - Simulation is commonplace only in <u>pockets</u> of locale, domain, & discipline
 - Content coverage is sparse
 - The number of clinicians who have been through a meaningful simulation is probably < 50,000 out of a total of >Nx10⁶



Does Simulation "Work"? What does it mean "to work"?

- Can it present a meaningful, socially contextual experience? YES
- Can it engage learners "as-if" real? USUALLY
- Can it teach/assess the target issues? OFTEN
- Does it change performance or behavior of individuals or teams? MAYBE
- Does it change patient outcome? HARD TO TELL



Does Simulation Work? Surgery

In surgery, several studies suggest that

 Simulation training speeds learning & improves safety for <u>early learners</u> of <u>laparoscopic surgery</u> (esp. chole), BUT...
 »Meta-analyses are equivocal <u>Surgery</u>
 »Uncertain of effects for experienced surgeons, or for other operations



Does Simulation Training Improve Safety?

- For complex endovascular procedures, the FDA seems to think so...
 - Not level 1A evidence or meta-analyses, but... a novel procedure & implanted device with palpable risk



Approval of Virtual Reality Training for Carotid Stenting

What This Means for Procedural-Based Medicine

Anthony G. Gallagher, PhD Christopher U. Cates, MD





Does Simulation Training Improve Safety?

For mannequin-based & team simulation

- Many types of qualitative data and small studies of isolated applications
- Definitive proof for many applications may be impossible due to logistics and cost
- Real test requires long-term adoption of comprehensive, integrated model of career-long (sim-based) training, with evaluation over long time horizon



If "Low-Reliability" is a "Disease" it Requires Long-term Sustained Therapy

- Who would treat hypertension to reduce negative cardiovascular events like this:
 - Use a low dose of a given antihypertensive
 - 3 5x per week (variable compliance)
 - 1 3 weeks per year
 - In between, heighten stress, take cocaine, eat high fat, high salt diet, stay sedentary



The Use of Simulation Has Been Similar (with some exceptions, a few here @ Pitt)

- Rare occasional training sessions -- often with low-impact curriculum
- Rarely coupled with programs of performance assessment
- In only a few disciplines/domains
- Little training/assessment for "experienced" personnel -- mostly aimed at "trainees"



Structural Issues: Who Pays for the "Proof"?

• In clinical trials, often the <u>manufacturer</u>

- Large companies, huge research budgets, many trials but few successes is "usual"
- Huge profits for successful drugs

• Simulator manufacturers or centers are:

- Small, on tiny margins, not used to many expensive trials with few successes
- No "blockbusters", few "lock" patents even if trials are successful



Who Pays for the "Proof"? How about the "Government" (NIH)?

- For some diseases the NIH does fund large and long trials (NCI, NHLBI)
 - Very few as long, large, and hard to control as the definitive simulation studies
 - AHRQ currently covers quality & safety but with tiny budget relative to NIH
 - No agency covers clinical education rsch
 - To-date small \$\$ & short limited studies



Incidentally: What is the Evidence for Simulation in Commercial Aviation?

- There is mandatory yearly training & checking of flying performance
 - Studies can be grafted onto these activities
- Nothing like level 1A evidence

-No randomized trials; would probably be considered unethical to conduct trials



{pilots are 1st ones at an accident}



D M Gaba

The future vision of simulation in health care

Qual Safety in Healthcar: {Suppl} October, 2004



- 11 dimensional space describing simulation applications 4 40 x 10⁶ cells
- What will the history of the next 20 years (now 17) look like from 2025?
 - Optimistic view
 - Pessimistic view

Lain Edition

"All the News That's Fit to Print"

MOL CLIFT: MA S2 H2

The New York Cimes

1. Turk (Baby, she's downing to (Bab 20 Turight, clouds below in 25 Turight, clouds, advised (200), high sci. Yano dig. Sigh 2 of 3. Supplied processing Sigh 2.

TEN DOLLARS

Simulation Key to Progress in Health Care Safety

The Power of Theater



By Benedikt David Rall

Patient safety was first recognized as an important single focus in the late 1990s. Over the last 25 years there has been slow but steady progress toward the "zero vision" goal of "no patient injuries by medical care." In the current era these risks have finally dropped to the level of risk the public accepts in transportation, including the hypersonic aircraft and sub-oceanic maglevs.

A critical component of this success story is the widespread use of simulation techniques

Mars Explorers to Land Next Week

A preview of the exploration

(First of three parts)



By Rachel Damewood Howard

Since its launch in 2019 the work of the crew of Mars 1 exploration vessel has been purely routine and of little interest to most of mankind. With the upcoming landing on the surface of Mars of the first human explorers, interest is growing rapidly. Although public attention has been focused on the spectacle of this upcoming milestone of human achievement, the scientific goals and methods for the mission have largely been forgotten.

The current surface and atmosphere of Mars is now well understood after more than 30 years of unmanned probes and samples returned to Earth.

TEN DOLLARS

That's Fit to Print"

"All the News

The New Hork Times 2025

MOL CLIFT: NA SLHP

NEW YORK, WEIGNESDAY, JANUARY & 2011

Simulation Training a **Costly Failure for Health Care Safety**

trappings of later has then both more

Why it worked for aviation and maglevs but not in health care

By Benedikt David Rall

Patient safety was first recognized as an important single focus in the late 1990s. Over the last 25 years there has been slow but steady progress toward the "zero vision" goal of "no patient injuries by medical care." In the current era these risks have finally dropped to the level of risk the public accepts in transportation, including the hypersonic aircraft and sub-oceanic maglevs.

One sad story in the development of patient safety has been the abject failure of simulation techniques to contribute effectively to patient

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A preview of the exploration agenda (first of three parts)

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Potential <u>Drivers</u> for Further Adoption of Simulation in Health Care

- Simulation community
- Professions



- Insurers / risk managers
- Payors for medical care




SSH

Society for Simulation in Healthcare

Government - local/state/federal









Potential "Implementors" of Simulation Activities or Requirements

- Professional societies
- Specialty boards (Colleges)
- Hospitals/networks
- Professional schools
- Accreditors (JC)
- Government regulators / legislators
- Simulation organizations











How Do We Engage the Public? {I don't have the magic answer}



- If the public really knew the difference in training & assessment between aviation & healthcare, would they care?
 - Historically, public more interested in access to & cost of care than in quality
 - Everyone wants to save money on everybody <u>else's</u> healthcare (Wildavsky)
- How do we attract them without unduly scaring them? {counterproductive}



Bottom Line

 ...no industry in which human lives depend on the skilled performance of responsible operators has waited for unequivocal proof of the benefits of simulation before embracing it... Neither should anesthesiology {health care} (Gaba, Anesthesiology 76:491-494, 1992)

And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved all mankind

(appearing in various forms in the Talmud & the Koran)



Jerry Garcia The Grateful Dead Role of Leaders in Something and it is just incredibly pathetic it Questions: us." e from the Grateful Dead (Quote & Photo courtesy of M. Hindery)

"History's page will be neatly carved in stone.
The future's here, we are it, we are on our own."

From "Throwing Stones,"
1982, Lyrics by John Barlow, Music by Bob Weir, played by The Grateful Dead



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