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Characterization of Solution Concepts in Standard Evolutionary Games
Characterization of Solution Concepts in Standard Evolutionary Games
1992Working Paper No. 1183
In this paper we prove that any strategy in any evolutionary game may result in four different types of evolutionary stability. We formulate and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for all four types of stability. We argue that only two of these types apply to rational adaption processes.