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Instant replay: The run game is a matter of daylight

Well, that’s more like it.

Stanford pounded UCF on Saturday evening. Now, to be fair, UCF had just come off a shocking upset loss to Florida International (which promptly lost by two scores to Indiana), and was returning just 10 starters from last year’s 9-4 squad. I wouldn’t look at this game and start predicting a nine-win season for the Cardinal. But any positive momentum is good momentum at a time like this.

The story of the game was probably the defense, which kept Stanford in the game at a time when Stanford couldn’t get any offense going whatsoever. Today, I want to focus on the game’s turning point, the forced fumble that led to a Stanford touchdown late in the second quarter. The turnover energized the Stanford team, and after the Cardinal scored on Kevin Hogan’s flea-flicker to Michael Rector, the team never looked back.

At this juncture in the game, the game’s tied at 0-0, and offense has been difficult to find. But UCF is driving, and for the second straight time, it has marched past the Stanford 40. It’s second down with eight yards to go at the Stanford 38. What will Stanford do?

Stanford vs. UCF_play

 

UCF calls Power, a bread-and-butter run play for something around half of the teams in Division I, including Stanford. Essentially, in Power, the offensive linemen try to open up a hole in the defense by overloading one side of the line. The tight end (Y) (alternatively, a fullback or offensive tackle – Power is an example of how many different variants you can have on a single play) kicks out the end man on the line of scrimmage (S), the two offensive linemen to the inside double-team the first interior lineman, and an offensive guard from the other side of the line pulls to the outer side and leads his runner through the hole the other blockers create. (I apologize for the messy graphic. Most run plays are like that.)

Power is a good play if you can win your blocks at the line of scrimmage, but as longtime Stanford fans will realize, it’s easy for a defense to foul it up by forcing as much “trash” (in defensive lingo) through the hole as possible. That was what Stanford tried to do here. (As usual, Web viewers can look at the video here – fast forward to 0:16.)

The Cardinal are trying to “spill” UCF running back William Stanback (R) to the outside, where his lead blockers cannot help him. To do this, they ask Peter Kalambayi (blue circle) to make a difficult play: Kalambayi is lined up on the outside of UCF tight end Cal Bloom (Y) and doesn’t have inside leverage, but he needs to fight to Bloom’s inside and fill the hole.

If Kalambayi can get in the hole, it’s going to be tough for UCF to open it again, even if it has an offensive lineman about to run through it. If the defensive play-call works, the only thing Stanback can actually do is cut to the outside – he can’t, as they say, “run to daylight.” And outside cuts on inside runs typically favor the defense: The back loses most of his momentum by cutting, and more importantly, if the back is going to the outside, he’s not going forwards.

Kalambayi has a tough assignment, but he pulls it off with aplomb. The problem is that Brennan Scarlett (E, right next to Kalambayi) gets absolutely destroyed on the double-team. I want to be positive, but there’s no other way to put it. The only reason Stanford managed to execute the spill properly was because Jordan Perez (M) crashes on the hole immediately. With Kalambayi and Perez both in the hole, UCF still has a numerical advantage, but realistically it’s not going to be getting third-and-manageable on this play. Stanback cuts to the outside.

Once Stanback commits himself to the outside, Stanford pounces. Blake Martinez (W) bails out Scarlett by shedding his block like water, and delivers the first hit on Stanback. Dallas Lloyd ($) gets caught napping and takes an eternity to get to the ball, but when he sees Martinez make the tackle he knows he’s free to go for the ball. Scarlett, who never stopped running to the play, sees the ball come loose and jumps on it to snuff out a promising UCF drive.

That’s the play of the game for you. But I want to make a few concluding points. Firstly, props to Lloyd and Scarlett. Lloyd may have taken way too long to react against the run, but he was smart to realize that Martinez’s hit gave him an opportunity to go for the ball. Scarlett didn’t give up after getting pushed around at the point of attack, and even though he’s a fifth-year senior with as guaranteed a starting spot as you can get in Division I, he fought for the ball like a freshman fighting for playing time. I respect that.

Secondly, even if you lose on paper you can still make a difference, as Martinez’s effort beautifully shows. Thirdly, defense is a team effort. And although two players got recognition for that play, the box score almost never tells the whole story.

Contact Winston Shi at wshi94 ‘at’ stanford.edu.

About Winston Shi

Winston Shi is an opinions and sports columnist and senior staff writer for The Stanford Daily, and was the Managing Editor of Opinions for Volume 245 (February-June 2014). He also sits on The Daily's Editorial Board. He is an coterminal BA/MA student in his senior year from Thousand Oaks, California, studying America's history and foreign policy. In his free time, he likes to read, travel and write about himself in the third person. Contact him at wshi94@stanford.edu.
  • TOser_In_LA

    To witness on video that a D-Lineman (Scarlett) starts out double teamed, remains upright shedding his counterparts, breaking free to pursue the ball, virtually reaching the ball carrier at the point of tackle and maintaining alertness to act and complete a spectacular game changing result.

    The Practical Football Dictionary states a situational definition of “destroyed” as you scan down to “as applied to D-Linemen”: “When an O-Lineman proceeds to manhandle and pancake a D-Lineman in such a way as render the D-Lineman useless to his team for the remainder of the pay, then, said D-Lineman is summary “destroyed” for all practical purposes.”

    Quick question – are their any affiliate advertising revenues to be gained for the Stanford Daily by the intentional misuse of an official practical football dictionary term and the unwarranted trashing of former Cal player in order to drive eye-balls to the video on that affiliate site?

    I’m just trying to get a grip on why the local hometown paper would report that the hero Scarlett was destroyed when clearly he prevailed. If the author believes that there was just no other way to put it, here’s a tip: there must be some editorial support for creative alternatives to just opting for wrong.

    Go Cardinal!

  • Candid One

    WS, there’s an errant assumption on your estimation of Dallas Lloyd’s tardy reaction in the fumble play. He was doing his job. The defense wasn’t stacking the box; it had both safeties deep, which is an invitation for UCF to attempt that power run. As the strong safety, he’s expected to be the backstop of the defense. In preseason interviews, Lloyd mentions his assigned concerns about decoys and fakes. He has an excellent coach. He’s also one of the fastest players on defense…he’s certainly the fastest big player on the team–as he often showed on special teams last season. His tardiness–if any–was much less than you think. He was fortunate to have his fellow tacklers prop-up the ball carrier.

    That was also an excellent job by #13, CB Alijah Holder, who kept containment, made first contact, and almost dislodged the ball before Martinez arrived to secure the tackle–and punch at the ball himself. Scarlett had been pushed out of the play but the wily veteran stayed in the pursuit and got rewarded.

  • stanfordTree1342

    Nice try in explaining run play defense by a reporter who has never played a down of football. Stick to something you know—plz.

  • NoTostanfordTree1342

    This only makes you look like a grown-up. Grow up!!!

  • Winston Shi

    As always, Candid One, I enjoy your takes, and I’m glad you read my work.

    I think we agree at least that Lloyd took a while to get to the ball – we disagree on who is more responsible for that, Lloyd or the defensive scheme. I see your point, I really do.

    Of course, I still believe that I was right. And that’s more of an eye test thing. I don’t expect Lloyd to respond to run game keys like Troy Polamalu, but if Martinez doesn’t stop Stanback, Stanford’s in a very tricky situation.

    But for the record, I want to lay out the key points so that people can decide for themselves.

    1. As the diagram shows, both safeties were deep, which makes sense on 2nd and 8.
    2. Lloyd is in an interesting situation in that he plays strong safety in a scheme where the $ is normally asked to stay a little further back. The $ is often aligned on the side of the tight end, so it’s better to have the $ take the TE down the middle – the classic example is Jordan Richards covering the middle of the field with Ed Reynolds playing closer to the LOS. [But many people are probably more used to seeing schemes where the $ is the main run support safety.]
    3. As you can see on the video, Kodi Whitfield (the free safety) is asked to crash the box, but he’s too far away to do anything except clean up on cutbacks to the backside – he does his best but he’s simply too far away to actually do anything. Lloyd has to be more aware of breakdowns on the playside.
    4. After the snap, Lloyd takes a while to diagnose the run play. He looks to the backside wideouts, but they’re not exactly running like they’re trying to get open.

    ***

    Holder was asked to spill Stanback further to the sideline by filling the next gap in the defense. In this regard he had mixed results – he narrowed the hole, to be sure, but he lined up to the inside of the flanker (Z) opposite him and still got hooked to the inside. (See the diagram, as well as the video.) I’m not going to harp on about that bit because run support isn’t a cornerback’s first priority. I do think that Holder is and will continue to be a very useful piece in the run game going forward.

    AH fought well once he got hooked though, and I give him credit for forcing Stanback to make a good cut through a tight window. On the other hand, Stanback still got through. Actually, aside from the fumble Stanback made a very good run – great vision and patience, and a very nice cut. Tough guy to stop.

    So what this particular component of the play shows us is that you can still make a difference without accomplishing all of your objectives on the play, which was what this entire column was all about.

  • Winston Shi

    “Quick question – are their any affiliate advertising revenues to be
    gained for the Stanford Daily by the intentional misuse of an official
    practical football dictionary term and the unwarranted trashing of
    former Cal player in order to drive eye-balls to the video on that
    affiliate site?”

    I don’t see any point in responding to this specifically. But since this is a public forum, let’s just make this clear for the record:

    The Stanford Daily and Winston Shi get no affiliate revenues from the Pac-12 conference, and especially not for linking to pac-12.com. I would not take the money if offered, and to the best of my knowledge they would not give it to me if I asked.

    Love y’all.

  • Candid One

    WS, you get to caught-up in the diagram, as if the defense was supposed to know what’s coming. That may apply in team practices but not hardly against opponents who are trying to keep the defense guessing. I didn’t go by the diagram; I watched that video and saw how the secondary was deployed, and how it reacted as the play started. Until the play began to develop, the defense didn’t have an exact sense of what their roles on that play.

    Also, it’s tenuous at best to relate previous years with the current one. We don’t know how differently Ed Reynolds might’ve been asked to play versus Richards–or Lloyd. Ed never played under Coach Akina, and Dallas and Jordan have a different skill strengths than Reynolds. Dallas is also in tandem with different ensemble of neophytes than the other two. This is the first fully-Akina crew. How he coaches the “stew” of this talent is likely to be more skewed–because most of the ingredients are more raw than the previous secondaries have been. I’d expect that Lloyd’s maturity (2-year mission after high school) and his QB insights are more integral to Coach Akina’s reliance on Dallas–and Kodi Whitfield, as backstops to a bunch of young frosh and RS-frosh.

  • Winston Shi

    We’re all in favor of the eye test. I watched the video and saw how the secondary was deployed and how it reacted too. I’ve always been assiduous in directing people to the video. Mentioning the diagram only serves to point out that I saw this in the comments (I actually had a paragraph on Holder written before cutting it because the article was too long and because, as I said to you earlier, it’s not worth harping on about) before you pointed it out to me.

    ***

    The issue of whether the strong safety or free safety stays deep longer is a relevant one because I’ve seen it before. It might be Akina’s doing, it might be Anderson insisting on it, it might be just one type of defense, my point is just that that’s what happened on the play. I thought it was interesting because most teams don’t do that.

  • Winston Shi

    “Mentioning the diagram only serves to point out that I saw this before you pointed it out to me in the comments.”

    Some Stanford education, huh. My apologies.