

# William Spaniel

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS **Stanford University.** Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellowship, Center for International Security and Cooperation.

EDUCATION **University of Rochester**  
PhD, Political Science. Defended June 2015.  
MA, Political Science. May 2013.  
Fields: International Relations, Formal Theory, and Political Methodology.

**University of California, San Diego**  
BA, Political Science (International Relations). High Honors. September 2009.

PUBLICATIONS [Arms Negotiations, War Exhaustion, and the Credibility of Preventive War.](#) (Forthcoming, *International Interactions*.)

[Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure.](#) With Bradley C. Smith. (Forthcoming, *International Studies Quarterly*.)

[How Uncertainty about the Legal Views of Judicial Nominees Distorts the Confirmation Process.](#) With Maya Sen. (Forthcoming, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.)

BOOK MANUSCRIPT *Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations*

Summary: Why do states acquire nuclear weapons? Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of the bargaining process—i.e., credible agreements exist in which rival states make sufficient concessions to convince the potential rising state not to proliferate. This book proves the existence of that range of settlements and the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. It then provides two main explanations as to why states proliferate anyway. First, if the would-be proliferator expects to lose the ability to construct nuclear weapons in the future, the states face a commitment problem: the rival state would like to promise to continue providing concessions into the future but will renege once proliferation is no longer an option. And second, if the proliferator's rival faces some sort of uncertainty—whether regarding the potential proliferator's ability to go nuclear or regarding its previous proliferation activity—the optimal offer can entail positive probability of nuclear investment. However, the nonproliferation regime's mission to increase the cost of building often leads to Pareto improvement. Put differently, rising states sometimes benefit directly by making their nuclear options more costly.

WORKING PAPERS [The Perverse Incentives of International Institutions](#) (Under review.)

[Delegating Extremism and Subsidizing Moderation: Terrorism, Signaling, and Principal-Agent Problems.](#) (Under review.)

[Policy Bargaining and International Conflict.](#) With Peter Bills. (Under review.)

[Getting a Hand by Cutting Them Off: How Uncertainty over Political Corruption Affects Violence.](#) With Paul Zachary. (Under review.)

Multi-Method Research: The Case for Formal Theory. With Hein Goemans. (Under review.)

Slow to Learn: Bargaining, Uncertainty, and the Calculus of Conquest. With Peter Bils. (Under review.)

You Get What You Give: A Model of Nuclear Reversal.

Rational Overreaction: Selection Problems in Counterterrorism.

Outbidding as Deterrence: Endogenous Demands in the Shadow of Group Competition.

Deterring Intervention: The Civil Origins of Nuclear Proliferation. With Zachary Taylor.

Leaders, Uncertainty, and War. With Brad Smith.

IN PREPARATION     Introducing Nu-CLEAR: The Nuclear Latency Dataset. With Brad Smith.

International Ideology, Crisis Initiation, and Conflict Duration. With Peter Bils and Brad Smith.

OTHER  
PEER-REVIEWED  
PUBLICATIONS     Responsible Sourcing, Corporate Citizenship, and Baseball: A Framework for Labor Procurement Negotiations in the Talent Supply Chain. With Adrien Bouchet and Mike Troilo. (Forthcoming, *Corporate Governance*)

Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third: A Game Theoretical Analysis of Optimal Behavior. *The Baseball Research Journal*, 2012.

TEXTBOOKS     **Game Theory 101: Bargaining**  
Published August 2014.

**The Rationality of War**  
Published August 2012.

**Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook**  
Published September 2011.

TEACHING     Nominated for University of Rochester's Professor of the Year Award, 2015.

2014 Edward Curtis Peck Award Winner for Excellence in Teaching (University of Rochester's highest graduate student teaching award; first political scientist to win it.)

### Courses Taught

Introduction to International Relations. Fall 2014 and Spring 2015. University of Rochester. [Personal Website](#), [YouTube](#), [Udemy](#).

Civil War and International Systems. Spring 2014 and Spring 2015. University of Rochester. [Personal Website](#), [YouTube](#).

The Bargaining Model of War. Winter 2013. (Short course, graduate level.)

Game Theory 101. Fall 2012. MOOC. [Personal Website](#), [YouTube](#), [Udemy](#).

### **Teaching Assistant**

Law and Politics in the United States. Professor Maya Sen. Fall 2013.

Introduction to International Relations. Professor Hein Goemans. Spring 2013 and Spring 2012.

Civil War and the International System. Professor Bethany Lacina. Fall 2012 and Fall 2011.

### **Game Theory 101**

Creator of the [Game Theory 101 YouTube Channel](#). 400 videos; 18,000 subscribers; 4 million lifetime video views.

### INVITED TALKS

Formal Models of International Relations, University of Southern California, February 2016 (Scheduled).

“The Invisible Fist: How Potential Power Coerces Concessions,” University of Buffalo, October 2012.

### AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2014 New Faces Presenter. Triangle Institute for Security Studies.

Graduate Instructor Fellowship. University of Rochester, Spring and Fall 2014.

Charles E. Lanni Research Assistant Fellowship with Maya Sen. University of Rochester, 2014.

Graduate Student Association Conference Travel Award. University of Rochester, Spring 2014.

W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy Fellowship. University of Rochester, 2013-2014.

Teaching Assistant Fellowship. University of Rochester, Fall 2013.

Teaching Assistant Fellowship. University of Rochester, Spring 2013.

Prestage-Cook Travel Award. 84th Annual Southern Political Science Association Conference, 2013.

Charles E. Lanni Research Assistant Fellowship with Maya Sen. University of Rochester, 2012.

Teaching Assistant Fellowship. University of Rochester, Fall 2012.

Charles E. Lanni Research Assistant Fellowship with Mark Fey. University of Rochester, 2012.

Charles E. Lanni Second Year Paper Fellowship. University of Rochester, 2012.

Teaching Assistant Fellowship. University of Rochester, Spring 2012.

Research Assistant Fellowship with Hein Goemans. University of Rochester, 2011.

Graduate Student Stipend and Tuition Fellowship. University of Rochester, 2010-2015.

### CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND SERVICE

“Getting a Hand By Cutting Them Off: How Uncertainty over Political Corruption Affects Violence,” Comparative Politics Association at UCLA Graduate Student Conference, with Paul Zachary (Scheduled April 2015).

“Policy Bargaining and International Conflict,” 73rd Annual Midwest Political Science Association

Conference, with Peter Bils.

“International Conflict, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure,” 73rd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, with Brad Smith.

“Crisis Bargaining with Irrelevant Learning,” 73rd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, with Peter Bils.

“Getting a Hand By Cutting Them Off: How Uncertainty over Political Corruption Affects Violence,” Southern California Comparative Political Institutions Conference, with Paul Zachary.

“Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure,” 2014 Peace Science Society Annual Meeting, with Bradley C. Smith.

“Ideology Matters: Policy Bargaining and International Conflict,” 2014 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting & Exhibition, with Peter Bils.

“War Exhaustion and the Stability of Arms Treaties,” 72st Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference.

“Bargaining over Nuclear Proliferation,” 55th Annual International Studies Association Convention.

“War Exhaustion and the Stability of Arms Treaties,” 85th Annual Southern Political Science Association Conference.

“War Exhaustion and the Stability of Arms Treaties,” 2013 Peace Science Society Annual Meeting.

“The Invisible Fist: How Potential Power Coerces Concessions,” 2013 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting & Exhibition. (Poster.)

“The Invisible Fist: How Potential Power Coerces Concessions,” 71st Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference.

Chair of “Nuclear Weapons and International Security” Panel, 71st Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference.

“Butter for Bombs: How Potential Power Coerces Concessions,” 84th Annual Southern Political Science Association Conference.

Chair of “Political Power and Bargaining Models” Panel, 84th Annual Southern Political Science Association Conference.

“The Fear of Injury: Explaining Delay in Contract Extensions,” 42nd Annual Society for American Baseball Research Convention July 2012.

#### REFEREEING

*Conflict Management and Peace Science, International Interactions, Journal of Politics, Review of International Studies, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, The Baseball Research Journal*

REFERENCES

**Randall W. Stone**

Professor of Political Science  
University of Rochester  
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**Hein Goemans**

Associate Professor of Political Science  
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**Mark Fey**

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University of Rochester  
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**Maya Sen**

Assistant Professor of Political Science  
Harvard University  
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