Ramesh Johari
Associate Professor of Management Science and Engineering and, by courtesy, of Computer Science and of Electrical Engineering
Bio
Johari is interested in the design and management of large-scale complex networks, such as the Internet. Using tools from operations research, engineering, and economics, he has developed models to analyze efficient market mechanisms for resource allocation in networks.
Academic Appointments
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Associate Professor, Management Science and Engineering
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Associate Professor (By courtesy), Electrical Engineering
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Associate Professor (By courtesy), Computer Science
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Affiliate, Precourt Institute for Energy
Honors & Awards
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George E. Nicholson Student Paper Competition (First Place), INFORMS (2003)
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George M. Sprowls Doctoral Dissertation Award, MIT EECS (2004)
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Doctoral Dissertation Award (Honorable Mention), ACM (2004)
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Okawa Foundation Research Grant, Okawa Foundation (2005)
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Telecommunications Dissertation Award, INFORMS (2006)
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CAREER Award, National Science Foundation (2007)
Professional Education
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PhD, MIT (2004)
2015-16 Courses
- "Small" Data
MS&E 226 (Aut) - Stochastic Modeling
MS&E 221 (Win) -
Independent Studies (25)
- Advanced Reading and Research
CS 499 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Advanced Reading and Research
CS 499P (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Computer Laboratory
CS 393 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Curricular Practical Training
CS 390A (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Curricular Practical Training
CS 390B (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Curricular Practical Training
CS 390C (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Directed Reading and Research
MS&E 408 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Independent Database Project
CS 395 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Independent Project
CS 399 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Independent Project
CS 399P (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Independent Work
CS 199 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Independent Work
CS 199P (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Master's Research
CME 291 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Part-Time CPT
CS 390S (Aut) - Part-Time CPT
CS 390T (Win) - Part-Time Curricular Practical Training
CS 390Q (Spr) - Part-Time Curricular Practical Training
CS 390U (Spr) - Part-time Curricular Practical Training
CS 390P (Win, Spr) - Ph.D. Qualifying Tutorial or Paper
MS&E 300 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Ph.D. Research
CME 400 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Programming Service Project
CS 192 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Senior Project
CS 191 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Special Studies or Projects in Electrical Engineering
EE 390 (Spr) - Undergraduate Directed Study
MS&E 101 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Writing Intensive Senior Project (WIM)
CS 191W (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Advanced Reading and Research
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Prior Year Courses
2014-15 Courses
- Platform and Marketplace Design
MS&E 336 (Win) - Stochastic Modeling
MS&E 221 (Win)
2013-14 Courses
- Networked Markets
MS&E 233 (Spr) - Stochastic Modeling
MS&E 221 (Spr)
- Platform and Marketplace Design
All Publications
- Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer. Foundations and Trends in Networking NOW Publishers.. 2013: 1
- Resource management with semiautonomous users. To appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2012
- Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. 2012
- Information and the value of execution guarantees. 2012
- Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. 2011
- Heavy traffic approximation of equilibria in resource sharing games. 2011
- Committing bandits. 2011
- How many tiers? Pricing in the Internet transit market. 2011
- Mean field analysis for large population stochastic games. 2010
- Mean field equilibrium in dynamic games with complementarities. 2010
- Congestible services and network effects. 2010
- Information aggregation in smooth markets. 2010
- Information theoretic operating regimes of large wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2010; 1 (56): 427-437
- Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 2009; 8 (54): 1765-1778
- A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. 2008
- Local myopic dynamics in network formation games. 2008
- Prices are right: aligning incentives for peer-assisted content distribution. 2008
- Peer-assisted content distribution with prices. 2008
- Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with unbounded costs. 2008
- Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with concave costs. 2008
- A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. 2008
- Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with many players. 2007
- Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory edited by Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom.. 2007: 543-567
- Revenue management for content delivery. 2007
- Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. 2007
- A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy. 2006
- Positive externalities and optimal scale. 2006
- Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 2005; 11 (50): 1712-1724
- Communication requirements of VCG-like mechanisms in convex environments. 2005
- Network resource allocation and a congestion game: the single link case. 2003
- End-to-end congestion control for the Internet: delays and stability. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 2001; 6 (9): 818-832