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27 February 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Deputy Director for Intelligence

From: Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: February 28, 1995 Deputies Committee Meeting, 1630

1. The meeting was called to address three questions:

- What strategy should the US take regarding Croatia's refusal to renew the UN mandate?
- Should the Administration approve Phase 2 of pre-positioning to prepare for the UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia and/or Bosnia?
- What should be the US long-term policy regarding the Balkans war?

2. At this point, we are unaware that you have any actions. However, you may wish to comment on what we know about Croatian preparations for an offensive in the Krajina. Also, you may want to participate in the discussion on the bottom-up review of strategy, particularly regarding possible reaction to a large NATO force in Bosnia/Croatia.

### CROATIAN STRATEGY

3. In recent weeks, State has taken the lead in delivering the message that prospects for peace are dim in Bosnia and that the main danger is an explosion in the Krajina. State is talking about a renewed effort to convince President Tudjman of Croatia that "no" is not an acceptable answer to renewing the UN mandate. Failing that, State would argue that Tudjman should be pressed to accept some formulation of "UNPROFOR LITE." We have previously noted that Tudjman has painted himself into a corner, and it will be difficult for him to retreat unless he is given considerable, highly visible concessions. **We have included a paper "Can Tudjman's Mind Be Changed," which argues that Krajina is more important to him than sanctions, for example, and that heavy Western pressure might drive him into a deal with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia. We have included for you a recent assessment on Croatian military readiness that arrays the data on Croatian preparations.**

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## PRE-POSITIONING

4. Last week's DC basically deferred decision on Phase 2 of pre-positioning of communications until completion of the bottom-up review. This would involve sending NATO communicators, including over 100 US personnel to Croatia, something which makes the NSC extremely nervous. This pre-positioning would be necessary to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia or to implement a peace agreement. According to JCS, this saves two weeks in planning for deployment. [redacted]

5. The NSC would prefer to delay a decision, but it is being pressed by the Military Committee at NATO as a precaution. Also, neither the French nor the British diplomats want pre-positioning because of a fear it sends a message to Tudjman that refusal to renew the mandate is okay. [redacted]

## POLICY REVIEW


6. At the last Principals' meeting, the Deputies were charged with doing a bottom up review of policy on the Balkans. The BTF led that effort with its paper on "Balkans: The Next Three Months." (See Policy Review tab.) It explores three scenarios for the next few months and the driving actors. The study concludes that the peace scenario is not likely, and that the most likely outcome is an outbreak of fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia. The most optimistic scenario we see is that the fighting can be delayed a few months after considerable arm-twisting. [redacted]


7. The NSC drafted a paper that built on our scenarios to explore policy decisions the next few months. It has developed a timeline for when the various decisions must be made for our most plausible scenario of increased fighting. The paper identifies four basic policy options, all undesirable:

- Continue our present policy of muddling through;
- Adopt a policy of neutrality and focus on active containment;
- Apply a policy of containment and undertake a long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, as we did with the USSR; and
- Increase US commitment to the Bosnian Government; apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement. [redacted]

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8. Last weekend Sandy Berger asked us to assess the likely reaction of the warring parties and other involved states to a large NATO presence in Bosnia and Croatia. The bottom line of that paper is that the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs are likely to impede a UN withdrawal, especially if they believe it will lead to US airstrikes. Meanwhile, Croatia and the Bosnians are likely to try to encourage NATO towards mission creep. 

9. Finally, we have enclosed a paper on increased air activity over Bosnia. This is a topic that comes up in regard to helicopter flights and the reports of fixed wing flights near Tuzla. 

  
Ray Converse