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## Chapter 12

# Human Settlements, Infrastructure and Spatial Planning

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## Chapter 12: Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning

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## 1 Executive Summary

2 The shift from rural to more urban societies is a global megatrend with significant consequences for  
3 greenhouse gas emissions and climate change mitigation. Across multiple dimensions, the scale and  
4 speed of urbanisation is unprecedented: more than half of the world population live in urban areas  
5 and each week the global urban population increases by 1.3 million. Today there are nearly 1000  
6 urban agglomerations with populations of 500,000 or greater; by 2050, the global urban population  
7 is expected to increase by between 2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to 64% to 69% of the world  
8 population [*robust evidence, high agreement*]. Expansion of urban areas is on average twice as fast  
9 as urban population growth, and the expected increase in urban land cover during in the first three  
10 decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be greater than the cumulative urban expansion in all of human  
11 history [*medium evidence, high agreement*]. Urban areas generate around 80% of global GDP, and  
12 account for approximately 67% of global primary energy use and around 76% of global final energy  
13 use. Future urbanisation trends will be significantly different from the past: urbanisation will take  
14 place at lower levels of economic development and the majority of the urban population growth will  
15 take place in small- to medium-sized urban areas in developing countries [*medium evidence, high*  
16 *agreement*]. (12.1, 12.2).

17 **Current and future urbanisation trends are significantly different from the past [*robust evidence,***  
18 ***high agreement*].** Urbanisation is taking place at lower levels of economic development and the  
19 majority of future urban population growth will take place in small- to medium-sized urban areas in  
20 developing countries. Expansion of urban areas is on average twice as fast as urban population  
21 growth, and the expected increase in urban land cover during in the first three decades of the 21<sup>st</sup>  
22 century will be greater than the cumulative urban expansion in all of human history (*robust*  
23 *evidence, high agreement*). [12.1, 12.2]

24 **Urban areas account for between 71% and 76% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from global final energy use and**  
25 **between 67-76% of global energy use [*medium evidence, medium agreement*].** There are very few  
26 studies that have examined the contribution of all urban areas to global GHG emissions. The fraction  
27 of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from urban areas depends on the spatial and functional boundary  
28 definitions of urban and the choice of emissions accounting method. Estimates for urban energy  
29 related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions range from 71% for 2006 to between 53% and 87% (central estimate, 76%) of  
30 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from global final energy use [*medium evidence, medium agreement*]. There is only  
31 one attempt in the literature that examines the total GHG (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and SF<sub>6</sub>) contribution of  
32 urban areas globally, estimated at between 37% and 49% of global GHG emissions for the year 2000.  
33 Using Scope1 accounting, urban share of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is about 44% (*limited evidence,*  
34 *medium agreement*). [12.2]

35 **No single factor explains variations in per-capita emissions across cities, and there are significant**  
36 **differences in per capita GHG emissions between cities within a single country [*robust evidence,***  
37 ***high agreement*].** Urban GHG emissions are influenced by a variety of physical, economic and social  
38 factors, development levels and urbanization histories specific to each city. Key influences on urban  
39 GHG emissions include income, population dynamics, urban form, locational factors, economic  
40 structure, and market failures [*robust evidence, high agreement*]. There is a prevalence for cities in  
41 Annex I countries to have lower per capita final energy use and GHG emissions than national  
42 averages, and for per capita final energy use and GHG emissions of cities in non-Annex I countries  
43 tend to be higher than national averages (*high agreement, robust evidence*). [12.3]

44 **The anticipated growth in urban population will require a massive build-up of urban**  
45 **infrastructure, which is a key driver of emissions across multiple sectors [*limited evidence, high***  
46 ***agreement*].** If the global population increases to 9.3 billion by 2050 and developing countries  
47 expand their built environment and infrastructure to current global average levels using available  
48 technology of today, the production of infrastructure materials alone would generate approximately

1 470 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Currently, average per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions embodied in the infrastructure  
2 of industrialized countries is five times larger than those in developing countries. The continued  
3 expansion of fossil fuel-based infrastructure would produce cumulative emissions of 2986-7402 Gt  
4 CO<sub>2</sub> during the remainder of the 21st century (*high agreement, limited evidence*). [12.2, 12.3]

5 **The existing infrastructure stock of the average Annex I resident is three times that of the world**  
6 **average and about five times higher than that of the average non-Annex I resident [*medium***  
7 ***evidence, medium agreement*].** The long life of infrastructure and the built environment, make them  
8 particularly prone to lock-in of energy and emissions pathways, lifestyles and consumption patterns  
9 that are difficult to change. The committed emissions from energy and transportation  
10 infrastructures are especially high, with respective ranges of 127-336 and 63-132 Gt, respectively  
11 (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). [12.3, 12.4]

12 **Infrastructure and urban form are strongly linked, especially among transportation infrastructure**  
13 **provision, travel demand and vehicle kilometres travelled [*robust evidence, high agreement*].** In  
14 developing countries in particular, the growth of transport infrastructure and ensuing urban forms  
15 will play important roles in affecting long-run emissions trajectories [*robust evidence, high*  
16 *agreement*]. Urban form and structure significantly affect direct (operational) and indirect  
17 (embodied) GHG emissions, and are strongly linked to the throughput of materials and energy in a  
18 city, the wastes which it generates, and system efficiencies of a city (*robust evidence, high*  
19 *agreement*). [12.4, 12.5]

20 **Key urban form drivers of energy and GHG emissions are density, land use mix, connectivity, and**  
21 **accessibility [*medium evidence, high agreement*].** These factors are interrelated and  
22 interdependent. As such, none of them in isolation are sufficient for lower emissions. Connectivity  
23 and accessibility are tightly related: highly connected places are accessible. While individual  
24 measures of urban form have relatively small effects on vehicle miles travelled, they become more  
25 effective when combined. There is consistent evidence that co-locating higher residential densities  
26 with higher employment densities, coupled with significant public transit improvements, higher land  
27 use mixes, and other supportive demand management measures can lead to greater emissions  
28 savings in the long run. Highly accessible communities are typically characterized by low daily  
29 commuting distances and travel times, enabled by multiple modes of transportation (*robust*  
30 *evidence, high agreement*). [12.5]

31 **Urban mitigation options vary across urbanisation trajectories and are likely to be most effective**  
32 **when policy instruments are bundled [*high evidence, high agreement*].** For rapidly developing  
33 cities, options include shaping their urbanization and infrastructure development towards more  
34 sustainable and low carbon pathways. In mature or established cities, options are constrained by  
35 existing urban forms and infrastructure and the potential for refurbishing existing systems and  
36 infrastructures. Key mitigation strategies include co-locating high residential with high employment  
37 densities, achieving high land use mixes, increasing accessibility and investing in public transit and  
38 other supportive demand management measures. Bundling these strategies can reduce emissions in  
39 the short term and generate even higher emissions savings in the long term (*high agreement, high*  
40 *evidence*). [12.5]

41 **Successful implementation of mitigation strategies at local scales requires that there be in place**  
42 **the institutional capacity and political will to align the right policy instruments to specific spatial**  
43 **planning strategies [*robust evidence, high agreement*].** Integrated land-use and transportation plan  
44 provides the opportunity to envision and articulate future settlement patterns, backed by zoning  
45 ordinances, subdivision regulations, and capital improvements programs to implement the vision.  
46 While smaller scale spatial planning may not have the energy conservation or emissions reduction  
47 benefits of larger scale ones, development tends to occur parcel by parcel and urbanised areas are  
48 ultimately the products of thousands of individual site-level development and design decisions  
49 (*robust evidence, high agreement*). [12.5, 12.6]

1 **The largest opportunities for future urban GHG emissions reduction might be in rapidly urbanizing**  
2 **countries where infrastructure inertia has not set in; however, the required governance, technical,**  
3 **financial, and institutional capacities can be limited [high evidence, high agreement].** The bulk of  
4 future infrastructure and urban growth is expected in small- to medium-size cities in developing  
5 countries, where these capacities can be limited or weak [high agreement, high evidence]. (12.4,  
6 12.5, 12.6, 12.7)

7 **Thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, but the extent of urban climate**  
8 **mitigation is highly uncertain [robust evidence, high agreement].** Local governments and  
9 institutions possess unique opportunities to engage in urban mitigation activities and local  
10 mitigation efforts have expanded rapidly. However, little systematic reporting or evidence exists  
11 regarding the overall extent to which cities are implementing mitigation policies, and even less  
12 regarding their GHG impacts. Climate action plans include a range of measures across sectors,  
13 largely focused on energy efficiency rather than broader land-use planning strategies and cross-  
14 sectoral measures to reduce sprawl and promote transit-oriented development [high evidence, high  
15 agreement]. The majority of these targets have been developed for Annex-I countries and reflect  
16 neither their mitigation potential nor implementation. Few targets have been established for non-  
17 Annex I country cities, and it is in these places where reliable city-level GHG emissions inventory may  
18 not exist. [high agreement, robust evidence]. (12.6, 12.7)

19 **The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate change mitigation is highly dependent**  
20 **on a city's financial and governance capability [robust evidence, high agreement].** Drivers of urban  
21 GHG emissions are interrelated and can be addressed by a number of regulatory, management and  
22 market-based instruments. Many of these instruments are applicable to cities in both the developed  
23 and developing countries, but the degree to which they can be implemented varies. In addition, each  
24 instrument varies in its potential to generate public revenues or require government expenditures,  
25 and the administrative scale at which it can be applied. A bundling of instruments and a high level of  
26 coordination across institutions can increase the likelihood of achieving emissions reductions and  
27 avoiding unintended outcomes [high agreement, robust evidence]. (12.6, 12.7)

28 **For designing and implementing climate policies effectively, institutional arrangements,**  
29 **governance mechanisms and financial resources should be aligned with the goals of reducing**  
30 **urban GHG emissions [robust evidence, high agreement].** These goals will reflect the specific  
31 challenges facing individual cities and local governments. The following have been identified as key  
32 factors: 1) institutional arrangements that facilitate the integration of mitigation with other high-  
33 priority urban agendas; 2) a multilevel governance context that empowers cities to promote urban  
34 transformations; 3) spatial planning competencies and political will to support integrated land-use  
35 and transportation planning; and 4) sufficient financial flows and incentives to adequately support  
36 mitigation strategies [high agreement, robust evidence]. (12.6, 12.7)

37 **Successful implementation of urban climate change mitigation strategies can provide co-benefits**  
38 **[high evidence, high agreement].** Co-benefits of local climate change mitigation can include public  
39 savings, pollution and health benefits, and productivity increases in urban centres, providing  
40 additional motivation for undertaking GHG mitigation activities [high agreement, high evidence].  
41 (12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8)

42 This assessment highlights a number of key knowledge gaps. First, there is lack of consistent and  
43 comparable emissions data at local scales, making it particularly challenging to assess the urban  
44 share of global GHG emissions as well as develop urbanisation and typologies and their emission  
45 pathways. Second, there is little scientific understanding of the magnitude of the emissions  
46 reduction from altering urban form, and the emissions savings from integrated infrastructure and  
47 land use planning. Third, there is a lack of consistency and thus comparability on local emissions  
48 accounting methods, making cross-city comparisons of emissions or climate action plans difficult.  
49 Fourth, there are few evaluations of urban climate action plans and their effectiveness. Fifth, there is

1 lack of scientific understanding of how cities can prioritize mitigation strategies, local actions,  
2 investments, and policy responses that are locally relevant. Sixth, there are large uncertainties about  
3 future urbanisation trajectories; their urban form and infrastructure will play large roles in  
4 determining emissions pathways.

5



## 12.1 Introduction

Urbanisation is a global phenomenon that is transforming human settlements. The shift from primarily rural to more urban societies is evident through the transformation of places, populations, economies, and the built environment. In each of these dimensions, urbanisation is unprecedented for its speed and scale: massive urbanisation is a megatrend of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With disorienting speed, villages and towns are being absorbed by, or coalescing into, larger urban conurbations and agglomerations. This rapid transformation is occurring throughout the world, and in many places it is accelerating.

Today, more than half of the global population is urban, compared to only 13% in 1900 (UN DESA, 2012). There are nearly 1,000 urban agglomerations with populations of 500,000 or more, three-quarters of which are in developing countries (UN DESA, 2012). By 2050, the global urban population is expected to increase by between 2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to 64% to 69% of the world population (Grubler et al., 2007; IIASA, 2009; UN DESA, 2012). Put differently, each week the urban population is increasing by approximately 1.3 million.

Future trends in the levels, patterns, and regional variation of urbanisation will be significantly different from those of the past. Most of the urban population growth will take place in small- to medium-sized urban areas. Nearly all of the future population growth will be absorbed by urban areas in developing countries (IIASA, 2009; UN DESA, 2012). In many developing countries, infrastructure and urban growth will be greatest, but technical capacities are limited, governance and financial and economic institutional capacities are weak (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004). The kinds of towns, cities, and urban agglomerations that ultimately emerge over the coming decades will have a critical impact on energy use and carbon emissions.

The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC did not have a chapter on human settlements or urban areas. Urban areas were addressed through the lens of individual sector chapters. Since the publication of AR4, there has been a growing recognition of the significant contribution of urban areas to GHG emissions, their potential role in mitigating them, and a multi-fold increase in the corresponding scientific literature. This chapter provides an assessment of this literature and the key mitigation options that are available at the local level. The majority of this literature has focused on urban areas and cities in developed countries. With the exception of China, there are few studies on the mitigation potential or GHG emissions of urban areas in developing countries. This assessment reflects these geographic limitations in the published literature.

Urbanisation is a process that involves simultaneous transitions and transformations across multiple dimensions, including demographic, economic, and physical changes in the landscape. Each of these dimensions presents different indicators and definitions of urbanisation. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the multiple dimensions and definitions of urbanisation, including implications for GHG emissions accounting, and then continues with an assessment of historical, current, and future trends across different dimensions of urbanisation in the context of GHG emissions (12.2). It then discusses GHG accounting approaches and challenges specific to urban areas and human settlements.

Next, the chapter assesses the drivers of urban GHG emissions in a systemic fashion (12.3), and examines the impacts of drivers on individual sectors as well as the interaction and interdependence of drivers. In this section, the relative magnitude of each driver's impact on urban GHG emissions is discussed both qualitatively and quantitatively, and provides the context for a more detailed assessment of how urban form and infrastructure affect urban GHG emissions (12.4). Here, the section discusses the individual urban form drivers such as density, connectivity, and land use mix, as well as their interactions with each other. Section 12.4 also examines the links between infrastructure and urban form, as well as their combined and interacting effects on GHG emissions.

1 Next, the chapter identifies spatial planning strategies and policy instruments that can affect  
2 multiple drivers (12.5), and examines the institutional, governance, and financial requirements to  
3 implement such policies (12.6). Of particular importance with regard to mitigation potential at the  
4 urban or local scale is a discussion of the geographic and administrative scales for which policies are  
5 implemented, overlapping, and/or in conflict. The chapter then identifies the scale and range of  
6 mitigation actions currently planned and/or implemented by local governments, and assesses the  
7 evidence of successful implementation of the plans, as well as barriers to further implementation  
8 (12.7). Next, the chapter discusses major co-benefits, trade-offs, and spillover effects of mitigation  
9 at the local scale, including opportunities for sustainable development (12.8). The chapter concludes  
10 with a discussion of the major gaps in knowledge with respect to mitigation of climate change in  
11 urban areas (12.9).

## 12 12.2 Human Settlements and GHG Emissions

13 This section assesses past, current, and future trends in human settlements in the context of GHG  
14 emissions. It aims to provide a multi-dimensional perspective on the scale of the urbanisation  
15 process. This section includes a discussion of the development trends of urban areas, including  
16 population size, land use, and density. The first section (12.2.1) outlines historic urbanisation  
17 dynamics in multiple dimensions as drivers of GHG emissions. The second section (12.2.2) focuses on  
18 current GHG emissions. The third section (12.2.3) assesses future scenarios of urbanisation in order  
19 to frame the GHG emissions challenges to come.

20

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### 21 **Box 12.1.** What is urban? The system boundary problem

22

23 Any empirical analysis of urban and rural areas as well as human settlements requires clear  
24 delineation of physical boundaries. However, it is not a trivial or unambiguous task to determine  
25 where a city, an urban area or human settlement physically starts and ends. In the literature, there  
26 are a number of methods to establish the boundaries of a city or urban area (Elliot, 1987; Buisseret,  
27 1998; Churchill, 2004). Three common types of boundaries include:

- 28 • **Administrative boundaries**, which refer to the territorial or political boundaries of a city  
29 (Hartshorne, 1933; Aguilar et al., 2003).
- 30 • **Functional boundaries**, which are delineated according to connections or interactions  
31 between areas, such as economic activity, per capita income, or commuting zone (Brown  
32 and Holmes, 1971; Douglass, 2000; Hidle et al., 2009).
- 33 • **Morphological boundaries**, which are based on the form or structure of land use, land  
34 cover, or the built environment. This is the dominant approach when satellite images are  
35 used to delineate urban areas (Benediktsson et al., 2003; Rashed et al., 2003).

36 What approach is chosen will often depend on the particular research question under consideration.  
37 The choice of the physical boundaries can have a substantial influence on the results of the analysis.  
38 For example, the Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 2012) estimates global urban energy consumption  
39 between 180-250 EJ/a depending on the particular choice of the physical delineation between rural  
40 and urban areas. Similarly, depending on the choice of different administrative, morphological, and  
41 functional boundaries, between 37% and 86% in buildings and industry and 37% to 77% of mobile  
42 diesel and gasoline consumption can be attributed in urban areas (Parshall et al., 2010). Thus any  
43 empirical evidence presented in this chapter is dependent on the particular boundary choice made  
44 in the respective analysis.

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## 12.2.1 The role of cities and urban areas in energy use and GHG emissions

Worldwide, 3.3 billion people live in rural areas, the majority of whom, about 92%, live in rural areas in developing countries (UN DESA, 2012). In general, rural populations have lower per capita energy consumption compared with urban populations in developing countries (International Energy Agency, 2008). Globally, 32% of the global rural population lack access to electricity and other modern energy sources, compared to only 5.3% of the urban population (International Energy Agency, 2010). Hence, energy use and GHG emissions from human settlements is mainly from urban areas rather than rural areas, and the role of cities and urban areas in global climate change has become increasingly important over time.

Urbanisation involves change across multiple dimensions and accordingly is defined differently by different disciplines. Demographers define urbanisation as a demographic transition that involves a population becoming urbanised through the increase in the urban proportion of the total population (Montgomery, 2008; Dorélien et al., 2013). Geographers and planners describe urbanisation as a land change process that includes the expansion of the urban land cover and growth in built-up areas and infrastructure (Berry et al., 1970; Blanco et al., 2011; Seto et al., 2011). Economists characterise urbanisation as a structural shift from primary economic activities such as agriculture and forestry to manufacturing and services (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Henderson, 2003). Sociologists, political scientists, and other social scientists describe urbanisation as cultural change, including change in social interactions and the growing complexity of political, social, and economic institutions (Weber, 1966; Berry, 1974). The next sections describe urbanisation trends across the first three of these four dimensions and point to the increasing and unprecedented speed and scale of urbanisation.

### 12.2.1.1 Urban population dynamics

In the absence of any other independent data source with global coverage, assessments of historic urban and rural population are commonly based on statistics provided by the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). The World Urbanisation Prospects is published every two years by UN DESA and provides projections of key demographic and urbanisation indicators for all countries in the world. Even within this dataset, there is no single definition of urban or rural areas that is uniformly applied across the data. Rather, each country develops its own definition of urban, often based a combination of population size or density, and other criteria such as the percentage of population not employed in agriculture; the availability of electricity, piped water, or other infrastructure; and characteristics of the built environment such as dwellings and built structures (UN DESA, 2012). The large variation in criteria gives rise to significant differences in national definitions. However, the underlying variations in the data do not seriously affect an assessment of urbanisation dynamics as long as the national definitions are sufficiently consistent over time (GEA, 2012; UN DESA, 2012). Irrespective of definition, the underlying assumption in all the definitions is that urban areas provide a higher standard of living than rural areas (UN DESA, 2013). A comprehensive assessment of urban and rural population dynamics is provided in the Global Energy Assessment (2012). Here, only key developments are briefly summarized.

For most of human history, the world population mostly lived in rural areas and in small urban settlements, and growth in global urban population occurred slowly. In 1800, when the world population was around one billion, only 3% of the total population lived in urban areas and only one city—Beijing—had had a population greater than one million (Davis, 1955; Chandler, 1987; Satterthwaite, 2007). Over the next one hundred years, the global share of urban population increased to 13% in 1900. The second half of the twentieth century experienced rapid urbanisation. The proportion of world urban population increased from 13% in 1900, to 29% in 1950, to 52% in 2011 (UN DESA, 2012). In 1960, the world reached a milestone when global urban population surpassed one billion (UN DESA, 2012). Although it took all previous human history to 1960 to reach one billion urban dwellers, it took only additional 26 years to reach two billion (Seto et al., 2010).

1 Since then, the time interval to add an additional one billion urban dwellers is decreasing, and by  
 2 approximately 2030, the world urban population will increase by one billion every 13 years (Seto et  
 3 al., 2010). Today, approximately 52% of the global population, or 3.6 billion, are estimated to live in  
 4 urban areas (UN DESA, 2012).


5 While urbanisation has been occurring in all major regions of the world (Table 12.1) since 1950,  
 6 there is great variability in urban transitions across regions and settlement types. This variability is  
 7 shaped by multiple factors, including history (Melosi, 2000), migration patterns (Harris and Todaro,  
 8 1970; Keyfitz, 1980; Chen et al., 1998), technological development (Tarr, 1984), culture (Wirth, 1938;  
 9 Inglehart, 1997), governance institutions (National Research Council, 2003), as well as  
 10 environmental factors such as the availability of energy (Jones, 2004; Dredge, 2008). Together, these  
 11 factors partially account for the large variations in urbanisation levels across regions.

12 **Table 12.1.** Arithmetic growth of human settlement classes for five periods between 1950-2050.  
 13 Number of human settlements by size class at four points in time.

	Average annual growth [%]					Number of cities			
	1950-1970	1970-1990	1990-2010	1950-2010	2010-2050	1950	1970	1990	2010
10,000,000 and more	2.60	6.72	4.11	4.46	2.13	2	2	10	23
5,000,000 – 10,000,000	7.55	1.34	2.53	3.77	1.22	4	15	19	38
1,000,000 – 5,000,000	3.27	3.17	2.70	3.05	1.36	69	128	237	388
100,000-1,000,000	2.86	2.48	1.87	2.40	0.70	Not Available			
Less than 100,000	2.54	2.37	1.71	2.21	1.95				
Rural	1.38	1.23	0.61	1.07	-0.50				

14 Source: (UN DESA, 2012).

15 Urbanisation rates in developed regions are high, between 73% in Europe to 89% in North America,  
 16 compared to 45% in Asia and 40% in Africa (UN DESA, 2012). The majority of urbanisation in the  
 17 future is expected to take place primarily in Africa and Asia, and will occur at lower levels of  
 18 economic development than the urban transitions that occurred in Europe and North America.  
 19 While its urbanisation rate is still lower than that of Europe and the Americas, the urban population  
 20 in Asia increased by 2.3 billion between 1950 and 2010 (Figure 12.1).




21 **Figure 12.1.** Urban Population as Percentage of Regional and World Populations for RCP5 Regions,  
 22 1950-2010

23 Source: (UN DESA, 2012).

24  
 25  
 26 Overall, urbanisation has led to the growth of cities of all sizes (Figure 12.2). Although mega-cities  
 27 (those with populations of 10 million or greater) receive a lot of attention in the literature, urban  
 28 population growth has been dominated by cities of smaller sizes. About one-third of the growth in  
 29 urban population between 1950 and 2010 (1.16 billion) occurred in settlements with populations

1 fewer than 100 thousand. Currently, approximately 10% of the 3.6 billion urban dwellers live in  
 2 mega-cities of 10 million or greater (UN DESA, 2012). Within regions and countries, there are large  
 3 variations in development levels, urbanisation processes, and urban transitions. While the dominant  
 4 global urbanisation trend is growth, some regions are experiencing significant urban population  
 5 declines. Urban shrinkage is not a new phenomenon, and most cities undergo cycles of growth and  
 6 decline, which is argued to correspond to waves of economic growth and recession (Kondratieff and  
 7 Stolper, 1935). There are few systematic analyses on the scale and prevalence of shrinking cities  
 8 (UN-Habitat, 2008). A recent assessment by the UN (UN DESA, 2012) indicates that about 11% of  
 9 3,552 cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 2005 experienced total population declines of  
 10 10.4 million between 1990 and 2005. These “shrinking cities” are distributed globally but  
 11 concentrated mainly in Eastern Europe (Bontje, 2005; Bernt, 2009) and the rust belt in the U.S.  
 12 (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2012), where de-urbanisation is strongly tied with de-industrialisation.



13  
 14 **Figure 12.2.** Population by settlement size using historical (1950-2010) and projected data to 2050.  
 15 Source: (UN DESA, 2010).  
 16


17 Urbanisation results in not only in growth in urban population, but also changes in household  
 18 structures and dynamics. As societies industrialise and urbanise, there is often a decline in  
 19 household size, as traditional complex households become more simple and less extended  
 20 (Bongaarts, 2001; Jiang and O’Neill, 2007; O’Neill et al., 2010). This trend has been observed in  
 21 Europe and North America, where household size has declined from between 4 to 6 in the mid-  
 22 1800s to between 2 and 3 today (Bongaarts, 2001).

### 23 12.2.1.2 Urban land use

24 Another key dimension of urbanisation is the increase in built-up area and urban land cover.  
 25 Worldwide, urban land cover occupies a small fraction of global land surface, with estimates ranging  
 26 between 0.276 to 3.5 million km<sup>2</sup>, or between 0.2% to 2.7% of ice free terrestrial land (Schneider et  
 27 al., 2009). Although the urban share of global land cover is negligible, urban land use at the local  
 28 scale shows trends of declining densities and outward expansion.

29 Analyses of 120 global cities show significant variation in densities across world regions, but the  
 30 dominant trend is one of declining built-up and population densities across all income levels and city  
 31 sizes (Figure 12.3) (Angel et al., 2010). For this sample of cities, built-up area densities have declined  
 32 significantly between 1990 and 2000, at an average annual rate of 2.0±0.4 % (Angel et al., 2010). On  
 33 average, urban population densities are four times higher in low-income countries (11,850  
 34 persons/km<sup>2</sup> in 2000) than in high-income countries (2,855 persons/km<sup>2</sup> in 2000). Urban areas in  
 35 Asia experienced the largest decline in population densities during the 1990s. Urban population

1 densities in East Asia and Southeast Asia declined 4.9% and 4.2%, respectively, between 1990 and  
 2 2000 (World Bank, 2005). These urban population densities are still higher than those in Europe,  
 3 North America, and Australia, where densities are on average 2,835 persons/km<sup>2</sup>. As the urban  
 4 transition continues in Asia and Africa, it is expected that their urban population densities will  
 5 continue to decline. Although urban population densities are decreasing, the amount of built-up  
 6 area per person is increasing (Seto et al., 2010; Angel et al., 2011). A meta-analysis of 326 studies  
 7 using satellite data shows a minimum global increase in urban land area of 58,000km<sup>2</sup> between 1970  
 8 and 2000, or roughly 9% of the 2000 urban extent (Seto et al., 2011). At current rates of declining  
 9 densities among developing country cities, a doubling of the urban population over the next 30 years  
 10 will require a tripling of built-up areas (Angel et al., 2010). For a discussion on drivers of declining  
 11 densities, see Box 12.4.



12  
 13 **Figure 12.3.** Average Built-Up Area per Person (m<sup>2</sup>) in 1990 (red) and 2000 (green) for 120 Cities.  
 14 Average annual percent change in density (blue, secondary x-axis). Source: (Angel et al., 2005).

### 15 12.2.1.3 Urban economies and GDP

16 Urban areas are engines of economic activities and growth. Further, the transition from a largely  
 17 agrarian and rural society to an industrial and consumption-based society is largely coincident with a  
 18 country's level of industrialization and economic development (Tisdale 1942; Jones 2004), and  
 19 reflects changes in the relative share of GDP by both sector and the proportion of the labour force  
 20 employed in these sectors (Satterthwaite, 2007; World Bank, 2009). The concentration and scale of  
 21 people, activities, and resources in urban areas fosters economic growth (Henderson et al., 1995;  
 22 Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Duranton and Puga, 2004; Puga, 2010), innovation (Feldman and Audretsch,  
 23 1999; Bettencourt et al., 2007; Arbesman et al., 2009), and an increase of economic and resource  
 24 use efficiencies (Kahn, 2009; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). The agglomeration economies made possible  
 25 by the concentration of individuals and firms make cities ideal settings for innovation, job, and  
 26 wealth creation (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Carlino et al., 2007; Knudsen et al., 2008; Puga, 2010).

27 A precise estimate of the contribution of all urban areas to global GDP is not available. However, a  
 28 downscaling of global GDP during the Global Energy Assessment (Grubler et al., 2007; GEA, 2012)  
 29 showed that urban areas contribute about 80% of global GDP. Other studies show that urban  
 30 economies generate more than 90% of global gross value (Gutman, 2007; United Nations, 2011). In  
 31 OECD countries, more than 80% of the patents filed are in cities (OECD, 2006a). Not many cities  
 32 report city-level GDP but recent attempts have been made by the Metropolitan Policy Program of  
 33 the Brookings Institute, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), and the McKinsey Global Institute to



1 provide such estimates. The PWC report shows that key 27 key global cities<sup>1</sup> accounted for 8% of  
2 world GDP for 2012 but only 2.5% of the global population (PwC and Partnership for New York City,  
3 2012).

4 In a compilation by UN-Habitat, big cities are shown to have disproportionately high share of  
5 national GDP compared to their population (UN-Habitat, 2012). The importance of big cities is  
6 further underscored in a recent report that shows that 600 cities generated 60% of global GDP in  
7 2007 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). This same report shows that the largest 380 cities in  
8 developed countries account for half of the global GDP. More than 20% of global GDP comes from  
9 190 North American cities alone (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). In contrast, the 220 largest cities  
10 in developing countries contribute to only 10% global of GDP, while 23 global megacities generated  
11 14% of global GDP in 2007. The prevalence of economic concentration in big cities highlights their  
12 importance but does not undermine the role of small and medium size cities. Although top-down  
13 and bottom-up estimates suggest a large urban contribution to global GDP, challenges remain in  
14 estimating the size of this, given large uncertainties in the downscaled GDP, incomplete urban  
15 coverage, sample bias, methodological ambiguities, and limitations of the city-based estimations in  
16 the existing studies.

## 17 **12.2.2 GHG emission estimates from human settlements**

18 Most of the literature on human settlements and climate change is rather recent.<sup>2</sup> Since AR4, there  
19 has been a considerable growth in scientific evidence on energy consumption and GHG emissions  
20 from human settlements. However, there are very few studies that have examined the contribution  
21 of all urban areas to global GHG emissions. The few studies that do exist will be discussed in Section  
22 12.2.2.1. In contrast, a larger number of studies have quantified GHG emissions for individual cities  
23 and other human settlements. These will be assessed in Section 12.2.2.2.

### 24 **12.2.2.1 Estimates of the urban share of global emissions**

25 There are very few studies that estimate the relative urban and rural shares of global GHG  
26 emissions. One challenge is that of boundary definitions and delineation: it is difficult to consistently  
27 define and delineate rural and urban areas globally (see Box 12.1). Another challenge is that of  
28 severe data constraints about GHG emissions. There is no comprehensive statistical database on  
29 urban or rural GHG emissions. Available global estimates of urban and rural emission shares are  
30 either derived bottom-up or top-down. Bottom-up or upscaling studies use a representative sample  
31 of estimates from regions or countries and scale these up to develop world totals (see International  
32 Energy Agency, 2008). Top-down studies use global or national datasets and downscale these to  
33 local grid cells. Urban and rural emissions contributions are then estimated based on additional  
34 spatial information such as the extent of urban areas or the location of emission point sources (GEA,  
35 2012). In the absence of a more substantive body of evidence, large uncertainties remain  
36 surrounding the estimates and their sensitivities (Grubler et al., 2012).

37 The *World Energy Outlook 2008* estimates urban energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at 19.8 Gt, or 71% of  
38 the global total for the year 2006 (International Energy Agency, 2008). This corresponds to 330 EJ of  
39 primary energy, of which urban final energy use is estimated to be at 222 EJ. The Global Energy  
40 Assessment provides a range of final urban energy use between 180 and 250 EJ with a central  
41 estimate of 240 EJ for the year 2005. This is equivalent to an urban share between 56% and 78%  
42 (central estimate, 76%) of global final energy use. Converting the GEA estimates on urban final


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<sup>1</sup> Paris, Hong Kong, Sydney, San Francisco, Singapore, Toronto, Berlin, Stockholm, London, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Tokyo, Abu Dhabi, Madrid, Kuala Lumpur, Milan, Moscow, São Paulo, Beijing, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Mexico City, Shanghai, Seoul, Istanbul, and Mumbai.

<sup>2</sup> A search on the ISI Web of Science database for keywords “urban AND climate change” for the years 1900-2007 yielded over 700 English language publications. The same search for the period from 2007 to present yielded nearly 2800 English language publications.

1 energy (Grubler et al., 2012) into CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (see Methodology and Metrics Annex) results in  
 2 global urban energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of 8.8 - 14.3 Gt (central estimate, 12.5Gt) which is  
 3 between 53% and 87% (central estimate, 76%) of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from global final energy use and  
 4 between 30% and 56% (central estimate, 43%) of global primary energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (CO<sub>2</sub>  
 5 includes flaring and cement emissions which are small). Urban CO<sub>2</sub> emission estimates refer to  
 6 commercial final energy fuel use only and exclude upstream emissions from energy conversion.

7 Aside from these global assessments, there is only one attempt in the literature to estimate the total  
 8 GHG (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and SF<sub>6</sub>) contribution of urban areas globally (Marcotullio et al., 2013).  
 9 Estimates are provided in ranges where the lower end provides an estimate of the direct emissions  
 10 from urban areas only and the higher end provides an estimate that assigns all emissions from  
 11 electricity consumption to the consuming (urban) areas. Using this methodology, the estimated total  
 12 GHG emission contribution of all urban areas is lower than other approaches, and ranges from 12.8  
 13 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>eq to 16.9 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>eq, or between 37% and 49% of global GHG emissions in the year 2000. The  
 14 estimated urban share of energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2000 is slightly lower than the GEA and  
 15 IEA estimate, at 72% using Scope 2 accounting and 44% using Scope 1 accounting (see Figure 12.4).  
 16 The urban GHG emissions (CO<sub>2</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, CH<sub>4</sub>, and SF<sub>6</sub>) from the energy share of total energy GHGs is  
 17 between 42% and 66%. Hence, while the sparse evidence available suggests that urban areas  
 18 dominate final energy consumption and associated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, the contribution to total global  
 19 GHG emissions may be more modest as the large majority of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from land-use change,  
 20 N<sub>2</sub>O emissions, and CH<sub>4</sub> emissions take place outside urban areas.



21  
 22 **Figure 12.4.** Estimates of urban CO<sub>2</sub> emissions shares as a percent of total emissions across world  
 23 regions (Gt CO<sub>2</sub>). Grubler et al. (2012) estimates are based on estimates of final urban and total final  
 24 energy use in 2005. Marcotullio et al. (2013) estimates are based on emissions attributed to urban  
 25 areas as a percent of regional totals reported by EDGAR. Scope 2 emissions allocate all emissions  
 26 from thermal power plants to urban areas.

27 Figure 12.4 shows CO<sub>2</sub> estimates derived from Grubler et al. (2012) and Marcotullio et al. (2013). It  
 28 highlights that there are large variations in the share of urban CO<sub>2</sub> emissions across world regions.  
 29 For example, urban emission shares of final energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions range from 58% in China  
 30 and Central Pacific Asia to 86% in North America. Ranges are from 31% to 57% in South Asia, if urban  
 31 final energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are taken relative to primary energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the  
 32 respective region.

33 Although differences in definitions make it challenging to compare across regional studies, there is  
 34 consistent evidence that large variations exist (Parshall et al., 2010; Marcotullio et al., 2011, 2012).



1 For example, the International Energy Agency (2008) estimates of the urban primary energy related  
2 CO2 emission shares are 69% for the EU (69% for primary energy), 80% for the U.S. (85% for primary  
3 energy, see also (Parshall et al., 2010), and 86% for China (75% for primary energy, see also (Dhakal,  
4 2009)). Marcotullio et al. (2013) highlight that non-energy related sectors can lead to substantially  
5 different urban emissions shares under consideration of a broader selection of greenhouse gases  
6 (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, SF<sub>6</sub>). For example, while Africa tends to have a high urban CO<sub>2</sub> emissions share  
7 (64%-74%) in terms of energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, the overall contribution of urban areas across  
8 all sectors and gases is estimated to range between 21% and 30% of all emissions (Marcotullio et al.,  
9 2013).

#### 10 **12.2.2.2 Emissions accounting for human settlements**

11 Whereas the previous section discussed the urban proportion of total global emissions, this section  
12 assesses emissions accounting methods for human settlements. A variety of emission estimates have  
13 been published by different research groups in the scientific literature (e.g., Ramaswami et al., 2008;  
14 Kennedy et al., 2009, 2011; Dhakal, 2009; World Bank, 2010; Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Glaeser  
15 and Kahn, 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a; c; Hoornweg et al., 2011;  
16 Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Chavez et al., 2012; Grubler et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Chong et al.,  
17 2012). The estimates of GHG emissions and energy consumption for human settlements are very  
18 diverse. Comparable estimates are usually only available across small samples of human  
19 settlements, which currently limit the insights that can be gained from an assessment of these  
20 estimates. This is rooted in the absence of commonly accepted GHG accounting standards and a lack  
21 of transparency over data availabilities, as well as choices that have been made in the compilation of  
22 particular estimates:

- 23 • **Choice of physical urban boundaries.** Human settlements are open systems with porous  
24 boundaries. Depending on how physical boundaries are defined, estimates of energy  
25 consumption and GHG emissions can vary significantly (see Box 12.1).
- 26 • **Choice of accounting approach/reporting scopes.** There is widespread acknowledgement in the  
27 literature for the need to report beyond the direct GHG emissions released from within a  
28 settlement's territory. Complementary accounting approaches have therefore been proposed  
29 to characterise different aspects of the GHG performance of human settlements (see Box 12.2).  
30 Cities and other human settlements are increasingly adopting dual approaches (Baynes et al.,  
31 2011; Ramaswami et al., 2011; ICLEI and WRI, 2012; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; Chavez  
32 and Ramaswami, 2013).
- 33 • **Choice of calculation methods:** There are differences in the methods used for calculating  
34 emissions, including differences in emission factors used, methods for imputing missing data,  
35 and methods for calculating indirect emissions (Heijungs and Suh, 2010; Ibrahim et al., 2012).

36 A number of organisations have started working towards standardisation protocols for emissions  
37 accounting (Carney et al., 2009; ICLEI, 2009; Covenant of Mayors, 2010; UNEP et al., 2010; Arian et  
38 al., 2011). Further progress has been achieved recently when several key efforts joined forces to  
39 create a more broadly supported reporting framework (ICLEI et al., 2012). Ibrahim et al. (2012) show  
40 that the differences across reporting standards explains significant cross-sectional variability in  
41 reported emission estimates. However, while high degrees of cross-sectional comparability are  
42 crucial in order to gain further insight into the emission patterns of human settlements across the  
43 world, many applications at the settlement level do not require this. Cities and other localities often  
44 compile these data to track their own performance in reducing energy consumption and/or  
45 greenhouse gas emissions (see Section 12.7). This makes a substantial body of evidence difficult to  
46 use for scientific inquiries.

---

**Box 12.2. Emission accounting at the local scale**

Three broad approaches have emerged for GHG emissions accounting for human settlements, each of which uses different boundaries and units of analysis:

**1) Territorial or production-based emissions accounting** includes all GHG emissions from activities within a city or settlement's territory (see Box 12.1). This is also referred to as Scope 1 accounting (Kennedy et al., 2010; ICLEI et al., 2012). Territorial emissions accounting is, for example, commonly applied by national statistical offices and used by countries under the UNFCCC for emission reporting (Ganson, 2008; DeShazo and Matute, 2012; ICLEI et al., 2012).

However, human settlements are typically smaller than the infrastructure in which they are embedded, and important emission sources may therefore be located outside the city territorial boundary. Moreover, human settlements trade goods and services that are often produced in one settlement but are consumed elsewhere, thus creating GHG emissions at different geographic locations associated with the production process of these consumable items. Two further approaches have thus been developed in the literature:

**2) Territorial plus supply chain accounting approaches** start with territorial emissions and then add a well defined set of indirect emissions which take place outside the settlement's territory. These include indirect emissions from (i) the consumption of purchased electricity, heat and steam (Scope 2 emissions), and (ii) any other activity (Scope 3 emissions). The simplest and most frequently used territorial plus supply chain accounting approach includes Scope 2 emissions (Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2010; Baynes et al., 2011; ICLEI et al., 2012).

**3) Consumption-based accounting approaches** include all direct and indirect emissions from final consumption activities associated with the settlement, which usually include consumption by residents and government (Larsen and Hertwich, 2009, 2010a; b; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a; b; Jones and Kammen, 2011; Minx et al., 2013). This excludes all emissions from the production of exports in the settlement territory and includes all indirect emissions occurring outside the settlement territory in the production of the final consumption items.


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Beyond the restricted comparability of the available GHG estimates, other limitations of the available literature remain. First, the growth in publications is restricted to the analysis of energy consumption and GHG emissions from a limited set of comparable emission estimates. New estimates do not emerge at the same pace. Second, available evidence is particularly scarce for medium and small cities as well as rural settlements (Grubler et al., 2012). Third, there is a regional bias in the evidence. Most studies focus on emissions from cities in developed countries with limited evidence from a few large cities in the developing world (Kennedy et al., 2009, 2011; Hoornweg et al., 2011; Sugar et al., 2012). Much of the most recent literature provides Chinese evidence (Dhakal, 2009; Ru et al., 2010; Chun et al., 2011; W Wang et al., 2012; H Wang et al., 2012; Chong et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013; Vause et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013), but only limited new emission estimates are emerging from that. Evidence on human settlements in least developed countries is almost non-existent with some notable exceptions in the non peer-reviewed literature (Lwasa, 2013). Fourth, most of the available emission estimates are focusing on energy related CO<sub>2</sub> rather than all GHG emissions. Fifth, while there is a considerable amount of evidence for territorial emissions, studies that include Scope 2 and 3 emission components are growing but remain limited (Ramaswami et al., 2008; Ramaswami, Chavez, et al., 2012; Kennedy et al., 2009; Larsen and Hertwich, 2009, 2010a; b; Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; White et al., 2010; Petsch et al., 2011; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a; b; Heinonen et al., 2011; Chavez et al., 2012; Paloheimo and Salmi, 2013; Minx et al., 2013). Finally, the comparability of available evidence of GHG emissions at the city scale is usually restricted across studies. There prevails marked differences in terms of the accounting methods, scope of covered sectors, sector definition, greenhouse gas covered, and data sources used (Bader and Bleischwitz, 2009; Kennedy et al., 2010; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Grubler et al., 2012; Ibrahim et al., 2012).

1 Across cities, existing studies point to a large variation in the magnitude of total and per capita  
2 emissions. For this assessment, emission estimates for several hundred individual cities were  
3 reviewed. Reported emission estimates for cities and other human settlements in the literature  
4 range from 0.5t CO<sub>2</sub>/cap to more than 190t CO<sub>2</sub>/cap (Carney et al., 2009; Kennedy et al., 2009;  
5 Dhakal, 2009; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a; c; Wright et al., 2011; Sugar et al., 2012; Ibrahim et al.,  
6 2012; Ramaswami, Chavez, et al., 2012; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; Chavez and Ramaswami,  
7 2013; Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013). Local emission inventories in the UK for 2005-  
8 2011 show that end use activities and industrial processes of both rural and urban localities vary  
9 from below 3t/cap to 190t/cap and more (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013). The total  
10 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from end use activities for ten global cities range (reference year ranges 2003-2006)  
11 between 4.2 and 21.5 t CO<sub>2</sub>e/cap (Kennedy et al., 2009; Sugar et al., 2012), while there is variation  
12 reported in GHG estimates from 18 European city regions from 3.5 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq/cap to 30 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq/cap in  
13 2005 (Carney et al., 2009).


14 In many cases, a large part of the observed variability will be related to the underlying drivers of  
15 emissions such as urban economic structures (balance of manufacturing versus service sector), local  
16 climate and geography, stage of economic development, energy mix, state of public transport, urban  
17 form and density, and many others (Carney et al., 2009; Kennedy et al., 2009, 2011; Dhakal, 2009,  
18 2010; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Shrestha and Rajbhandari, 2010; Gomi et al., 2010; Parshall et al.,  
19 2010; Rosenzweig et al., 2011; Sugar et al., 2012; Grubler et al., 2012; Wiedenhofer et al., 2013).  
20 Normalising aggregate city-level emissions by population therefore does not necessarily result in  
21 robust cross-city comparisons, since each city's economic function, trade typology, and imports-  
22 exports balance can differ widely. Hence, using different emissions accounting methods can lead to  
23 substantial differences in reported emissions (see Figure 12.4). Therefore, understanding differences  
24 in accounting approaches is essential in order to draw meaningful conclusions from cross-city  
25 comparisons of emissions.

26 Evidence from developed countries such as the U.S., Finland, or the UK suggests that consumption-  
27 based emission estimates for cities and other human settlements tend to be higher than their  
28 territorial emissions. However, in some cases, territorial or extended territorial emission estimates  
29 (Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions) can be substantially higher. This is mainly due to the large  
30 fluctuations in territorial emission estimates that are highly dependent on a city's economic  
31 structure and trade typology. Consumption-based estimates tend to be more homogenous (see  
32 Figure 12.5).



1  
2 **Figure 12.5.** Extended territorial and consumption-based per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for 354 urban  
3 (yellow) and rural (green) municipalities in England. At the 45° line, per capita extended territorial and  
4 consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are of equal size. Below the 45° line, consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub>  
5 emission estimates are larger than extended territorial emissions. Above the 45° line, estimates of  
6 extended territorial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are larger than consumption-based CO emissions. Robust  
7 regression lines are shown for the rural (green) and urban (yellow) sub-samples. In the inset, the x-  
8 axis shows 10-15 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita and the y-axis shows 4-16 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>  
9 emissions per capita. Source: (Minx et al., 2013).


10  
11 Based on a global sample of 198 cities by the Global Energy Assessment, Grubler et al. (2012) find  
12 that two out of three cities in Annex I countries have a lower per capita final energy use than  
13 national levels. In contrast, per capita final energy use for more than two out of three cities in non-  
14 Annex I countries have higher than national averages (see Figure 12.6). There is not sufficient  
15 comparable evidence available for this assessment to confirm this finding for energy related CO<sub>2</sub>  
16 emissions, but this pattern is suggested by the close relationship between final energy use and  
17 energy related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Individual studies for 35 cities in China, Bangkok, and 10 global cities  
18 provide additional evidence of these trends (Dhakar, 2009; Aumnad, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2010;  
19 Sovacool and Brown, 2010). Moreover, the literature suggests that differences in per capita energy  
20 consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emission patterns of cities in Annex I and non-Annex I countries have  
21 converged more than their national emissions (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Sugar et al., 2012). For  
22 consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, initial evidence suggests that urban areas tend to have much  
23 higher emissions than rural areas in non-Annex I countries, but the evidence is limited to a few  
24 studies on India and China (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Guan et al., 2008, 2009; Pachauri and Jiang,  
25 2008; Minx et al., 2011). For Annex I countries, studies suggest that using consumption based CO<sub>2</sub>  
26 emission accounting, urban areas can, but do not always, have higher emissions than rural  
27 settlements (Lenzen et al., 2006; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011c; Minx et al., 2013).



1

2 **Figure 12.6.** Per capita (direct) total final consumption (TFC) of energy (GJ) versus cumulative  
 3 population (millions) in urban areas. Source: (GEA, 2012).

4 There are only a few downscaled estimates of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from human settlements and urban as  
 5 well as rural areas, mostly at regional and national scales for the EU, U.S., China and India (Parshall  
 6 et al., 2010; Raupach et al., 2010; Marcotullio et al., 2011, 2012; Gurney et al., 2012). However,  
 7 these studies provide little to no representation of intra-urban features and therefore cannot be  
 8 substitutes for place-based emission studies from cities. Recent studies have begun to combine  
 9 downscaled estimates of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions with local urban energy consumption information to  
 10 generate fine-scale maps of urban emissions (see Figure 12.7 and Gurney et al., 2012). Similarly,  
 11 geographic-demographic approaches have been used for downscaling consumption-based estimates  
 12 (Druckman and Jackson, 2008; Minx et al., 2013). Such studies may allow more detailed analyses of  
 13 the drivers of urban energy consumption and emissions in the future.



14

15 **Figure 12.7.** Total fossil fuel emissions of Marion County, IN, for the year 2002. a) top-down view with  
 16 numbered zones and b) blow ups of numbered zones. Colour units: log<sub>10</sub> kg C/year. Box height units:  
 17 linear. Source: (Gurney et al., 2012).

18

## 12.2.3 Future trends in urbanisation and GHG emissions from human settlements

### 12.2.3.1 Dimension 1: Urban population

Worldwide, populations will increasingly live in urban settlements. By the middle of the century, the global urban population is expected to reach between 5.6 to 7.1 billion, with trends growth varying substantially across regions (Table 12.2). While highly urbanised North America, Europe, Oceania, and Latin America will continue to urbanise, the increase in urbanisation levels in these regions is relatively small. Urbanisation will be much more significant in Asia and Africa where the majority of the population is still rural. Urban population growth will also largely occur in the less developed Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The proportion of rural population in the developed regions have declined from about 60% in 1950 to less than 30% in 2010, and will continue to decline to less than 20% by 2050.

**Table 12.2.** Mid-Year Global Urban Population, 2050


2050 Mid-Year Global Urban Population			
Source	Total Pop. <i>in billions</i>	% Urban	Urban Pop. <i>in billions</i>
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, A2R Scenario	10.245	69	7.069
World Bank	9.417	67	6.308
United Nations	9.306	67	6.252
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, B2 Scenario	9.367	66	6.182
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, B1 Scenario	8.721	64	5.581

Sources: (IIASA, 2009; UN DESA, 2012; World Bank, 2013).

Uncertainties in future global urbanisation trends are large, due in part to different trajectories in economic development and population growth. While the UNPD produces a single urbanisation scenario for each country through 2050, studies suggests that urbanisation processes in different countries and different periods of time vary remarkably. Moreover, past UN urbanisation projections have contained large errors and have tended to overestimate urban growth, especially for countries at low and middle urbanisation levels (Bocquier, 2005; Montgomery, 2008; Alkema et al., 2011).

Given these limitations, recent studies have begun to explore a range of urban population growth scenarios. A study undertaken at IIASA extrapolates UN scenarios to 2100 and develops three alternative scenarios by making assumptions about long-term maximum urbanisation levels (Grubler et al., 2007). However, missing from these scenarios is the full range of uncertainty over the next twenty to thirty years, the period when the majority of developing countries will undergo significant urban transitions. For instance, variation across different urbanisation scenarios before 2030 is negligible (0.3%) for India and also very small (<4%) for China (see Figure 12.8, dashed lines). By 2050, urbanisation levels could realistically reach between 38–69% in India, and 55–78% in China (O'Neill et al., 2012). In other words, there are large uncertainties in urbanisation trajectories for both countries. The *speed* (fast or slow) as well as the *nature* (an increase in industrialisation) of urbanisation could lead to significant effects on future urban energy use and emissions.





**Figure 12.8.** Projected urban population growth for India and China under fast, central, and slow growth scenarios (left) and associated growth in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (right). Sources: (O'Neill et al., 2012) (O'Neill et al. 2012); dashed lines in left panel are the IIASA A2r, B2 and B1 scenarios (Grubler et al., 2007).

### 12.2.3.2 Dimension 2: Urban land cover

Recently, global forecasts of urban expansion that take into account population and economic factors have become available (Nelson et al., 2010; Angel et al., 2011; Seto et al., 2011, 2012). These studies vary in their baseline urban extent in 2000, model inputs, assumptions about future trends in densities, economic and population growth, and modelling methods. They forecast that between 2000 and 2030, urban areas will expand between 0.3 million to 2.3 million km<sup>2</sup>, corresponding to an increase between 56% to 310% (see Table 12.3 and Angel et al., 2011; Seto et al., 2011, 2012). Given worldwide trends of declining densities, the zero population density decline scenario and associated urban growth forecast (0.3 million) is unlikely, as is the SRES A1 scenario of very rapid economic growth and a peak in global population mid-century. According to the studies, the most likely scenarios are SRES B2 (Seto et al., 2011), >75% probability (Seto et al., 2012), and 2% decline (Angel et al., 2011), which reduces the range of forecast estimates to between 1.1 to 1.5 million km<sup>2</sup> of new urban land. This corresponds to an increase in urban land cover between 110% to 210% over the 2000 global urban extent. It is important to note that these studies forecast changes in urban land cover (features of Earth's surface) and not changes in the built environment and infrastructure (e.g., buildings, roads). However, these forecasts of urban land cover can be useful to project infrastructure development and associated emissions. Finally, Hurtt et al. (2011) report projected land-use transitions including urbanisation, out to 2100, for the intended use in Earth System Models. However, they do not give a detailed account of the projected urban expansion in different parts of the world.

Depending on the scenario and forecast, 55% of the total urban land in 2030 is expected to be built in the first three decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Nearly half of the global growth in urban land cover is forecasted to occur in Asia, and 55% of the regional growth will take place in China and India (Seto et al., 2012). China's urban land area is expected to expand by almost 220,000 square km<sup>2</sup> by 2030, and account for 18% of the global increase in urban land cover (Seto et al., 2012). These forecasts provide first-order estimates of the likelihood that expansion of urban areas will occur in areas of increasing vulnerability to extreme climate events including floods, storm surges, sea level rise, droughts, and heat waves (See WGII, Urban Chapter). Urban expansion and associated land clearing and loss of aboveground biomass carbon in the pan-tropics is expected to be 1.38 PgC between 2000 and 2030, or 0.05 PgC yr<sup>-1</sup> (Seto et al., 2012).

1 **Table 12.3.** Forecasts of Global Urban Land Expansion to 2030

Study	Scenario	Urban Land 2000 (km <sup>2</sup> )	Projected Urban Expansion to 2030 (km <sup>2</sup> )						TOTAL (%increase from 2000)	% of projected urban land in 2030 to be built between 2000-2030
			Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin America	North America	Oceania		
Seto et al (2011)	SRES A1	726,943	107,551	1,354,001	296,638	407,214	73,176	16,996	2,255,576 (310)	76
	SRES A2	726,943	113,423	702,772	162,179	122,438	49,487	15,486	1,165,785 (160)	62
	SRES B1	726,943	107,551	1,238,267	232,625	230,559	86,165	18,106	1,913,273 (263)	72
	SRES B2	726,943	136,419	989,198	180,265	131,016	74,572	15,334	1,526,805 (210)	68
Seto et al (2012)	>75% probability	652,825	244,475	585,475	77,575	175,075	118,175	9,700	1,210,475 (185)	65
Angel et al (2011)			Africa	Asia	East Asia and the Pacific	Europe and Japan	Latin America and the Caribbean	Land Rich Developed Countries	TOTAL	
	0 density decline	602,864	58,132	120,757	43,092	9,772	49,348	54,801	335,902 (56)	36
	1% density decline	602,864	92,002	203,949	75,674	74,290	98,554	119,868	664,337 (110)	52
	2% density decline	602,864	137,722	316,248	119,654	161,379	164,975	207,699	1,107,677 (184)	65

Sources: (Angel et al., 2011; Seto et al., 2011, 2012).

### 12.2.3.3 Dimension 3: GHG emissions

Recent developments in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) are beginning to capture the interdependence among urban population, urban land cover, and GHG emissions. Some IAMs have found that changes in urbanisation in China and India have a less than proportional effect on aggregate emissions and energy use (O'Neill et al., 2012). These studies find that income effects due to economic growth and urbanisation result in household consumption shifts toward cleaner cooking fuels (O'Neill et al., 2012). In India, the urbanisation level in 2050 will be 16 percentage points lower under the slow urbanisation scenario than under the central scenario, or 15 percentage points higher under the fast scenario than under the central scenario. However, these large differences in potential urbanisation levels in India lead to relatively small differences in emissions: 7% between the slow and central urbanisation scenarios, and 6% between the fast and central urbanisation scenarios (O'Neill et al., 2012). The relatively small effect of urbanisation on emissions is likely due to relatively small differences in per capita income between rural and urban areas (O'Neill et al., 2012). In contrast, large differences in per capita income between urban and rural areas in China result in significant differences in household consumption, including for energy (O'Neill et al., 2012). Differences in urbanisation pathways also reflect different speeds of transition away from the use of traditional fuels toward modern fuels such as electricity and natural gas (Krey et al., 2012). Slower rates of urbanisation result in slower transitions away from traditional to modern fuels (Jiang and O'Neill, 2004; Pachauri and Jiang, 2008). A large share of solid fuels or traditional biomass in the final energy mix can have adverse health impacts due to indoor air pollution (Bailis et al., 2005; Venkataraman et al., 2010).

Accounting for uncertainties in urban population growth, the scenarios show that urbanisation does not lead to a corresponding growth in emissions and energy use (Figure 12.8b). In China, for example, under the central scenario (similar to UN projections) the country will reach 70% urban population by 2050 and the total carbon emissions will reach 11GtC/year. Under the slow urbanisation scenario, the urbanisation level is 13% lower than the central urbanisation scenario, but results in emissions that are 9% lower than under the central urbanisation scenario. Similarly, the fast urbanisation scenario results in emissions that are 7% higher than under the central scenario, but with urbanisation levels that are 11% higher.

Studies of the effects of demographic change on GHG emissions come to contradicting conclusions (Dalton et al., 2008; Kronenberg, 2009). Many of the forecasts on urbanisation also do not explicitly account for the infrastructure for which there is a separate set of forecasts (Davis et al., 2010;



1 Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2013; Müller et al., 2013) including those developed by the IEA  
 2 (International Energy Agency, 2013) and the OECD (OECD, 2006b, 2007). However these  
 3 infrastructure forecasts, typically by region or country, do not specify the portion of the forecasted  
 4 infrastructure in urban areas and other settlements. One study finds that both aging and  
 5 urbanisation can have substantial impacts on emissions in certain world regions such as the U.S., the  
 6 EU, China, and India. Globally, a 16–29% reduction in the emissions by 2050 (1.4–2.5 GtC/y) could be  
 7 achieved through slowing population growth (O’Neill et al., 2010).

## 8 **12.3 Urban Systems: Activities, Resources, and Performance**

9 How does urbanisation influence global or regional CO<sub>2</sub> emissions? This section discusses drivers of  
 10 urban GHG emissions, how they affect different sectors, and their interaction and interdependence.  
 11 The magnitude of their impact on urban GHG emissions is also discussed qualitatively and  
 12 quantitatively to provide context for a more detailed assessment of urban form and infrastructure  
 13 (12.4) and spatial planning (12.5).

### 14 **12.3.1 Overview of drivers of urban GHG emissions**

#### 15 **12.3.1.1 Introduction**

16 Urban areas and nations share some common drivers of GHG emissions. Other drivers of urban GHG  
 17 emissions are distinct from national drivers and locally specific. The previous section discussed  
 18 important accounting issues that affect the estimation of urban-scale GHG emissions. (For a more  
 19 comprehensive review, see Kennedy et al., 2009; ICLEI and WRI, 2012; Ramaswami, Chavez, et al.,  
 20 2012; Steinberger and Weisz, 2013). Another characteristic of urban areas is that their physical form  
 21 and structure in terms of land-use mix and patterns, density, and spatial configuration of  
 22 infrastructure can strongly influence GHG emissions (see discussion below and in 12.4). The basic  
 23 constituent elements of cities such as streets, public spaces, buildings, and their design, placement,  
 24 and function reflect their socio-political, economic, and technological histories (Kostof, 1992; Morris,  
 25 1994; Kostof and Tobias, 1999). Hence, cities often portray features of “path dependency” (Arthur,  
 26 1989), a historical contingency that is compounded by the extent of pre-existing policies and market  
 27 failures that have lasting impacts on emissions (see Section 12.6 below).

28 The following sections group and discuss urban GHG emission drivers into four clusters that reflect  
 29 both the specificity of urban scale emissions as well as their commonality with national-scale drivers  
 30 of GHG emissions addressed in the other Chapters of this assessment:

- 31 • ***Economic geography and income***
- 32 • ***Socio-demographic factors***
- 33 • ***Technology***
- 34 • ***Infrastructure and urban form***

35 **Economic geography** refers to the function of a human settlement within the global hierarchy of  
 36 places and the international division of labour, as well as the resulting trade flows of raw materials,  
 37 energy, manufactured goods, and services. Income refers to the scale of economic activity, often  
 38 expressed through measures of Gross Regional Product (i.e. the GDP equivalent at the scale of  
 39 human settlements), calculated either as an urban (or settlement) total, or normalized on a per  
 40 capita basis.

41 **Socio-demographic drivers** of urban GHG emissions include population structure and dynamics (e.g.,  
 42 population size, age distribution, household characteristics) (O’Neill et al., 2010) as well as cultural  
 43 norms (e.g., consumption and lifestyle choices) and distributional and equity factors (e.g., access or  
 44 lack thereof to basic urban infrastructure). Unequal access to housing and electricity is a significant

1 social problem in many rapidly growing cities of the Global South (Grubler and Schulz, 2013) and  
2 shapes patterns of urban development. Here, **technology** refers to macro-level drivers such as the  
3 technology of manufacturing and commercial activities. **Infrastructure and urban form** refer to the  
4 patterns and spatial arrangements of land use, transportation systems, and urban design elements  
5 (Lynch, 1981; Handy, 1996) and are discussed in greater detail in Section 12.4.


### 6 **12.3.1.2 Emission drivers decomposition via IPAT**

7 Explaining GHG emission growth trends via decomposition analysis is a widely used technique in the  
8 scientific literature and within IPCC assessments ever since Kaya (1990). The so-called IPAT identity  
9 (for a review, see Chertow, 2000) is a multiplicative identity in which Impacts (e.g., emissions) are  
10 described as being the product of Population x Affluence x Technology. First derivatives (growth  
11 rates) of the components of this identity become additive, thus allowing a first analysis on the  
12 relative weight of different drivers. The IPAT identity is a growth accounting framework and does not  
13 lend itself to explaining differences between urban settlements in terms of absolute GHG emission  
14 levels and their driving forces (see discussion below).

15 There is great interest in understanding the drivers of China's urban GHG emissions, which has  
16 resulted in a large literature on the decomposition of GHG emissions for Chinese megacities. With  
17 approximately 10 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per urban capita—three times the national average—China  
18 approaches and in some cases, surpasses levels for Annex-I countries and cities (Dhakal 2009).  
19 Studies have used national emission inventory methods following the IPCC/OECD guidelines (Dhakal,  
20 2009; Chong et al., 2012) or Input-Output techniques (Wang et al., 2013) and thus have used both  
21 production and consumption accounting perspectives. Studies have also gone beyond the simple  
22 IPAT accounting framework, such as using index decomposition (e.g. Donglan et al., 2010). Together,  
23 these studies show considerable variation in per capita GHG emissions across Chinese cities (see, for  
24 example, Figure 12.9). Although the relative contribution of different drivers of emissions varies  
25 across cities and time periods, one study of several Chinese cities found that income is the most  
26 important driver of increases in urban carbon emissions, far surpassing population growth, with  
27 improvements in energy efficiency serving as a critical counterbalancing factor to income growth  
28 (Dhakal 2009). The importance of economic growth as a driver of urban CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in China has  
29 been consistently corroborated in other studies, including those that examine relatively smaller  
30 cities and with the use of alternative types of data and methods (Li et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2012; e.g.  
31 Chong et al., 2012; Jiang and Lin, 2012).

32 However, the evidence on whether the gains in efficiency can counterbalance the scale of  
33 infrastructure construction and income growth in China is less conclusive. Several studies  
34 implemented at different spatial scales have found that the scale of urbanisation and associated  
35 consumption growth in China have outpaced gains from improvements in efficiency (Peters et al.,  
36 2007; Feng et al., 2012; Güneralp and Seto, 2012). Other studies have found that improvements in  
37 efficiency offset the increase in consumption (Liu et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2009; Minx et al., 2011).

38 The literature on drivers of urban GHG emissions in other non-Annex-I countries is more sparse,  
39 often focusing on emission drivers at the sectoral level such as transport (e.g. the case study of  
40 Mraïhi et al., 2013 for Tunisia) or household energy use (Ekholm et al., 2010). In these sectoral  
41 studies, income and other factors (that are highly correlated with income) such as vehicle ownership  
42 and household discount rates, are also shown as important determining variables.



1 **Figure 12.9.** Decomposition of urban-scale CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (absolute difference over time period  
 2 specified and renormalized to index 1) for four Chinese cities 1985 to 2006 (Dhakai, 2009). Note the  
 3 “economic effect” in the graph corresponds to an income effect as discussed in the text. For  
 4 comparison, per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for these four cities range between 11.7 (Shanghai), 11.1  
 5 (Tianjin), 10.1 (Beijing), and 3.7 (Chongqing) tons CO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Hoorweg et al., 2011).  
 6

7 Decomposition analyses are available for cities in the U.S. (Glaeser and Kahn, 2010), the UK (Minx et  
 8 al., 2013), Japan (Makido et al., 2012), and Australia (Wiedenhofer et al., 2013). These studies show  
 9 that income is an important driver of urban GHG emissions. Studies using more disaggregated  
 10 emission accounts complement these findings by also identifying other significant influencing factors  
 11 including automobile dependence, household size, and education (Minx et al., 2013) or additional  
 12 variables such as climate represented by heating- or cooling-degree days (Wiedenhofer et al., 2013).  
 13 The latter two studies are of particular interest as they provide an in-depth analysis of the  
 14 determining variables of urban GHG emissions using both production and consumption-based  
 15 accounting approaches. In both accounting approaches, income emerges as an important  
 16 determinant of urban GHG emissions.

### 17 **12.3.1.3 Interdependence between drivers**

18 These drivers outlined above vary in their ability to be influenced by local decision-making. It is  
 19 difficult to isolate the individual impact of any of these factors on urban energy use and GHG  
 20 emissions since they are linked and often interact across different spatial and temporal scales. The  
 21 interaction among the factors and the relative importance of each will vary from place to place.  
 22 Moreover, many of these factors change over time and exhibit path dependence.

23 A legitimate concern with the IPAT decomposition approach is that the analysis assumes variable  
 24 independence, thus ignoring variable interdependence and co-variance. This was first formulated for  
 25 macro-economic growth accounts (from which the IPAT identity is conceptually derived) by  
 26 Abramovitz (1993) who emphasized the coevolution and interdependence of the income and  
 27 technology variables in the IPAT identity. For instance, a study of 225 cities suggests a robust  
 28 negative correlation between per capita income levels and energy intensity (Grubler et al., 2012)  
 29 that holds for both high-income as well as low-income cities. Income growth has the potential to  
 30 drive investment in technology, changing investment in newer and more efficient technologies, as  
 31 higher income segments have lower discount rates or higher tolerance to longer payback times  
 32 (Hausman, 1979).

### 12.3.1.4 Human settlements, linkages to sectors and policies

The major drivers discussed above affect urban GHG emissions through their influence on energy demand in buildings, transport, industry, and services. These can be mitigated through demand-side management options. As such, human settlements cut across the assessment of mitigation options in sector-specific chapters of this Assessment (see Table 12.4). The drivers also affect the demand for urban energy, water, and waste infrastructure systems, whose GHG emissions can be mitigated via technological improvements within each individual infrastructure system (e.g., methane recovery from municipal wastewater treatment plants and landfills) as well as through improved system integration (e.g., using urban waste as an energy source). Given the interdependence between drivers and across driver groups discussed above, independent sectoral assessments have limitations and risk omitting important mitigation potentials that arise from systems integration.

**Table 12.4.** Examples of policies across sectors and mitigation options at the scale of human settlements.

SOURCES OF GHG EMISSIONS IN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

	ENERGY SYSTEMS (Chapter 7)	TRANSPORT (Chapter 8)	BUILDINGS (Chapter 9)	INDUSTRY (Chapter 10)	LAND-USE (Chapter 11)
<b>Carbon Sinks / Sequestration</b>					Tradable Credits, EQ Policies
<b>Energy Efficiency</b>	Taxes, Credits/Permits	Subsidies for Fuel Efficiency, Standards, Targets	Taxes, Preferential Lending, Codes, Standards	Taxes, Standards, Emissions Trading, Target-setting	
<b>Fuel / Energy Switching / Renewables</b>	Taxes, EQ Policies, Ren Energy Portfolio Stds, Energy Security Policies	Taxes, Biofuel Incentives, Standards			Taxes, Targets, Subsidies
<b>High-Performance / Passive Design</b>		Bike sharing, Urban Planning	Codes, Standards, Integrated Planning, Certification		
<b>Improved Planning / Management</b>	Demand Response Measures	Integrated Planning	Commissioning, Audits, Education		Land Planning, Protected Areas
<b>Materials Efficiency</b>			Codes, Standards, Taxes, LCA, Certification	Standards	Taxes
<b>New / Improved Technology</b>	R&D Policies, Low Carbon Tech Targets	Subsidies for Fuel Efficiency, Bike Sharing, Real-time Information	Real-time Information		Bioenergy Targets
<b>Recycling / Reducing Waste</b>				Taxes, Target-setting, Education	Education
<b>Reduced Demand / Behavior Change</b>		Tolls, Congestion Pricing		Taxes, Subsidies, Education	Education, Standards
<b>Urban Form / Density</b>		Smart Growth, Urban Planning, Growth Management	Certification, Urban Planning		

On one hand, governance and institutions for addressing mitigation options at the urban scale are more dispersed (see 12.6) and face a legacy of inadequately addressing a range of market failures (see Box 12.3). On the other hand, the urban scale also provides unique opportunities for policy integration between urban form and density, infrastructure planning, and demand management options. These are key, especially in the domain of urban transport systems. Lastly, governance and institutional capacity are scale and income dependent, i.e., tend to be weaker in smaller scale cities

1 and in low income/revenue settings. In so far as the bulk of urban growth momentum is expected to  
2 unfold in small- to medium-size cities in non-Annex-I countries (see Section 12.2), mitigation of GHG  
3 emissions at the scale of human settlements faces a new type of “governance paradox” (Grubler et  
4 al., 2012): the largest opportunities for GHG emission reduction (or avoidance of unfettered  
5 emission growth) might be precisely in urban areas where governance and institutional capacities to  
6 address them are weakest (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004).

## 7 **12.3.2 Weighing of Drivers**

### 8 **12.3.2.1 Qualitative weighting**

9 In the previous discussion of the respective role of different emission drivers, the emphasis was  
10 placed on the role of drivers in terms of emission growth. That perspective is complemented in this  
11 Section by a consideration of the absolute level of emissions, and the issue of urban size/scale. This  
12 section also differentiates the role of emission drivers between mature versus growing human  
13 settlements.

#### 14 **Importance of Size and Scaling**

15 Given the significance of human settlements for global resource use, an improved understanding of  
16 their size distribution and likely growth dynamics is crucial. For many physical, biological, social, and  
17 technological systems, robust quantitative regularities like stable patterns of rank distributions have  
18 been observed. Examples of such power law-scaling patterns include phenomena like the frequency  
19 of vocabulary in languages, the hierarchy of urban population sizes across the world (Zipf, 1949;  
20 Berry and Garrison, 1958; Krugman, 1996) or the allometric scaling patterns in biology, such as  
21 Kleiber’s Law, which observes the astonishing constancy in the relation between body mass and  
22 metabolic rates: for living organisms across many orders of magnitude in size that metabolic rate  
23 scales to the  $\frac{3}{4}$  power of the body mass (Kleiber, 1961). There is a vigorous debate in many fields,  
24 including Geography (Batty, 2005, 2008), Ecology (Levin, 1992; West et al., 1999; Brown et al., 2004),  
25 Architecture (Weinstock, 2011), and Physics (Carvalho and Penn, 2004) about the extent to which  
26 underlying hierarchical networks of metabolic systems or transportation networks are the ultimate  
27 causes of the size, shape and rank-distribution of entities, be they organisms or urban systems  
28 (Decker et al., 2000, 2007).


29 With the scale of urbanisation trends currently underway, whether the relationship between city  
30 size and GHG emissions is linear (i.e., one to one, or proportional increase), super-linear (i.e.,  
31 increasing returns to scale) or sub-linear (i.e., economies of scale such as efficiency gains through  
32 shared infrastructure) will be critical for understanding future urban GHG emissions. Super-linear  
33 scaling has been observed for many urban phenomena: as a city’s population increases, there is a  
34 greater than one to one increase in productivity, wages, and innovation as well as crime  
35 (Bettencourt et al., 2007, 2010). If cities exhibit sub-linear scaling with respect to energy and GHG  
36 emissions, it suggests that larger cities are more efficient than smaller ones. While there are many  
37 studies of urban scaling, few studies explicitly examine city size and GHG emissions or energy use,  
38 and the limited empirical evidence on the scaling relationship is inconclusive. A study of 930 urban  
39 areas in the U.S.—nearly all the urban settlements—shows a barely sub-linear relationship  
40 (coefficient=0.93) between urban population size and GHG emissions (Fragkias et al., 2013).

41 In a study of 225 cities across both Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries, Grubler and Schulz (2013)  
42 find non-uniform scaling for urban final energy use, with a distribution characterized by threshold  
43 effects across an overall convex distribution (Figure 12.10). In terms of final energy use, which is an  
44 important determinant of urban GHG emissions, increasing the urban scale in terms of energy use  
45 has different implications as a function of three different urban energy scale classes. Small cities with  
46 low levels of final energy use—below 30 PJ—present the steepest growth in energy use with respect  
47 to increasing city size: a doubling of rank position tends to increase the urban energy use by a factor  
48 of 6.1. For medium-sized cities with moderate energy use (between 30 and 500 PJ final energy use



1 per city), a doubling of city rank corresponds to an increase in energy consumption only by a factor  
 2 of 1.6. For the largest urban energy users in the dataset, cities with greater than 500 PJ of final  
 3 energy use per year, a doubling of urban rank is associated with an increase in urban energy use by a  
 4 factor of only 0.5. This indicates considerable positive agglomeration economies of bigger cities with  
 5 respect to energy use. Only four urban agglomerations of the entire sample of 225 have an annual  
 6 final energy use significantly greater than one EJ: Shanghai (2 EJ), Moscow (1.6 EJ), Los Angeles (1.5  
 7 EJ), and Beijing (1.2 EJ). With urban growth anticipated to be the most rapid in the smaller cities of  
 8 fewer than 500,000 inhabitants (UN DESA, 2010), the patterns observed by (Grubler and Schulz,  
 9 2013) suggest very high elasticities of energy demand growth with respect to future increases in  
 10 urban population.

11



12

13 **Figure 12.10.** Rank size distribution of 225 cities in terms of their final energy use (in EJ) regrouped  
 14 into 3 subsamples (>0.5EJ, 0.03-0.5EJ, <0.03EJ) and corresponding sample statistics. The rank of a  
 15 city is its position in the list of all cities sorted by size, measured in terms of final energy use. Note the  
 16 different elasticities of energy use with respect to changes in urban size rank. The factors (.5, 1.6, 6.1)  
 17 shown in the figure detail the increase of energy use when doubling the rank for the respective  
 18 groups. Source: (Grubler and Schulz, 2013).

### 19 *Mature versus Growing Cities*

20 The relative impacts of the four drivers on emissions differ depending upon whether urban areas are  
 21 established and mature versus growing and developing.

22 **Economic geography** and income have high impact for both mature and growing cities. Mature  
 23 cities in developed countries often have high income, high consumption and are net consumers of  
 24 goods and services, with a large share of imports. These cities have high emissions, depending upon  
 25 the energy supply mix. Many imported goods are produced in growing cities in developing  
 26 countries. The resulting differentiation within the international division of labour and corresponding  
 27 trade flows can be categorized into three types of cities: Net Producers, Trade Balanced, and Net  
 28 Consumers (Chavez and Ramaswami, 2013). As a result, differences in reported urban GHG  
 29 emissions are pronounced for Net Producer and Net Consumer cities, illustrating the critical  
 30 importance of taking economic geography and international trade into account when considering  
 31 urban GHG emission inventory frameworks. The degree to which economic growth drives GHG  
 32 emissions includes the type of economic specialization of urban activities and the energy supply mix

1 (Brownsword et al., 2005; Kennedy et al., 2012). Cities with energy intensive industries are likely to  
2 contribute higher total and per capita GHG emissions than those whose economic base is in the  
3 service sector (Dhakal, 2009, 2010). Specialization in energy-intensive sectors creates a strong  
4 correlation between economic growth and GHG emissions growth. This relationship is further  
5 strengthened if the energy supply mix is carbon intensive (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Sugar et al.,  
6 2012).

7 Higher **urban incomes** are correlated with higher consumption of energy and GHG emissions (Kahn,  
8 2009; Satterthwaite, 2009; Kennedy et al., 2009; Weisz and Steinberger, 2010; Zheng et al., 2010;  
9 Hoornweg et al., 2011; Marcotullio et al., 2012). At the household level, studies in a variety of  
10 different countries (Netherlands, India, Brazil, Denmark, Japan, and Australia) have also noted  
11 positive correlations between income and energy use (Vringer and Blok, 1995; Cohen et al., 2005;  
12 Lenzen et al., 2006; Pachauri and Jiang, 2008; Sahakian and Steinberger, 2011). As such, income  
13 exerts a *high* influence on GHG emissions. The Global Energy Assessment concluded that cities in  
14 non-Annex-I countries generally have much higher levels of energy use compared to the national  
15 average, in contrast to cities in Annex-I countries which generally have lower energy use per capita  
16 than national averages (see Figure 12.6 and Grubler et al., 2012). One reason for this inverse pattern  
17 is due to the significantly higher urban to rural income gradient in cities in non-Annex-I countries  
18 compared to Annex-I countries. That is, per capita incomes in non-Annex-I cities tend to be several  
19 fold higher than rural per capita incomes, thus leading to much higher energy use and resulting  
20 emissions.

21 **Socio-demographic** drivers are of *medium* importance in rapidly growing cities, further mediated as  
22 growth rates decline, incomes increase and lifestyle choices change. Social demographic drivers are  
23 of *relatively small* importance in mature cities, where growth is slow and populations are aging.  
24 Household size, defined as the number of persons in a household, has been steadily declining over  
25 the last fifty years. Worldwide, average household size declined from 3.6 to 2.7 between 1950 to  
26 1990, and this trend is occurring in both developed and developing countries although at different  
27 rates (MacKellar et al., 1995; Bongaarts, 2001). Smaller household size is correlated with higher per  
28 capita emissions, whereas larger household size can take advantage of economies of scale. Evidence  
29 on the relationship between urban population size and per capita emissions is inconclusive. Scale  
30 effects have been shown for cities in Asia (Marcotullio et al., 2012) but little to no scaling effect for  
31 GHG emissions in the U.S. (Fragkias et al., 2013).

32 **Infrastructure and urban form** are of *medium to high* importance as drivers of emissions. In rapidly  
33 growing cities, infrastructure is of high importance where the largest share of infrastructure  
34 construction is occurring. In mature cities, urban form drivers are of high importance as they set in  
35 place patterns of transport and other energy use behaviour. In mature cities, infrastructure is of  
36 medium importance, as they are largely established, and thus refurbishing or repurposing of old  
37 infrastructures offers primary mitigation opportunities. The global expansion of infrastructure used  
38 to support urbanisation is a key driver of emissions across multiple sectors. Due to the high capital  
39 costs, increasing returns, and network externalities related to infrastructures that provide  
40 fundamental services to cities, emissions associated with infrastructure systems are particularly  
41 prone to lock-in (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006; Unruh, 2002, 2000). The committed  
42 emissions from energy and transportation infrastructures are especially high, with respective ranges  
43 of committed CO<sub>2</sub> of 127-336 and 63-132 Gt (Davis et al., 2010). For example, the GHG emissions  
44 from primary production alone for new infrastructure development for non-Annex I countries are  
45 projected to be 350 Gt (Müller et al., 2013). For a detailed discussion see sections 12.4 and 12.5.

46 **Technology** is a driver of *high* importance. Income and scale exert important influences on the  
47 mitigation potential for technologies. While lock-in may limit the rate of mitigation in mature cities,  
48 the opportunity exists in rapidly growing cities to leapfrog to new technologies. For mature cities,  
49 technology is important due to agglomeration externalities, R&D and knowledge concentration, and  
50 access to capital that facilitate the development and early deployment of low-carbon technologies

1 (Grubler et al., 2012). For rapidly growing cities, the importance of technology as a driver may be low  
2 for systems with high capital requirements but high for less capital-intensive (e.g., some demand-  
3 side efficiency or distributed supply) systems. The influence of all drivers depends upon governance,  
4 institutions, and finance (section 12.6).

### 5 **12.3.2.2 Relative weighting of drivers for sectoral mitigation options**

6 Drivers affect GHG emissions via influence on energy demand (including demand management) in  
7 buildings (households and services), transport, and industry, as well as on energy supply, water, and  
8 waste systems. Over time, structural transitions change both the shares of emissions by sectors—  
9 with industrial, then services and transport shares of final energy increasing with development  
10 (Schäfer, 2005; Hofman, 2007)—as well as the relative importance of drivers. Economic geography  
11 has a large influence on emissions from the industry and service sectors (Ramaswami, 2013) plus  
12 international transport (bunkers fuels). These influences are particularly pronounced in urban  
13 agglomerations with very porous economies. For example Schulz (2010) analysed Singapore and  
14 found that GHG emission embodied in the imports and exports of the city are five to six times larger  
15 than the emissions from the direct primary energy use of the city's population. Similarly, Grubler et  
16 al. (2012) examine New York and London, which are global transportation hubs for international air  
17 travel and maritime commerce. As a result, international aviation and maritime fuels (bunker fuels)  
18 make up about one third of the total direct energy use of these cities, even if associated emissions  
19 are often excluded in inventories, following a practice also used in national GHG emission  
20 inventories (Macknick, 2011).

21 Income has a large influence on direct emissions due to energy use in buildings by influencing the  
22 floor area of residential dwellings, the amount of commercial floor space and services purchased,  
23 and buildings' energy intensities (see Table 9.2), and also on transport, including increasing vehicle  
24 ownership, activity, energy intensity and infrastructure (see Chapter 8.2). Income also has large  
25 indirect effects on emissions, for example influencing the number of products purchased (e.g.,  
26 increasing sales of electronics) (see Chapter 10.2) and their energy intensity (e.g., consumables like  
27 food) (see Chapter 11.4), perhaps produced by the industrial and services sectors somewhere else,  
28 and transported to the consumers (increasing freight transport activity).

29 Social demographic drivers have a large effect on emissions, particularly in buildings (e.g., number of  
30 households, persons per household (see Chapter 9.2.2)) and transport sectors (see Chapter 8.2.1).  
31 Infrastructure and urban form have a large impact on transport (Chapter 8.4) and medium impact on  
32 energy systems (grid layout and economics) (see Chapter 7.6). Technology has a large impact in all  
33 sectors. Income interacts with technology, increasing both innovative (e.g. R&D) and adoptive  
34 capacity (purchases and replacement rate of products, which in turn can increase energy efficiency).  
35 In demand sectors, mitigation from efficiency may be mediated by behaviours impacting  
36 consumption (e.g., more efficient yet larger televisions or refrigerators, or more efficient but larger  
37 or more powerful vehicles). See the sectoral Chapters 7–11 for further discussion of these issues.

### 38 **12.3.2.3 Quantitative modeling to determine driver weights**

39 An inherent difficulty in any assessment of emission drivers at the urban scale is that both mitigation  
40 options as well as policy levers are constrained by the legacy of past decisions as reflected in existing  
41 urban spatial structures and infrastructures, the built environment, and economic structures.  
42 Modelling studies that simulate alternative development strategies, even the entire evolution of a  
43 human settlement, or that explore the effects of policy integration across sectors can shed  
44 additional light on the relative weight of drivers as less constrained or entirely unconstrained by the  
45 existing status quo or by more limited sectoral assessment perspectives.

46 For instance, large-scale urban simulation models have been used to study the joint effects of policy  
47 integration such as pursuing smart-growth planning that restricts urban sprawl with market-based  
48 pricing mechanisms. One study of metropolitan regions in OECD countries concludes that policies



1 such as those that encourage higher urban densities and road tolls such as congestion charges have  
2 lower stabilisation costs than economy-wide approaches such as a carbon tax (Crassous et al., 2006;  
3 OECD, 2010a) . Models suggest that adding substantially upgraded urban services to the mix of  
4 bundled strategies yields even greater benefits. A meta-analysis of 14 urban simulations of scenarios  
5 with varying degrees of urban containment, road pricing, and transit services upgrades forecasted  
6 median transportation demand volumes (VKT, vehicle-kilometer-travelled) reductions of 3.9% within  
7 10 years, rising to 15.8% declines over 40 years (Rodier, 2009). Estimates from a review of published  
8 studies of U.S. cities forecasted a 5% to 12% VKT reduction from doubling residential densities and  
9 as high as 25% reductions when combined with other strategies, including road pricing (National  
10 Research Council, 2009a). GHG emissions were estimated to decline 11% from the most aggressive  
11 combination of densification and market-based pricing. The combination of introducing VKT charges,  
12 upgrading transit, and more compact development from simulation studies in Helsinki, Dortmund,  
13 Edinburgh, and Sacramento yielded simulation-model estimates of 14.5% reductions in VKT within  
14 10 years and 24.1% declines over 40 years (Rodier, 2009).


15 A more holistic modelling strategy with a much larger system boundary was followed with the  
16 Sincity model, a combined engineering-type systems-optimization model that integrates agent-  
17 based and spatially explicit modelling of urban form and density with transport and energy  
18 infrastructure planning to simulate the entire evolution of a “synthetic” city (Keirstead and Shah,  
19 2013; Steinberger and Weisz, 2013) or of large scale new urban developments (Hao et al., 2011).  
20 Using an illustrative European city of 20,000 inhabitants and with a service dominated economy (i.e.  
21 holding the economic geography and income variables constant), alternative urban designs were  
22 explored to separate out the various effects of different policy measures in determining urban  
23 energy use. The results suggest that compared to a baseline (sprawl city with current practice  
24 technologies), improvements by a factor of two each were possible by either a combination of  
25 energy efficiency measures for the urban building stock and the vehicle fleet, versus modifying  
26 urban form and density. Conversely energy systems optimization through cogeneration and  
27 distributed energy systems were found to yield improvements of between 15-30% (Keirstead and  
28 Shah, 2013; Steinberger and Weisz, 2013). The largest improvements of a factor of three were found  
29 through an integration of policy measures across all domains.

#### 30 **12.3.2.4 Conclusions on drivers of GHG emissions at the urban scale**

31 Perhaps the most significant conclusion emerging from Section 12.2 and above discussion of urban  
32 GHG emission drivers is the realization that the traditional distinction between Annex-I and non-  
33 Annex-I becomes increasingly blurred at the urban scale. There is an increasing number of cities,  
34 particularly in the rapidly growing economies of Asia, where per capita resource use, energy  
35 consumption, and associated GHG emissions are not different from the ones in developed  
36 economies. A second important conclusion is that economic geography and income by themselves  
37 are often such important drivers of urban GHG emissions that they dwarf the effects of technology  
38 choices or of place-based policy variables of urban form and infrastructures. However, the latter  
39 policy options are those for which urban-scale decision-making can make the *largest* impact on GHG  
40 emissions.

41 A more detailed discussion on the different leverage effects of urban scale policy options using the  
42 example of urban energy use is provided in the Global Energy Assessment, Chapter 18 (Grubler et  
43 al., 2012) which can be combined with above assessment on the relative weight of emission drivers  
44 to derive a categorization of urban policy intervention levels as a function of potential impacts on  
45 emissions as well as the degree to which policy interventions can be implemented by urban-scale  
46 decision making processes by local governments, firms, and individuals (Figure 12.11).

### Stylized Hierarchy of Urban Energy/GHG Drivers and Policy Leverages



**Figure 12.11.** Stylized hierarchy of drivers of urban GHG emissions and policy leverages by urban scale decision making. Cities have little control over some of the most important drivers of GHG emissions and have large control over comparatively smaller drivers of emissions. Source: synthesized from (Jaccard et al., 1997; Grubler et al., 2012) and this assessment.

The categorization in Figure 12.11 is necessarily stylized. It will vary across local contexts, but it helps to disentangle the impacts of macro- from micro-drivers. For instance, urban GHG emission levels will be strongly influenced by differences in urban function, such as the role of a city as a manufacturing centre for international markets, versus a city providing service functions to its regional or national hinterlands. Conversely, the emissions impact from smaller-scale decisions such as increasing local and urban-scale renewable energy flows—which has been assessed to be very limited, particularly for larger and more dense cities (Grubler et al., 2012)—is much smaller. The largest leverage on urban GHG emissions from urban scale decision-making thus is at the “meso” scale level of the energy/emissions and urban policy hierarchy: improving the efficiency of equipment used in a city, improving and integrating urban infrastructure, and shaping urban form towards low carbon pathways. Pursuing multiple strategies simultaneously at this scale may be most effective at reducing the urban-related emissions. This conclusion echoes concepts such as integrated community-energy-management strategies (Jaccard et al., 1997).

#### 12.3.3 Motivation for assessment of spatial planning, infrastructure, and urban form drivers

Urban form and infrastructure significantly affect direct (operational) and indirect (embodied) GHG emissions, and are strongly linked to the throughput of materials and energy in a city, the waste that it generates, and system efficiencies of a city. Mitigation options vary by city type and development levels. The options available for rapidly developing cities include shaping their urbanisation and infrastructure development trajectories. For mature, built-up cities, mitigation options lie in urban regeneration (compact, mixed-use development that shortens journeys, promotes transit/walking/cycling, adaptive reuse of buildings) and rehabilitation/conversion to energy-efficient building designs. Urban form and infrastructure are discussed in detail in Section 12.4. A combination of integrated sustainable infrastructure (12.4), spatial planning (12.5), and market-based and regulatory instruments (12.6) can increase efficiencies and reduce GHG emissions in already built-up cities and direct urban and infrastructure development to reduce the growth of GHG emissions in rapidly expanding cities in developing countries.

## 12.4 Urban Form and Infrastructure

Urban form and structure are the patterns and spatial arrangements of land use, transportation systems, and urban design elements, including the physical urban extent, layout of streets and buildings, as well as the internal configuration of settlements (Lynch, 1981; Handy, 1996). Infrastructure comprises services and built-up structures that support the functions and operations of cities, including transport infrastructure, water supply systems, sanitation and wastewater management, solid waste management, drainage and flood protection, telecommunications, and power generation and distribution. There is a strong connection between infrastructure and urban form (Kelly, 1993; Guy and Marvin, 1996), but the causal order is not fully resolved (Handy, 2005). Transport, energy, and water infrastructure are powerful instruments in shaping where urban development occurs and in what forms (Hall, 1993; Moss, 2003; Muller, 2004). The absence of basic infrastructure often—but not always—inhibits urban development.


This section assesses the literature on urban form and infrastructure drivers of GHG emissions, details what data exist, the ranges, effects on emissions, and their interplay with the drivers discussed in Section 12.3. Based on this, conclusions are drawn on the diversity of favourable urban forms and infrastructure highlighting caveats and conflicting goals. This literature is dominated by case studies of cities in developed countries. The literature on conditions in developing country cities, especially for large parts of Africa, is particularly limited. This assessment reflects this limitation in the literature.

### 12.4.1 Infrastructure

Infrastructure affects GHG emissions primarily during three phases in its lifecycle: 1) construction, 2) use/operation, and 3) end-of-life. The production of infrastructure materials such as concrete and metals is energy and carbon intensive (Cole, 1998; Horvath, 2004). For example, the manufacturing of steel and cement, two of the most common infrastructure materials, contributed to nearly 9% and 7%, respectively, of global carbon emissions in 2006 (Allwood et al., 2010). Globally, the carbon emissions embodied in built-up infrastructure as of 2008 was estimated to be 122 (–20/+15) Gt (Müller et al., 2013). Much of the research on the mitigation potential of infrastructure focuses on the use/operation phase and increasing the efficiency of the technology. Estimating emissions from urban infrastructure such as electricity grids and transportation networks is challenging because they often extend beyond a city's administrative boundaries (Ramaswami, Chavez, et al., 2012) (see Section 12.2 for detailed discussion). Several studies show that the transboundary emissions of infrastructure can be as large as or even larger than the direct GHG emissions within city boundaries (Ramaswami et al., 2008; Kennedy et al., 2009; Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2013). Thus, a full accounting of GHG emissions from urban infrastructure would need to include both primary and embodied energy of infrastructure materials, as well as energy from the use/operation phase and end-of-life, including reuse and recycling.

Rates of infrastructure construction in mature versus rapidly developing cities lead to fundamentally different impacts on GHG emissions. Infrastructure growth is hypothesized to follow an S-shaped curve starting with an early development phase, continuing with a rapid growth and expansion phase, and ending with a saturation phase (Ausubel and Herman, 1988). The build-up of infrastructure that occurs during early phases of urbanisation is particularly emissions intensive. Currently, the average per capita emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized countries is 53 (±6) t CO<sub>2</sub> (see Figure 12.12) which is more than five times larger than that in developing countries (10 (±1) t CO<sub>2</sub>) (Müller et al., 2013). While there have been energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sector, especially steel and cement production, the scale and pace of urbanisation can outstrip efficiency gains and lead to continued growth in emissions (Levine and Aden, 2008; Güneralp and Seto, 2012). China accounts for roughly 37% of the global emissions commitments in part due to its large-scale urbanisation—the United States adds 15%; Europe 15%,

1 and Japan 4%, together representing 71% of total global emissions commitments by 2060 (Davis et  
 2 al., 2010).  
 3 Emissions related to infrastructure growth are therefore tied to existing urban energy systems,  
 4 investment decisions, and regulatory policies that shape the process of urban growth. The effects of  
 5 these decisions are difficult to reverse: high fixed costs, increasing returns, and network externalities  
 6 make emissions intensive infrastructure systems particularly prone to lock-in (Unruh and Carrillo-  
 7 Herмосilla, 2006; Unruh, 2002, 2000). Furthermore, the long lifespan of infrastructure affects the  
 8 turnover rate of the capital stock, which can limit the speed at which emissions in the use/operation  
 9 phase can be reduced (Jaccard and Rivers, 2007).




10  
 11 **Figure 12.12.** (A) Total fuel-related per-capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by country (red and gray bars)  
 12 compared to the global per-capita emission level in 2050 to reach the 2 °C target with a 50–75%  
 13 probability; (B) CRV(P2008) per capita of existing stocks by country (red and gray) and as yet unbuilt  
 14 stocks if developing countries converge on the current average Annex I level (light blue); (C)  
 15 comparison with emission budget for the period 2000–2050 to reach the 2 °C target with a 75%  
 16 probability. Of this emission budget (1000 Gt), approximately 420 Gt was already emitted during the  
 17 period from 2000 to 2011. Source: (Müller et al., 2013).  
 18

19 The build-up of infrastructure in developing countries as part of the massive urbanisation currently  
 20 underway will result in significant future emissions. Under one scenario, if the global population  
 21 increases to 9.3 billion by 2050 and developing countries expand their built environment and  
 22 infrastructure to the current global average levels using available technology today, the production  
 23 of infrastructure materials alone would generate approximately 470 Gt of emissions (see Figure  
 24 12.12). This underscores that the production of infrastructure materials such as concrete and metals  
 25 rely heavily on fossil-fuel combustion, which is predicted to contribute 496 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> between 2010  
 26 and 2060 (from a range of 282 to 701 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub>) (Cole, 1998; Horvath, 2004; Allwood et al., 2010;  
 27 Davis et al., 2010). The continued expansion of infrastructure would produce cumulative emissions

1 of 3000 to 7400 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> from now through the end of this century, which would lead to  
 2 atmospheric concentrations greater than 600 ppm (Davis et al., 2010).

3 The links between infrastructure and urban form are well established, especially among  
 4 transportation infrastructure provision, travel demand and VKT. In developing countries in  
 5 particular, the growth of transport infrastructure and resulting urban forms are playing important  
 6 roles in affecting long-run emissions trajectories (See Chapter 8). The committed emissions from  
 7 existing energy and transportation infrastructure are high, with ranges of CO<sub>2</sub> of 127-336 and 63-132  
 8 Gt, respectively (see Figure 12.13 and Davis et al., 2010). Transport infrastructure affects travel  
 9 demand and emissions in the short-run by reducing the time cost of travel, and in the long-run by  
 10 shaping land-use patterns (Vickrey, 1969; Downs, 2004). Development of transport infrastructure  
 11 tends to promote “sprawl”, characterized by low-density, auto-dependent, and separated land uses  
 12 (Brueckner, 2000; Ewing et al., 2003). Consistent evidence of short-run effects show that the  
 13 demand elasticities range between 0.1-0.2. That is, a doubling of transport infrastructure capacity  
 14 increases VKT by 10-20% in the short-run (Goodwin, 1996; Hymel et al., 2010). Other studies suggest  
 15 larger short-run elasticities of 0.59 (Cervero and Hansen, 2002) and a range of 0.3-0.9 (Noland and  
 16 Lem, 2002). Differences in short-run elasticities reflect fundamental differences in the  
 17 methodologies underlying the studies (see Chapter 15.4 on policy evaluation). In the long-run, the  
 18 elasticities of VKT with respect to road capacity are likely to be in the range 0.8-1.0 as land-use  
 19 patterns adjust (Hansen and Huang, 1997; Noland, 2001; Duranton and Turner, 2011). While the  
 20 links between transport infrastructure, urban form, and VKT are well studied, there are few studies  
 21 that extend the analysis to estimate emissions due to transport-induced increases in VKT. One  
 22 exception is a study that concludes that freezing U.S. highway capacity at 1996 levels would reduce  
 23 emissions by 43 MMT Cyr<sup>-1</sup> by 2012, compared to continuing construction at historical rates  
 24 (Noland, 2001).



26  
 27 **Figure 12.13.** Scenario of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from existing energy and transportation infrastructure by  
 28 industry sector (A) and country/region (B). Source: (Davis et al., 2010).

### 29 12.4.2 Urban form

30 Urban form can be characterized using four key metrics: density, land use mix, connectivity, and  
 31 accessibility. These dimensions are not independent from one another. Rather, they measure  
 32 different aspects of urban form and structure, and each dimension impacts greenhouse gas  
 33 emissions differently (Figure 12.14). The urban form drivers of GHG emissions do not work in  
 34 isolation.


35 Impacts of changes in urban form on travel behaviour are commonly estimated using elasticities,  
 36 which measure the effect of a 1% change in an urban form metric on the percent change in vehicle  
 37 kilometres travelled (see Chapter 15.4 on policy evaluation). This allows for a comparison of  
 38 magnitudes across different factors and metrics. A large share of the existing evidence is limited to



1 studies of North American cities. Moreover, much of this work is focused on larger cities (see  
 2 National Research Council, 2009b for an extensive discussion of methodological considerations).

3 **12.4.2.1 Density**

4 Urban density is the measure of an urban unit of interest (e.g., population, employment, and  
 5 housing) per area unit (e.g., block, neighbourhood, city, metro area, and nation) (Figure 12.14).  
 6 There are many measures of density, and three common measures are population density (i.e.,  
 7 population per unit area), built-up area density (i.e., buildings or urban land cover per unit area), and  
 8 employment density (i.e., jobs per unit area) (see (Boyko and Cooper, 2011) for a comprehensive  
 9 review on density measures). Urban density affects GHG emissions in two primary ways. First,  
 10 separated and low densities of employment, commerce, and housing increase the average travel  
 11 distances for both work and shopping trips (L. D. Frank and Pivo, 1994; Cervero and Kockelman,  
 12 1997; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Brownstone and Golob, 2009). These longer travel distances  
 13 translate into higher VKT and emissions. Conversely, higher population densities, especially when co-  
 14 located with high employment densities are strongly correlated with lower GHG emissions  
 15 (Lawrence D. Frank and Pivo, 1994; Kenworthy and Laube, 1999; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Clark,  
 16 2013). In the U.S., households located in relatively low density areas (0-50 households per square  
 17 mile) produce twice as much GHG emissions as households located in relatively high density areas  
 18 (5,000 -9,999 households per square mile) (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009).




19  
 20 **Figure 12.14.** Four key aspects of urban form and structure (density, land use mix, connectivity, and  
 21 accessibility), their VKT elasticities, commonly used metrics, and stylised graphics.

22 Sources: Density (Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pickrell and Schimek, 1999; Ewing and Cervero, 2001,  
 23 2010; Boarnet and Crane, 2001; Holtzclaw et al., 2002; Bhatia, 2004; Bento et al., 2005; Zhou and Kockelman,  
 24 2008; Fang, 2008; Kuzmyak, 2009; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Heres-Del-Valle and Niemeier, 2011); Land  
 25 Use (Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010; Chapman and Frank, 2004; Frank and  
 26 Engelke, 2005; Vance and Hedel, 2007; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Kuzmyak, 2009; Frank et al., 2009);  
 27 Connectivity (Boarnet and Crane, 2001; Chapman and Frank, 2004; Frank and Engelke, 2005; Ewing et al.,  
 28 2008; Frank et al., 2009; Ewing and Cervero, 2010); Accessibility (Goodwin, 1996; Kockelman, 1997; Cervero  
 29 and Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pushkar et al., 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Næss, 2005; Cervero  
 30 and Duncan, 2006; Kuzmyak, 2009; Frank et al., 2009; Zegras, 2010; Hymel et al., 2010)

1 Second, low densities make it difficult to switch over to less energy intensive and alternative modes  
2 of transportation such as public transportation, walking, and cycling because the transit demand is  
3 both too dispersed and too low (Bunting et al., 2002; Saelens et al., 2003; Forsyth et al., 2007). In  
4 contrast, higher population densities at places of origin (e.g., home) and destination (e.g., work,  
5 shopping) concentrate demand that is necessary for mass transit alternatives. The density thresholds  
6 required for successful transit are not absolute, and vary by type of transit (e.g., bus, light rail,  
7 metro), their frequency, and characteristics specific to each city. One of the most comprehensive  
8 studies of density and emission estimates that a doubling of residential densities in the U.S. can  
9 reduce VKT by 5-12% in the short run, and if coupled with mixed land use, higher employment  
10 densities, and improvements in transit, can reduce VKT as much as 25% over the long run (National  
11 Research Council, 2009a). Urban density is thus a necessary—but not a sufficient—condition for low-  
12 carbon cities.

13 Comparable and consistent estimates of urban densities and changes in urban densities are difficult  
14 to obtain in part because of different methodologies to calculate density. However, multiple studies  
15 using multiple lines of evidence including satellite data (Deng et al., 2008; Angel et al., 2010, 2011;  
16 Seto et al., 2011) and economic and census data (Burchfield et al., 2006) show that both population  
17 and built-up densities are declining across all regions around the world (see Section 12.2 for details).  
18 Although there is substantial variation in magnitudes and rates of density decline across income  
19 groups, city sizes, and regions, the overarching trend is a persistent decline in densities (Angel et al.,  
20 2010). Although the dominant trend is declining density, there are some exceptions. Analyses of 100  
21 large cities worldwide using a microwave scatterometer show significant vertical expansion of built-  
22 up areas in East Asian cities, notably those in China (see Figure 12.15 and Frohking et al., 2013).

23 A common misconception about density is that it can only be achieved through high-rise buildings  
24 configured in close proximity. However, the same level of density can be achieved through multiple  
25 land use configurations (Figure 12.16). Population density is strongly correlated with built density,  
26 but high population density does not necessarily imply high-rise buildings (Cheng, 2009; Salat, 2011).




1  
2 **Figure 12.15.** Changes in Urban Structure, 1999-2009 using backscatter (PR) and nighttime lights  
3 (NL). Panels a–l show changes in vertical structure of major urban areas as characterised by (PR)  
4 and horizontal growth as measured by NL for 12 large cities. Coloured arrows represent non-water,  
5  $0.05^\circ$  cells in an  $11 \times 11$  grid around each city's centre; tail and head are at 1999 and 2009 coordinates  
6 of cell PR and NL, respectively. Arrow colour corresponds to percent urban cover circa 2001 (see  
7 legend in panel n). Source: (Frolking et al., 2013).  
8

9 Medium-rise (less than seven floors) urban areas with a high building footprint ratio can have a  
10 higher built density than high-rise urban areas with a low building footprint. These different  
11 configurations of high-density development involve important energy trade-offs. Often, high-rise,  
12 high-density urban areas involve a trade-off between building height and spacing between buildings  
13 – higher buildings have to be more spaced out to allow light penetration. High-rise buildings imply




1 higher energy costs in terms of vertical transport and also in heating, cooling, and lighting due to low  
 2 passive volume ratios (Ratti et al., 2005; Salat, 2009). Medium-rise, high-density urban areas can  
 3 achieve similar levels of density as high-rise, high density developments but require less materials  
 4 and embodied energy (Picken and Ilozor, 2003; Blackman and Picken, 2010). Their building operating  
 5 energy levels are lower due to high passive volume ratio (Ratti et al., 2005; Salat, 2009). Single  
 6 storey, free-standing housing units are more GHG emissions intensive than multi-family, semi-  
 7 detached buildings (Myors et al., 2005; Perkins et al., 2009). Thus, while the effect of building type  
 8 on energy use may be relatively small, the combination of dwelling type, design, location and  
 9 orientation together can generate significant energy savings (Rickwood et al., 2008).



10  
 11 **Figure 12.16.** Same densities in three different layouts: a) low-rise single-story homes; b) multi-story  
 12 medium-rise; high-rise towers. Adapted from (Cheng, 2009).

### 13 **12.4.2.2 Land use mix**

14 Land use mix refers to the diversity and integration of land uses (e.g., residential, park, commercial)  
 15 at a given scale (Figure 12.17). As with density, there are multiple measures of land use mix,  
 16 including: 1) the ratio of jobs to residents; 2) the variety and mixture of amenities and activities; and  
 17 3) the relative proportion of retail and housing. Historically, the separation of land uses, especially of  
 18 residential from other uses, was motivated by the noxious uses and pollution of the industrial city.  
 19 However, as cities transition from industrial to service economies, resulting in a simultaneous  
 20 reduction in air pollution and other nuisances, the rationale for such separation of land uses  
 21 diminishes.



22  
 23 **Figure 12.17.** Three different land use mixes (Manaugh and Kreider, 2013).  
 24

25 In general, when land uses are separated, the distance between origin (e.g., homes) and destination  
 26 (e.g., jobs or retail) will be longer (Kockelman, 1997). Hence, diverse and mixed land uses can reduce  
 27 travel distances and enable both walking and the use of non-motorised modes of travel (Kockelman,  
 28 1997; Permana et al., 2008), thereby reducing aggregate amounts of vehicular movement and  
 29 associated greenhouse gas emissions (Lipper et al., 2010). Several meta-analyses estimate the  
 30 elasticity of land use mix related VKT from -0.02 to -0.10 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et al.,  
 31 2012) while simultaneously increasing walking. The average elasticity between walking and diversity  
 32 of land uses is reported to be between 0.15-0.25 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010). The effects of mixed  
 33 land use on VKT and GHG emissions can be applied at three spatial scales; city-regional, neighbourhood,  
 34 and block.

35 At the city-scale, a high degree of land use mix can result in significant reductions in VKT by  
 36 increasing the proximity of housing to office developments, business districts, shops, and malls  
 37 (Cervero and Duncan, 2006). In service-economy cities with effective air pollution controls, mixed  
 38 land use can also have a beneficial impact on citizen health and well-being by enabling walking and  
 39 cycling (Saelens et al., 2003; Heath et al., 2006; Sallis et al., 2009). For cities with lower mixed land

1 use, such as often found in North American cities and in many new urban developments in Asia,  
2 large residential developments are separated from jobs or retail centres by long distances. A  
3 number of studies of such single-use zoning show strong tendencies for residents to travel longer  
4 overall distances and to carry out a higher proportion of their travel in private vehicles than  
5 residents who live in mixed land use areas in cities (Mogridge, 1985; Fouchier, 1998; Næss, 2005;  
6 Zhou and Kockelman, 2008).

7 Mixed use at the neighbourhood scale refers to a “smart” mix of residential buildings, offices, shops,  
8 and urban amenities (Bourdic et al., 2012). Similar to the city-scale case, such mixed uses can  
9 decrease average travel distances (McCormack et al., 2001). However, on the neighbourhood scale,  
10 the reduced travel is primarily related to non-work trips, e.g. for shopping, services, leisure.  
11 Research on U.S. cities indicates that the presence of shops and workplaces near residential areas is  
12 associated with relatively low vehicle ownership rates (Cervero and Duncan, 2006), and can have a  
13 positive impact on transportation patterns (Ewing and Cervero, 2010). The impacts of mixed use on  
14 non-motorized commuting such as cycling and walking and the presence or absence of  
15 neighbourhood shops can be even more important than urban density (Cervero, 1996).

16 At the block and building scale, mixed use allows space for small-scale businesses, offices,  
17 workshops, and studios that are intermixed with housing and live-work spaces. Areas with a high mix  
18 of land uses encourages a mix of residential and retail activity and thus increases the area’s vitality,  
19 aesthetic interest, and neighbourhood (Hoppenbrouwer and Louw, 2005).

#### 20 **12.4.2.3 Connectivity**

21 Connectivity refers to street density and design. Common measures of connectivity include  
22 intersection density or proportion, block size, or intersections per road kilometer (Cervero and  
23 Kockelman, 1997; Pushkar et al., 2000; Chapman and Frank, 2004; Lee and Moudon, 2006; Fan,  
24 2007). Where street connectivity is high—characterized by finer grain systems with smaller blocks  
25 that allow frequent changes in direction—there is typically a positive correlation with walking and  
26 thereby lower GHG emissions. There are a number of reasons for this: distances tend to be shorter  
27 and the system of small blocks promotes convenience and walking (Gehl, 2010).

28 Improving connectivity in areas where it is low (and thus associated with higher GHG emissions)  
29 requires varying amounts of street reconstruction. Many street features, such as street size, four-  
30 way intersections or intersection design, sidewalk width, the number of traffic lanes (or street width)  
31 and street medians are designed at the time of the construction of the city. As the infrastructure  
32 already exists, increasing connectivity requires investment either to redevelop the site or to retrofit  
33 it to facilitate walking and biking. In larger redevelopment projects, street patterns may be  
34 redesigned for smaller blocks with high connectivity. Alternatively, retrofitting often involves  
35 widening sidewalks, constructing medians, and adding bike lanes, as well as reducing traffic speeds,  
36 improving traffic signals, and providing parking for bikes (McCann and Rynne, 2010). Other features,  
37 such as street furniture (benches and transit stops and shelters), street trees, traffic signals, can be  
38 added after the initial design, without much disruption or large costs.

39 Systematic reviews show that transport network connectivity has a larger impact on VKT than  
40 density or land use mix, between -0.06 and -0.26 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012). For  
41 North American cities, the elasticity of walking with respect to sidewalk coverage or length is  
42 between 0.09 to 0.27 (Salon et al., 2012). There are typically higher elasticities in other OECD  
43 countries than in the U.S.

#### 44 **12.4.2.4 Accessibility**

45 Accessibility can be defined as access to jobs, housing, services, shopping, and in general, to people  
46 and places in cities (Hansen, 1959; Ingram, 1971; Wachs and Kumagai, 1973). It can be viewed as a  
47 combination of proximity and travel time, and is closely related to land use mix. Common measures  
48 of accessibility include population centrality, job accessibility by auto or transit, distance to the city

1 centre or central business district (CBD), and retail accessibility. Meta-analyses show that VKT  
2 reduction is most strongly related to high accessibility to job destinations (Ewing and Cervero, 2001,  
3 2010). Highly accessible communities (e.g. compact cities in Europe such as Copenhagen) are  
4 typically characterized by low daily commuting distances and travel times, enabled by multiple  
5 modes of transportation (Næss, 2006). In a rapidly motorising city of Santiago de Chile, proximity to  
6 the central business district as well as metro stations has a relatively strong association with VKT  
7 (Zegras, 2010). Measures to increase accessibility that are accompanied by innovative technologies  
8 and alternative energies can reduce VKT and associated GHG emissions in the cities of both  
9 developed and developing countries (Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1998; Axhausen, 2008; Hankey and  
10 Marshall, 2010; Banister, 2011). However, it should be noted that at least one study has shown that  
11 in cities where motorization is already mature, changing accessibility no longer influences  
12 automobile-dependent lifestyles and travel behaviours (Kitamura et al., 2001).

13 Countries and regions undergoing early stages of urbanisation may therefore have a unique  
14 potential to influence accessibility, particularly in cases where income levels, infrastructure and  
15 motorization trends are rapidly changing (Kumar, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Perkins et al., 2009; Reilly  
16 et al., 2009; Zegras, 2010; Hou and Li, 2011; Adeyinka, 2013). In Shanghai, China, new transportation  
17 projects have influenced job accessibility and have thereby reduced commute times (Cervero and  
18 Day, 2008). In Chennai, India, differences in accessibility to the city centre between low-income  
19 communities have been shown to strongly affect transport mode choice and trip frequency  
20 (Srinivasan and Rogers, 2005). In a rapidly motorizing city of Santiago de Chile, proximity to the  
21 central business district as well as metro stations has a relatively strong association with VKT (Zegras,  
22 2010). The typical elasticity between job accessibility and VKT across North American cities ranges  
23 from -0.10 to -0.30 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012).

#### 24 **12.4.2.5 Effects of combined options**

25 While individual measures of urban form have relatively small effects on vehicle miles travelled, they  
26 become more effective when combined. For example, there is consistent evidence that the  
27 combination of co-location of increased population and job densities, substantial investments in  
28 public transit, higher mix of land uses, and transportation or mobility demand management  
29 strategies can reduce VKT and travel-related carbon emissions (National Research Council, 2009a;  
30 Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012). The spatial concentration of population, coupled with  
31 jobs-housing balance have a significant impact VKT by households. At the same time, urban form  
32 and the density of transportation networks also affect VKT (Bento et al., 2005). The elasticity of VKT  
33 with respect to each of these factors is relatively small, between 0.10 and 0.20 in absolute value.  
34 However, changing several measures of form simultaneously can reduce annual VKT significantly.  
35 Moving the sample households from a city with the characteristics of a low-density, automobile-  
36 centric city to a city with high public transit, connectivity, and mixed land use reduced annual VKT by  
37 25%. While in practice such change is highly unlikely in a mature city, it may be more relevant when  
38 considering cities at earlier stages of development.

39 A growing body of literature shows that traditional neighbourhood designs are associated with  
40 reduced travel and resource conservation (Krizek, 2003; Ewing and Cervero, 2010). A U.S. study  
41 found those living in neo-traditional neighbourhoods made as many daily trips as those in low-  
42 density, single-family suburban neighbourhoods, however the switch from driving to walking and the  
43 shortening of trip distances resulted in a 20% less VKT per household (Khattak and Rodriguez, 2005).  
44 Empirical research shows that the design of streets have even stronger influences than urban  
45 densities on incidences of walking and reduced motorized travel in traditional neighbourhoods of  
46 Bogota, Tehran, Taipei, and Hong Kong (Zhang, 2004; Cervero et al., 2009; Lin and Yang, 2009; Lotfi  
47 and Koohsari, 2011). A study in Jinan, China, found the energy use of residents living in mixed-use  
48 and grid street enclaves to be one-third that of similar households in superblock, single-use  
49 developments (Calthorpe, 2013).

## 12.5 Spatial Planning and Climate Change Mitigation

Spatial planning is a broad term that describes systematic and coordinated efforts to manage urban and regional growth in ways that promote well-defined societal objectives such as land conservation, economic development, carbon sequestration, and social justice. Growth management is a similar idea, aimed at guiding “the location, quality, and timing of development” (Porter, 1997) to minimize “sprawl” (Nelson and Duncan, 1995), which is characterized by low density, non-contiguous, automobile-dependent development that prematurely or excessively consumes farmland, natural preserves, and other valued resources (Ewing, 1997).

This section reviews the range of spatial planning strategies that may reduce emissions through impacts on most if not all of the elements of urban form and infrastructure reviewed in section 12.4. It begins with an assessment of key spatial planning strategies that can be implemented at the macro, meso, and micro geographic scales. It then assesses the range of regulatory, land use, and market-based policy instruments that can be employed to achieve these strategic objectives. Given evidence of the increased emissions reduction potential associated with affecting the collective set of spatial factors driving emissions (see Section 12.4), emphasis is placed on assessing the efficacy of strategies or bundles that simultaneously impact multiple spatial outcomes (See Chapter 15.4 and 15.5 on policy evaluation and assessment).

The strategies discussed below aim to reduce sprawl and automobile dependence—and thus energy consumption, VKT, and GHG emissions—to varying degrees. Evidence on the energy and emission reduction benefits of these strategies comes mainly from case studies in the developed world even though their greatest potential for reducing future emissions lies in developing countries undergoing early stages of urbanisation. The existing evidence highlights the importance of an integrated infrastructure development framework that combines analysis of mitigation reduction potentials alongside the long-term public provision of services.

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### Box 12.3. Urban Expansion: Drivers, Markets, and Policies

While the literature that examines the impacts of changes in urban spatial structure and infrastructure on urban GHG emissions is sparse, there is a well-established body of literature that discusses the drivers of urban development, and policies that aim to alter its pace and shape.

- **Drivers of Urban Expansion** – The drivers of urban development can be broadly defined into the following categories: *Economic Geography, Income, Technology* (see 12.3.1), as well as *Market Failures* (see Chapter 15), and *Pre-Existing Conditions*, which are structured by *Policies and Regulations* (see 12.5.2) that in turn shape *Urban Form and Infrastructure* (see 12.4 and Box 12.4).
- **Primary drivers** of urban spatial expansion unfold under the influence of economic conditions and the functioning of markets. These are however strongly affected by:
- **Market Failures** and **Pre-Existing Policies and Regulations** that can exacerbate or alleviate the effect of the primary drivers on urban growth. **Market Failures** are the result of individuals and firms ignoring the external costs and benefits they impose on others when making economic decisions (see Chapter 15). These include:
  - Failure to account for the social costs of GHG (and local) emissions that result from production and consumption activities in cities.
  - Failure to account for the social costs of traffic congestion (see Chapter 8).
  - Failure to assign property rights and titles for land.

- 1           ○ Failure to account for the social benefits of spatial amenities and mix land uses (see
- 2           12.5.2.3).
- 3           ○ Failure to account for the social benefits of agglomeration that result from the
- 4           interactions of individuals and firms in cities.
- 5       • Although not precisely quantified in the literature, by altering the location of individuals and
- 6       firms in space (and resulting travelling patterns and consumption of space), these market
- 7       failures can lead to excessive growth (see Box 12.4).
- 8       • For each failure, there is a policy solution, either in the form of regulations or market-based
- 9       instruments (see 12.5.2)
- 10      • ***Pre-Existing Policies and Regulations*** can also lead to excessive growth. These include:
- 11           ○ **Hidden Pre-Existing Subsidies** – including the failure to charge new development for the
- 12           infrastructure costs it generates (see 12.5.3 and Box 12.4).
- 13           ○ **Excessive Pre-Existing Policies and Regulations** - including zoning, building codes,
- 14           ordinances, and property taxes that can distort real estate markets (see 12.5.2 and Box
- 15           12.4).

16

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## 17 **12.5.1 Spatial Planning Strategies**

18 Spatial planning occurs at multiple geographic scales: (1) Macro – regions and metropolitan areas;

19 (2) Meso – sub-regions, districts, and corridors; and (3) Micro – neighbourhoods, streets, blocks. At

20 each scale, some form of comprehensive land-use and transportation planning provides a different

21 opportunity to envision and articulate future settlement patterns, backed by zoning ordinances,

22 subdivision regulations, and capital improvements programs to implement the vision (Hack et al.,

23 2009). Plans at each scale must also be harmonized and integrated to maximize effectiveness and

24 efficiency (Hoch et al., 2000). Different strategy bundles invite different policy tools, adapted to the

25 unique political, institutional, and cultural landscapes of cities in which they are applied (see Table

26 12.5). Successful implementation requires that there be in place the institutional capacity and

27 political wherewithal to align the right policy instruments to specific spatial planning strategies.

### 28 **12.5.1.1 Macro: Regions and metropolitan areas**

29 Macro-scale strategies are regional in nature, corresponding to the territories of many economic

30 transactions (e.g., laboursheds and tradesheds) and from where natural resources are drawn (water

31 tributaries) or externalities are experienced (air basins).

32 **1. Regional Plan.** A regional plan shows where and when different types of development are

33 allowed, and where and when they are not. In polycentric plans, sub-centres often serve as building

34 blocks for designing regional rail-transit networks (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2001). Scale is a particularly

35 important determinant of success. Regional strategies can minimize environmental spillovers and

36 economize on large-scale infrastructure investments (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2001; Seltzer and

37 Carbonell, 2011). Polycentric metropolises like Singapore, Tokyo, and Paris have successfully linked

38 sub-centres with high-quality, synchronized metro-rail and feeder bus services (Cervero, 1998;

39 Gakenheimer, 2011). Spatial plans might be defined less in terms of a specific urban-form vision and

40 more with regard to core development principles. In its “Accessible Ahmedabad” plan, the city of

41 Ahmedabad, India, embraced the principle of creating a city designed for accessibility rather than

42 mobility, without specific details on the siting of new growth (Suzuki et al., 2013).

1 **2. Urban containment.** Urban containment encourages cities and their peripheries to grow inwards  
2 and upwards, not outwards (Pendall et al., 2002). They can also contribute to climate change  
3 mitigation by creating more compact, less car-oriented built form as well as by preserving the carbon  
4 sequestration capacity of natural and agricultural areas in the surrounding areas (Daniels, 1998).  
5 The impact of development restrictions is uncertain and varies with the geographic and regulatory  
6 context (Pendall, 1999; Dawkins and Nelson, 2002; Han et al., 2009; Woo and Guldmann, 2011). In  
7 the U.S., regional measures such as the Portland urban growth boundary have been more effective  
8 at containing development than local initiatives (DeGrove and Mines, 1992; Nelson and Moore,  
9 1993; Boyle and Mohamed, 2007). In the UK, urban containment policies may have pushed growth  
10 to leapfrog the greenbelt to more distant locations and increased car commuting (Amati, 2008). In  
11 Seoul and in Swiss municipalities, greenbelts have densified the core city but made the metropolitan  
12 area as a whole less compact; in Seoul, commuting distances also increased by 5% (Jun and Bae,  
13 2000; Bae and Jun, 2003; Bengston and Youn, 2006; Gennaio et al., 2009).

14 **3. Regional jobs-housing balance.** Separation of workers from job sites creates long-haul  
15 commutes and thus worsens traffic and environmental conditions (Cervero, 1996). Jobs-housing  
16 imbalances are often a product of insufficient housing in jobs-rich cities and districts (Boarnet and  
17 Crane, 2001; Wilson, 2009; Pendall et al., 2012). One view holds that the market will eventually  
18 work around such problems—developers will build more housing near jobs because more profit can  
19 be made from such housing (Gordon et al., 1991; Downs, 2004). There is evidence of co-location in  
20 U.S. cities like Boston and Atlanta (Weitz, 2003). Even in the developing world, co-location occurs as  
21 a means to economize on travel, such as the peri-urban zones of Dar es Salaam and Lagos where  
22 infill and densification, often in the form of informal settlements and shantytowns, occurs in lieu of  
23 extended growth along peripheral radial roads (Pirie, 2011).

24 Research on balanced growth strategies provides mixed signals on mobility and environmental  
25 impacts. Studies of Atlanta estimate that jobs-housing balance can reduce traffic congestion,  
26 emissions, and related externalities (Weitz, 2003; Horner and Murray, 2003). In the San Francisco  
27 Bay Area, jobs-housing balance has reduced travel more than intermixing housing and retail  
28 development (Cervero and Duncan, 2006). Other studies, however, suggest that jobs-housing  
29 balance has little impact on travel and traffic congestion since many factors besides commuting  
30 condition residential location choices (Levine, 1998).

31 Self-contained, “complete” communities—wherein the jobs, retail commodities and services needed  
32 by workers and households exist within a community—is another form of balanced growth. Many  
33 master-planned new towns in the U.S., France, South Korea, and the UK were designed as self-  
34 contained communities however their physical isolation and economic dependence on major urban  
35 centres resulted in high levels of external motorized travel (Cervero, 1995b; Hall, 1996). How new  
36 towns are designed and the kinds of transport infrastructure built, experiences show, have strongly  
37 influenced travel and environmental outcomes (Potter, 1984). In the UK, new towns designed for  
38 good transit access (e.g., Runcorn and Redditch) averaged far higher transit ridership and less VKT  
39 per capita than low-density, auto-oriented ones like Milton Keynes and Washington (Dupree, 1987).

40 Telecommunities are a more contemporary version of self-contained communities, combining  
41 information and communication technologies (ICTs) with traditional neighbourhood designs in  
42 remote communities on the edges of cities like Washington, DC and Seattle (Slabbert, 2005;  
43 Aguilera, 2008). Until such initiatives scale up, their contributions to VKT and GHG reductions will  
44 likely remain miniscule (Choo et al., 2005; Andreev et al., 2010; Mans et al., 2012).



1 **Table 12.5.** Matching Spatial Planning Strategies and Policy Instruments. Summary of the types of policy instruments that can be applied to different spatial  
 2 planning strategies carried out at different geographic scales. Unless otherwise noted, references can be found in the relevant chapter sections.  
 3 Additional sources referenced in table: 1(Nelson, 1992; Alterman, 1997), 2(Sagalyn, 2007; Yescombe, 2007),3(Hagman and Misczynski, 1978; Bauman and Ethier, 1987), 4(Rolon, 2008), 5(Dye  
 4 and Sundberg, 1998; Dye and Merriman, 2000; Brueckner, 2001b),6(Sælensminde, 2004; McAndrews et al., 2010), 7(Rolon, 2008), 8(Brambilla and Longo, 1977).

SPATIAL STRATEGY	POLICY INSTRUMENTS/IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS					
	Government Regulations		Government Incentives		Market-Based Strategies	
	Land Regulation/Zoning (see 12.5.2.1)	Taxation/Finance Strategies (see 12.5.2.3)	Land Management (see 12.5.2.2)	Targeted Infrastructure/Services (see 12.5.1)	Pricing (see 12.5.2.3)	Public Private Partnerships (see 12.5.2.3)
<b>Metropolitan/Regional</b>						
Urban containment	Development restrictions; UGBs	Sprawl taxes	Urban Service Boundaries	Park improvements; trail improvements		
Balanced growth	Affordable housing mandates	Tax-bases sharing	Extraterritorial zoning		Farm Tax Credits <sup>1</sup>	
Self-contained communities/ new towns	Mixed-use zoning		Greenbelts	Utilities; urban services		Joint ventures <sup>2</sup>
<b>Corridor/District</b>						
Corridor growth management	Zoning	Impact fees; Exactions <sup>3</sup>		Service Districts <sup>4</sup>		
Transit-oriented corridors	Transfer development rights			Urban rail; Bus rapid transit investments		Joint Powers Authorities
<b>Neighbourhood/Community</b>						
Urban Regeneration/Infill	Mix-use zoning/small lot designations	Split-Rate Property Taxes; Tax increment finance <sup>5</sup>	Redevelopment districts	Highway conversions; Context-sensitive design standards	Congestion charges (see Ch. 8)	
Traditional Neighbourhood Designs; New urbanism	Zoning overlays; form-based codes			Sidewalks; cycle tracks; bike stations <sup>6</sup>		
Transit oriented Development	Design codes; flexible parking	Impact Fees; Betterment Taxes <sup>7</sup>		Station siting; station access		Joint development <sup>2</sup>
Eco-Communities	Mixed-use zoning			District Heating/Cooling; co-generation (see Ch. 9.4)	Peak-load pricing	Joint venture <sup>2</sup>
<b>Site/Streetscape</b>						
Pedestrian Zones/Car-Free Districts	Street code revisions <sup>8</sup>	Special Improvement Districts <sup>7</sup>		Road entry restrictions; sidewalks <sup>8</sup>	Parking surcharges	
Traffic Calming/Context-Sensitive Design	Street code revisions <sup>8</sup>	Benefit Assessment <sup>7</sup>				Property owner self-assessments
Complete Streets	Design standards			Bike infrastructure; Pedestrian facilities		Design competitions

### 12.5.1.2 *Meso: Sub-regions, corridors, and districts*

The corridor or district scale captures the spatial context of many day-to-day activities, such as going to work or shopping for common household items. Significant challenges are often faced in coordinating transportation and land development across multiple jurisdictions along a corridor.

**1. Corridor growth management.** Corridor-level growth management plans aim to link land development to new or expanded infrastructure investments (Moore et al., 2007). Both land development and transport infrastructure need years for implementation, so coordinated and strategic long-range planning is essential (Gakenheimer, 2011). Once a transport investment is committed and land use policies are adopted, the two can co-evolve over time. A good example of coordinated multi-jurisdictional management of growth is the 20 km Paris-Pike corridor outside of Lexington, Kentucky (Schneider, 2003). There, two county governments reached an agreement and created a new extra-territorial authority to zone land parcels for agricultural activities within a ½ km radius of a newly expanded road to preserve the corridor’s rural character, prevent sprawl, and maintain the road’s mobility function.

**2. Transit-oriented corridors.** Corridors also present a spatial context for designing a network of Transit Oriented Developments (TODs), traditional (compact, mixed-use, pedestrian-friendly) development that is physically oriented to a transit station. TODs are expected to reduce the need to drive, and thus reduce VKT. Some global cities have directed land uses typically scattered throughout suburban developments (e.g., housing, offices, shops, restaurants, strip malls) to transit-served corridors (Moore et al., 2007; Ferrell et al., 2011). Scandinavian cities like Stockholm, Helsinki, and Copenhagen have created “necklace of pearls” built form not only to induce transit riding but also to produce balanced, bi-directional flows and thus more efficient use of infrastructure (Cervero, 1998; Suzuki et al., 2013).

Curitiba, Brazil, is often heralded as one of the world’s most sustainable cities and is a successful example of the use of Transit Oriented Corridors to shape and direct growth (Cervero, 1998; Duarte and Ultramari, 2012). The has evolved along well-defined radial axes (e.g., lineal corridors) that are served by dedicated busways. Along some transportation corridors, double-articulated buses transport about 16,000 passengers per hour which is comparable to the capacity of more expensive metro-rail systems (Suzuki et al., 2013). To ensure a transit-oriented built form, Curitiba’s government mandates that all medium- and large-scale urban development be sited along a BRT corridor (Cervero, 1998; Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013). High transit use has appreciably shrunk the city’s environmental footprint. In 2005, Curitiba’s VKT per capita of 7,900 was half as much as in Brazil’s national capital Brasilia, a city with a similar population size and income level but a sprawling, auto-centric built form (Santos, 2011).

### 12.5.1.3 *Micro: communities, neighbourhoods, streetscapes*

The neighbourhood scale is where activities like convenience shopping, socialising with neighbours, and walking to school usually take place, and where urban design approaches such as gridded street patterns and transit-oriented development are often targeted. While smaller scale spatial planning might not have the energy conservation or emission reduction benefits of larger scale ones, development tends to occur parcel-by-parcel and urbanised areas are ultimately the products of thousands of individual site-level development and design decisions.

**1. Urban Regeneration and Infill Development.** The move to curb urban sprawl has spawned movements to revitalize and regenerate long-standing traditional urban centres (Oatley, 1995). Former industrial sites or economically stagnant urban districts are often fairly close to central business districts, offering spatial proximity advantages. However, brownfield redevelopment (e.g., tearing down and replacing older buildings, remediating contaminated sites, upgrading worn out or obsolete underground utilities) is invariably more expensive than building anew on vacant greenfield sites (Burchell et al., 2005).

1 In recent decades, British planners have turned away from building expensive, master-planned new  
2 towns in remote locations to creating “new towns/in town”, such as the light-rail-served Canary  
3 Wharf brownfield redevelopment in east London (Gordon, 2001). Recycling former industrial  
4 estates into mixed-use urban centres with mixed-income housing and high-quality transit services  
5 have been successful models (Foletta and Field, 2011). Vancouver and several other Canadian cities  
6 have managed to redirect successfully regional growth to their urban cores by investing heavily in  
7 pedestrian infrastructure and emphasizing an urban milieu that is attractive to families. In particular,  
8 Vancouver has invested in developing attractive and inviting urban spaces, high quality and  
9 dedicated cycling and walking facilities, multiple and reliable public transit options, and creating  
10 high-density residential areas that are integrated with public and cooperative housing (Marshall,  
11 2008). Seoul, South Korea, has sought to regenerate its urban core through a mix of transportation  
12 infrastructure investments and de-investments, along with urban renewal (Jun and Bae, 2000; Jun  
13 and Hur, 2001). Reclaiming valuable inner-city land in the form of tearing down an elevated freeway  
14 and expropriating roadway lanes, replaced by expanded BRT services and pedestrian infrastructure  
15 has been the centrepiece of Seoul’s urban regeneration efforts (Kang and Cervero, 2009).

16 **2. Traditional neighbourhood design and new urbanism.** Another movement, spearheaded by  
17 reform-minded architects and environmental and sustainability planners, has been to return  
18 communities to their designs and qualities of yesteryear, before the ascendancy of the private  
19 automobile (Nasar, 2003). Referred to as “compact cities” in much of Europe and “New Urbanism” in  
20 the U.S., the movement takes on features of traditional, pre-automobile neighbourhoods: grid iron  
21 streets and small rectilinear city blocks well suited to walking, narrow lots and building setbacks,  
22 prominent civic spaces that draw people together (and thus help build social capital), tree-lined  
23 narrow streets with curbside parking and back-lot alleys that slow car traffic, and a mix of housing  
24 types and prices (Kunstler, 1998; Duany et al., 2001; Talen, 2005).

25 In the U.S., more than 600 New Urbanism neighbourhoods have been built, are planned, or are  
26 under construction (Trudeau, 2013). In Europe, a number of former brownfield sites have been  
27 redeveloped since the 1980s based on traditional versus modernist design principles (Fraker, 2013).  
28 In developing countries, recent examples of neighbourhood designs and redevelopment projects  
29 that follow New Urbanism principles to varying degrees are found in Belize, Jamaica, Bhutan, and  
30 South Africa (Cervero, 2013).

31 **3. Transit Oriented Development (TOD).** TODs can occur at a corridor scale, as discussed earlier for  
32 cities like Curitiba and Stockholm, or as is more common, take on a nodal, neighbourhood form.  
33 Besides being the “jumping off” point for catching a train or bus, TODs also serve other community  
34 purposes. Scandinavian TODs often feature a large civic square that functions as a community’s hub  
35 and human-scale entryway to rail stations (Bernick and Cervero, 1996; Curtis et al., 2009).

36 In Stockholm and Copenhagen, TOD has been credited with reducing VKT per capita to among the  
37 lowest levels anywhere among high-income cities (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). In the U.S.,  
38 studies show that TODs can decrease per capita use of cars by 50%. In turn, this could save  
39 households about 20% of their income (Arrington and Cervero, 2008). TOD residents in the U.S.  
40 typically commute by transit four to five times more than the average commuter in a region (Lund et  
41 al., 2006). Similar ridership bonuses have been recorded for TOD projects in Toronto, Vancouver,  
42 Singapore, and Tokyo (Chorus, 2009; Yang and Lew, 2009). In China, a recent study found smaller  
43 differentials of around 25% in rail commuting between those living near, versus away from suburban  
44 rail stations (Day and Cervero, 2010).

45 Many cities in the developing world have had long histories of being transit oriented, and feature  
46 fine-grain mixes of land uses, abundant pathways that encourage and enable walking and biking, and  
47 ample transit options along major roads (Cervero, 2006; Cervero et al., 2009; Curtis et al., 2009). In  
48 Latin America, TOD is being planned or has taken form to varying degrees around BRT stations in  
49 Curitiba, Santiago, Mexico City, and Guatemala City, as well as in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Qingdao and

1 Jiaxing, China, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Cervero, 2013). Green TODs that feature low-  
2 energy/low-emission buildings and the replacement of surface parking with community gardens are  
3 being built (Teriman et al., 2010; Cervero and Sullivan, 2011). A number of Chinese cities have  
4 embraced TOD for managing growth and capitalizing upon massive rail and BRT investments. For  
5 example, Beijing and Guangzhou adopted TOD as a guiding design principle in their most recent  
6 long-range master plans (Li and Huang, 2010). However, failure to articulate densities (e.g., tapering  
7 building heights with distances from stations), the siting of stations in isolated superblocs, poor  
8 pedestrian access, and a lack of co-benefiting mixed land uses have undermined TOD efforts in many  
9 Chinese cities (Zhang, 2007; Zhang and Wang, 2013).

10 **4. Pedestrian zones/car-restricted districts.** Many European cities have elevated liveability and  
11 pedestrian safety to the top of transportation planning agendas, and have invested in programs that  
12 reduce dependence on and use of private automobiles (Banister, 2005, 2008; Dupuy, 2011). One  
13 strategy for this is traffic calming, which uses speed humps, realigned roads, necked down  
14 intersections along with planted trees and other vegetation in the middle of streets to slow down  
15 traffic (Ewing and Brown, 2009). With these traffic calming approaches, automobile passage  
16 becomes secondary. A related concept is “complete streets,” which—through dedicated lanes and  
17 traffic-slowing designs—provide safe passage for all users of a street: drivers as well as pedestrians,  
18 cyclists, and transit patrons (McCann and Rynne, 2010).

19 An even bolder urban-design/traffic-management strategy has been the outright banning of cars  
20 from the cores of traditional neighbourhoods and districts, complemented by an upgrading and  
21 beautification of pedestrian spaces. This practice has become commonplace in many older European  
22 cities whose narrow and winding inner-city street were never designed for motorized traffic (Hass-  
23 Klau, 1993). Multi-block car-free streets and enhanced pedestrian zones are also found in cities of  
24 the developing world, including Curitiba, Buenos Aires, Guadalajara, and Beirut (Cervero, 2013).

25 Empirical evidence reveals a host of benefits from street redesigns and auto-restraint measures like  
26 these. The traffic-calming measures implemented in Heidelberg, Germany during the early 1990s  
27 lead to a 31% decline in car-related accidents, 44% fewer casualties, and less central-city traffic  
28 (Button, 2010). A study of pedestrianisation in German cities recorded increases in pedestrian flows,  
29 transit ridership, land values, and retail transactions, as well as property conversions to more  
30 intensive land uses, matched by fewer traffic accidents and fatalities (Hass-Klau, 1993). Research on  
31 over 100 case studies in Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia, found that road-capacity  
32 reductions including car-free zones, creation of pedestrian streets, and street closures, results in an  
33 overall decline in motorised traffic of 25% (Goodwin et al., 1998).

#### 34 **12.5.2 Policy Instruments**

35 Spatial planning strategies rely on a host of policy instruments and levers (see Chapter 15.3 for a  
36 classification of policy instruments). Some instruments intervene in markets, aimed at correcting  
37 market failures (e.g., negative externalities). Others work with markets, aimed at shaping  
38 behaviours through price signals or public-private partnerships. Interventionist strategies can  
39 discourage or restrict growth through government fiat but they can also incentivize development,  
40 such as through zoning bonuses or property tax abatements (Bengston et al., 2004). Policy  
41 instruments can be applied to different spatial planning strategies and carried out at different  
42 geographic scales (see Table 12.5). Different strategy bundles can be achieved through a mix of  
43 different policy tools, adapted to the unique political, institutional, and cultural landscapes of cities  
44 in which they are applied. Successful implementation requires institutional capacity and political  
45 wherewithal to align the right policy instruments to specific spatial planning strategies.

46 The effectiveness of particular instruments introduced depends on legal and political environments.  
47 For example, cities in the Global South can lack the institutional capacity to regulate land or to  
48 enforce development regulations and tax incentives may have little impact on development in the  
49 informal sector (Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992; Sivam, 2002; Bird and Slack, 2007; UN-Habitat,

1 2013). Infrastructure provision and market-based instruments such as fuel taxes will more likely  
2 affect development decisions in the informal sectors, although there is little direct empirical  
3 evidence. The impact of instruments on urban form and spatial outcomes can be difficult to assess  
4 since regulations like land-use zoning are often endogenous. That is, they codify land use patterns  
5 that would have occurred under the free market rather than causing changes in urban form  
6 (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994).

### 7 **12.5.2.1 Land use regulations**

8 Land-use regulations specify the use, size, mass and other aspects of development on a particular  
9 parcel of land. They are also known as development controls or zoning regulations. In countries like  
10 the U.S. and India, land-use regulations usually promote low-density, single-use developments with  
11 large amounts of parking that increase car dependence and emissions (Talen 2012; Levine 2005;  
12 Glaeser, 2011). For example, densities in the U.S. are often lower than developers would choose  
13 under an unregulated system (Fischel, 1999; Levine and Inam, 2004). Thus, regulatory reforms that  
14 relax or eliminate overly restrictive land-use controls could contribute to climate mitigation. In  
15 Europe, by contrast, land-use regulations have been used to promote more compact, mixed-use,  
16 transit-friendly cities (Beatley, 2000). The following are the primary land-use regulations to reduce  
17 urban form-related GHG emissions.

18 **1. Use restrictions** specify which land uses, such as residential, retail or office, or a mix of uses, may  
19 be built on a particular parcel. Single-use zoning regulations which rigidly separate residential and  
20 other uses are prevalent in the U.S., although some cities such as Miami have recently adopted  
21 form-based codes which regulate physical form and design rather than use (Parolek et al., 2008;  
22 Talen, 2012). Use restrictions are rare in European countries such as Germany and France, where  
23 mixed-use development is permitted or encouraged (Hirt, 2007, 2012).

24 **2. Density regulations** specify minimum and/or maximum permissible densities in terms of the  
25 number of residential units, floor area on a parcel, or restrictions on building height or mass.  
26 Density regulations can provide incentives for open space or other public benefits by allowing higher  
27 density development in certain parts of a city. In India, densities or heights are capped in many  
28 cities, creating a pattern of mid-rise buildings horizontally spread throughout the city and failing to  
29 allow TOD to take form around BRT and urban rail stations (Glaeser, 2011; Brueckner and Sridhar,  
30 2012; Suzuki et al., 2013). In Europe, by contrast, land-use regulations have been used to promote  
31 more compact, mixed-use, transit-friendly cities (Beatley, 2000; Parolek et al., 2008; Talen, 2012). In  
32 Curitiba, Brazil, density bonuses provide incentives for mixed-use development (Cervero, 1998;  
33 Duarte and Ultramari, 2012). A density bonus (Rubin and Seneca, 1991) is an option where an  
34 incentive is created for the developer to set aside land for open spaces or other benefits by being  
35 allowed to develop more densely, typically in Central Business Districts. One challenge with density  
36 bonus is that individuals may have preferences for density levels (high, low) and adjust their location  
37 accordingly.

38 **3. Urban containment instruments** include greenbelts or urban growth boundaries and have been  
39 employed in London, Berlin, Portland, Beijing and Singapore. In the UK and in South Korea,  
40 greenbelts delineate the edges of many built-up and rural areas (Hall, 1996; Bengston and Youn,  
41 2006). In many European cities, after the break-up of the city walls in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries,  
42 greenbelts were used to delineate cities (Elson, 1986; Kühn, 2003). Some U.S. states have passed  
43 growth management laws that hem in urban sprawl through such initiatives as creating urban  
44 growth boundaries, geographically restricting utility service districts, enacting concurrency rules to  
45 pace the rate of land development and infrastructure improvements, and tying state aid to the  
46 success of local governments in controlling sprawl (DeGrove and Mines, 1992; Nelson et al., 2004).  
47 The mixed evidence on the impacts of urban containment instruments on density and compactness  
48 (decreases in some cases and increases in others) indicates the importance of instrument choice and  
49 particularities of setting.

1 **4. Building codes** provide a mechanism to regulate the energy efficiency of development. Building  
2 codes affect the energy efficiency of new development, and cities provide enforcement of those  
3 regulations in some countries (Chapter 9). City policies influence emissions through energy use in  
4 buildings in several other ways, which can influence purchases and leasing of commercial and  
5 residential real estate properties. Some cities participate in energy labelling programs for buildings  
6 (see Chapter 9.10.2.6) or have financing schemes linked to property taxes (see Property Assess Clean  
7 Energy (PACE) in Chapter 9.10.3.1). Energy efficient equipment in buildings can further reduce  
8 energy consumption and associated emissions, including electronics, appliances, and equipment (see  
9 Table 9.3). Cities that operate utilities can influence energy usage directly by using smart meters and  
10 information infrastructures (see 9.4.1.3).

11 **5. Parking regulations** specify minimum and/or maximum numbers of parking spaces for a particular  
12 development. Minimum parking standards are ubiquitous in much of the world, including cities in  
13 the United States, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, China and India (Barter, 2011; Al-Fouzan, 2012;  
14 Wang and Yuan, 2013). Where regulations require developers to provide more parking than they  
15 would have otherwise, as in place like New York and Los Angeles (McDonnell et al., 2011; Bowman  
16 and Franco, 2012), they induce car travel by reducing the cost of driving. Minimum parking  
17 requirements also have an indirect impact on emissions through land-use, as they reduce the  
18 densities that are physically or economically feasible on a site, by 30%-40% or more in typical cases  
19 in the U.S. (Willson, 1995; Talen, 2012). Maximum parking standards, in contrast, have been used in  
20 cities such as San Francisco, London and Zurich (Kodransky and Hermann, 2011) to constrain car use  
21 or increase the cost of driving as well as to reduce the amount of urban land devoted to vehicle  
22 infrastructure. In London, moving from minimum to maximum residential parking standards reduced  
23 parking supply by 40%, with most of the impact coming through the elimination of parking  
24 minimums (Guo and Ren, 2013).

25 **6. Design regulations** can be used to promote pedestrian and bicycle travel. For example, site-design  
26 requirements may require buildings to face the street or prohibit the placement of parking between  
27 building entrances and street rights-of-way (Talen, 2012). Design regulations can also be used to  
28 increase albedo or reduce urban heat island effects, through requiring light-coloured or green roofs  
29 or regulating impervious surfaces (Stone et al., 2012), as in Montreal and Toronto (Richardson and  
30 Otero, 2012).

31 **7. Affordable housing mandates** can reduce the spatial mismatch between jobs and housing  
32 (Aurand, 2010). Incentives, such as floor area ratios and credits against exactions and impact fee  
33 obligations, can be arranged for developers to provide social housing units within their development  
34 packages (Cervero, 1989; Weitz, 2003).

35

36 **Box 12.4.** What drives declining densities?

37 The global phenomenon of declining densities (see 12.2.1.2 and Angel et al., 2010) is the combined  
38 result of (1) fundamental processes such as population growth, rising incomes, and technological  
39 improvements in urban transportation systems (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Mieszkowski and Mills,  
40 1993; Bertaud and Malpezzi, 2003; Glaeser and Kahn, 2004), (2) market failures that distort urban  
41 form during the process of growth (Brueckner, 2001a; Bento et al., 2006, 2011), and (3) regulatory  
42 policies that can have unintended impacts on density (Sridhar, 2007, 2010). A range of externalities  
43 can result in lower densities, such as the failure to adequately account for the cost of traffic  
44 congestion and infrastructure development and the failure to account for the social value of open  
45 space (Brueckner, 2000).

46 Regulatory policies, such as zoning and FAR restrictions, as well as subsidies to particular types of  
47 transportation infrastructures can have large impacts on land development which lead to leapfrog  
48 development (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Baum-Snow, 2007; Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012). The



emissions impacts of these interventions are often not fully understood. Finally, the spatial distribution of amenities and services can shape urban densities through housing demand (Brueckner et al., 1999). In the U.S., deteriorating conditions in city centres have been an important factor in increased suburbanisation (Bento et al., 2011; Brueckner and Helsley, 2011). Conversely, the continued consolidation of amenities, services and employment opportunities in the cores of European and Chinese cities has kept households in city centres (Brueckner et al., 1999; Zheng et al., 2006, 2009).

### 12.5.2.2 Land management and acquisition

The previous section discussed regulatory instruments that are primarily used to shape the decisions of private landowners. Land management and acquisition include parks, lease air rights, utility corridors, transfer development rights, and urban service districts. Urban governments can also directly shape urban form through land that is publicly owned—particularly around public transport nodes where municipalities and public transport agencies have acquired land, assembled parcels and taken the lead on development proposals (Cervero et al., 2004; Curtis et al., 2009; Curtis, 2012). In Hong Kong, the ‘Rail + Property’ development programme, which emphasises not only density but also mixed uses and pedestrian linkages to the station, increases patronage by about 35,000 weekday passengers at the average station. In addition to supporting ridership, an important aim of many agencies is to generate revenue to fund infrastructure, as in Istanbul, Sao Paulo, and numerous Asian cities (Peterson, 2009; Sandroni, 2010).

**1. Transfer of Development Rights (TDR)** allows the voluntary transfer or sale of development from one region or parcel where less development is desired to another region or parcel where more development is desired. They can be used to protect heritage sites from redevelopment or to redistribute urban growth to transit station areas. The parcels that “send” development are protected through restrictive covenants or permanent conservation easements. TDR effectively redirects new growth from areas where current development is to be protected (historical sites or protected areas) to areas where more development is desired (e.g., transit station areas).

**2. Increasing green space and urban carbon sinks** can sequester carbon and reduce energy consumption for cooling. Increasing green space offers co-benefits such as increased property values, regulating stormwater, reduced air pollution, increased recreational space, provision of shade and cooling, rainwater interception and infiltration, increased biodiversity support, and enhancement of wellbeing (Heynen et al., 2006; Gill et al., 2007; McDonald, 2008). However, many studies show that significantly increasing urban green space would have negligible effects on offsetting total urban carbon emissions, especially when emissions generated by fuel combustion, fertilizer use, and irrigation are also considered (Pataki et al., 2009; Jim and Chen, 2009; Townsend-Small and Czimczik, 2010). Globally, urban soils could sequester 290 Mt carbon per year if designed with calcium-rich minerals (Renforth et al., 2009). Annual C uptake varies significantly by location and plant species. Carbon uptake per hectare for temperate urban green spaces is estimated to be 0.15-0.94 t/year for seven cities in the U.S., Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Jersey City, New York, Philadelphia and Syracuse (Nowak and Crane, 2002), 0.38 t/year in Beijing, China (Yang and Gakenheimer, 2007), and 0.53-0.8 t/year in the South Korean cities of Chuncheon, Kangleung (Gangneung) and Seoul (Jo, 2002). U.S. cities in semi-tropical areas have higher levels of per ha annual C sequestration, of 3.2 t/year in Gainesville and 4.5 t/year in Miami-Dade (Escobedo et al., 2010). Urban forests are estimated to sequester 1.66 t C/ha/year in Hangzhou, China (Zhao et al., 2010). The variation in estimates across cities can be partly ascribed to differences in tree species, sizes and densities of planting (Zhao et al., 2010), as well as land use (Whitford et al., 2001) and tree life span (Strohbach et al., 2012; Raciti et al., 2012).

### 12.5.2.3 Market-based instruments

Market-based instruments use taxation and pricing policies to shape urban form (see Chapter 15.5.2 for more in-depth discussion of market-based instruments). Because much low-density, single-use

1 urban development stems from market failures or pre-existing distorted policies or regulations, a  
2 variety of market-based instruments can be introduced that correct these failures (Brueckner and  
3 Fansler, 1983; Brueckner and Kim, 2003; Brueckner, 2000; Bento et al., 2006, 2011).

4 **1. Property taxes.** The property tax, a local tax widely used to fund local urban services and  
5 infrastructure, typically taxes both land and structures. A variant of the property tax, a land tax or  
6 split-rate tax, levies a higher rate of tax on the value of the land, and a lower or zero rate on the  
7 value of the buildings and other improvements. This variant of the property tax can promote  
8 compact urban form through increasing the capital to land ratio, i.e. the intensity of development.  
9 There are numerous examples of the land or split-rate tax worldwide, including Jamaica, Kenya,  
10 Denmark, parts of Australia, the U.S., and South Africa (Bird and Slack, 2002, 2007; Franzsen and  
11 Youngman, 2009; Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010) – although in these places, tax reform was not  
12 necessarily implemented with the aim of reducing sprawl.

13 In principle, moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-rate tax has ambiguous effects on  
14 urban form. The capital to land ratio could rise through an increase in dwelling size – promoting  
15 sprawl – and/or through an increase in density or units per acre – promoting compact urban form  
16 (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). In practice, however, the density effect seems to dominate. Most of the  
17 empirical evidence supporting the role of property tax reform in promoting compact urban form  
18 comes from the U.S. state of Pennsylvania, where the most thorough study found that the split-rate  
19 tax led to a 4-5% point increase per decade in the number of housing units per hectare, with a  
20 minimal increase in unit size (for other evidence from Pennsylvania, see Oates and Schwab, 1997;  
21 Plassmann and Tideman, 2000; Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010).

22 Prospective or simulation studies also tend to find that land or split-rate taxes have the potential to  
23 promote compact urban form at least to some extent (many earlier studies are summarized in  
24 Roakes, 1996; Needham, 2000; for more recent work see Junge and Levinson, 2012). However,  
25 studies of land taxes in Australia have tended to find no effect on urban form (Skaburskis, 2003),  
26 although with some exceptions (e.g. Edwards, 1984; Lusht, 1992). There are several suggestions to  
27 tailor land or property taxes to explicitly support urban planning objectives. For example, the  
28 property tax could vary by use or by impervious area (Nuisl and Schroeter-Schlaack, 2009), or the  
29 tax could be on greenfield development only (Altes, 2009). However, there are few examples of  
30 these approaches in practice, and little or no empirical evidence of their impacts.

31 Moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-rate tax can yield efficiency and equity  
32 benefits (see Chapter 3 for definitions). The efficiency effect stems from the fact that the land tax is  
33 less distortionary than a tax on improvements, as the supply of land is fixed (Brueckner and Kim,  
34 2003). The equity argument stems from the view that land value accrues because of the actions of  
35 the wider community, for example through infrastructure investments, rather than the actions of  
36 the landowner (Roakes, 1996). Indeed, some variants of the land tax in countries such as Colombia  
37 (Bird and Slack, 2007) take an explicit “value capture” approach, and attempt to tax the incremental  
38 increase in land value resulting from transport projects.

39 Development impact fees are imposed per unit of new development to finance the marginal costs of  
40 new infrastructure required by the development, and are levied on a one-time basis. The effects of  
41 impact fees on urban form will be similar to a property tax. The main difference is that impact fees  
42 are more likely to be used by urban governments as a financing mechanism for transport  
43 infrastructure. For example, San Francisco and many British cities have impact fees dedicated to  
44 public transport (Enoch et al., 2005), and other cities such as Santiago have fees that are primarily  
45 dedicated to road infrastructure (Zegras, 2003).

46 **2. Development taxes.** To the extent that excessive urban development reflects the failure to  
47 charge developers for the full costs of infrastructure and the failure to account for the social benefits  
48 of spatially explicit amenities or open space, some economists argue that development taxes, a tax  
49 per unit of land converted to residential uses, are the most direct market-based instruments to

1 correct for such failures (Brueckner, 2000; Bento et al., 2006). According to these studies, in contrast  
2 to urban growth boundaries, development taxes can control urban growth at lower economic costs.  
3 Urban sprawl occurs in part because the costs associated with development are not fully accounted  
4 for. Development taxes could make up for the difference between the private costs and the social  
5 costs of development, and coupled with urban growth boundaries could be effective at reducing  
6 sprawl.

7 **3. Fuel prices and transportation costs.** Increases in fuel taxes or transportation costs more  
8 generally have a direct effect on reducing VKT (see Chapter 8 and Chapter 15). They are also likely to  
9 have a long-run mitigation effect as households adjust their location choices to reduce travel  
10 distances, and urban form responds accordingly. An urban area that becomes more compact as  
11 households bid up the price of centrally located land is a core result from standard theoretical  
12 economic models of urban form (Romanos, 1978; Brueckner, 2001a, 2005; Bento et al., 2006).

13 Empirically, evidence for this relationship comes from cities in the U.S., where a 10% increase in fuel  
14 prices leads to a 10% decrease in construction on the urban periphery (Molloy and Shan, 2013);  
15 Canada, where a 1% increase in gas prices is associated with a 0.32% increase in the population  
16 living in the inner city (Tanguay and Gingras, 2012); and cross-national datasets of 35 world cities  
17 (Glaeser et al., 2001; Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). However, another cross-national study using a larger  
18 dataset found no statistically significant link, which the authors attribute to noisiness in their  
19 (national-level) fuel price data (Angel et al., 2005).

20 Similar impacts on urban form would be expected from other pricing instruments that increase the  
21 cost of driving. While there is clear evidence that road and parking pricing schemes reduce emissions  
22 through direct impacts on mode and travel choices (see Chapter 8.10.1), there is more limited data  
23 on the indirect impacts through land-use patterns. One of the few simulation studies found that  
24 optimum congestion pricing would reduce the radius of the Paris metropolitan area by 34%, and the  
25 average travel distance by 15% (De Lara et al., 2013).


### 26 **12.5.3 Integrated spatial planning and implementation**

27 A characteristic of effective spatial planning is interlinked and coordinated efforts that are  
28 synergistic, and the sum of which are greater than each individual part incrementally or individually  
29 (Porter, 1997). Relying on a single instrument or one-size-fits-all approach can be ineffective or  
30 worse, have perverse, unintended consequences. Singapore is a textbook example of successfully  
31 bundling spatial planning and supportive pricing strategies that reinforce and strengthen the  
32 influences of each other (see Box 12.5). Bundling spatial strategies in ways that produce positive  
33 synergies often requires successful institutional coordination and political leadership from higher  
34 levels of government (Gakenheimer, 2011). The U.S. state of Oregon has managed to protect  
35 farmland and restrict urban sprawl through a combination of measures, including urban growth  
36 boundaries (required for all metropolitan areas above 50,000 inhabitants), farm tax credit programs,  
37 tax abatements for infill development, and state grants that have helped fund investments in high-  
38 quality transit, such as light rail and tramways in Portland and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Eugene  
39 (Moore et al., 2007). Enabling legislation introduced by the state prompted cities like Portland to  
40 aggressively curb sprawl through a combination of urban containment, targeted infrastructure  
41 investments, aggressive expansion of pedestrian and bikeway facilities, and commercial-rate pricing  
42 of parking (Nelson et al., 2004).

43

**Box 12.5.** Singapore: TOD and Road Pricing

The island-state of Singapore has over the years introduced a series of cross-cutting, reinforcing spatial planning and supportive strategies that promote sustainable urbanism and mobility (Suzuki et al., 2013). Guided by its visionary Constellation Plan, Singapore built a series of new master-planned towns that interact with each other because they each have different functional niches. Rather than being self-contained entities, these new towns function together (Cervero, 1998). All are interlinked by high-capacity, high-quality urban rail and bus services, and correspondingly the majority of trips between urban centres are by public transport. Congestion charges and quota controls on vehicle registrations through an auctioning system also explain why Singapore's transit services are so heavily patronised and not un-related, why new land development is occurring around rail stations (Lam and Toan, 2006).



**Figure 12.18.** Singapore's Constellation Plan. Source: (Suzuki et al., 2013).

Empirical evidence on the environmental benefits of policies that bundle spatial planning and market strategies continues to accumulate. A 2006 experiment in Portland, Oregon, replaced gasoline taxes with VKT charges, levied on 183 households that volunteered for the experiment. Some motorists paid a flat VKT charge while others paid considerably higher rates during the peak than non-peak. The largest VKT reductions were recorded among households in compact, mixed-use neighbourhoods that paid congestion charges matched by little change in travel among those living in lower density areas and paying flat rates (Guo et al., 2011). Another study estimated that compact development combined with technological improvements (e.g., more efficient vehicle fleets and low-carbon fuels) could reduce GHG emissions by 15% to 20% (Hankey and Marshall, 2010). A general equilibrium model of urban regions in the OECD concluded that "urban density policies and congestion charges reduce the overall cost of meeting GHG emissions reduction targets more than economy-wide policies, such as a carbon tax, introduced by themselves" (OECD, 2010d).

## 12.6 Governance, Institutions, and Finance

The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate change mitigation depends greatly upon each city's governance and financial capacities. Even if financial capacities are present, a number of other obstacles need to be surmounted. For example, many local governments are disinclined to support compact, mixed-use, and dense development. Even in cases where there is political support for low-carbon development, institutions may be ineffective in developing, implementing, or regulating land use plans. This section assesses the governance, institutional, and financial challenges and opportunities for implementing the mitigation strategies outlined in Section 12.5.

It needs to be emphasised that both the demand for energy as well as for urban infrastructure services as well as the efficiency of service delivery is also influenced by behaviour and individual choices. Cultural and lifestyle norms surrounding comfort, cleanliness, and convenience structure

1 expectations and use of energy, water, waste, and other urban infrastructure services (Miller, 1998;  
2 Shove, 2003, 2004; Bulkeley, 2013). Individual and household choices and behaviour can also  
3 strongly affect the demand for, and the delivery efficiency of, public infrastructure services, for  
4 instance by lowering or increasing load factors (utilisation rates) of public transport systems  
5 (Sammer, 2013). Governance and institutions are necessary for the design and implementation of  
6 effective policy frameworks that can translate theoretical emission reduction potentials of a range of  
7 mitigation options into actual improved emission outcomes.

### 8 **12.6.1 Institutional and governance constraints and opportunities**

9 The governance and institutional requirements most relevant to changing urban form and integrated  
10 infrastructure in urban areas relate to spatial planning. The nature of spatial planning varies  
11 significantly across countries, but in most national contexts, a framework for planning is provided by  
12 state and local governments. Within these frameworks, municipal authorities have varying degrees  
13 of autonomy and authority. Furthermore, there are often divisions between land use planning,  
14 where municipalities have the authority for land regulation within their jurisdiction, and  
15 transportation planning (which is either centrally organized or done in a cross-cutting manner), in  
16 which municipal responsibilities are often more limited. Thus, spatial planning is one area where  
17 municipalities have both the authority and the institutions to address GHG emissions.

18 However, the best plans for advancing sustainable urbanisation and low-carbon development,  
19 especially in fast-growing parts of the world, will not become a reality unless there is both the  
20 political will and institutional capacity to implement them. The ability to manage and respond to  
21 escalating demands for urban services and infrastructure is often limited in developing country  
22 cities. Multiple institutional shortcomings exist, such as an insufficiently trained and undereducated  
23 civil service talent pool or the absence of a transparent and corruption-free procurement process for  
24 providing urban infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 2013). For example, limited experience with urban  
25 management, budgeting and accounting, urban planning, finance, and project supervision have  
26 thwarted Indonesia's decentralization of infrastructure programs from the central to local  
27 governments over the past decade (Cervero, 2013).

28 Although lack of coordination among local land management and infrastructure agencies is also a  
29 common problem in cities of industrialized countries (Kennedy et al., 2005), in developing cities  
30 institutional fragmentation undermines the ability to coordinate urban services within and across  
31 sectors (Dimitriou, 2011). Separating urban sector functions into different organizations – each with  
32 its own boards, staff, budgets, and by-laws – often translates into uni-sectoral actions and missed  
33 opportunities, such as the failure to site new housing projects near public transport stations. In  
34 addition, ineffective bureaucracies are notorious for introducing waste and delays in the deployment  
35 of urban transport projects.


36 In rapidly urbanising cities, limited capacities and the need to respond to everyday crises often  
37 occupy most of the available time in transportation and public utility departments, with little  
38 attention left to strategically plan for prevention of such crises in the first place. As a result, strategic  
39 planning and coordination of land use and transportation across different transport modes is  
40 practically non-existent. Institutions rarely have sufficient time or funds to expand transport  
41 infrastructure fast enough to accommodate the exponential growth in travel. Public utilities for  
42 water and sanitation face similar challenges, and most local agencies operate constantly in the  
43 catch-up mode. Water utilities in southeast Asian cities are so preoccupied with fixing leaks,  
44 removing illegal connections, and meeting water purity standards that there is little time to  
45 strategically plan ahead for expanding trunk-line capacities in line with urban population growth  
46 projections. The ability to advance sustainable transport programs, provide clean water  
47 connections, or introduce efficient pricing schemes implies the presence of conditions that rarely  
48 exist: a well-managed infrastructure authority that sets clear, measurable objectives and rigorously  
49 appraises the expenditure of funds in a transparent and accountable way (Cervero, 2013). Lack of  
50



### Box 12.6. Sustainable Curitiba: Visionary Planning and Strong Institutions

Developing cities such as Curitiba, well-known for advancing sustainable transport and urbanism, owe part of their success to strong governance and institutions (Cervero, 2013). Early in Curitiba's planning process, the Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba (IPPUC) was formed and given the responsibility of ensuring the integration of all elements of urban growth. Creative design elements, such as the trinary corridors (shown below) that concentrate vertically mixed development along high-capacity dedicated busways and systematically taper densities away from transit corridors, were inventions of IPPUC's professional staff. As an independent planning and research agency with dedicated funding support, IPPUC is insulated from the whims of day-to-day politics and able to cost effectively coordinate urban expansion and infrastructure development. Sustained political commitment has been another important element of Curitiba's success. The harmonization of transport and urban development took place over 40 years, marked by a succession of progressive, forward-looking, like-minded mayors who built on the work of their predecessors. A cogent long-term vision and the presence of a politically insulated regional planning organization, IPPUC, to implement the vision have been crucial in allowing the city to chart a sustainable urban pathway.

However, urban governance of land use and transport planning is not the sole province of municipal authorities or other levels of government. Increasingly, private sector developers are creating their own strategies to govern the nature of urban development that exceed codes and established standards. These strategies can relate both to the physical infrastructure being developed (e.g., the energy rating of housing on a particular development) or take the form of requirements and guides for those who will occupy new or refurbished developments (e.g., age limits, types of home appliance that can be used, energy contracts, education about how to reduce GHG emissions). Non-governmental organizations aimed at industry groups, such as U.S. Green Building Council, the Korea Green Building Certification Criteria, and U.K.'s Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) have also become important in shaping urban development, particularly in terms of regeneration and the refurbishment or retrofitting of existing buildings. For example, this is the case in terms of community-based organizations in informal settlements, as well as in the redevelopment of brownfield sites in Europe and North America.



**Figure 12.19.** Curitiba's trinary road system. The inclusion of mixed land uses and affordable housing allows developers to increase building heights, adding density to the corridor. Source: (Suzuki et al., 2013).



1 local institutional capacity among developing cities is a major barrier to achieving the full potential  
2 that such cities have to reduce GHG emissions (UN-Habitat, 2013). This highlights the urban  
3 institutional climate conundrum that rapidly urbanising cities, cities with the greatest potential to  
4 reduce future GHG emissions, are the cities where the current lack of institutional capacity will most  
5 obstruct climate mitigation efforts.

6 Curitiba, Brazil, regarded as one of the world's most sustainable cities, is a product of not only  
7 visionary spatial planning but also strong institutions and political leadership (see Box 12.6.). Other  
8 global cities are striving to follow Curitiba's lead. Bangkok recently announced a paradigm shift in  
9 planning that emphasizes redesigning the city to eliminate or shorten trips, create complete streets,  
10 and makes the city more liveable (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2013). The Amman,  
11 Jordan, Master Plan of 2008 promotes high-density, mixed-use development through the  
12 identification of growth centres, intensification along select corridors across the city, and the  
13 provision of safe and efficient public transportation (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011).  
14 Similar transit-oriented master plans have been prepared for Islamabad, Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, and  
15 Johannesburg in recent years. Mexico City has aggressively invested in BRT and bicycle infrastructure  
16 to promote both a culture and built form conducive to sustainable mobility (Mejía-Dugand et al.,  
17 2013).

18 In addition to the internal institutional challenges outlined above, cities face the problem of  
19 coordinating policies across jurisdictional boundaries as their populations grow beyond the  
20 boundaries of their jurisdictions. Effective spatial planning and infrastructure provision requires an  
21 integrated metropolitan approach that transcends traditional municipal boundaries, especially to  
22 achieve regional accessibility. The fragmented local government structure of metropolitan areas  
23 facilitates the conversion of agricultural, forested, or otherwise undeveloped land to urban uses.  
24 These expanding urban areas also exhibit fiscal weaknesses, face heightened challenges of  
25 metropolitan transportation, and deficiencies in critical physical and social infrastructures (Rusk,  
26 1995; Norris, 2001; Orfield, 2002; McCarney and Stren, 2008; Blanco et al., 2011; McCarney et al.,  
27 2011). Several efforts to address urban climate mitigation at a metropolitan scale are emerging. The  
28 State of California, for example, is requiring metropolitan transportation agencies to develop climate  
29 change mitigation plans in concert with municipalities in their region. California's 2008 Sustainable  
30 Communities and Climate Protection Act or SB 375, was the first legislation in the U.S. to link  
31 transportation and land use planning with climate change (State of California, 2008; Barbour and  
32 Deakin, 2012).

33 In order for integrated planning development to be successful, it must be supported at national  
34 levels (Gakenheimer, 2011). India's National Urban Transport Policy of 2006 embraces integrated  
35 transport and land use planning as its top priority. The central government covers half the costs of  
36 preparing integrated transport and land use plans in Indian cities. For the past 25 years, Brazil has  
37 had a national urban transport policy that supports planning for sustainable transport and urban  
38 growth in BRT-served cities like Curitiba and Belo Horizonte.


### 39 **12.6.2 Financing urban mitigation**

40 Urban infrastructure financing comes from a variety of sources, some of which may already be  
41 devoted to urban development. Some of these include direct central government budgetary  
42 investments, intergovernmental transfers to city and provincial governments, revenues raised by city  
43 and provincial governments, the private sector or public-private partnerships, resources drawn from  
44 the capital markets via municipal bonds or financial intermediaries, risk management instruments,  
45 and carbon financing. Such sources provide opportunities for urban GHG mitigation initiatives  
46 (OECD, 2010b), but access to these financial resources varies from one place to another.

47 In many industrialised countries, national and supra-national policies and programs have provided  
48 cities with the additional financing and facilitations for urban climate change mitigation. Where the  
49 national commitment is lacking, state and municipal governments can influence mitigation initiatives

1 at the city scale. Cities in emerging economies are also increasingly engaging in GHG mitigation, but  
 2 they often rely on international sources of funding. GHG abatement is generally pursued as part of  
 3 the urban development efforts required to improve access to infrastructure and services in the  
 4 fast-growing cities of developing countries, and to increase the liveability of largely built-out cities in  
 5 industrialized countries. Incorporating mitigation into urban development has important financial  
 6 implications, as many of the existing or planned urban investments can be accompanied through  
 7 requirements to meet certain carbon mitigation standards (OECD, 2010b). As decentralization has  
 8 progressed worldwide (the average share of sub-national expenditure in OECD countries reached 33  
 9 % in 2005), regional and local governments increasingly manage significant resources.

10 Local fiscal policy itself can restrict mitigation efforts. When local budgets rely on property taxes or  
 11 other taxes imposed on new development, there is a fiscal incentive to expand into rural areas or  
 12 sprawl instead of pursuing more compact city strategies (Ladd, 1998; Song and Zenou, 2006).  
 13 Metropolitan transportation policies and taxes also affect urban carbon emissions. Congestion  
 14 charges reduce GHG emissions from transport by up to 19.5 % in London where proceeds are used  
 15 to finance public transport, thus combining global and local benefits very effectively (Beevers and  
 16 Carslaw, 2005). Parking charges have led to a 12% decrease of vehicle miles of commuters in U.S.  
 17 cities, a 20% reduction in single car trips in Ottawa and a 38% increase of carpooling in Portland  
 18 (OECD, 2010c).



19  
 20 **Figure 12.20.** Key spatial planning tools and effects on government revenues and expenditures  
 21 across administrative scales. Figure shows four key spatial planning tools (coded in colours) and the  
 22 scale of governance at which they are administered (x-axis) as well as how much public revenue or  
 23 expenditure the government generates by implementing each instrument (y-axis).

24 Sources: Bahl and Linn (1998); Bhatt (2011); Cervero (2004); Deng (2005); Fekade (2000); Rogers (1999); Hong and  
 25 Needham (2007); Peterson (2009); Peyroux (2012); Sandroni (2010); Suzuki et al. (2013); Urban LandMark (2012); U.S. EPA  
 26 (2013); Weitz (2003).

27

1 Another way to think about the policy instruments available to governments for incentivising GHG  
2 abatement is to consider each instrument’s potential to generate public revenues or demand for  
3 government expenditures, and the administrative scale at which it can be applied (Figure 12.20).  
4 Here, the policy instruments discussed earlier (Table 12.5) are categorised into four groups: a)  
5 regulation; b) taxation/charge; c) land-based policy; and d) capital investment. Many of these are  
6 applicable to cities in both the developed and developing countries, but they vary in degree of  
7 implementation due to limited institutional or governance capacities. Overcoming the lack of  
8 political will, restricted technical capacities, and ineffective institutions for regulating or planning  
9 land use will be central to attaining low-carbon development at a city-scale.

10 Fiscal crises along with public investment, urban development, and environmental policy challenges  
11 in both developed and developing countries have sparked interest in innovative financial instruments  
12 to affect spatial development, including a variety of land-based techniques (Peterson, 2009). One of  
13 these key financial/economic mechanisms is land value capture. Land value capture consists of  
14 financing the construction of new transit infrastructures using the profits generated by the land  
15 value price increase associated with the presence of new infrastructure (Deweese, 1976; Benjamin  
16 and Sirmans, 1996; Batt, 2001; Fensham and Gleeson, 2003; Smith and Gihring, 2006). Also called  
17 windfall recapture, it is a local financing option based on recouping a portion or all of public  
18 infrastructure costs from private land betterments under the “beneficiary” principle. In contrast,  
19 value compensation, or wipeout mitigation, is commonly viewed as a policy tool to alleviate private  
20 land worsenments—the deterioration in the value or usefulness of a piece of real property—resulting  
21 from public regulatory activities (Hagman and Misczynski, 1978; Callies, 1979).

22 The majority of the value capture for transit literature use U.S. cities as case studies in part because  
23 of the prevalence of low-density, automobile-centred development. However, there is an emerging  
24 literature on value capture financing that focus on developing country cities, which tend to be  
25 denser than those in OECD countries, and where there is more even shares of distinct travel modes  
26 (Cervero et al., 2004). There are various ways to implement the idea of value capture, including: land  
27 and property taxes, special assessment or business improvement districts, tax incremental financing,  
28 development impact fees, public land leasing and development right sales, land readjustment  
29 programs, joint developments and cost/benefit sharing, connection fees), most typically for public  
30 transit projects (Johnson and Hoel, 1985; Landis et al., 1991; Bahl and Linn, 1998; Enoch et al., 2005;  
31 Smith and Gihring, 2006). There is much evidence that public transit investments often increase land  
32 values around new and existing stations (Du and Mulley, 2006; Debrezion et al., 2007).

33 In summary, the following are key factors for successful urban climate governance: 1) institutional  
34 arrangements that facilitate the integration of mitigation with other high-priority urban agendas; 2)  
35 an enabling multilevel governance context that empowers cities to promote urban transformations;  
36 3) spatial planning competencies and political will to support integrated land-use and transportation  
37 planning; and 4) sufficient financial flows and incentives to adequately support mitigation strategies.

## 38 **12.7 Urban Climate Mitigation: Experiences and Opportunities**

39 This section identifies the scale and range of mitigation actions being planned by municipal  
40 governments and assesses the evidence of successful implementation of the plans as well as barriers  
41 to further implementation. The majority of studies reviewed pertain to large cities in North America,  
42 Japan, and Europe, although there are some cross-city comparisons and case studies that include  
43 smaller cities in industrialized economies (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 2012; Dierwechter and Wessells, 2013)  
44 and cities in developing countries and emerging economies (Romero Lankao, 2007; Pitt, 2010).

45 Addressing climate change has become part of the policy landscape in many cities, and municipal  
46 authorities have begun to implement policies to reduce GHG emissions generated from within their  
47 administrative boundaries (Acuto, 2013; OECD, 2010a). The most visible way in which cities  
48 undertake mitigation is under the auspices of a climate action plan – a policy document created by a

1 local government agency that sets out a program of action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  
2 Usually such plans include a GHG emissions inventory and an emissions reduction target, as well as a  
3 series of mitigation policies.

4 This section focuses on such climate action plans, as they provide the most comprehensive and  
5 consistent, albeit limited, evidence available regarding urban mitigation efforts. However, there is  
6 not a one-to-one correspondence between climate action plans and urban mitigation efforts. Even  
7 when included in climate action plans, mitigation measures may well have been implemented in the  
8 plan's absence, whether for climate-related or other reasons (Millard-Ball, 2012b). Conversely,  
9 climate action plans are only one framework under which cities plan for mitigation policies, and  
10 similar recommendations may also occur as part of a municipal sustainability, land-use, or transport  
11 plan (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; GTZ, 2009; Bassett and Shandas, 2010). In these other types of plans,  
12 climate change may be one motivation, but mitigation measures are often pursued because of co-  
13 benefits such as local air quality (Betsill, 2001; Kousky and Schneider, 2003).

#### 14 **12.7.1 Scale of urban mitigation efforts**

15 The number of cities that have signed up to voluntary frameworks for GHG emission reductions has  
16 increased from fewer than 50 at the start of the 1990s to several hundred by the early 2000s  
17 (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), and several thousand by 2012 (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Pitt, 2010;  
18 Krause, 2011a). These voluntary frameworks provide technical assistance and political visibility. They  
19 include the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, which by October 2013 counted most of the  
20 world's largest cities among its 58 affiliates (C40 Cities, 2013), the Cities for Climate Protection  
21 Campaign, and the 2013 European Covenant of Mayors, which had over 5,200 members  
22 representing over 170 million people, or roughly one-third of the European population (The  
23 Covenant of Mayors, 2013). In the U.S., nearly 1,100 municipalities, representing approximately 30%  
24 of the country's population, have joined the Mayors the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate  
25 Protection Agreement, thus committing to reduce their local GHG emissions to below 1990 levels  
26 (Krause, 2011a).

27 Such estimates represent a lower bound, as cities may complete a climate action plan or undertake  
28 mitigation outside one of these voluntary frameworks. In California in 2009, 72% of cities responding  
29 to a survey stated they had adopted policies and/or programs to address climate change, but only  
30 14% had adopted a GHG reduction target (Wang, 2013). In some countries, climate action plans are  
31 mandatory for local governments, further adding to the total. For example, in Japan, the Global  
32 Warming Law and the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan mandate that 1,800 municipal  
33 governments and 47 Prefectures prepare climate change mitigation action plans (Sugiyama and  
34 Takeuchi, 2008). In France, climate action plans are mandatory for cities with populations larger than  
35 50,000 (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 2012). Climate action planning has been most extensive in cities in Annex  
36 I countries, particularly those in Europe and Japan. This presents a mismatch between the places  
37 with mitigation planning efforts, and the places where most urban growth will occur - and where the  
38 greatest mitigation potential exists – largely in developing countries that are rapidly urbanising.

---

#### 40 **Box 12.7. Urban Climate Change Mitigation in Less Developed Countries**

41 The majority of future population growth and demand for new infrastructure will take place in urban  
42 areas in developing countries. Africa and Asia will absorb the bulk of the urban population growth,  
43 and urbanisation will occur at lower levels of economic development than the urban transitions that  
44 occurred in Annex-I countries. There are currently multiple urban transitions taking place in  
45 developing countries, with differences in part due to their development histories, and with different  
46 impacts on energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.

47 Urban areas in developing and least developed countries can have dual energy systems (Martinot et  
48 al., 2002; Berndes et al., 2003). That is, one segment of the population may have access to modern

1 energy and associated technology for heating and cooking. Another segment of the population –  
2 mainly those living in informal settlements – may rely mainly on wood-based biomass. Such non-  
3 commercial biomass is a prominent source in the urban fuel mix in Sub-Saharan Africa (50%) and in  
4 South Asia (23%). In other regions, Latin America and the Caribbean (12%), Pacific Asia (8%) and  
5 China (7%) traditional, non-commercial energy is not negligible but a relatively smaller proportion of  
6 overall energy portfolio (Grubler et al., 2012). The traditional energy system operates informally and  
7 inefficiently, using out-dated technology. It can be associated with significant health impacts (see  
8 Chapters 2 and 9 in IPCC, 2011). The unsustainable harvesting of woodfuels to supply large urban  
9 and industrial markets is significantly contributing to forest degradation and coupled with other  
10 land-use changes to deforestation (see Chapter 11). However, recent technological advances suggest  
11 that energy production from biomass can be an opportunity for low carbon development (Zeng et  
12 al., 2007; Fargione et al., 2008; Hoekman, 2009; Azar et al., 2010). Predictions of significant growth  
13 in woodfuel demand (Mwampamba, 2007; Zulu, 2010; Agyeman et al., 2012) make it vital that this  
14 sector is overhauled and modernised using new technologies, approaches, and governance  
15 mechanisms.

16 Additionally, informal urbanisation may not result in an increase in the provision of infrastructure  
17 services. Rather, unequal access to infrastructure, especially housing and electricity, is a significant  
18 problem in many rapidly growing urban centres in developing countries and shapes patterns of  
19 urban development. Mitigation options vary by development levels and urbanisation trajectories.  
20 The rapid urbanisation and motorisation occurring in many developing and least developed  
21 countries is constrained by limited infrastructure and deteriorating transport systems. Integrated  
22 infrastructure development in these areas can have greater effects on travel demands and low-  
23 emission modal choices than in high-income countries, where infrastructure is largely set in place  
24 (see Chapter 8.9). The scale of new building construction in developing countries follows a similar  
25 path. Two billion people currently live without access to modern energy, and shifting their energy  
26 sources to electricity and clean fuels could strongly influence building-related emissions reductions  
27 (see box 9.1). Thus, it is in developing and least developed country cities where opportunities for  
28 integrated infrastructure and land-use planning may be most effective at shaping development and  
29 emissions trajectories, but where a “governance paradox” exists (see 12.3.1).

### 30 **12.7.2 Targets and timetables**

31 One way to assess the scale of planned mitigation is through the emission reduction targets set by  
32 cities, typically as part of their climate action plans. A central feature of municipal climate change  
33 responses is that targets and timetables have frequently exceeded national and international  
34 ambitions for emissions reduction. In Germany, nearly 75% of cities with a GHG target established  
35 their emissions goals based on national or international metrics rather than local analysis of  
36 mitigation options and the average city reduction target of 1.44% per year exceeds the national  
37 target (Sippel, 2011). In the U.S., signatories to the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement have  
38 pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 7% below 1990 levels by 2012, in line with the target agreed  
39 upon in the Kyoto Protocol for the U.S. (Krause, 2011b). Lutsey and Sperling (2008) find that these  
40 and other targets in 684 U.S. cities would reduce emissions in the U.S. by 7% below the 2020 BAU  
41 baseline.


42 In Europe and Australia, several municipalities have adopted targets of reducing GHG emissions by  
43 20% by 2020 and long-term targets for radically reducing GHG emissions, including “zero-carbon”  
44 targets in the City of Melbourne and Moreland (Victoria), and a target of 80% reduction over 1990  
45 levels by 2050 in London (Bulkeley, H, 2009). This approach has not been limited to cities in  
46 developed economies. For example, the city of Cape Town has set a target of increasing energy  
47 efficiency within the municipality by 12% by 2010 (Holgate, 2007), and Mexico City has implemented  
48 a target of reducing GHG by 12% below 1990 levels by 2012 (Romero Lankao, 2007). Data compiled  
49 for this assessment, although illustrative rather than systematic, indicate an average reduction of  
50 2.74 t CO<sub>2</sub> –e capita<sup>-1</sup> if cities were to achieve their targets, with percentage targets ranging from



1 10% to 100%. In general, percentage reduction targets are larger for more distant years and in more  
2 affluent cities. However, the absolute level of the targeted reductions depends primarily on the  
3 city's population and other determinants of baseline emissions (Figure 12.21.).

4 In some cases, targets may reflect patterns of potential mitigation. Targets are often arbitrary or  
5 aspirational, and reflect neither mitigation potential nor implementation. How targets translate into  
6 mitigation effort also depends on how they are quantified, e.g., whether fuel economy and similar  
7 improvements mandated at the national level are claimed by cities as part of their own reductions  
8 (Boswell et al., 2010; DeShazo and Matute, 2012). Mitigation targets are often set in absolute terms,  
9 which may be less meaningful than per-capita reductions in assessing mitigation potential at the  
10 metropolitan scale. This is a particularly important issue for central cities and inner suburbs, where  
11 population and emissions may increase within the city boundary if policies to increase density and  
12 compactness are successful (see Section 12.4 and Ganson, 2008; Salon et al., 2010).

13 Many cities, particularly those in developing countries, do not set targets at all. For example, the  
14 Delhi Climate Change Agenda only reports Delhi's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from power, transport and  
15 domestic sectors as 22.49 MtCO<sub>2</sub> for 2007-8 (Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010), while the  
16 contributions from commercial sectors and industries comprise a larger share of the city's total  
17 emissions. Furthermore, Delhi's climate action plan lacks clear GHG reduction targets, analysis of the  
18 total carbon reductions projected under the plan, and a strategy for how to achieve their emissions  
19 goals. Similar limitations are apparent in climate mitigation plans for other global cities such as  
20 Bangkok and Jakarta (Dhakal and Poruschi, 2010). For many cities in developing countries, a reliable  
21 city GHG inventory may not exist, making the climate change actions largely symbolic. However,  
22 these city action plans provide a foundation for municipal engagement in mitigation initiatives while  
23 building momentum for collective action on a global scale.




24

25 **Figure 12.21.** Mitigation Targets for 42 Cities. Sources: Baseline emissions, reduction targets and  
26 population from self-reported data submitted to Carbon Disclosure Project (2013). GDP data from  
27 Istrate & Nadeau (2012). Note that the figure is illustrative only; data are not representative, and  
28 physical boundaries, emissions accounting methods and baseline years vary between cities. Many  
29 cities have targets for intermediate years (not shown).



### 12.7.3 Planned and implemented mitigation measures

Limited information is available on the extent to which targets are being achieved or emissions reduced. Some cities have already achieved their initial GHG reduction targets, e.g. Seattle (Boswell et al., 2011), or are on track to do so, e.g. Stockholm (City of Stockholm, 2013). In other places such as western Germany, few if any cities are likely to meet their targets (Sippel, 2011). Further data come from comparison of “before” and “after” GHG inventories. One study of six major cities found that emissions are falling by an average 0.27 t CO<sub>2</sub>e/capita per year (Kennedy et al., 2012). Overall, however, the available data are usually incomplete, self-reported and subject to various biases. More fundamentally, changes in aggregate emissions do not necessarily reflect the success or failure to implement mitigation measures, because so many drivers of emissions – including the electricity generation mix and fuel taxation – are normally beyond the control of cities (DeShazo and Matute, 2012). Whether a city achieves its target has less to do with its own actions and more to do with external drivers of emissions.



**Figure 12.22.** Mitigation Measures in Climate Action Plans. Sources: Compiled for this assessment from self-reported data submitted to Carbon Disclosure Project (2013).

An alternative way to gauge the extent of planned and implemented mitigation measures is through a bottom-up analysis of individual policies (Ramaswami, Bernard, et al., 2012) or sector-specific data on green buildings, transport, or waste production (Millard-Ball, 2012a). However, there are no data from a large number of cities using these methods. Instead, available data are usually in the form of self-reported planned or implemented policies (Krause, 2011c; Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2012; Stone et al., 2012; Bedsworth and Hanak, 2013). While these data do not reveal aggregate emission reductions, they indicate the sectoral breadth of city climate action plans and the types of measures that cities are planning. No single sector dominates mitigation plans, although transportation and building efficiency are the most common self-reported measures (Figure 12.22). Here it is worth

1 noting that the relative contribution of sectors to total urban emissions varies greatly by city (see  
2 Section 12.3).

3 The types of land-use strategies discussed in Section 12.5, such as compact development, are  
4 sometimes included in municipal efforts or plans, but the popularity of such land-use measures  
5 varies considerably by context. In California, 80% of municipal survey respondents reported that  
6 they had policies for high-density or mixed-use development in place or under consideration, and  
7 the adoption of such land-use policies rose substantially between 2008 and 2010 (Bedsworth and  
8 Hanak, 2013). In the U.S., 70% of climate action plans reviewed in one study include compact  
9 development strategies (Bassett and Shandas, 2010). In contrast, municipal climate plans in Norway  
10 and Germany focus on energy, transport and building efficiency, with little attention given to land  
11 use (Aall et al., 2007; Sippel, 2011). At a global level, self-reported data from a small sample of cities  
12 (Figure 12.22) suggests that land-use measures are relatively uncommon in climate action plans –  
13 particularly outside Annex I countries. Moreover, where land-use strategies exist, they focus on  
14 urban greenspace and/or biodiversity, rather than on the cross-sectoral measures to reduce sprawl  
15 and promote TOD that were discussed in Section 12.5.

16 Even if land use measures are listed in climate action plans, implementation has focused on win-win  
17 energy efficiency measures that lead to cost savings, rather than larger changes to land use,  
18 buildings or transport. This is a consistent message from qualitative studies (Kousky and Schneider,  
19 2003; Rutland and Aylett, 2008; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009), and some larger surveys of city efforts  
20 (Wang, 2013). There has been less engagement by municipalities with sectors such as energy and  
21 water supply that often lie outside of their jurisdiction (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; ARUP, 2011) or with  
22 the GHG emissions embodied in present patterns of urban resource use and consumption. More  
23 broadly, there is considerable variation in the nature and quality of climate change plans, particularly  
24 when it comes to specifying the detail of actions and approaches to implementation (Wheeler, 2008;  
25 Tang et al., 2011; Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012).

26 Despite the implementation of comprehensive climate action plans and policies, progress for cities in  
27 developed countries is slow and the achievability of emissions targets remains uncertain. Although  
28 municipalities often highlight progress on climate mitigation projects, the impacts of these initiatives  
29 are not often evaluated (see Chapter 15 on policy evaluation). Cities' mitigation reduction  
30 performance is largely correlated to the national performance in mitigation reduction.

## 31 **12.8 Sustainable Development, Co-Benefits, Trade-offs, and Spill-over** 32 **Effects**

33 Sustainable development (SD) is, and has always been, closely associated with human settlements.  
34 In fact, the very document that coined the phrase, the World Commission on Environment and  
35 Development Report (WCED 1987), devoted a chapter to “the urban challenge.” While averting the  
36 adverse social and environmental effects of climate change remains at the core of the urban  
37 challenge today, cities throughout the world also continue to struggle with a host of other critical  
38 challenges, including, for instance, ensuring access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services  
39 for their citizens (particularly for the urban poor); limiting congestion, noise, air and water pollution,  
40 and health and ecosystem damages; and maintaining sufficient employment opportunities and  
41 competitiveness in an increasingly globalized world.

42 Efforts to mitigate climate change will have important side effects for these various policy objectives,  
43 as discussed in sections 5.7, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7 and 11.A.6. To the extent these side effects  
44 are positive, they can be deemed “co-benefits”; if adverse, they imply “risks”.<sup>3</sup> As such side effects

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<sup>3</sup> Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe co-effects without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the respective sections in the framing chapters as well as to the glossary in Annex I for concepts and definitions – particularly 2.4, 3.6.3, and 4.8.2.

1 are likely to materialize first in urban settings since these are the hubs of activity, commerce, and  
 2 culture in the modern world: this section will focus on the literature specifically linked to urban  
 3 settings and refer to other sections of the report where appropriate.

4 Action on climate change mitigation often depends on the ability to ‘reframe’ or ‘localize’ climate  
 5 change with respect to the co-benefits that could be realized (Betsill, 2001). For example, in Canada  
 6 “actions to reduce GHG emissions are also deeply connected to other goals and co-benefits such as  
 7 human health improvements through improved air quality, cost savings, adaptability to real or  
 8 potential vulnerabilities due to climate change, and overall improvements in short, medium and  
 9 long-term urban sustainability” (Gore et al., 2009). Sometimes called ‘localizing’ or ‘issue bundling’  
 10 (Koehn, 2008), these reframing strategies have proven to be successful in marshalling local support  
 11 and action in developing country cities, and will continue to be an important component of  
 12 developing local capacity for mitigation (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009).

13 **Table 12.6.** Potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side effects (orange arrows) of urban  
 14 mitigation measures. Arrows pointing up/down denote a positive/negative effect on the respective  
 15 objective/concern. The effects depend on local circumstances and specific implementation strategy.  
 16 For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e.g.,  
 17 on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2.

Mitigation measures	Effect on additional objectives/concerns		
	Economic	Social (including health)	Environmental
Compact development and infrastructure	↑ Innovation and productivity <sup>1</sup> ↑↑ Higher rents & residential property values <sup>2</sup> ↑ Efficient resource use and delivery <sup>5</sup>	↑ Health from physical activity <sup>3</sup>	↑ Preservation of open space <sup>4</sup>
Increased accessibility	↑ Commute savings <sup>6</sup>	↑ Health from increased physical activity <sup>3</sup> ↑ Social interaction & mental health <sup>7</sup>	↑ Air quality and reduced ecosystem/health impacts <sup>8</sup>
Mixed land use	↑ Commute savings <sup>6</sup> ↑↑ Higher rents & residential property values <sup>2</sup>	↑ Health from increased physical activity <sup>3</sup> ↑ Social interaction and mental health <sup>7</sup>	↑ Air quality and reduced ecosystem/health impacts <sup>8</sup>

18 Sources: 1(Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Carlino et al., 2007) ;2 (Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Glaeser  
 19 et al., 2006; Koster and Rouwendal, 2012) ; 3 (Handy et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2004, 2009; Heath et al., 2006; Forsyth et al.,  
 20 2007; Owen et al., 2007); 4 (Brueckner, 2000; Bengston et al., 2004); 5 (Speir and Stephenson, 2002; Guhathakurta and  
 21 Gober, 2007) 6 (Krizek, 2003; Cervero and Duncan, 2006; Ma and Banister, 2006; Day and Cervero, 2010); 7 (Galea et al.,  
 22 2005; Berke et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 2013); 8 (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007; Creutzig and He, 2009; Milner et al.,  
 23 2012; Puppim de Oliveira et al., 2013).


### 24 12.8.1 Urban air quality co-benefits

25 Worldwide, only 160 million people live in cities with truly clean air – that is, in compliance with  
 26 World Health Organization guidelines (Grubler et al., 2012) (Figure 12.23). Oxides of sulfur and  
 27 nitrogen (SO<sub>x</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub>) and ozone (O<sub>3</sub>) – i.e., outdoor air pollutants – are particularly problematic in  
 28 cities because of high concentrations and exposures (Smith et al., 2012) (see section 9.7 for a  
 29 discussion of mitigation measures in the buildings sector on indoor air pollution). Transport remains  
 30 one of the biggest emitting sectors in the industrialized world. In developing countries, a wider range  
 31 of sources is to blame, with vehicle emissions playing an ever increasing role also due to continuing  
 32 urbanisation trends (Kinney et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012) (see also sections 5.3.5.1 and 8.2). In a  
 33 study of four Indian megacities, for instance, gasoline and diesel vehicle emissions already comprise  
 34 20–50% of fine particulate matter (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) emissions (Chowdhury et al., 2007). The associated health  
 35 burdens are particularly high in low-income communities due to high exposures and vulnerabilities  
 36 (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007; Morello-Frosch et al., 2011).

37 Major air quality co-benefits can be achieved through climate mitigation actions in the urban  
 38 context, especially in megacities in developing countries where outdoor air pollution tends to be  
 39 higher than in urban centres in industrialized countries (Molina and Molina, 2004 and section 5.7).

1 Urban planning strategies and other policies that promote cleaner fuels, transport mode shifting,  
 2 energy cogeneration and waste heat recycling, buildings, transport and industry efficiency standards  
 3 can all contribute to lower rates of respiratory and cardiovascular disease (improved human health)  
 4 as well as decreased impacts on urban vegetation (enhanced ecosystems) via simultaneous  
 5 reductions in co-emitted air pollutant species (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007; Creutzig and  
 6 He, 2009; Milner et al., 2012; Puppim de Oliveira et al., 2013 and sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.88 as well  
 7 as WGII chapter 11.9).<sup>4</sup> Even an action like shading parking lots, which is generally thought of in the  
 8 context of limiting the urban heat-island effect, can bring air pollution co-benefits through  
 9 reductions in volatile organic compounds (VOC) and, thus, low-level ozone formation from parked  
 10 vehicles (Scott et al., 1999).

11 In the near-term (2030), air quality co-benefits of stringent mitigation actions (i.e., in line with  
 12 achieving 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-e by 2100) can be quite substantial in a highly urbanised region like Europe:  
 13 decarbonisation and energy efficiency (largely in transport) could reduce aggregate NO<sub>x</sub> emissions by  
 14 a further 38% relative to a reference case that includes current and planned air quality legislation by  
 15 2030 but does not consider climate policies (Colette et al., 2012). Similar co-benefits have been  
 16 reported for other pollutants in other regions (Rao et al., 2013), particularly in developing Asia (Doll  
 17 and Balaban 2013; Geng, Ma et al. 2013; Puppim de Oliveira, Doll et al. 2013) (see section 6.6). The  
 18 potential for realising these co-benefits depends on institutional frameworks and policy agendas at  
 19 both the local and national level, as well as the interplay between the two (see Doll, Dreyfus et al.  
 20 (2013) and Jiang et al. (2013) for reviews of India and China). At the same time, the increasing role of  
 21 decentralised power generation could lead to adverse air quality side effects if this trend is not  
 22 coupled with a more intensive use of low-carbon energy supply (Milner et al., 2012).



23  
 24 **Figure 12.23.** Human risk exposure to PM10 pollution in 3200 cities worldwide. Sources: Grubler et  
 25 al. (2012) and Doll (2009).

### 26 12.8.2 Energy security side effects for urban energy systems

27 Mitigating climate change could have important side effects for urban energy security (sufficient  
 28 resources and resilient supply) – concerns that have re-emerged in many cities throughout the world  
 29 in recent years (see sections 6.6.2.1 and 7.9.1 for a broader discussion of energy security concerns).  
 30 Perhaps the greatest energy-related vulnerability in this context is the fact that urban transport  
 31 systems are at present almost entirely dependent on oil (Cherp et al., 2012). This is especially true in  
 32 low-density areas (Levinson and Kumar 1997). Therefore, any climate mitigation activities leading to

<sup>4</sup> Monetized health co-benefits are found to be larger in developing countries than industrialized countries, a finding that results from the currently higher pollution levels of the former and, thus, the greater potential for improving health, particularly in the transport and household energy demand sectors (Markandya et al., 2009; Nemet et al., 2010; West et al., 2013 and section 5.7).

1 a diversification of the transport sector away from oil could potentially also contribute to a security  
2 co-benefit (see Jewell et al., 2013) and other references in chapter 8.7.1). Such measures might  
3 range from technology standards (e.g., for vehicles and their fuels) to integrated infrastructure,  
4 spatial planning, and mass transit policies (Sections 12.5 and 8.10). Energy efficiency regulations for  
5 buildings and industrial facilities (both existing and new) can also help to enhance the resilience of  
6 fuel and electricity distribution networks (see Chapters 9.7 and 10.8).

### 7 **12.8.3 Additional health and socioeconomic co-benefits**

8 Spatial planning and TOD can yield other positive side effects that may enhance a city's liveability.  
9 For example, mass transit requires considerably less physical space than private automobiles  
10 (transit: 0.75-2.5 m<sup>2</sup>/person; auto: 21-28 m<sup>2</sup>/person) and generally emits less noise (Grubler, Bai et  
11 al. 2012), with health co-benefits in terms of cardiovascular disease and sleep disturbance (Kawada,  
12 2011; Ndrepepa and Twardella, 2011 see also 8.7; Milner et al., 2012).

13 Neighbourhoods with walkable characteristics such as connectivity and proximity of destinations  
14 are correlated with higher frequency of physical activity among residents (Frank et al., 2004; Owen  
15 et al., 2007), which is correlated with lower symptoms and incidences of depression (Galea et al.,  
16 2005; Berke et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 2013). Compact neighbourhoods with more diversified land  
17 uses are correlated with higher housing prices and rents (Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Quigley and  
18 Raphael, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2006; Koster and Rouwendal, 2012). In a study of the Netherlands,  
19 neighbourhoods with more diverse land uses had a 2.5% higher housing prices (Koster and  
20 Rouwendal, 2012).

### 21 **12.8.4 Additional co-benefits of reducing the urban heat island effect**

22 The UHI presents a major challenge to urban sustainability (see WGII Chapter 8). Not only does UHI  
23 increase the use of energy for cooling buildings (increasing the mitigation challenge) and thermal  
24 discomfort in urban areas, but UHI also increases smoggy days in urban areas, with smog health  
25 effects present above 32 degrees C (Akbari et al., 2001; O'Neill and Ebi, 2009; Mavrogianni et al.,  
26 2011; Rydin et al., 2012). Proven methods for cooling the urban environment include urban  
27 greening, increasing openness to allow cooling winds (Smith and Levermore, 2008), and using more  
28 "cool" or reflective materials that absorb less solar radiation, i.e., increasing the albedo of the  
29 surfaces (Akbari et al., 2008, 2010). Reducing UHI is most effective when considered in conjunction  
30 with other environmental aspects of urban design, including solar/daylight control, ventilation and  
31 indoor environment, and streetscape (Yang et al., 2010). On a global scale, increasing albedos of  
32 urban roofs and paved surfaces is estimated to induce a negative radiative forcing equivalent to  
33 offsetting about 44 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions annually (Akbari et al., 2008).

34 Reducing summer heat in urban areas has several co-benefits. Electricity use in cities increases 2-4%  
35 for each 1 degree C increase in temperature, due to air conditioning use (Akbari et al., 2001). Lower  
36 temperatures reduce energy requirements for air conditioning (which may result in decreasing GHG  
37 emissions from electricity generation, depending upon the sources of electricity), reduce smog levels  
38 (Rosenfeld et al., 1998), and reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality due to heat and poor air  
39 quality (Harlan and Ruddell, 2011). Cool materials decrease the temperature of surfaces and  
40 increase the lifespan of building materials and pavements (Santero and Horvath, 2009; Synnefa et  
41 al., 2011).

42 The projected temperature increases under climate change will disproportionately impact cities  
43 already affected by UHI, thereby increasing the energy requirements for cooling buildings and  
44 increasing urban carbon emissions, as well as air pollution (Mickley et al., 2004; Jacob and Winner,  
45 2009). In addition, it is likely that cities will experience an increase in UHI as a result of projected  
46 increases in temperature under climate change, which will result in additional global urban energy  
47 use, GHG emissions, and local air pollution. As reviewed here, studies indicate that several  
48 strategies are effective for decreasing the UHI. An effective strategy to mitigate UHI through



1 increasing green spaces, however, can potentially conflict with a major urban climate change  
2 mitigation strategy, increasing densities to create more compact cities (Milner et al., 2012). This  
3 illustrates the complexity of developing integrated and effective climate change policies for urban  
4 areas.

5 More generally, reducing UHI effects – either through mitigation measures (e.g., improved waste  
6 heat recycling, co-generation, use of reflective building materials, increased vegetation) or through  
7 mitigation – can have co-benefits for urban water supplies (e.g., cooling water for thermal or  
8 industrial plants, drinking water), given that evaporation losses rise as water bodies warm (Grubler  
9 et al., 2012).

## 10 **12.9 Gaps in Knowledge**

11 This assessment highlights a number of key knowledge gaps:

- 12 • **Lack of consistent and comparable emissions data at local scales.** Although some emissions  
13 data collection efforts are underway, they have been undertaken primarily in large cities in  
14 developed countries. The lack of baseline data makes it particularly challenging to assess the  
15 urban share of global GHG emissions as well as develop urbanisation and typologies and their  
16 emission pathways. Given the small number of city based estimates, more city data and research  
17 are needed, especially an urban emissions data system.
- 18 • **Little scientific understanding of the magnitude of the emissions reduction from altering urban  
19 form, and the emissions savings from integrated infrastructure and land use planning.**  
20 Furthermore, there is little understanding of how different aspects of urban form interact and  
21 affect emissions. The existing research on the impact of policies designed to achieve emissions  
22 reductions through urban form do not conform to the standards of policy evaluation and  
23 assessment defined in Chapter 15.
- 24 • **Lack of consistency and thus comparability on local emissions accounting methods.** Different  
25 accounting protocols yield significantly different results, making cross-city comparisons of  
26 emissions or climate action plans difficult. There is a need for standardized methodologies for  
27 local- or urban-level carbon accounting.
- 28 • **Few evaluations of urban climate action plans and their effectiveness.** There is no systematic  
29 accounting to evaluate the efficacy of city climate action plans (Zimmerman and Faris, 2011).  
30 Studies that have examined city climate action plans conclude that they are unlikely to have  
31 significant impact on reducing overall emissions (Stone et al., 2012; Millard-Ball, 2012a).  
32 Another major limitation to local or city climate action plans is their limited coordination across  
33 city sectors and administrative/hierarchical levels of governance and lack of explicitly  
34 incorporating land-based mitigation strategies. Successful local climate action plans will require  
35 coordination, integration, and partnerships among community organizations, local government,  
36 state and federal agencies, and international organizations (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 2012; Zeemering,  
37 2012).
- 38 • **Lack of scientific understanding of how cities can prioritize climate change mitigation  
39 strategies, local actions, investments, and policy responses that are locally relevant.** Some  
40 cities will be facing critical vulnerability challenges, while other will be in the “red zone” for their  
41 high levels of emissions. Local decision-makers need clarity on where to focus their actions, and  
42 to avoid spending resources and efforts on policies and investments that are not essential. There  
43 is little scientific basis for identifying the right mix of policy responses to address local and urban  
44 level mitigation and adaptation. Policy packages will be determined based on the characteristics  
45 of individual cities and their urbanisation and development pathways, as well as on forecasts of  
46 future climate and urbanisation. They will be aimed at flexing the urban- and settlement-related



1 “drivers” of emissions and vulnerability in order to ensure a less carbon-intensive and more  
2 resilient future for cities.

- 3 • **Large uncertainties as to how cities will develop in the future.** There is robust scientific  
4 evidence that emissions vary across cities and that urban form and infrastructure play large roles  
5 in determining the relationship between urbanisation and emissions.

## 6 **12.10 Frequently Asked Questions**

### 7 ***FAQ 12.1: Why is the IPCC including a new chapter on human settlements and spatial 8 planning? Isn't this covered in the individual sectoral chapters?***

9 Urbanisation is a global megatrend that is transforming societies. Today, more than 50% of the  
10 world population lives in urban areas. By 2050, the global urban population is expected to increase  
11 by between 2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to 64% to 69% of the world population. By mid-century,  
12 more urban areas and infrastructure will be built than currently exist. The kinds of towns, cities, and  
13 urban agglomerations that ultimately emerge over the coming decades will have a critical impact on  
14 energy use and carbon emissions. The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC did not have a  
15 chapter on human settlements or urban areas. Urban areas were addressed through the lens of  
16 individual sector chapters. Since the publication of AR4, there has been a growing recognition of the  
17 significant contribution of urban areas to GHG emissions, their potential role in mitigating them, and  
18 a multi-fold increase in the corresponding scientific literature.

### 19 ***FAQ 12.2 What is the urban share of global energy and GHG emissions?***

20 The exact share of urban energy and GHG emissions varies with emission accounting frameworks  
21 and definitions. Urban areas account for 67-76% of global energy use and 71-76% of global energy-  
22 related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Using Scope1 accounting, urban share of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is about 44%.  
23 Urban areas account for between 53% and 87% (central estimate, 76%) of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from  
24 global final energy use and between 30% and 56% (central estimate, 43%) of global primary energy  
25 related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

### 26 ***FAQ 12.3: What is the potential of human settlements to mitigate climate change?***

27 Drivers of urban GHG emissions can be categorized into four major groups: economic geography and  
28 income, socio-demographic factors, technology, and infrastructure and urban form. Of these, the  
29 first three groups have been examined in greatest detail, and income is consistently shown to exert a  
30 high influence on urban GHG emissions. Socio-demographic drivers are of medium importance in  
31 rapidly growing cities, technology is a driver of high importance, and infrastructure and urban form  
32 are of medium to high importance as drivers of emissions. Key urban form drivers of GHG emissions  
33 are density, land use mix, connectivity, and accessibility. These factors are interrelated and  
34 interdependent. As such, none of them in isolation are sufficient for lower emissions.

35

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