INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON Climate Change Working Group III – Mitigation of Climate Change

# Chapter 4

# Sustainable Development and Equity

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4 **COMMENTS ON TEXT BY TSU TO REVIEWER**: This Chapter has been allocated 56 template pages, 5 currently it counts 71 pages (excluding this page and the bibliography), so it is 15 pages over target.

6 Reviewers are kindly asked to indicate where the chapter could be shortened.

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# **1 Executive Summary**

2 Since the first assessment report, the IPCC has considered issues of sustainable development (SD) 3 and equity: acknowledging the importance to climate decision-making, and progressively expanding the scope to include: the co-benefits of climate actions for SD and equity, the importance of 4 5 advancing broader SD objectives for effective climate response, the relevance of lifestyle and 6 behaviour, the relevance of procedural equity to effective decision-making, and the relevance of 7 ethical frameworks and equitable burden-sharing in assessing climate responses. In this Assessment 8 Report, we further explore key dimensions of SD and equity, highlighting the significance of 9 disparities across different groups, and the importance of advancing broader SD objectives and 10 equity for an effective climate response. [4.1]

SD is variably conceived as development that preserves the interests of future generations, that preserves the ecosystem services on which continued human flourishing depends, or that harmonizes the co-evolution of three pillars (economic, social, environmental). Weak sustainability allows for the substitution of natural capital with human-made capital, while strong sustainability requires the preservation of certain critical forms of natural capital such as a stable climate system and biodiversity. Ensuring SD is less ambitious but more consensual than seeking a socially optimal pathway. [4.2]

18 SD is a framing issue in this Assessment Report because it is intimately connected to climate change. 19 First, the climate threat constrains possible development paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate 20 change could preclude any prospect for sustainable future (high agreement, medium evidence). 21 Thus, a stable climate is one objective of SD. Second, there are trade-offs between climate responses 22 and broader sustainable development goals, because some climate responses can impose other 23 environmental pressures, have adverse distributional effects, draw resources away from other 24 developmental priorities, or otherwise impose limitations on growth and development. These trade-25 offs are studied in the sector chapters of this report, along with measures and strategies to minimize 26 them. Options for equitable burden-sharing can reduce the potential for the costs of climate action 27 to constrain development (high agreement, medium evidence). Third, there are multiple potential 28 synergies between climate responses and broader sustainable development efforts. Not only can 29 specific climate responses generate co-benefits for human and economic development, but at a 30 more fundamental level, the capacities underlying an effective climate response overlap strongly 31 with capacities for SD (high agreement, medium evidence). [4.2]

32 Equity permeates the SD literature. First, intergenerational equity underlies the basic notion of 33 sustainability. Intragenerational equity is often considered an intrinsic component of sustainable 34 development in relation to the social pillar, yet not without its qualifications. Meeting the needs of 35 the world's poor through the convergence of developing countries toward the standard of living of 36 the world's richest populations based on the same consumption patterns and production processes, 37 would be unsustainable and would threaten to exceed the regeneration and absorption capacity of 38 the Earth which would itself undermine the well-being of poor communities in particular (high 39 agreement, high evidence). [4.2]

40 Notwithstanding the challenges, compelling arguments have been put forward that equity, in its 41 multiple dimensions, be embraced as a fundamental component of sustainable development. In the 42 particular context of international climate change relations, the arguments encompass three 43 dimensions: a moral justification that draws upon ethical principles; a legal justification that appeals 44 to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements to cooperate on the basis of stated equity 45 principles; and an effectiveness justification that argues that a fair arrangement is more likely to be agreed internationally and successfully implemented domestically. (medium agreement, medium 46 47 evidence) [4.2]

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The latter justification is based on the fact that the climate change problem is a classic commons 1 2 problem, and thus an effective solution relies on collective action, which is more likely to be agreed 3 and effectively implemented if it is perceived to be fair in both its terms and the procedures through 4 which they were decided. This reinforces a regime's legitimacy, increasing countries' commitment to 5 fulfilling its requirements and reducing the risks of defection and a cooperative collapse. A relatively 6 small set of core equity principles that are well-grounded in moral philosophy serve as the basis for 7 most discussions of equitable burden-sharing in a climate regime: responsibility (for GHG emissions), 8 capacity (ability to pay for mitigation, but sometimes other dimensions of mitigative capacity), the 9 right to sustainable development, and equality (often interpreted as an equal entitlement to emit). 10 Various quantitative indicators can help illuminate how these various equity principles reflect on the 11 "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" of different nations or 12 national groupings, and burden-sharing frameworks – both resource-sharing and burden-sharing – 13 have been developed that draw in various ways on these equity principles. [4.2]

A useful set of determinants from which to examine the prospects for and impediments to sustainable development and equity are: the legacy of development; governance and political economy; population and demography; human and social capital; behaviour, culture and values; technology; natural resource endowments; and finance and investment. While it is possible to envision an evolution of each of these determinants as a driver (rather than barrier) to a sustainable development transition, each is also deeply embedded and highly inertial, posing profound challenges. [4.3]

Governing a transition toward a more sustainable development pathway is inevitably challenging because it involves multiple agents that hold vested interests, varying degrees of agency and power, and differential access to decision-making authority. This all reflects a political economy that conditions and mediates several realms of policy, organization, discourse and action, from international to national to local to individual levels. [4.3]

26 A society' transition towards sustainable development can be facilitated by enhancements to human 27 capital based on individual knowledge and skills, and social capital based on mutually beneficial 28 formal and informal relationships. At the level of individual values and behaviour, sustainable 29 development poses 'social dilemmas' where short-term narrow individual interests conflict with the 30 longer term social interests, with values that transcend selfishness and promote the welfare of 31 others being favourable to a sustainable development transition. However, formation of values and 32 their translation into behaviours is mediated by a many factors, including the available set of market 33 choices and lifestyles, the tenor of dominant information sources (including advertisements and 34 popular culture), the culture and priorities of formal and civil institutions, the prevailing governance 35 structures. All of these are embedded in and conditioned by the prevailing political economy, which 36 imposes tight structural constraints on the ability for individuals to make substantive, lasting, and 37 impactful change at the personal level. [4.3]

38 Technology and finance both are strong determinants of future societal paths. While society's 39 current systems of allocating resources and prioritizing efforts toward investment and innovation is 40 in many ways robust and dynamic, there are some fundamental tensions with the underlying ideals 41 of sustainable development. First, the financial and technological innovation systems are not 42 structured to balance the three pillars of sustainable development: they are highly responsive to 43 short-term financial motivations, but are sensitive to broader social and environmental costs and 44 benefits only to the relatively limited extent that they are internalized by regulation, taxation, laws 45 and social norms. Second, while they are quite responsive to market demand that is supported by 46 purchasing power, they are only indirectly responsive to needs, and particularly insensitive to "the 47 essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given". Third, thev 48 operate with a time horizon that is too short to be sensitive to "the ability of future generations to 49 meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987) [4.3]

The global consumption of goods and services has increased dramatically over the last decades, in both absolute and per capita terms, and is a key driver of environmental degradation, including global warming (high agreement, robust evidence). This trend involves the spread of highconsumption life-styles in some countries and sub-regions, while in other parts of the world large populations continue to live in poverty. There are high disparities in consumption both between and within countries. [4.4]

7 Two basic types of decoupling can be identified at the global scale and in the long term: the 8 decoupling of material resource consumption (including fossil fuels) and environmental impact 9 (including climate change) from economic growth, and the decoupling of economic growth from 10 human well-being. The first type – the dematerialization of the economy, i.e. of consumption and production - is generally considered crucial for meeting sustainable development and equity goals, 11 12 including mitigation of climate change. Production-based (territorial) accounting suggests some 13 decoupling of impacts from economic growth has occurred, especially in industrialized countries, but 14 the extent of this decoupling is significantly diminished based on a consumption-based accounting. 15 The consumption-based emissions are more strongly associated with GDP than production-based 16 emissions, because wealthier countries satisfy a higher share of their final consumption of products 17 through net imports compared to poorer countries. Ultimately, absolute levels of resource use and 18 environmental impact - including GHG emissions - generally continue to rise with GDP (high 19 agreement, robust evidence). The second type of decoupling – of human well-being from economic 20 growth - is a more controversial and novel concept than the first, at least in the context of climate 21 change mitigation. There are ethical controversies about the measure of well-being and the use of 22 subjective data for this purpose. There are also empirical controversies about the relationship 23 between subjective well-being and income, some recent studies across countries finding a clear 24 relationship between average levels of ladder-of-life satisfaction and per capita income, while the 25 evidence about the long-term relationship between satisfaction and income is less conclusive and 26 quite diverse among countries. Studies of emotional well-being do identify clear satiation points 27 beyond which further increases in income no longer improve individuals' ability to do what matters 28 most to their emotional well-being. Furthermore, income inequality has been found to have a 29 marked negative effect on average subjective well-being, due to perceived fairness and general trust 30 in the case of low income groups. [4.4]

31 How development paths unfold in the future will impact both emissions and mitigative capacity. Yet 32 the link between individual characteristics of the development paths (in particular, GDP growth rate) 33 and emissions is ambiguous (high agreement, robust evidence). In fact, understanding how 34 development paths impact on emissions and mitigative capacity, and, more generally, how 35 development paths can be made more sustainable and more equitable in the future requires in-36 depth analysis of the mechanisms that underpin these paths. Of particular importance are the 37 processes that may generate path dependence and lock-ins, notably "increasing returns" but also use of scarce resources, switching costs, negative externalities or complementarities between 38 39 outcomes. [4.5, 4.6]

The study of transitions between pathways is an emerging field of literature, notably in the context of technology transitions. Yet analyzing how to transition between pathways remains a major scientific challenge. To do so, models should simultaneously capture processes relevant for the short- term and for the long-term. And output-wise, models should provide information on the relationships between the economy, society, and the environment, and on the distribution of economic activity, notably across income groups, especially in the perspective of assessing the possible future evolution of well-being. [4.5, 4.7]

This chapter has focused on examining ways in which the broader objectives of equitable and sustainable development provide a policy frame for an effective, robust, and long-term response to the climate problem. While building both mitigative capacity and adaptive capacity relies to a profound extent on the same factors as those that are integral to equitable and sustainable development (high agreement, medium evidence), mitigation and adaptation measures can strongly affect broader SD and equity objectives, (high agreement, robust evidence) and it is thus necessary to assess their broader implications. Implications of measures can be assessed using alternative frameworks: the three pillars (economic, social, environmental), capital (productive, human, natural, social), and well-being. As risk is a central aspect of sustainability, the analysis of mitigation measures and measures should not stop with central estimates of consequences for SD and equity, but examine likelihood of potential impacts. [4.6, 4.8]

# 8 4.1 Introduction

#### 9 4.1.1 Key messages of previous IPCC reports

10 This chapter seeks to place climate change, and climate change mitigation in particular, in the 11 context of equity and sustainable development. Prior IPCC assessments have sought to do this as 12 well, progressively expanding the scope of assessment to include broader and more insightful 13 reflections on the policy-relevant contributions of academic literature.

14 The IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR) (IPCC, 1990) underscored the fundamental nature of equity 15 and sustainable development to climate policy. While the FAR gave only cursory consideration to 16 broader sustainable development objectives in its evaluation of potential response strategies, 17 focusing primarily on efficiency and effectiveness with respect to mitigation specifically, its more 18 important contribution was to squarely and explicitly place the imminent negotiations on a global 19 climate regime within an equity and sustainable development rubric. Specifically, in response to its 20 mandate to identify "possible elements for inclusion in a framework convention on climate change", 21 the IPCC specifically and prominently put forward the "endorsement and elaboration of the concept 22 of sustainable development" for negotiators to consider as part of the convention's Preamble. It also 23 noted that a key issue would be "how to address equitably the consequences for all" - and in 24 particular, "whether obligations should be equitably differentiated according to countries' respective 25 responsibilities for causing and combating climate change and their level of development". This set 26 the stage for the ensuing negotiations of the UNFCCC, which ultimately included explicit appeals to 27 equity and sustainable development, including in its Preamble, its Principles (Article 2), its Objective 28 (Article 3), and its Commitments (Article 4).

29 The IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) (IPCC, 1995), published after the UNFCCC was signed, 30 maintained this focus on equity and sustainable development. As with the FAR, the SAR's 31 assessment of potential response strategies treated broader sustainable development objectives 32 only briefly, although it reflected a growing appreciation for the prospects for sustainable 33 development co-benefits and reiterated the policy relevance of equity and sustainable development. 34 It did this most visibly within a special section of the Summary for Policymakers, which presented 35 "Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change", including "Equity and social considerations" and "Economic development to proceed in a 36 37 sustainable manner". Notably, the SAR added an emphasis on procedural equity, recognizing that a 38 climate regime cannot be equitable in its structure and implementation if it is not designed through 39 a legitimate process that empowers all actors to effectively participate, and arguing for the need to 40 build capacities and strengthen institutions, particularly in developing countries.

41 The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) conveyed important 42 lessons from the academic study of development pathways. The SRES demonstrated that broader 43 sustainable development goals can contribute indirectly, yet substantially, to reducing emissions. 44 This IPCC contribution reflected a change in the scientific literature, which had in recent years 45 expanded its discussion of sustainable development to encompass analyses of lifestyles, culture, and 46 behaviour, complementing its traditional techno-economic analyses. It also reflected a recognition 47 that economic growth (especially as currently measured) is not the sole goal of societies across the 48 globe. The SRES thus provided insights into how policy intervention can decouple economic growth from emissions and well-being from economic growth, showing that both forms of decoupling are
 important elements of a transition to a world with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

3 The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001) maintained and deepened the consideration of 4 broader sustainable development objectives in its assessment of potential response strategies. 5 Moreover, and perhaps owing to a growing appreciation for the severity of the climate challenge, the TAR stressed the need for an ambitious and encompassing response, and was thus more 6 7 attentive to the potential for climate-focused measures to conflict with basic development 8 aspirations. It thus articulated the fundamental equity challenge of climate change to be ensuring 9 "that neither the impact of climate change nor that of mitigation policies exacerbates existing 10 inequities both within and across nations", specifically because "restrictions on emissions will continue to be viewed by many people in developing countries as yet another constraint on the 11 12 development process". The TAR recognized, in other words, the need to deepen the analysis of 13 equitable burden-sharing as a basis for an equitable climate regime, but even more fundamentally as 14 a means to avoid undermining prospects for sustainable development in developing countries. More 15 generally, the TAR observed that equitable burden-sharing is not solely an ethical matter; even from 16 a rational-actor game-theoretic perspective, an agreement in which the burden is equitably shared is 17 more likely to be signed by a large number of countries, and thus to be more effective and efficient. 18 Equitable burden-sharing would provide the basis by which the developing countries could earnestly 19 engage in a global climate effort.

20 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007) further expanded the consideration of 21 broader sustainable development objectives in its assessment of potential response strategies. It 22 stressed the importance of civil society and other non-government actors in designing climate policy 23 and equitable sustainable development strategies in general. The AR4 focused more strongly than 24 previous assessments on the distributional implications of climate policies, noting that conventional 25 climate policy analysis that is based too narrowly on traditional utilitarian or cost-benefit 26 frameworks will neglect critical equity issues including human rights implications and moral 27 imperatives. Even more straightforwardly, it neglects both the distribution of costs and benefits of a 28 given set of policies, and the further distributional inequities that arise when these policies are 29 implemented in a world where the poor have limited scope to influence policy adoption and 30 implementation. This is particularly problematic, the AR4 notes, in integrated assessment model 31 (IAM) analyses of "optimal" mitigation pathways, because climate impacts do not affect the poor 32 exclusively, or even mainly, through changes in real incomes. Nor do these approaches satisfactorily 33 account for uncertainty and risk, which is treated differently by the poor compared with the rich, 34 due to their higher risk aversion and lower access to assets and financial mechanisms, such as 35 insurance, that buffer against shocks.

The AR4 went on to outline alternative ethical frameworks including rights-based and capabilitiesbased approaches, suggesting how they can inform climate policy decisions. In particular, the AR4 discussed the implications of these different frameworks for equitable international burden-sharing. It is these approaches that have inspired the environmental justice framework and informed its approach to climate policy decisions, both at the national and international levels.

The IPCC *Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation* (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011) deepened the consideration of broader sustainable development objectives in assessing renewable energies options, noting particularly that while they can be synergistic (for example, through helping to expand access to energy services, increase energy security, and reduce other environmental pressures), they also pose challenges (such as those relating to increasing pressure on land resources, and affordability) and that trade-offs must be negotiated in a manner that is sensitive to equity considerations.

The IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) (IPCC 2012a) raised key further dimensions of sustainable development 1 and equity, including the distinction and interplay between incremental and transformative changes

2 – both of which are necessary – and emphasized the importance of values in justifying the basis for desiring making a g - a human rights framework us utilitation cost honofit analysis

decision-making, e.g., a human rights framework vs utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.

Building upon the progressively more sophisticated understanding of the sustainable development
and equity context of climate change as found in the scientific literature and reflected in the prior
IPCC assessments, this Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) elaborates further on key dimensions and
expands the treatment in important directions.

# 8 **4.1.2** The narrative focus and key messages of this chapter

9 In keeping with the previous IPCC assessments, this chapter considers sustainable development and 10 equity as matters of policy relevance for climate change decision-makers. It examines the ways in 11 which climate change is in fact inextricably linked with sustainable development and equity. It 12 examines these links with the aim of drawing policy-relevant conclusions regarding equitable and 13 sustainable responses to climate change.

14 In one direction, the link is self-evident: an effective climate response is necessary for equitable and 15 sustainable development to occur. The disruptions that climate change would cause in the absence 16 of an effective societal response are sufficiently severe (AR5 WGI, AR5 WGII) to severely compromise 17 development, even taking into account future societies' ability to adapt (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). 18 Nor is this development likely to be equitable, as an increasingly inhospitable climate will most 19 seriously undermine the future prospects of those nations, communities, and individuals that are 20 already most in need of development. Without an effective response to climate change, including 21 both timely mitigation and proactive adaptation, development can be neither sustainable nor 22 equitable.

23 In recent years, the academic community has come increasingly to appreciate the extent to which SD 24 and equity are also needed as frameworks in which to assess and prioritize climate responses: given 25 the various trade-offs and synergies between the options for a climate response and the various 26 determinants and components of SD, the design of an effective climate response must respect the 27 demands for development and equity and exploit the synergies. A climate strategy that does not fit 28 this frame runs the risk either of being ineffective for lack of consensus and earnest implementation 29 or of jeopardizing SD just as unabated climate change would. Therefore, a shift toward more 30 equitable and sustainable modes of development may provide the only context in which an effective 31 climate response can be realized.

The scientific community is coming to understand that climate change is but one example of how humankind is pressing up against its planetary limits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005a; Rockström et al., 2009a). Technical measures can certainly help in the near-term to alleviate climate change. However, the comprehensive and durable strategies society needs are those that recognize climate change shares its root causes with other dimensions of the global sustainability crisis, and that without addressing these root causes, robust solutions may not be accessible.

This chapter, and many parts of this report, uncovers ways in which a broader agenda of sustainable development and equity may support and enable an effective societal response to the climate challenge, by establishing the basis by which mitigative and adaptive capacity can be built and sustained. In examining this perspective, this chapter focuses on several broad themes.

# 42 **4.1.2.1** Consumption, disparities and well-being

The first theme relates to well-being and consumption. We have long understood the relationship between aggregate levels of consumption and environmental pressures, including GHG emissions. What we are increasingly understanding is the significance of high-consumption lifestyles in particular and consumption disparities (Sec. 4.4). An important part of this literature relates to the methodologies for understanding and calculating the environmental impacts across national boundaries of different modes of consumption, through consumption-based accounting and GHG footprint analysis (Sec. 4.4). Important research is now being undertaken on the relationship between well-being and consumption, and how to moderate consumption and its impacts without sacrificing well-being – and indeed, while enhancing it. More research is now available on the importance of behaviour, lifestyles and culture, and their relationship to over-consumption.

5 At the same time, there are more data and research available to help understand "underconsumption", i.e., poverty and deprivation, and its impacts on well-being more broadly, and 6 7 specifically on the means by which it undermines mitigative and adaptive capacity. Energy poverty is 8 one critical example, linked directly to climate change, of under-consumption that is highly 9 correlated with weakening of livelihoods, lack of resilience, and limiting of mitigative and adaptive 10 capacity. Overcoming under-consumption and reversing over-consumption, while maintaining and advancing human well-being, are fundamental dimensions of a transition to a sustainable 11 12 development pathway, and are equally critical to resolving the climate problem (see Sec. 4.5).

#### 13 **4.1.2.2** Equity at the national and international scales

Given the disparities evident in consumption patterns, the distributional implications of climate response strategies are critically important. As recent history shows, understanding how policies affect different segments of the population is critical to designing and implementing politically acceptable and effective national climate response strategies. A just transition would be helpful to build the level of public support needed for the substantial techno-economic, institutional and lifestyle shifts needed to reduce emissions substantially and enable adaptive responses.

At the international level, an equitable regime with fair burden-sharing is likely to be a necessary condition for an effective global response (Sec. 4.2, 4.7). Given the urgency of the climate challenge, a rather rapid transition will be required if the global temperature rise is to be kept below any of the politically discussed targets, such as 1.5°C or 2°C over pre-industrial levels, with global emissions peaking as soon as 2020. Particularly in a situation calling for a concerted global effort, the most promising response is a cooperative approach "that would quickly require humanity to think like a society of people, not like a collection of individual states" (Victor 1998).

While scientific assessments cannot define what is equitable and how equity should be interpreted in implementing the Convention and climate policies in general, they can help illuminate the implications of alternative choices and their ethical basis (Sec 4.7, also Chapter 3, Chapter 13).

# 30 **4.1.2.3** Building institutions and capacity for democratic governance

Charting an effective and viable course through the climate challenge is not merely a technical exercise. It will involve myriad and sequential decisions, among states and civil society actors, supported by the broadest possible constituencies. (Sec. 4.3) Such a process requires the education and empowerment of diverse actors to participate in systems of decision-making that are designed and implemented with procedural equity as a deliberate objective. This is true at the national as well as international levels, where effective governance relating to global common resources, in particular, is not yet mature.

Any given approach to addressing the climate challenge has potential winners and losers. The political feasibility of that approach will depend strongly on the distribution of power, resources, and decision-making authority among those potential winners and losers. In a world characterized by profound disparities, systems of democratic engagement and governance are needed to enable a polity to come to equitable and sustainable solutions to climate. This applies to decisions relating to finance and technology (4.3).

# 44 **4.2** Approaches and indicators

This section maps out the various conceptual approaches to the issues of sustainable development (4.2.1), equity (4.2.2), and their linkages to climate change and climate policy.

# 1 4.2.1 Sustainability and sustainable development (SD)

- 2 **4.2.1.1** Defining and measuring sustainability
- The most frequently quoted definition is from *Our Common Future* (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987), the Brundtland Report:
- 5 Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 6 the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
- the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which
   overriding priority should be given; and
- 9 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 10 environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

11 This definition acknowledges a tension between sustainability and development (Jabareen, 2006), 12 and that for developing countries, development objectives are for basic needs to be met for all 13 citizens and secured in a sustainable manner (Murdiyarso, 2010). One of the first definitions of SD 14 (Prescott-Allen, 1980) referred to a process of development that is compatible with the preservation 15 of ecosystems and species.

16 A popular conceptualization of SD goes beyond securing needs and preserving the environment and 17 involves three "pillars" or three "bottom-lines" of sustainability: environmental, economic, and 18 social aspects (Dobson, 1991; Elkington, 1998; Flint and Danner, 2001; Pope et al., 2004; Sneddon et 19 al., 2006; Murdiyarso, 2010; Okereke, 2011). There is some variation in the articulation of the three 20 spheres, with some arguing for an equal appraisal of their co-evolution and mutual interactions, and 21 others considering that there is a hierarchy and that economic activities are embedded in the social 22 matrix, which is itself grounded in the ecosphere – this debate may affect relative priorities for 23 action (Levin, 2000; Fischer et al., 2007). This broad SD framework is equally relevant for rich 24 countries concerned with growth, well-being, human development, and lifestyles.

25 An important distinction opposes weak sustainability to strong sustainability approaches (Neumayer, 26 2010). The former rely on the assumption that human-made capital can replace natural resources 27 and ecosystem services with a high degree of substitutability, and that what matters is the aggregate 28 value of all capital stocks. The notion of strong sustainability, in contrast, relies on the view that 29 certain critical natural stocks – such as the climate system and biodiversity – cannot be replaced by 30 human-made capital and must be preserved. Weak sustainability is often believed to be inherent to 31 economic modelling that aggregates all forms of capital together, as in the genuine savings indicator 32 introduced in Box 4.2.1 (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). But economic models and indicators can 33 accommodate any degree of substitutability between different forms of capital (Fleurbaey and 34 Blanchet, 2013). The question of substitutability also arises regarding the various forms of natural 35 capital (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). A different but related issue is whether one should evaluate 36 development paths only in terms of human well-being or also take account of natural systems as 37 intrinsically valuable (McShane, 2007; Attfield, 2008). While respecting other species implies a form 38 of strong sustainability, it is not a precondition. It can also be argued on the grounds that human 39 flourishing requires a preserved natural environment that can provide critical ecosystem services 40 (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005a).

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Box 4.2.1 Sustainable development indicators (SDI)

When SD started to become an integral consideration in policy-making, SDI initiatives flourished in the early 1990s. Conceptual frameworks for SDIs help focus and clarify what to measure, what to expect from measurement and what kind of indicators to use. Pressure-state-response (PSR) and capital accounting-based (CAB) frameworks, in particular, were widely used to assess sustainability.

The PSR approach was further modified as driving force-state-response (DSR) by UNCSD (2001) and 1 driving force-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR) by UNEP (UNEP, 1997, 2000, 2002). The 2 3 System of Integrated Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations offers a 4 wealth of information about the state of ecosystems and is currently under revision and expansion.<sup>1</sup> The CAB approach is embodied in the Adjusted Net Savings indicator of the World Bank (2003, 5 6 2011). It is based on the economic theory of "genuine savings" that is summarized at the end of this 7 box.

- 8 General presentations and critical assessments of SDIs can be found in a large literature (Daly, 1996; 9 Aronsson et al., 1997; Pezzey and Toman, 2002; Lawn, 2003; Hamilton and Atkinson, 2006; Asheim, 10 2007; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007; Neumayer, 2010; Martinet, 2012; Mori and Christodoulou, 2012; 11 Fleurbaey and Blanchet, 2013). This literature is pervaded by a concern for comprehensiveness – recording all important aspects of well-being, equity, and nature preservation for current and future 12 13 generations – and accuracy – avoiding arbitrary or unreliable weighting of the relevant dimensions 14 when synthesizing multidimensional information.
- The CAB approach assumes that social welfare over current and future generations is a function of 15
- the current stocks of manmade and natural capital:  $W(S_t)$ . Its evolution can be written as 16
- $\frac{dW}{dt} = p_t \frac{dU}{dt}$ , where the "accounting price" vector  $p_t$  is the vector of partial derivatives of W with 17
- respect to each stock (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000). The path of generational welfare<sup>2</sup>  $U_{\tau}$  for  $\tau \geq t$ , 18
- is said to sustain the current level  $U_t$  if welfare is never lower than this level along the path. The 19
- 20 current level is said to be sustainable is there exists a feasible path that sustains it (Pezzey and
- 21 Toman, 2002; Asheim, 2007).

# If the discounted utilitarian criterion is used, $W(S_t) = \int_t^{\infty} e^{-\rho(t-t)} U_{\tau}(S_t) d\tau$ , under time consistency assumptions one also has $\frac{dW}{dt} = \rho W(S_t) - U_t(S_t)$ . Therefore, if "genuine savings" $p_t \frac{dS}{dt}$ are

- 22
- 23
- negative, one has  $\rho W(S_t) < U_t(S_t)$ , which implies that  $U_\tau(S_t) < U_t(S_t)$  at some future date  $\tau$ 24
- because  $\rho W(S_t)$  is a weighted average of  $U_t(S_t)$  over all future dates. Negative genuine savings 25
- thus imply that the current welfare  $U_t(S_t)$  will not be sustained (Fleurbaev, 2009). This test is valid 26
- 27 even if the utilitarian criterion is not used in policy decisions. If the policy does rely on the utilitarian
- criterion and  $W(S_t)$  is maximal at the contemplated path, more can be said because there is no 28
- feasible path that avoids this downturn, so that current welfare is then unsustainable (Hamilton and 29
- Clemens, 1999; Pezzey, 2004). 30
- Let the maximum sustainable level of  $U_{\tau}(S_t)$  for  $\tau \geq t$ , i.e., the greatest level u such that 31
- $U_{\tau}(S_t) \ge u$  for all  $\tau \ge t$ , be denoted  $V(S_t)$ . Its evolution can be written as  $\frac{dV}{dt} = q_t \frac{dS}{dt}$ , where  $q_t$ 32
- is the vector of "maximin prices", the partial derivatives of V. If this quantity is positive, necessarily 33
- $U_t(S_t) \leq V(S_t)$  and the current level  $U_t(S_t)$  is sustainable in the future, though it may not be 34
- 35 sustained along the contemplated path (Cairns and Martinet, 2012).
- 36 In conclusion, one obtains two CAB indicators. Non-negative genuine savings at discounted
- 37 utilitarian prices are necessary for a sustained path (and negative genuine savings at these prices are
- 38 sufficient for unsustainability if the path is discounted utilitarian optimal); positive genuine savings at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Documentation is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seearev/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Welfare, or equivalently well-being, for a generation can be measured in any way that is deemed relevant (in particular, it need not be a narrow notion of economic utility).

- 1 maximin prices are sufficient for sustainability. The indicators  $p_t \frac{dS}{dt}$  and  $q_t \frac{dS}{dt}$  can be decomposed dS
- 2 by sectors if the contribution of each sector of the economy to the evolution of stocks  $\overline{dt}$  can be
- 3 identified (Asheim and Wei, 2008).
- 4 Computing CAB indicators compounds the difficulty of comprehensively estimating the evolution of
- 5 capital stocks with the difficulty of computing the accounting prices. While market prices do provide
- 6 relevant information in a perfectly managed economy (a striking result due to Weitzman (1976)), 7 they may be your micloading in actual conditions (Descurts and Mäler, 2000; K L Arrow et al., 2010)
- 7 they may be very misleading in actual conditions (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; K.J. Arrow et al., 2010).
- 8 Sustainability is closely related to resilience (WG2-Sections 2.4 and 20.3, Folke et al. (2010), Gallopin
- 9 (2006), Goerner et al. (2009)) and vulnerability (Kates, 2001; Clark and Dickson, 2003). A key premise
- 10 of this direction of research is that social and biophysical processes are interdependent and co-11 evolving (Polsky and Eakin, 2011). The biosphere itself is a complex adaptive system, the monitoring
- 12 of which is still perfectible (Levin, 2000; Thuiller, 2007).
- Various approaches toward achieving sustainability are discussed in 4.5. Although SD is a contested concept, there are internationally agreed principles of SD adopted by heads of states and governments at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and reaffirmed at subsequent review and implementation conferences (United Nations, 1992a, 1997, 2002, 2012a). One guiding principle is: "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations" (1992 Rio Declaration
- 19 Principle 3). The Rio principles were reaffirmed at the June 2012 summit level UN Conference on SD.

# 20 **4.2.1.2** Links with climate change and climate policy

- 21 The literature on the complex relations between climate change, climate policies, and sustainable
- development is large (Swart et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 2006; Bizikova et al., 2007; Sathaye et al.,
- 23 2007; Thuiller, 2007; Akimoto et al., 2012; Janetos et al., 2012). The links between SD and climate
- issues are examined in detail in Chapter 20 of WG2. Mapping out these links is also important in the
- 25 WG3 report; this subsection puts the relevant components of the report in perspective.
- Three main linkages can be identified, each of which contains many elements. First, the climate threat constrains possible development paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any prospect for sustainable future (Chapter 19 of WG2). In this perspective, a stable climate is one objective of SD, and thus an effective climate response (both mitigation and adaptation) is necessarily an integral part of an effective SD strategy.
- 31 Second, there are trade-offs between climate responses and broader sustainable development 32 goals, because some climate responses can impose other environmental pressures, have adverse 33 distributional effects, draw resources away from other developmental priorities, or otherwise 34 impose limitations on growth and development. These trade-offs are studied in the sector chapters 35 of this report, along with measures and strategies to minimize them, and section 4.7 examines 36 options for equitable burden-sharing to reduce the potential for the costs of climate action to 37 constrain development. Conversely, development along existing trends contributes to climate (and 38 other environmental) pressures. Section 4.4 examines if such trade-offs can be loosened by changing 39 behavioural patterns and decoupling emissions and growth, and/or decoupling growth and well-40 being.
- Third, there are multiple potential synergies between climate responses and broader sustainable development efforts. Climate responses may generate co-benefits for human and economic development in several well-documented ways, e.g., when low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies enhance livelihood opportunities, or reduce other environmental pollutants. (Section 3.9 contains a detailed presentation of the notion of co-benefits, and Chapter 6 contains a summary of the co-benefits of mitigation policies identified in the sectoral chapters of the WG3 report.) At a

more fundamental level, capacities underlying an effective climate response overlap strongly with 1 2 capacities for SD, as discussed in section 4.6, and the drivers and barriers to SD are important 3 determinants of the prospects for an effective climate response as well, as analyzed in section 4.3. 4 Conversely, lack of development and poverty are characterized by a lack of basic capacities that 5 raises vulnerability to the climate and makes effective mitigation difficult, as discussed in section 4.3 6 and chapter 5. Moreover, formulating climate responses as a component of a broader strategy of 7 equitable and sustainable development may be a key factor to ensuring cooperation between 8 countries and gathering political support within countries, as discussed in 4.2.2 and in the review of 9 burden-sharing in section 4.7.

10 The trade-offs and synergies between climate response and development are given many concrete illustrations in the next chapters of this report, and the analysis of the positive and negative 11 12 implications of climate responses for broader SD objectives in these chapters is introduced and 13 summarized in section 4.8. Developing a successful strategy for sustainable development requires 14 exploiting the opportunities created by the synergies between climate policy and sustainable development, and "mainstreaming" climate issues into the design of sustainable development 15 16 strategies (Metz et al., 2002; Brown and Corbera, 2003; Swart et al., 2003; Olsen, 2007; Gupta and 17 Grijp, 2010; Murdiyarso, 2010). The WG2 and WG3 volumes of this Assessment Report can be 18 viewed as resources for the design of such a strategy. The analysis of development paths from the 19 point of view of SD is examined in section 4.5, and the design of scenarios is analyzed in chapter 6.

FAQ 4.1 Why does IPCC need to think about sustainable development? If we respond to climate change won't sustainable development follow?

22

23 Climate change is a threat to sustainable development. Addressing the climate risks is therefore 24 needed in order to achieve sustainable and equitable development for the coming generations. 25 Though addressing climate is necessary, it is not sufficient, as there are other threats such as the 26 depletion of natural resources, pollution hazards, inequalities, or geopolitical tensions. As 27 policymakers are concerned with the broader issues of sustainable development, it is important to 28 reflect on how climate risks and policies fit in the general outlook. Moreover, preparing societies to 29 move to sustainable development pathways provides a favourable setting for building mitigative and 30 adaptive capacity ultimately needed to address climate change.

#### **4.2.2** Equity and its relation to sustainable development and climate change

32 Equity plays a key role in research and policy debates about sustainable development and climate 33 issues. It arises both with respect to distributive equity (distribution of resources in specific contexts 34 such as burden-sharing, distribution of well being in the broader context of social justice, see 35 sections 4.4, 4.7, 4.8) and procedural equity (participation in decision-making, see 4.3). Various 36 aspects of the general concept, as developed in social ethics, have been introduced in Chapter 3. The 37 aim of this subsection is to analyze the links between equity, SD, and climate issues. Note that in this 38 chapter the terms equity, fairness, and justice are given similar meanings and are used 39 interchangeably.

Equity between generations underlies the very notion of sustainable development. There has been a 40 41 recent surge of research on intergenerational equity, motivated by dissatisfaction with the tradition 42 of discounting the utility of future generations in the analysis of growth paths (see, e.g., Asheim 43 (2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2007) for recent syntheses). The debate on discounting has been 44 reviewed in Chapter 3. This literature has delivered original simple arguments in favour of 45 sustainability. A first argument is that a path in which well-being decreases at some point in time is 46 obviously inequitable when an investment in favour of the disadvantaged future has a positive rate 47 of return, so that, when increasing the investment, the future becomes better-off than the present 48 before the latter becomes as poor as the former was initially (Asheim et al., 2001). Another 49 argument in favour of sustainability is that it is easy to justify giving a strong priority to the future 1 when many future generations are worse off than the present generation, even in absence of a

positive rate of return to investments. Indeed, investing for many of the future generations equally
 may not benefit each of them much, but is nevertheless worthwhile by a mere application of the
 Pigou-Dalton transfer principle<sup>3</sup> (Asheim et al., 2012).

5 Equity within every generation is often considered an intrinsic component of sustainable 6 development in relation to the social pillar. This is clearly expressed in the Brundtland Commission's 7 elevation of "the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given" as 8 a fundamental objective of sustainable development. This reflects considerably greater 9 prioritization to equity than the status quo, in which humanity has chronically failed to meet the 10 essential needs of a large fraction of its population. Indeed, continued failure to resolve these inequities may be politically unsustainable, especially in a world that is increasingly materially 11 12 capable of meeting those needs. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000, 13 might be seen as one indication of a more explicit global commitment to lessen inequities (United 14 Nations, 2000).

15 Yet, the relation between equity within generations and sustainable development is complex. It is 16 evident that if meeting the needs of the world's poor meant that developing countries must 17 converge toward the standard of living of the world's richest populations based on the same 18 consumption patterns and production processes, it would unsustainable and would threaten to 19 exceed the regeneration and absorption capacity of the Earth (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 20 2005a; Rockström et al., 2009a; Steffen et al., 2011; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 21 2014). Such a scenario would not likely play out well for the world's poor. As articulated by Okerere 22 (2011), environmental issues are interwoven with the fabric of racial, social and economic injustice, 23 with environmental costs and benefits often distributed such that those who already suffer other 24 socio-economic disadvantages tend to bear the greatest burden.

25 Still, despite the formidable challenges, compelling arguments have been put forward that equity, in 26 its multiple dimensions, be embraced as a fundamental objective of sustainable development. While 27 recognizing the complexity of the issue, we focus here on one key dimension of equity that is of 28 central importance to deliberations about an effective global response to climate change. As in 29 many other contexts, fundamental questions of resource allocation and burden-sharing arise in 30 climate change. Economic theories of fair allocation have examined various notions of equity (e.g., 31 minimal rights, solidarity, no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence) and their relevance to climate change as 32 a problem of collective action (Moulin, 2003; Raymond, 2003; Thomson, 2011). Here we examine 33 the three primary lines of argument that have been put forward to justify equitable burden-sharing 34 in the climate context. (Section 4.7 examines the details of burden-sharing principles and 35 frameworks in a climate regime.)

Moral justification: The first justification is the normative claim that it is morally proper to allocate burdens associated with our common global climate challenge according to ethical principles. The broad set of ethical arguments for ascribing moral obligations to individual nations has been reviewed in Chapter 3, drawing implicitly upon a cosmopolitan view of justice, which posits that the rights and duties that obtain between people within nations also obtain between people of different nations.

42 **Legal justification**: The second justification is the legal claim that countries have accepted treaty 43 commitments to act against climate change that include the commitment to share the burden of 44 action equitably. This claim derives from the fact that signatories to the UNFCCC have agreed that: 45 "Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 46 humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle says that making a redistributive transfer between two unequally endowed individuals reduces inequality and increases social welfare (Chakravarty, 2009).

responsibilities and respective capabilities." This agreement echoes the 1992 Rio Declaration on 1 2 Environment and Development(United Nations, 1992b), reaffirmed at the 2012 Rio Conference on 3 Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2012a), which elaborates further on the connection between burden-sharing and underlying ethical principles: "States shall cooperate in a spirit of 4 5 global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's 6 ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have 7 common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility 8 that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their 9 societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 10 command." (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7). While the definition of 11 equity is not elaborated in quantified detail in the UNFCCC, it does give it practical meaning by assigning distinct qualitative obligations to categories of countries that were defined according to 12 13 level of development. (See 4.7.3.1.)

14 These specific legal statements are further buttressed by a body of soft law and norms relating to 15 the nature of obligations and their relation to principles such as moral responsibility (Stone, 2004). 16 The no-harm rule is a widely recognised principle of customary international law whereby a State is 17 duty-bound to prevent, reduce or control the risk of serious environmental harm to other States. For 18 example, nations have expressly recognized (most notably in the Stockholm Convention of 1972 and 19 reiterated in Rio Declaration of 1992) that they have "the responsibility to ensure that activities 20 within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." The 1992 Rio Declaration further notes that 21 22 "National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and 23 the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 24 principle, bear the cost of pollution ... "

Another further legal justification notes that climate change adversely affects a range of human rights that are incorporated in widely ratified treaties, and raises the prospect that states are thus obliged to protect peoples and individuals from climate change-related human rights violations (Aminzadeh, 2006; Humphreys, 2009; Knox, 2009; Wewerinke and Yu III, 2010; Bodansky, 2010). This concern has been formally recognized by the United Nations Human Rights Council (in Resolutions 7/23 and 10/4), but has not reached definitive legal resolution (Posner, 2007; Bodansky, 2010).

32 *Effectiveness justification*: The third justification is the positive claim that equitable burden-sharing 33 will be necessary if the climate challenge is to be effectively met. This claim derives from the fact 34 that climate change is a classic commons problem (Soroos, 1997; Buck, 1998; Folke, 2007; Folke et 35 al., 2010) (Also see section 13.2.2.1). Actors (whether states, firms or individuals) receive the full 36 benefits of emitting GHGs, but bear a negligible share of the costs (climate change impacts), thus 37 creating an incentive for all rational emitters to over-emit. Or, put another way, individuals bear the 38 full costs of mitigation, but receive only a negligible share of the benefits (avoided climate change), 39 thus the incentive for all rational mitigators to under-mitigate relative to the global optimum. Posed 40 the first way, we have the classic tragedy of the commons; posed the second way, we have the free-41 rider problem. But however posed, the scenario is one in which individually rational decision-making 42 leads to an outcome that is collectively disastrous.

43 As with any commons problem, the solution lies in collective action (Ostrom, 1990). This is true at 44 the global scale as well as the local, only more challenging to achieve (Ostrom et al., 1999). In the 45 case of climate, an actor then justifies the cost of additional mitigation not because it is 46 compensated by the direct benefits of reduced climate change, but rather because it induces 47 comparable mitigation action among other actors. Inducing that cooperation relies, to an important 48 degree, on convincing others that one is doing one's fair share, i.e., not free riding. It is for this 49 reason that notions of equitable burden-sharing are considered important in motivating actors to 50 effectively respond to climate change. They are even more important given that actors are not as

equal as the proverbial "commoners," where the very name asserts homogeneity (Milanović et al., 1 2 2007). To the contrary, there are important asymmetries or inequalities between stakeholders 3 (Okereke et al., 2009; Okereke, 2010): asymmetry in contribution to climate change (past and 4 present), in vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, in capacity to mitigate the problem, and 5 in power to decide on solutions (i.e. ways of addressing climate change can reduce or further 6 exacerbate inequity). Other aspects of the relation between intragenerational equity and climate 7 response include the gender issues noted in 4.2.1.2, and the role of virtue ethics and citizen 8 attitudes in changing lifestyles and behaviours (Dobson, 2007; Lane, 2012), a topic analyzed in 4.4.

9 Young (2013) has identified three general conditions under which the successful formation and 10 eventual effectiveness of a collective action regime may hinge on equitable burden-sharing. The first condition is the absence of actors who are powerful enough to coercively impose their preferred 11 12 burden-sharing arrangements on other members. In the case of climate, the distribution across 13 countries of geopolitical power and GHG emissions precludes this. The second condition, which 14 climate change also satisfies, is that standard utilitarian methods of calculating costs and benefits 15 are not straightforwardly applicable to regime participation. In this situation, a reliable calculus of 16 expected returns cannot be used to buttress a convincing strategy of shrewd bargaining. The third 17 condition is that regime effectiveness relies on a long-term commitment of members to implement 18 its terms. The perception of fairness – in both the terms of the arrangements and the procedures 19 through which they were decided – reinforces the regime's legitimacy, increasing countries' 20 commitment to fulfilling its requirements and reducing the risks of defection and a cooperative 21 collapse. Conversely, regimes that many members find unfair will be vulnerable to festering tensions 22 that jeopardize the regime's effectiveness (Young, 2012). Specifically, any attempt to protect the 23 climate by keeping living standards low for a large part of the world population will face strong 24 political resistance, and will almost certainly fail (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Baer, Kartha, et al., 2009). 25 While costs of participation may provide incentives for non-cooperation or defection in the short-26 term, a climate regime is not a one-shot game; cooperation at one time and in one venue is seen in 27 both theory and practice to facilitate broader and longer-term cooperation, with the many 28 associated benefits. Clearly, the climate negotiations are ongoing, not a one-shot game, and they are 29 embedded in a much broader global context; climate change is only one of many global problems -30 environmental, economic, and social - that will require effective cooperative global governance if 31 development – and indeed human welfare – is to be sustained in the long term (Kjellén, 2004; 32 Singer, 2004; Jasanoff, 2004; Speth and Haas, 2006).

33 The effectiveness of a regime can also be expected to be enhanced by equitable burden-sharing 34 when the underlying equity principles tend to place higher obligations on countries that can more 35 easily fulfil them than on countries that would face hardship doing so. In the context of climate 36 change, the main equity principles under discussion (see 4.7.3.1) generally assign greater burdens 37 to developed countries, which have more resources to invest in emission reductions, and lower burdens to developing countries, whose resources are limited and constrained by immediate 38 39 demands, such as the struggle to eradicate poverty, that are more politically pressing than the threat 40 of climate impacts.

41 Despite these three lines of justification, the question of the role that equity does or should play in 42 the establishment of global climate policy and burden-sharing in particular is nonetheless 43 controversial. (Victor, 1998). The fact that there is no universally accepted global authority to 44 enforce participation is taken by some to mean that sovereignty, not equity is the prevailing 45 principle. Such a conception implies that the bottom-line criterion for a self-enforcing (Barrett, 2005) 46 cooperative agreement would be simply that everyone is no worse off than the status quo. This has 47 been termed "International Paretianism" (Posner and Weisbach, 2010), and its ironic, even perverse 48 results have been pointed out: "an optimal climate treaty could well require side payments to rich 49 countries like the United States and rising countries like China, and indeed possibly from very poor 50 countries which are extremely vulnerable to climate change - such as Bangladesh." (Ibid., p. 86).

However, the assumption that nations can be treated as unified rational actors, maximizing their 1 2 discounted economic costs and benefits, is neither theoretically nor empirically robust. Both critics 3 and advocates of the importance of equity in the climate negotiations acknowledge that 4 governments can choose to act on moral rather than purely self-interested principles, either because 5 of or in spite of the expressed desires of their citizens and domestic interest groups (DeCanio and 6 Fremstad, 2010; Posner and Weisbach, 2010, 2012; Baer, 2013; Jamieson, 2013). Whether or not 7 states behave as rational actors, given the significant global gains to be had from cooperation, this 8 leaves ample room for discussion of the role of equity in the distribution of those global gains, while 9 still leaving all parties better off (Stone, 2004).

- 10 **Box 4.2.2** Co-benefits and equity
- 11

12 The distributional co-benefits of climate policy are analyzed in 3.10.1.2 in terms of impacts on 13 consumer and producer surplus and related rents. In this box we explain how to make use of 14 standard distributional objectives derived from a social welfare function (3.4.6, 3.6.1-2).

Suppose that the overall objective of the policy-maker is  $W(u_1, ..., u_n)$ , where  $u_i$  measures individual i 's well-being (or whatever magnitude is deemed relevant to assess an individual situation). Normalising the function so that  $W(u, ..., u) \equiv u$ , one can write (Atkinson, 1970):


18 
$$W(u_1, ..., u_n) = \bar{u}(1 - l(u_1, ..., u_n)),$$

19 where an upper bar denotes the average value, and  $I(u_1, ..., u_n)$  is an inequality index that

20 measures the impact of inequalities in well-being on social welfare. This formula can then be used as

21 in Equation 3.9.1 in order to isolate the impact of a policy on the distribution of well-being.

- 22 Figure 4.2.1 summarizes the main relations between the notions of this section, in particular the
- 23 potentially conflicting developmental and environmental goals of policy-makers, the conceptual and
- 24 practical equity underpinnings, and the complex interactions between SD and climate policy.



25

26 Figure 4.2.1 Links between SD, equity, and climate policy

# 27 4.3 Determinants, drivers and barriers

This section explores the determinants of sustainable development and equity, emphasizing their relationship with climate change mitigation. Determinants refer to social processes, properties, and 1 artefacts, as well as natural resource endowments, which together condition and mediate the course 2 of societal development, and thus the prospects for sustainable development. Those determinants

3 that facilitate SD we call drivers, and those that inhibit SD are barriers.

4 The determinants discussed in this section are a set that usefully highlights key factors of interest to 5 decision-makers concerned with the prospects and impediments for sustainable development. The 6 determinants considered are: the legacy of development, governance and political economy, 7 population and demography, human and social capital, behaviour, culture and values, technology 8 and innovation processes, natural resource endowments, and finance and investment. This section 9 briefly discusses how each of these determinants influences the extent to which societies can 10 balance the economic, social and environmental pillars of SD, whilst highlighting synergies and potential trade-offs for the building of mitigation and adaptation capacity and realisation of effective 11 12 and equitable mitigation and adaptation strategies.

- 13 It is important to state some caveats. First, there is no definitive set of factors that can objectively be 14 called the fundamental causal determinants of societal development. Factors are interdependent, 15 characterized by feedbacks that blur the distinction between cause and effect, and their relevance 16 depends on time and place (see the analogous discussion in the context of drivers of GHG emissions 17 in section 5.3.). The discussion of determinants in this section could have been organized differently 18 (for example, governance and political economy could have been separated and each examined in 19 considerably more detail), or other determinants could have been added, such as leadership (Jones 20 and Olken, 2005), randomness (Holling, 1973; Arthur, 1989), or human nature (Wilson, 1978). While these are popularly perceived as strong determinants of the course of societal development, they 21 22 are less amenable to deliberate intervention by policy-makers and other decision-makers.
- 23 Second, analysis based on any framework of determinants (or drivers) must be interpreted with 24 caution. Consider the I-PAT identity (Impact = Population x Affluence x Technology) introduced by 25 Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), a straightforward accounting framework that decomposes an arbitrary 26 environmental impact into the three key contributions, which was developed to help resolve the 27 controversial question as to whether population growth was a key driver of environmental 28 degradation and how it could be mitigated by better technologies. Its refinement – the Kaya identiy 29 (Kaya, 1990) – was adopted by the energy community for use in analyzing emissions, and has served 30 as a useful initial step beyond simple mono-causal analysis. Yet, its value for meaningful quantitative 31 decompositions and explanatory power has been shown to be severely limited (O'Neill et al., 2001). 32 The underlying distinction between the number of emitting units and emissions per unit does not 33 necessarily have to assume that the emitting units are individual people; households may actually be 34 the more appropriate emitting units (MacKellar et al., 1995). Alternatively, one could also assume 35 that it is the number of engines or fires or any CO2 emitting human-made devices. Depending on 36 these choices the whole issue is framed very differently and hence the conclusions and 37 recommendations derived tend to be different. Additionally, the identity is based on the assumption 38 of homogeneity of the emitting units, i.e. that every person added to the population (at a given level 39 of national affluence and technology) causes the same environmental impact, which is evidently 40 incorrect. Further, the three components are clearly not independent as the rate of population 41 growth is closely related to affluence and the efficiency of technology is related to both of them. And 42 finally, a decomposition of this sort tends to be meaningless when the components move into 43 different directions, e.g. population shrinks while income per person increases. Additionally, studies 44 demonstrate that informal institutions can play a mediating role in regulating resource use in 45 contexts of rising populations (Mazzucato and Niemeijer, 2002).
- 46 FAQ 4.2 What are the main drivers of a transition toward SD?
- 47

- 48 There are many factors that determine the development path, and simple accounting formulas like 49 Kaya, though helpful, do not suffice to capture the complexity of the causal mechanisms determining
- 50 the course of societal development. Among the main factors that can be influenced by policy

decisions, one can list governance, human and social capital, technology, and finance. Population
 size, behaviors and values are also important factors. Managing the transition toward SD also

3 requires taking account of path dependence and potential favorable or unfavorable lock-ins (e.g. via

4 infrastructures), and attention to the political economy in which all of these factors are embedded.

#### 5 4.3.1 Legacy of development

Following World War II, diverse relations - security, economic, and humanitarian - between rich 6 7 nations and poor nations were comingled and addressed under the umbrella of "development" (Sachs, Wolfgang, 1999). Differing perspectives on the mixed outcomes of six decades of 8 9 development, and what the outcomes may indicate about underlying intentions and capabilities, 10 inform different actors in different ways as to what will work to address climate change and the 11 transition to SD. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, expectations were firmly implanted that 12 poverty could and would be reduced dramatically by the end of the century (Rist, 2003). It was 13 widely believed that economic development could be instigated and sustained through aid, both 14 financial and in kind, from richer nations. Development was seen as a process of going through 15 stages starting with transforming traditional agriculture through education, the introduction of new 16 agricultural technologies, improved access to capital for farm improvements, and the construction of 17 transportation infrastructure to facilitate markets. Improved agriculture would release workers for 18 an industrial stage and thereby further improve opportunities for education and commercial 19 development in cities. As development proceeded, nations would increasingly acquire their own 20 scientific capabilities and, later, sophisticated governance structures to regulate finance and industry 21 in the public good, becoming well-rounded, well-governed economies.

22 By the 1970s, however, it was clear that development was not on a path to fulfilling these linear 23 expectations because: 1) contributions of aid from the rich nations were not at the levels promised; 24 2) technological and institutional changes were only partially successful, proved inappropriate, or 25 had unpredicted, unfortunate consequences; 3) requests for military aid and the security and 26 economic objectives of richer nations in the context of the Cold War were frequently given priority 27 over poverty reduction; and 4) graft, patronage, and the favouring of special interests diverted funds 28 from poverty reduction. As beliefs that nations naturally went through stages of development faded 29 in the early 1980s, trade, with its implied specialization, was invoked as the path to economic 30 growth. Diverse efforts were made to improve how development worked, but with only modest 31 success, leaving many in both rich and poor nations concerned about the process and prospects 32 (United Nations, 2011a).

- 33 Layering the goal of environmental sustainability onto the goal of poverty reduction in development 34 further compounded the legacy of unmet expectations, particularly since the 1980s. There have 35 been difficulties determining sustainable pathways as well as difficulties in implementing 36 appropriate technologies, monitoring adequately for environmental responses, and governing for 37 sustainability (Sanwal, 2010) -see section 4.3.2 below-. The negotiation of new rules for the mobility 38 of private capital and the drive for globalization of the economy also came with new expectations for 39 development (Stiglitz, 2002). The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) to be met by 2015 are an 40 example of how such expectations could be realized in the rapidly evolving times of the global 41 financial economy. In this respect, however, significant improvements are largely in China and India 42 where economic growth accelerated through private capital flows independent of the MDG process. 43 Excluding these countries, the record is mixed at best and still poor in Africa (Keyzer and 44 Wesenbeeck, 2007; Easterly, 2009; United Nations, 2011a).
- Since the 1990s, historic greenhouse gas emissions became regarded as yet another contentious
  legacy of development (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009; Müller et al., 2009; Baer, Athanasiou, et al.,
- 47 2009). The developed nations had become rich through the early use of fossil fuels and land 48 transformations that put greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, imposing costs on all people, rich and
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poor, through adverse climate effects that will persist over centuries to come (Srinivasan et al.,
 2008). The connections between causal responsibility and moral responsibility are thus not sharp.

3 The resulting legacy of such unmet development and sustainability expectations is open to multiple 4 interpretations. In richer nations, the evidence can be interpreted to support the diverse views of 5 fiscal conservatives who oppose aid, libertarians who oppose both humanitarian and environmental 6 interventions, progressives who urge that more needs to be done to reach social and environmental 7 goals, and some environmentalists who urge dematerialization and depopulation as the only 8 solution. In poorer nations, the legacy is similarly taken as support for various views, including a 9 distrust of rich nations who have not delivered development and environmental assistance as 10 promised, cynicism toward the intentions when it is provided, and also a wariness of its unpredicted 11 outcomes. In both developed and developing nations, however, these diverse informed sentiments 12 among the public, policy makers, and climate negotiators contribute to what philosopher Stephen 13 Gardiner refers to as the "perfect moral storm" of climate policy (Gardiner, 2006).

14 The international arrangements embodied in the UNFCCC acknowledge the legacy of development, 15 in that they oblige Parties to contribute "on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (UNFCCC, 1992) based on level of development. However, some analysts 16 17 of climate negotiations argue that the legacy of development so clouds global climate negotiations 18 that the possibility for reaching a global climate and development agreement is highly unlikely. Thus 19 nations should proceed with ad hoc agreements and voluntary efforts (Victor, 2004) and that 20 decisions on the mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gases and questions of development should 21 be better negotiated separately (Posner and Sunstein, 2007; Posner and Weisbach, 2010). However, 22 given the richer nations' record of meeting development commitments, poorer nations may be 23 unwilling to accept separate negotiations (Stone, 2004; Sanwal, 2011).

#### 24 **4.3.2** Governance and political economy

Governance and political economy are criticals determinants for SD, equity and climate mitigation 25 26 because they circumscribe the process through which these goals and how to attain them are 27 articulated and contested. Conversely, the quest for equity and climate mitigation in the context of 28 SD inspires the understanding and practice of governance (Biermann et al., 2009; Okereke et al., 29 2009). Governance in the broadest sense refers to the processes of interaction and decision-making 30 among actors involved in a common problem (Kooiman, 2003; Hufty, 2011). It goes beyond notions 31 of formal government or political authority and integrates other actors, networks, informal 32 institutions and incentive structures operating at various levels of social organization (Rosenau, 33 1990; Chotray and Stoker, 2009). In turn, climate governance has been defined as the mechanisms 34 and response measures "aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, mitigating or adapting 35 to the risks posed by climate change" (Jagers and Stripple, 2003). From this definition, it can be seen 36 as an all-encompassing phenomenon covering how society understands and addresses all 37 determinants of climate change and sustainability. In practice, however, its use is often narrower 38 with emphasis frequently placed on the overt political actors and processes that shape visions and 39 approaches for global sustainability and climate mitigation.

40 Many scholars have highlighted the unique challenges associated with governing for sustainable 41 development and climate change. First, it involves rethinking the ways society relates to the 42 biophysical system. This is pertinent in the context of the growing evidence of the impact of human 43 activity on the planet and the understanding that extra-ordinary degrees of irreversible damage and 44 harm are distinct possibilities if the right measures are not taken within adequate timescale (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005b; Rockström et al., 2009b). Additional complexities are 45 46 caused by persistent scientific uncertainties about magnitude, timing, impact and locality of change 47 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Second, governing for sustainability and climate 48 change involves complex intergenerational considerations. On the one hand, cause and effect of 49 climate change are separated by decades, often generations, and on the other hand, those who bear

the costs of mitigation may not be the ones to reap the benefits of avoided harm (Biermann, 2007). 1 2 Third, effective response to climate change appears to require a fundamental restructuring of the 3 global economic and social systems which in turn would involve overcoming the inertia associated 4 with behavioural patterns and crafting new institutions that promote equity and sustainability 5 (Meadows et al., 2004; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005b) This challenge is exacerbated by 6 the huge mismatch between the planning horizon needed to address climate change and the tenure 7 of decision makers. In addition, there is the problem that the effects of climate change are 8 sometimes most felt in places far removed from the point of pollution, which implies that the 9 urgency felt by those who suffer the harm may not be shared by those that cause the problem (Hulme, 2009). Fourth, climate governance cuts across several realms of policy and organisation. The 10 11 governance of climate mitigation and adaptation is an element of a complex and evolving arena of 12 global environmental governance, which deals with other, and often overlapping, issues such as 13 biodiversity loss, desertification, ozone depletion, trade, energy security and international 14 development. Sites of climate change governance and policy-making are thus multiple and are not 15 confined to the UNFCCC and national rule-making processes (Okereke et al., 2009; Andonova et al., 16 2009) -see chapters 13-15 of this report, notably figure 13.1 for a visual summary-. Here, the key 17 problem is how to achieve coordination and synergy across these various issues and governance 18 sites. Too much issue linkage can result in further complexity and "overloading" while inadequate 19 linkages can lead to redundancies, inefficiencies and negative trade-offs (Zelli, 2011).

20 The fifth attribute of global SD and climate governance is that it implicates multiple scales and 21 multiple agents that hold vested interests and varying degrees of power and authority. Climate 22 governance has been characterized by an increasing segmentation of different layers and clusters of 23 rule-making and rule-implementing, fragmented both vertically between supranational, 24 international, national and subnational layers of authority and horizontally between different 25 parallel rule-making systems (Biermann et al., 2009). Some of the most notable agents of 26 governance are multiple and include a range of public, private and hybrid actors, such as 27 governments, cities, multilateral organizations, corporations, non-governmental organizations, 28 communities and even individual entrepreneurs (Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2011). 29 This proliferation of actors has prompted the multiplication of spheres of authority and inspired 30 "new modes of governance" beyond traditional command and control measures, such as self-31 governance, enabling, provision and public-private partnerships (Pattberg, 2010).

32 All of this explains why climate governance has attracted more political contestation and 33 controversy than any other issue in relation to global equity and SD. Some of the main aspects of this 34 controversy include: (i) who should participate in decision making; (ii) how to modulate power 35 asymmetry among stakeholders; (ii) how to share responsibility among actors; (iv) what ideas and 36 institutions should govern response measures, and (v) where should interventions most focus? 37 Questions of justice are deeply embedded in these five domains, aggravated by the high stakes involved and especially the stark asymmetry among states in terms of cause, effect, and capability to 38 respond to the problem (Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Okereke, 2010). It is precisely in deciding how 39 40 these questions are settled (or not) that governance exerts its greatest influence on climate mitigation, equity and SD. 41

42 Scholars have long analysed climate governance focusing on the above key controversies and 43 cognate categorisations with a cacophony of possible solutions being volunteered. The defining 44 paradox is that increase in awareness and activity has not resulted in corresponding progress 45 towards global climate equity and SD. First, concerning participation, some have suggested a 46 departure from the top-down approach implied in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol towards a more 47 voluntary and bottom-up approach (Rayner, 2010). Others suggest limiting participation to the key greenhouse gas emitting countries (Eckersley, 2012). However, both suggestions have been 48 49 vehemently opposed on the basis that such schemes will further marginalize those most vulnerable 50 to climate change and exacerbate issues of inequity (Aitken, 2012; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012).

Second, on allocation of responsibility, agreement has been elusive not the least because parties and other key actors have different conceptions of justice (Okereke, 2008). Moreover, an explicit debate about these conflicting conceptions and how to reconcile them has yet to take place on key platforms for climate governance. Third, on the question of sector focus, progress has been made in identifying key sectors that need to be targeted to achieve meaningful and rapid decarbonisation. However, relevant policies have been stalled by a combination of factors prominent among which are finance, politics and vested interests.

8 Precisely, a defining image of the climate governance landscape is that key actors have vastly 9 disproportionate capacities and resources, including political, financial and cognitive resources that 10 are necessary to steer the behaviour of the collective within and across territorial boundaries (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). A central element of governance related to this asymmetry is the 11 12 concept of authority, defined in terms of claims to legitimacy as well as ability to excise power or 13 influence outcomes (Weber, 1978). Authority then characterizes the extent to which institutions, 14 actors or individuals, based on their capacities and resources, are able to facilitate and/or constrain 15 the agency of others. It enhances the ability of actors to influence mitigation options leading to 16 winners and losers.

17 The problem, however, does not reside simply in capacity, resource and power-related asymmetries 18 among actors but rather in the fact that those that wield the greatest authority either consider it 19 against their interest to facilitate rapid progress towards a global low carbon economy or insist that 20 every solution must be aligned to increase their authority and material gains (Sæverud and 21 Skjærseth, 2007; Giddens, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Lohmann, 2009, 2010; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012; 22 Wittneben et al., 2012). The most notable effect of this is that despite some exceptions, the 23 prevailing organization of the global economy around free market capitalism has provided the 24 context for the sorts of governance practices of climate change that have dominated to date (Newell 25 and Paterson, 2010).

26 It is instructive that many of the specific governance initiatives discussed in Chapters 13-15 of this 27 report, whether organized by states or among novel configurations of actors, have focused on 28 creating new markets or investment opportunities. This applies, for example, to carbon markets 29 (Paterson, 2009), carbon offsetting in energy and land-use sectors (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; 30 Lovell et al., 2009; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Corbera, 2012), investor-led governance initiatives 31 such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (Kolk et al., 2008) or partnerships such as the Renewable 32 Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (Parthan et al., 2010). Market-oriented initiatives can be a 33 potent tool in achieving low carbon transition. However, due to power-asymmetry and other 34 political economic forces, such programs are also very vulnerable to "capture" by special interests 35 and against the original purposes for which they are conceived. Several authors have discussed this 36 problem in the context of the CDM and the EU-ETS (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012; Clò, 2010; 37 Helm, 2010; Lohmann, 2006, 2008; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012). This "predication of sustainable development on liberal economic philosophy" (Bernstein, 2001) necessarily constrains how the 38 39 pursuit of SD might be carried out, even while it generates opportunities to bring new actors into the 40 process of governing climate change.

41 Governing for sustainability and climate change opens up a variety of questions that require closer 42 attention. First, there is a need to understand whether indeed there is a real shift "from government 43 to governance", which could illuminate the actual role that formal policy prescriptions adopted by 44 governments at multiple scales play in determining the process and outcomes of a transition 45 towards sustainability or a "climate safe" world (Adger and Jordan, 2009). Second, and related, there 46 is a need to explore if and how different modes of governance translate into positive outcomes 47 across all dimensions of sustainability and draw lessons regarding their effectiveness and 48 distributional implications, or any existing trade-offs. Despite some merits, the "decentralization" 49 that governance involves per se makes it difficult to establish responsibilities, and ensure 50 transparency and accountability in any transition towards sustainability. For this reason, it has been

argued that states, through conventional command-and-control approaches, including taxation, should still be regarded as key agents in steering such transitions (Eckersley, 2004; Weale, 2009). Finally, it is critical to pay attention to how these modes of governance are defined in the first place, by whom and for whose benefit, which presses home the impossibility of disconnecting sustainability and climate change governance from existing trends in global capitalism and political economy.

#### 7 4.3.3 Population and demography

8 Population variables, including size, density, growth rate as well as age, sex, education and 9 settlement structures, play a determinant role in countries' SD trajectories. Their drivers - in particular fertility, mortality and migration – are reciprocally influenced by countries' development 10 11 paths, including evolving policies, socio-cultural trends, as well as by changes in the economy 12 (Bloom 2011). In the context of climate change, population trends have been shown to matter both 13 for mitigation efforts as well as for societies' adaptive capacities to climate change (O'Neil et al. 14 2001). Current demographic trends show distinct patterns in different parts of the world. While 15 population sizes are already on a declining trajectory in Eastern Europe and Japan, they are set for 16 significant further increase in many developing countries (particularly in Africa and south-western 17 Asia) due to a very young population age structure and continued high levels of fertility. As most 18 recent population projections show, the world's population is almost certain to increase to between 19 8 and 10 billion by mid-century. After that period, uncertainty increases significantly, with the future 20 trend in birth rates being the key determinant (Lutz and KC, 2010; United Nations, 2011b; Lee, 2011; 21 Scherbov et al., 2011). The population of Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly double and could still increase by a factor of three or more depending on the course of fertility over the coming 22 23 decades, which depends primarily on progress in female education and the availability of 24 reproductive health services (Bongaarts, 2009; Bloom, 2011; Bongaarts and Sinding, 2011).

25 Declining fertility rates together with continued increases in life expectancy result in significant 26 population ageing around the world, with the current low fertility countries being most advanced in 27 this process. This population ageing is widely considered a major challenge for the solvency of social 28 security systems. For populations that are still in the process of fertility decline, the expected burden 29 of ageing is a more distant prospect, and the declining birth rates are expected to bring some near 30 term benefits. This phase in the universal process of demographic transition, when the ratio of 31 children to adults is already declining and the proportion of elderly has not yet increased, is 32 considered a window of opportunity for economic development, which may also result in an 33 economic rebound effect leading to higher per capita consumption, and potentially emissions 34 (Bloom and Canning, 2000).

35 Low development is widely understood to contribute to high population growth, which declines only 36 after the appearance of widespread access to key developmental needs such as peri-natal and 37 maternal healthcare, and female education and empowerment Conversely, high population growth 38 is widely regarded as an obstacle to SD, because it tends to make efforts such as the provision of 39 clean drinking water and agricultural goods and the expansion of health services and school 40 enrolment rates an uphill battle (Dyson, 2006; Potts, 2007; Pimentel and Paoletti, 2009). This has 41 given rise to the fear of a vicious circle of a low level of development leading to high population 42 growth and environmental degradation that in turn inhibits the development that would be 43 necessary to bring down fertility (Caole and Hoover, 1958; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; Dasgupta, 44 1993). However, history shows that countries can break this vicious circle with the right social 45 policies, with an early emphasis on education and family planning, prominent examples being South Korea and Mauritius, which in the 1950s were used as textbook examples of countries trapped in 46 such a vicious circle (Meade, 1967). 47

With respect to adaptation to climate change, the literature on population and environment has begun to explore more closely people's vulnerability to climate stressors, including variability and


extreme events, and to analyze their adaptive capacity and reliance on environmental resources to 1 2 cope with adversities and adapt to gradual changes and shocks (Bankoff et al., 2004; Adger et al., 3 2009) - see also Working Group II report. Generally speaking, not only the number of people 4 matters, but also their composition by age, gender, place of residence and level of education, as well 5 as the institutional context that influences people's decision-making and development 6 opportunities. People have differential vulnerabilities even within households depending on age, 7 gender and level of education, a fact that is increasingly considered by impact studies (Dyson, 2006). 8 One widely and controversially discussed form of adaptation can be international migration induced 9 by climate change. A major recent review of this topic has concluded that much environmentally 10 induced migration is likely to be internal migration and there is very little science-based evidence for 11 assessing possible consequences on large international migration streams (The UK Government 12 Office for Science, 2011).

#### 13 4.3.4 Values and behaviours

14 Climate change uncertainties, long-term predictions, and the scale of the problem are often used to 15 justify limited action, insofar as they combined lead to personal and collective discounting of the 16 problem and the need for urgent actions. Research has identified a range of individual and 17 contextual predictors of behaviours in favour or against climate mitigation, ranging from individuals' 18 psychological needs to cultural and social orientations towards time and nature (Swim et al., 2009). 19 Below we discuss some of these factors, focusing on human values that influence individual and 20 collective behaviours and affect our priorities and actions concerning the pursuit of SD, equity goals 21 and climate mitigation. Values provide "guides for living the best way possible" for individuals, social 22 groups and cultures (citing Rohan, 2000; Pepper et al., 2009). Individuals are understood to acquire 23 values through socialization and learning experience (ibid) and so can be seen to be dialectally 24 related to education, governance systems and other determinants discussed elsewhere in Section 25 4.3.

26 Pepper et al. (2009) propose to use Shalom Schwartz's value theory (1992, 1994) to understand 27 behavioural motivations. Schwartz's value theory enables the systematic study of the relationship 28 between a wide spectrum of human values and other constructs, including self-reported socially and 29 ecologically conscious consumer behaviour (Pepper et al., 2009). This perspective defines values as 30 "enduring beliefs that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, 31 guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and are ordered by importance" (Schwartz 32 and Bilsky, 1987). Ten motivational value types are identified by Schwartz's theory, grouped into 33 four higher order types according to the total pattern of relations of compatibility of and conflict 34 among values. The ten values form a continuum of related motivations, giving rise to a circular 35 structure (Figure 4.3.1).

36



**Figure 4.3.1** Model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value types (in periphery) and bipolar value dimension. Source: Adapted from Schwartz (1994).

5 The particular relevance of values to ecologically conscious behaviour and SD is related to the nature

6 of environmental issues as 'social dilemmas' where short-term narrow individual interests conflict

7 with the longer term social interests (Pepper et al., 2009). Researchers have thus demonstrated the 8 importance of values that transcends selfishness and promote the welfare of others (including

8 importance of values that transcends selfishness and promote the welfare of others (including 9 nature) – i.e. those belonging to Schwartz's 'self-transcendence' type – for this behavioural domain

10 (ibid).

However, the impact of values on behaviour is mediated by a range of factors such that the 11 12 predictive power of values for ecologically conscious behaviour is often low (ibid). In fact, this 'value-13 action' gap (see below and Section 4.4) suggests that pursuing climate mitigation and SD globally 14 probably requires substantial efforts to change behaviour in the short term while at the same time 15 fostering a transformation of human values in the long term (e.g. progressively changing conceptions 16 and attitudes toward biophysical systems and human interaction) (Gladwin et al., 1995; Leiserowitz 17 et al., 2005; Vlek and Steg, 2007; Folke, Jansson, Rockstrom, et al., 2011). Changing human values 18 would require a better understanding of cross-cultural behavioural differences that in turn relate to 19 historical developments, environmental, economic and political contexts, and genetics, in complex 20 relationships of potential complementarity and co-evolution (Norenzayan, 2011).

21 Incentivizing behavioural change (in the short and long term) would require changes in formal and 22 civil institutions and governance, as well as in values (Jackson, 2005a; Folke, Jansson, Rockstrom, et 23 al., 2011; Fischer et al., 2012). Removing perverse subsidies for environmentally harmful products, 24 favouring greener consumption and technologies, adopting more comprehensive forms of 25 biophysical and economic accounting, and providing safer and more secure working conditions are 26 also considered central for achieving pro-SD behavioural change (Lebel and Lorek, 2008; Sukhdev et 27 al., 2010; Le Blanc, 2010; Thøgersen, 2010). Yet behaviour experiments (Osbaldiston and Schott, 28 2012) suggests that there is no "silver bullet" for fostering ecologically conscious behaviour, as 29 favourable responses to an issue at stake (e.g. energy conservation) are triggered by different 30 stimuli, including information, regulation or economic rewards, and influenced by the nature of the 31 issue itself. Furthermore, people are able to "express both relatively high levels of environmental 32 concern and relatively high levels of materialism simultaneously" (Gatersleben et al., 2010). This 33 suggests the need to be issue, context and culturally aware when supporting institutional reforms or 34 designing specific actions to foster pro-SD behaviour, insofar as both environmental and materialistic 35 concerns must be addressed. Overall, these complexities underscore the difficulties in changing peoples' beliefs, preferences, routines and practices on multiple fronts, such as in the domain of
 consumption (see Section 4.4).

#### 3 4.3.5 Human and social capital

4 Human and social capital influence individual and collective responses to the challenge of 5 sustainability, equitable development and both climate mitigation and adaptation. Human capital 6 results from individual and collective investments in acquiring knowledge and skills that become 7 useful for improving wellbeing (lyer, 2006). Such knowledge and skills can be acquired through 8 formal schooling and training, as well as informally through customary practices and institutions, 9 including communities and families. Human capital can thus be viewed as a component of human capability, understood as humans' ability to lead lives they have reason to value (Sen, 1997, 2001). 10 11 Human capability refers in turn to a person's ability to achieve a given list of "functionings" or 12 achievements, which depend on a range of personal and social factors, including age, gender, health, 13 income, nutritional knowledge and education, and environmental conditions, among others -see 14 Clark (2009) and Schokkaert (2009) for a review of Sen's capability approach and its critiques-.

15 Economists have long considered improvements in human capital a key explanatory reason behind 16 the evolution of economic systems, in terms of growth and constant innovation (Schultz, 1961; Healy 17 and Cote, 2001). Macro-economic research shows a strong correlation between low levels of 18 economic development and low levels of human capital and vice versa (Schultz 2003; Iyer 2006), 19 whilst micro-economic studies reveal a positive relationship between increases in the quantity and 20 quality of formal education and future earnings (Duflo 2001). Gains in human capital can be 21 positively correlated to economic growth and efficiency, but also to nutritional, health and education 22 standards (Schultz 1995). As such, improvements in human capital provide a basis for SD, because 23 they shape countries' socio-economic systems and influence people's ability to make informed 24 choices.

25 Indeed, it is well-known that individuals' formal education and informal knowledge systems can 26 contribute simultaneously to their wellbeing and to fostering resource sustainability in particular 27 contexts, thus providing the basis for the resilience of socio-ecological systems (Berkes et al., 2000; 28 Armitage et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera, 2013). Human capital often also explains the 29 development and survival of business ventures (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Patzelt, 2010; Gimmon 30 and Levie, 2010), which are often an important source of innovation and diffusion of principles and 31 technologies that can contribute to human and equitable development and to ambitious climate 32 mitigation and adaptation goals (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007; Terjesen, 2007). Studies suggest that 33 knowledge (or lack of) by local populations and individuals on climate change and what to do about 34 it can act as a strong driver or barrier to individual and individual action (Semenza et al., 2008; 35 Sutton and Tobin, 2011). For this reason, researchers have proposed didactical methods to improve 36 the understanding of climate change science and potential responses across higher education 37 curricula (Kagawa and Selby, 2010; Burandt and Barth, 2010).

38 However, a growing body of literature in economics and geography -reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 39 and in WGII- has shown that the diversity of environmental, socio-economic, educational and 40 cultural contexts in which individuals make decisions significantly shape their willingness and/or 41 ability to engage in mitigation and adaptation action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). It is important to 42 distinguish between formally acquired scientific knowledge on climate change, traditional 43 knowledge on climate-related issues and values, beliefs, preferences and perceptions over the 44 validity of both types of knowledge, as well as over the meaning and relevance of personal engagement. Formal (and more robust scientific) knowledge on climate issues alone does not 45 46 explain or lead to individual responses to the climate challenge (Whitmarsh, 2009; Wolf and Moser, 47 2011; Berkhout, 2012), in the same way that it has resulted insufficient to agree on significant and equitable mitigation commitments in UNFCCC negotiations and national policy contexts (Sarewitz, 48 49 2011). There is evidence of cognitive dissonance and strategic behaviour in both mitigation and adaptation arenas. Denial mechanisms that overrate the costs of changing lifestyles; blame others;

and that cast doubt on the effectiveness of individual action, or the soundness of scientific
 knowledge have been documented (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Norgaard, 2011; McCright and
 Dunlap, 2011).

5 There exist different formulations of social capital that can be traced back to the work of influential 6 scholars, such as Bordeaux, Coleman, Putnam and Fukuyama (Gamarnikow and Green, 1999). As 7 there is not a unique definition of the term, we adopt here an encompassing definition provided by a 8 synthesis paper on the issue and that defines social capital as the institutions, the relationships, the 9 attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 10 development (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002). Fukuyama, for example, offers a more succint definition as the shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, which are founded in turn 11 12 on actual social relationships, including trust and reciprocity (Fukuyama, 2002).

13 Social capital materializes in the form of family bonds and ties, friendship and collective networks, 14 associations, and other more or less institutionalized forms of collective action. Social capital is thus 15 generally perceived as an asset for both the individuals that participate from such norms and 16 networks and for the respective group/society, insofar as they can derive benefits from information, 17 participating in decision-making and belonging to the group. The concept, however, has been 18 criticized for being too ambiguous and lexically conducive to linking social relationships with a 19 utilitarian ethos and to move the development agenda away from class struggles and critical 20 engagements with capital (Fine, 1999).

21 Social capital research has often concluded that the presence of social capital can be linked to 22 successful social outcomes in education, employment, family relationships, and health (Gamarnikow 23 and Green, 1999), as well as to economic development and participatory, democratic governance 24 (Woolcock, 1998; Fukuyama, 2002; Doh and McNeely, 2012). However, studies that report 25 specifically on the relationship between social capital, sustainable development, equity, and climate 26 change mitigation are still relatively scarce and inconclusive. Scholars have shown that social capital 27 can be instrumental for people to collectively fight injustices and reduce their conditions of poverty 28 and vulnerability (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). In the field of environmental studies, for example, 29 it has been argued that social capital can be a pre-condition for accessing and benefiting from 30 resources (Bebbington, 1999; Diaz et al., 2002), in the same way that it can foster climate change 31 mitigation and adaptation responses (Adger, 2003). However, social capital can also be sustained on 32 unfair social norms and institutions that perpetuate an inequitable access to the benefits provided 33 by social organisation (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). In particular instances, social capital can be 34 founded upon illegal behaviours and organisational practices that result disfunctional for society. 35 Social networks of corruption or criminal organisations, for example, can perpetuate the uneven distribution of public resources, and undermine societies' cohesion and physical security. 36

# 37 **4.3.6 Technology**

38 Technology has been a central element of human, social, and economic development since ancient 39 times (Jonas, 1985; Mokyr, 1992). It can be regarded as a key means to achieving equitable SD, by 40 enabling economic and social development whilst using environmental resources more efficiently. 41 The development and deployment of the overwhelming majority of technologies is mediated by 42 markets and carried out by private firms, where the requisite technological capacity and investment 43 resources tend to be found. This process provides abundant incentives for technological innovation 44 in response to the effective demand of purchasers (Baumol, 2002). It does not, however, necessarily 45 address the basic needs of those members of society with insufficient market demand to influence 46 the decisions of innovators and investors, nor does it provide an incentive to reduce externalized costs, such as the costs of GHG pollution (Jaffe et al., 2005). 47

Fundamental objectives of equitable and sustainable development are still unmet. For example, the basic energy and nutritional needs of large parts of the world's population remain unfulfilled. An

estimated 2.6 billion people worldwide relied on highly-polluting and unhealthy traditional biomass 1 2 cook stoves for household cooking and heating in 2010, and 1.3 billion people did not have access to 3 electricity (International Energy Agency, 2012). Similarly, the Food and Agricultural Organization 4 (FAO) indicates that almost 870 million people (most of which are in developing countries) were 5 chronically undernourished in 2010–12 (FAO, 2012). Achieving the objectives of equitable SD 6 demands the fulfilment of such basic and other developmental needs. The challenges is therefore to 7 design, implement, and provide support for technology innovation and diffusion processes that 8 respond simultaneously to social and environmental goals, which at present do not receive adequate 9 incentives through traditional markets.

10 It is well known that there exist numerous barriers that can impede the development and diffusion of relevant technologies and approaches (Negro et al., 2012). Accordingly, a systematic assessment 11 12 of the adequacy and performance of the relevant innovation systems is required, which includes the 13 scale of the investments, the allocation among various objectives and options, the efficiency by 14 which inputs are converted into outputs, and how effectively the outputs are utilized for meeting 15 the objectives (Sagar and Holdren 2002; Sanwal 2011; Aitken 2012). Many reports and analyses have 16 suggested that investments in innovation for public goods such as clean energy and energy access 17 need to be enhanced (Nemet and Kammen, 2007; AEIC, 2010; Bazilian et al., 2010) such that the 18 scale of these activities are commensurate with these complex objectives. Innovation in and 19 diffusion of new technologies require skills and knowledge from both developers and users, as well 20 as different combinations of enabling policies, institutions, markets, social capital and financial 21 means depending on the type of technology and the application being considered (Bretschger, 2005; 22 Winkler et al., 2007, Dinica, 2009; Blalock and Gertler, 2009; KU Rao and Kishore, 2010; JP Weyant, 23 2011; Jänicke, 2012). These kinds of capabilities and processes may themselves require novel 24 mechanisms and institutional forms (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2009; Sagar et al., 2009).

25 Different countries, of course, may use different policy instruments and approaches to achieve this objective. (See Chapter 15). The creation of demand for technologies that contributes to equitable 26 27 SD while mitigating climate change should be seen as complementary to the steps mentioned in the 28 previous paragraphs. In fact the role of government policy in advancing the development and 29 diffusion of technologies that have a public goods nature cannot be overstated. In the case of 30 renewable energy technologies, for example, it has been shown that intermittent policy subsidies, 31 governments' changing R&D support, misalignments between policy levels, sectors and institutions 32 can greatly impede the diffusion of these technologies (Negro et al., 2012). Similarly, in agriculture, 33 while there are many intersections between mitigation and SD in agriculture through options such as 34 'sustainable agriculture', the potential for leveraging these synergies is contingent on appropriate 35 and effective policies (Smith et al., 2007).

36 Sometimes there may be a clear alignment between achieving equitable SD benefits and meeting 37 climate goals such as provision of clean energy to the rural poor. But in meeting multiple objectives, 38 potential for conflicts and trade-offs between equitable SD and climate mitigation objectives can 39 also arise. For example, the likelihood that fossil-fuels will maintain their significant share in energy 40 supply for the near-to-medium future (International Energy Agency, 2012) explains the current 41 exploration of new or well-established mitigation options, such as biofuels or nuclear power, and 42 other approaches like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and geo-engineering approaches, including 43 solar radiation management and carbon dioxide removal techniques to avoid a dangerous increase 44 of the Earth's temperature (Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et al., 2008; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 45 Change, 2012b). While such technological options may indeed help mitigate global warming, they 46 also pose risks of adverse environmental and social consequences, and thus give rise to concerns 47 about their regulation and governance (Mitchell, 2008; Pimentel et al., 2009; de Paula Gomes and Muylaert de Araujo, 2011; Shrader-Frechette, 2011; Jackson, 2011; Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; 48 49 Scott, 2013; Diaz-Maurin and Giampietro, 2013).

The public perception and acceptability of technologies is country and context-specific, mediated by 1 2 age, gender, knowledge, attitudes towards environmental risks and climate change, and policy 3 procedures (Shackley et al., 2005; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Wallquist et al., 2010; Corner et al., 2011; 4 Poumadere et al., 2011; Visschers and Siegrist, 2012) and therefore resolution of these kinds of 5 trade-offs and conflicts may not be easy. Yet the trade-offs and synergies between the three 6 dimensions of SD, as well as the impacts over socio-ecological systems across geographical scales will 7 need to be systematically considered, which in turn will require incorporation of multiple 8 stakeholder perspectives. Assessment of energy technology options, for example, will need to 9 include impact on landscapes' ecological and social dimensions – accounting for multiple values – and on energy distribution and access (Wolsink, 2007; Zografos and Martinez-Alier, 2009). 10

Lastly, there are some crosscutting issues, such as regimes for technology transfer (TT) and 11 12 intellectual property (IP) that are particularly relevant to international cooperation in meeting these 13 global challenges. Even progress under the UNFCCC has been limited, both within cooperative-14 implementation programs (e.g. TT under the CDM has been limited to selective conditions and mainly to a few countries (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009; Seres et al., 2009; Wang, 2010)) and within 15 16 the negotiations. In part, there are very divergent views on such issues in the climate arena since 17 they also touch upon economic competitiveness (Ockwell et al., 2010). As earlier, perspectives are 18 shaped by perceived national circumstances, capabilities, and needs, yet these issues do need to be 19 resolved – in fact, there may be no single approach that will meet all needs. Different IPR regimes, 20 for example, are required to meet development objectives at different stages of development 21 (Correa, 2011). Recent analyses (Boldrin and Levine, 2013) and empirical studies of China's 22 experience in wind power, solar power and LED sectors that suggest that IP rights can pose obstacles 23 for technology transfer and further innovation (Wang, Wang, and Jiang, 2013; Wang, Wang, and Xu, 24 2013) provide impetus for further analysis and exploration to develop IP and TT regimes that further 25 international cooperation to meet climate, SD, and equity objectives.

#### 26 4.3.7 Natural resources

27 Countries' level of endowment with renewable and/or non-renewable resources influences 28 development pathways and determines their environmental and economic performance. The 29 location, types, quantities, long-term availability and the rates of exploitation of non-renewable 30 resources, including fossil fuels and minerals, and renewable resources such as fertile land, forests, 31 or freshwater shape the organization of national economies (e.g. in terms of trade balance and rent 32 potential), their agricultural and industrial production systems, and countries' role in global geo-33 political and trade systems. This configuration evolves over time to reflect changes in global 34 economic trends, in international politics or in consumption patterns, both nationally and 35 internationally. Ultimately, it influences the rate of economic growth and its distribution among 36 societies members, along with the amount of finance available for re-investment in the numerous 37 socio-economic domains that affect human wellbeing (e.g. education and health). In the context of 38 climate change, natural resource endowments affects the level and profile of GHG emissions, and 39 correspondingly are a major determinant of mitigation opportunities, the cost of mitigation, the 40 distribution of those costs, and ultimately the level of political commitment to climate action.

It has been argued that we are currently witnessing a shift in the world's historical trend toward 41 42 declining the use of natural resource per unit of economic output, particularly due to reductions in 43 resource efficiency in the Asia-Pacific region over the last decade (Schandl and West, 2010). In 44 parallel, there has been an unprecedented growth in the dependency of developed countries on 45 natural resources and materials from developing and emerging economies, coupled with a steady increase in the exploitation of natural resources that would continue in the near future under 46 47 current growth rates and technologies, and a reconfiguration of global commodity chains and geo-48 political relations due to the appearance of new actors from emerging economies, including both 49 public and private actors (Muradian et al., 2012; Bruckner et al., 2012). These trends, which highlight 50 the intricate relationship between material extraction, economic growth, global political economy, and global environmental change (Krausmann et al., 2009a), also underscore the manner in which natural resource endowments are strong determinants of the future prospects and challenges in the

3 pursuit of SD (Van der Ploeg, 2011; Muradian et al., 2012).

4 Governments in resource-rich countries can in principle benefit greatly from those resources. They 5 can increase their bargaining power over the conditions for extraction of natural resources, and 6 translate increased national revenues into potential investments in human development, for 7 example in education and health services, particularly if well-functioning institutions and policies are 8 in place (Mehlum et al., 2006). It has been suggested that both domestic and international factors, 9 such as robust human capital formation, migration policy and countries' global economic 10 integration, are key to explaining whether oil resources result in a key developmental "curse" or a "blessing" (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Bearce and Hutnick, 2011; Kurtz and Brooks, 2011; 11 12 Rudra and Jensen, 2011).

13 Simultaneously, serious challenges face resource-rich countries. Those resource-rich countries 14 characterized by governance problems, such as rent-seeking behaviour, corruption and weak 15 judiciary and political institutions, have more limited capacity to distribute resource extraction rents, 16 as well as to increase income per capita (Mehlum et al., 2006; Pendergast et al., 2011; Bjorvatn et 17 al., 2012). Furthermore, these countries also face risks associated with an over-specialization on 18 agriculture and resource-based exports that can undermine other productive sectors – through 19 increases in exchange rates and with an increasing reliance on importing countries and regions' 20 economic growth trajectories (Muradian et al., 2012). Van der Ploeg (2011) shows that many 21 resource-rich countries have negative genuine savings, i.e. they do not fully reinvest their resource 22 rents in foreign assets or productive capital (e.g., buildings, roads, machines, human capital, or 23 health), which in turn impoverishes present and future generations and undermines both natural 24 capital and human development prospects. In some countries, an increase in primary commodity 25 exports can lead to the rise of socio-environmental conflicts due to the increasing exploitation of 26 land and mineral resources (Martinez-Alier et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2012). These conflicts may, 27 in some contexts, result in a decrease of the extraction rates of some resources and translate into an 28 over-exploitation of others, such as fisheries (Mitchell and Thies, 2012). Not all research supports 29 this view, however, with some suggesting a negative relationship between resource abundance and 30 civil conflict, with abundance associated with a reduced probability of the onset of war 31 (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009).

32 Scholars are thus far away from definitive conclusions on the inter-relationships between resource 33 endowments and use, and in-country development pathways, including varying degrees of social 34 welfare and conflict, and prospects for SD. Recent reviews, for example, remark the need to 35 continue investigating current resource booms and busts and documenting the latter's effect on 36 national economies, policies, and social well-being, and to draw historical comparisons across 37 countries and different institutional contexts (Wick and Bulte, 2009; Deacon, 2011; van der Ploeg, 38 2011). But, what is clear is that the state and those actors involved in the use of natural resources 39 play a critical role in ensuring a fair distribution of any benefits and costs resulting from resource use 40 within and beyond countries (Banai et al., 2011). Further, economic valuation studies have for a long 41 time noted that systematic valuations of both positive and negative externalities yield information 42 that can be important to policy-making relating to resource exploitation, in some cases 43 demonstrating even that the exploitation of land and mineral resources is not socially optimal (De 44 Groot, 2006; Thampapillai, 2011).

These considerations are relevant for climate mitigation policy. An example of a policy initiative based on recognizing the full costs of resource exploitation is the Ecuadorian government's recent choice to keep millions of oil barrels underground in exchange of global contributions for avoided emissions, representing an innovative way to secure national rents while avoiding the depletion of natural capital and reducing global GHG emissions (Rival, 2010; Martin, 2011). This is unique counter-example to the prevailing dynamic, in which a given country with abundant fossil fuel

reserves has, in theory, a strong economic interest in exploiting such reserves, and thus in avoiding 1 2 the adoption of policies that could constrain such exploitation. Opportunity costs are only one of the 3 factors influencing countries' mitigative capacity (Winkler et al., 2007a) but they are sufficiently 4 important to raise the issue of compensating resource-rich countries against forgone benefits, 5 particularly if they are requested to participate in global mitigation efforts (Ramanathan and Xu, 6 2010). Additionally, if this given country faces increased exposure to climate variability and extreme 7 events, the forgone benefits of resource rents may undermine its ability to absorb increasing 8 adaptation costs. In this regard, a recent analysis of the relationship between countries' adoption of 9 mitigation policies and their vulnerability to climate change confirms that countries which may suffer 10 considerable impacts of climate change in the future, which include many resource-rich developing 11 countries, do not show a strong commitment to either mitigation or adaptation, whilst countries 12 exhibiting strong political commitment and action towards mitigation are also active in promoting 13 adaptation policies. This is an indication that vulnerability is unlikely to prevail over the free-rider 14 problem of mitigation and the development concerns of many developing countries (Tubi et al., 15 2012).

#### 16 **4.3.8 Finance and investment**

17 The financial system is the set of financial actors – along with the institutions govern them – that 18 mediate the allocation of financial resources to productive investments, with the aim of reaping 19 future gains. It is the medium by which society defers today's consumption and devotes resources 20 to securing future well-being. Fundamentally, the system of finance and investment is a direct 21 expression of a society's priorities and its attitude toward the future. As such, it is a key determinant 22 of society's development pathway and thus its prospects for a sustainable development transition.

23 Even while it mediates society's investments in future well-being, the finance system is characterized 24 by several structural tensions with the ideals of sustainable development. First, the global finance 25 system is motivated by financial profits, and thus focuses by design on the economic pillar. The 26 environmental and social justice pillars of sustainable development are integrated only to the limited 27 extent that market actors are compelled by regulation, taxation, laws and social norms to internalize 28 social and environmental costs and benefits. Climate change, identified as the "greatest and widest-29 ranging market failure ever seen" (Stern and Treasury, 2007), is but one obvious example of a large 30 societally important cost that is neglected by capital markets, which is reflected by the manner in 31 which they value and assess fossil fuel reserves (Campanale, Mark and Leggett, Jeremy, 2011).

Second, the financial system is insensitive to the declining marginal utility of income (Layard et al., 2008), or equivalently, it is indifferent to the choice between investments that contribute to the financial betterment of a poor person versus a rich person. While markets are quite responsive to demand that is supported by purchasing power, they are only indirectly responsive to needs, and particularly insensitive to "the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given" (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987).

38 Third, the financial system evaluates investments with a short time horizon that is not sensitive to 39 "the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and 40 Development (WCED), 1987). The underlying economic issue of discounting, which been discussed in 41 detail in Chapter 3 and section 4.2, is one relevant factor: a typical discount rate of 5%, say, costs 42 and benefits accrued fifty years hence are discounted by more than a factor of ten; at 100 years, 43 they are rendered virtually invisible. Additionally, there are various governance, organizational and 44 sociological mechanisms further contributing to short-termism (Tonello, 2006; Marginson and 45 McAulay, 2008). In such a context it is difficult for the financial system in its current form to 46 accommodate principles of long-term sustainability.

These disconnects between our current financial system and the objectives of sustainable development have become more important during the recent period of rapid financialization of the global economy. This period has been characterized accelerated growth of the financial sector flows and profit share relative to the "real" economy of goods production and services provision, along with an increasing role of the financial system in mediating short-term speculation as distinct from long-term investment (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Palley, 2007; Dore, 2008).

4 The challenges are felt especially in developing countries, which are constrained by a generally lower 5 capacity to mobilize private sector capital toward SD objectives, and for climate change adaptation 6 and mitigation of GHG emissions in developing countries in particular. This is due to a number of 7 complex interrelated factors, including the comparatively high overall cost of doing business; market 8 distortionary policies such as subsidies for conventional fuels; absence of credit-worthy off-takers; 9 low access to early-stage financing; lower public R&D spending; too few wealthy consumers willing 10 to pay a premium for "green products"; social and political instability; poor market infrastructure, and weak enforcement of the regulatory frameworks. These usually increase the investment risk 11 12 factor. Establishing better mechanisms for leveraging private sector finance through innovative 13 financing can help (EGTT, 2008), but there are also risks in relying on the private sector as market-14 based finance focuses on short term lending and private financing in times of abundant liquidity may 15 seek potential high returns rather than constitute a source of stable long-term climate finance 16 (Akyuz, 2012).

17 Even mechanisms that are specifically designed and implemented for the purpose of generating SD 18 benefits have faced difficulty. Consider the the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism 19 (CDM), which has uncertain value in financing real additional emission reductions in developing 20 countries, as well as being concentrated on particular technologies and unevenly spread across the 21 world, showing a significant bias towards emerging economies and leaving the African continent 22 aside (Boyd et al., 2009; UNEP/Risø Centre on Energy, 2011). (See Chapter 13.) The CDM as it was in 23 the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol did not meaningfully contribute to development goals such as 24 improving energy access amongst the world's poorest people and industrialization in the poorer 25 countries (Olsen, 2007; Corbera and Jover, 2012).

26 While some developing countries are able to mobilize some domestic financial resources to support 27 efforts toward SD, the needs for many developing countries exceed their own financial capacity. 28 Accordingly, their ability to pursue SD, and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in 29 particular, can be severely constrained by lack of finance. The international provision of finance, 30 alongside technology transfer, can help to alleviate this problem, as well as being consistent with 31 principles of equity, international commitments, and arguments of effectiveness (see section 4.2.1 32 and 4.7.3.1). Under international agreements, in particular Agenda 21 and the Rio Conventions of 33 1992, and reaffirmed in subsequent UN resolutions and programs including the 2012 UN Conference 34 on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2012a), developed countries have committed to 35 provide financial resources to developing countries.

36 In the context of climate specifically, the UNFCCC Parties have established three funds to support 37 meaningful climate action in developing countries: the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), to 38 support mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer to developing countries; the Least 39 Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), to support the preparation of National Adaptation Plans; and the 40 Adaptation Fund, to support adaptation programs and projects in developing countries. Additionally, in 2010, the Green Climate Fund was established at the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties 41 42 (COP-16) and COP-17 decided to undertake a work program on long-term finance with the aim of 43 contributing to the ongoing efforts to scale up the mobilization of climate change finance after 2012 44 (UNFCCC, 2011). As such it will analyze options for the mobilization of resources from a wide variety 45 of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources and relevant 46 analytical work on climate-related financing needs of developing countries. At COP-18 in 2012, a 47 decision to develop an institutional arrangement to address loss and damage of developing 48 countries from climate change was adopted, which is expected to further increase the financing 49 required.

Funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) shows great unevenness in supporting 1 2 mitigation and adaptation projects through the above-mentioned operational funds. From its 3 inception in 1991 until June 2011 the GEF Trust Fund has funded 755 mitigation projects costing US\$3.39 billion and attracting US\$19.9 billion in co-funding, spread across 156 developing countries 4 5 and economies in transition, which represents a fraction of what is required for mitigation and 6 adaptation compared to current estimates of needs of developing countries. A total of 47 projects 7 have been funded through the LDCF for a total of US\$178.6 million and another 32 through the SCCF for a total of US\$127.74 million. The GEF Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) program distributed 8 9 US\$50 million between 2004 and 2010, aiming to show how adaptation planning and assessment 10 can be practically translated into full-scale projects. In addition, the World Bank's Strategic Climate 11 Fund (SCF) and the Clean Technology Fund (CTN) are scheduled to "sunset" once a "new financial 12 architecture is effective" (World Bank, 2008). All these initiatives are complemented by multilateral, 13 bilateral or single-country funding initiatives designed to support mitigation and adaptation projects 14 and programs, with a diversity of priorities and levels of disbursement.

Such diversity, however, has led scholars to advocate for a better integration of climate funding and development aid to ensure coordination and increase the effectiveness of financial transfers (Smith et al., 2011), as well as to suggest ways of improving funds governance and management approaches. Recent analyses of the AF, for example, highlight difficulties in targeting vulnerable areas and populations due to a lack of clear, accepted definitions, nor strong incentives to consider vulnerability or related information, such as weather events attribution, in the evaluation of project proposals (Van Renssen, 2011; Horstmann, 2011; Hulme et al., 2011).

# 22 **4.4 Production, trade, consumption and waste patterns**

23 This section concerns the consumption of goods and services by households, consumption trends 24 and disparities, and the relationship between consumption and GHG emissions. It also discusses the 25 components and drivers of consumption, efforts to make consumption (and production) more 26 sustainable, and how consumption affects well-being. We also review approaches to consumption-27 based accounting of GHG emissions (carbon footprinting) and their relationship to territorial 28 approaches. Hence, while subsequent chapters analyse GHG emissions associated with specific 29 sectors and transformation pathways, we focus here on a particular group (consumers) and examine 30 their emissions in an integrated way.

31 The section considers two types of decoupling, at the global scale and in the long term: The 32 decoupling of material resource consumption (including fossil carbon) and environmental impact 33 (including climate change) from economic growth or economic development ("dematerialization"); 34 and the decoupling of human well-being from economic growth. The first type (see Sec. 4.4.1 and 35 4.4.3) is generally considered crucial for meeting sustainable development and equity goals (UNEP, 36 2011); yet while some dematerialization has occurred (see below), absolute levels of resource use 37 and environmental impact have continued to rise (Krausmann et al., 2009b). This has inspired 38 debates relevant to the second type of decoupling (Jackson, 2005b, 2009; Assadourian, 2010), 39 including discussion of reducing consumption levels in wealthier countries. We address this topic 40 (Sec. 4.4.4) by examining how income and income inequality affect dimensions of well-being. While 41 the second type of decoupling represents a "stronger" form than the first, it is also a more 42 controversial and a more novel concept, at least in a climate change context (yet programmes to 43 address reduced excessive consumption were mandated in Chapter 4.5 of Agenda 21 (United 44 Nations, 1992c).

#### 45 **4.4.1** Consumption patterns, inequality and environmental impact

The global annual use (extraction) of material resources – i.e., ores and industrial minerals, construction materials, biomass, and fossil energy carriers – increased eightfold during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, reaching about 55 Gt in 2000, while the average resource use per capita (the metabolic rate) doubled, reaching 8.5-9.2 tonnes per capita per year in 2005 (Krausmann et al., 2009b; UNEP,
2011). The *value* of the global consumption of goods and services (the global GDP) has increased sixfold since 1960 while consumption expenditures per capita has almost tripled (Assadourian, 2010).
Consumption-based GHG emissions increased between 1990 and 2009 in the world's major
economies, except the Russian Federation, ranging from 0.1-0.2% per year in the EU27, to 4.8-6.0%
per year in China (Peters et al., 2012) (see Chapter 5).

Global resource consumption has risen slower than GDP, especially since around 1970, indicating
some decoupling of economic development and resource use, signifying an increase in resource
productivity by about 1-2% annually at the global level (Krausmann et al., 2009b; UNEP, 2011). This
dematerialization of economic activity has been most pronounced in the industrialized countries.
Metabolic rates across countries are highly unequal, varying by a factor of 10 or more, due in large
part to variations in economic development, but there is also significant cross-country variation in
the relation between GDP and resource use (ibid.).

While for the world's many poor people, consumption is driven mainly by the need to satisfy basic 14 15 human needs, it is an increasingly common pattern across cultures to find meaning, contentment 16 and acceptance primarily through consumption (2010). This pattern is often referred to as 17 "consumerism", defined as a cultural paradigm where "the possession and use of an increasing 18 number and variety of goods and services is the principal cultural aspiration and the surest perceived 19 route to personal happiness, social status and national success" (Assadourian, 2010). Consumerist 20 lifestyles in industrialized countries seem to be imitated by the growing elites (Pow, 2011) and 21 middle-class populations in developing countries (Cleveland and Laroche, 2007; Gupta, 2011). 22 Together with the unequal distribution of income in the world (Sec. 4.2), the spread of consumerism 23 means that a large share of goods and services produced are "luxuries" that only the wealthy are 24 able to pay for, while the poor are unable to afford even the most basic goods and services (Khor, 25 2011).

Furthermore, the spread of consumerism as incomes rise is one of the "mega-drivers" of global 26 27 resource use and environmental degradation (2010). Hence a disproportionate part of the GHG 28 emissions arising from production are linked to the consumption of goods and services by a 29 relatively small portion of the world's population. This is illustrated by the great variation in the per 30 capita life-cycle GHG emissions of consumption ("carbon footprint") between countries and regions 31 at different income levels ("Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions"; Hertwich and Peters, 32 2009; Peters et al., 2011) (see below and Annex II). For example, the average carbon footprint per 33 person per year varies from 1-2 tonnes for many African and Asian countries, to 10-20 tonnes in 34 Europe, to more than 28 tonnes for the United States, Hong Kong and Luxemburg (Hertwich and Peters, 2009).<sup>4</sup> 35


36 As these figures indicate, the carbon footprint is strongly correlated with per capita consumption 37 expenditure (see Sec. 4.5). Across countries, Hertwich and Peters (2009) found an expenditure 38 elasticity of 0.57 for all GHGs – i.e., as nations become wealthier, the per capita carbon footprint 39 increases by 57% for each doubling of consumption (Figure 4.4.1). Within countries, similar 40 relationships have been found between household expenditure and carbon footprint (Hertwich, 2011). In the United Kingdom, the mean per capita  $CO_2$  emissions of households with the highest 41 42 disposable income was 10.4 tonnes, versus 7.4 tonnes for those in the lowest income category 43 (Druckman and Jackson, 2009). A multi-country study found expenditure elasticities of household 44 energy consumption ranging from 0.64 in Japan to 1.0 in Brazil (Lenzen et al., 2006). Because 45 wealthier countries meet a higher share of their final demand from (net) imports than do less 46 wealthy countries, consumption-based emissions are more closely associated with GDP than are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The figures refer to year 2001. The analysis excludes countries in the Middle East (except Turkey) and a disproportionate share of poor countries.

territorial emissions (Figure 4.4.2), the difference being the emissions embodied in trade (see Sec.
 4.4.2., Ch. 5 and Ch. 14).

3 The relationship between specific consumption patterns and environmental impact has been studied intensely in recent years (Tukker et al., 2010a). In industrialized countries, mobility (automobile and 4 5 air transport), food (mainly meat and dairy) and housing (including the use of energy-using products) are responsible for the largest proportion of consumption-related GHG emissions. Together they 6 7 account for 70% to 80% of all life-cycle impacts. A similar pattern exists for the carbon footprint of 8 consumption ("Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions"; Druckman and Jackson, 2009; 9 Hertwich, 2011). At the global scale, 72% of GHG emissions are related to household consumption, 10% to government consumption and 18% to investments (Hertwich and Peters, 2009). Food is the 10 11 most important consumption category, accounting for nearly 20% of GHG emissions, followed by housing/shelter (19%), mobility (17%), services (16%), manufactured products (13%), and 12 construction (10%). Food and services are more important in poor countries, while at high 13 14 expenditure levels, mobility and the consumption of manufactured goods cause the largest GHG emissions (ibid) (see Chapter 14). 15


The effects of non-income factors such as geography, energy system, production methods, household size, diet and lifestyle also affect per capita carbon footprints and other environmental impacts (Tukker et al., 2010a) so that the effects of increasing income varies considerably between regions and countries (Lenzen et al., 2006; Hertwich, 2011; Homma et al., 2012), cities (Jones and Kammen, 2011) and between rural and urban areas (Lenzen and Peters, 2010). The factors responsible for variations in carbon footprints across households at different scales are further discussed in Chapters 5, 12 and 14.



23

Figure 4.4.1 Relationship between final consumption (\$/capita) and carbon footprint (tCO2e/capita) for countries classified according to income (GNI per capita, World Bank Atlas method). Data refer to year 2001. Source: Adapted from Hertwich and Peters (2009). [Note from the authors: Will be updated to year 2010 or 2011]

28



1

Figure 4.4.2 Relationship between the wealth (GDP, USD 2004 PPP) and GHG emissions (CO2e) of
countries, for 92 countries. Data refer to year 2004. The red colour shows consumption-based
emissions and the blue colour territorial emissions. Source: Adapted from Steen-Olsen et al. (2012).
Data sources: GTAP and World Bank. [Note from the authors: Will be updated to year 2010 or 2011]

### 6 **4.4.2 Consumption patterns and carbon accounting**

### 7 **4.4.2.1** Carbon footprinting (consumption-based GHG emissions accounting)

8 Carbon (or GHG) accounting refers to the calculation of the GHG emissions associated with 9 economic activities at a given scale or with respect to a given unit. GHG accounting has traditionally 10 focused on emission sources, but in recent years there has been a growing interest in analyzing the 11 drivers of emissions by calculating the GHG emissions that occur along the supply chain of a functional unit such as a product or household (Peters, 2010). The result of this consumption-based 12 13 emissions accounting is often referred to as "carbon footprint", even if it involves other GHGs along 14 with  $CO_2$  (see Annex II). A carbon footprint in principle includes all emissions generated during the 15 life-cycle of a good or service – i.e., from production and distribution to end-use (final consumption) 16 and disposal or recycling.

17 Carbon footprinting starts from the premise that the GHG emissions associated with economic 18 activity are generated at least partly as a result of people's attempts to satisfy certain functional needs and desires (Lenzen et al., 2007; Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Bows and Barrett, 2010). These 19 20 are needs and desires expressed in the consumer demand for goods and services, and this demand 21 drives the production processes that consume material and energy resources and emit pollutants. 22 Emission drivers are not limited to individuals' consumption behaviour, however, but include also 23 the wider contexts of consumption such as transport infrastructure, production and marketing 24 systems, energy systems (see Sec. 4.3 and below). Carbon footprints have therefore been estimated 25 with respect to different functional units at different scales, including products, households, companies, cities, countries and regions (Peters, 2010; Pandey et al., 2011).<sup>5</sup> 26

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The emissions associated with the functional unit (but physically not part of the unit) are referred to as "embodied carbon", "carbon flows" or similar terms. A carbon footprint is expressed in  $CO_{2-}e$  (GWP100) per unit for a given time period (typically one year; for products the time frame is the product life cycle (see Annex II). Using the GTP metric instead of the GWP100 one can sometimes change a carbon footprint significantly.

There is no single accepted carbon footprinting methodology (Pandey et al., 2011), although several international carbon footprint standards have been developed, e.g. for products (Bolwig et al., 2011). Nor is there one widely accepted definition of carbon footprint. Peters (2010) proposes this definition, which allows for all possible applications across scales: "The 'carbon footprint' of a functional unit is the climate impact under a specific metric that considers all relevant emission sources, sinks and storage in both consumption and production within the specified spatial and temporal system boundary".

8 Calculating the carbon footprint of products can enable a range of climate mitigation actions (Sinden, 2009; Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010). Informing consumers about the climate impact of products 9 10 through labelling or other means can influence purchasing decisions in a more climate-friendly 11 direction and at the same time enable product differentiation (Edwards-Jones et al., 2009; Weber 12 and Johnson, 2012). Carbon footprinting can also help companies reduce GHG emissions cost-13 effectively by identifying the various emission sources within the company and along the supply 14 chain, including in other countries and in shipping and aviation (Sinden, 2009; Sundarakani et al., 15 2010; Lee, 2012). Those emissions can be reduced directly, or by purchasing offsets in carbon 16 markets. Some also argue that a company's success at reducing its carbon footprint can inspire 17 confidence in its general performance, but this effect is not well researched, and in the United 18 Kingdom, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) found limited investor interest in the climate change-related 19 data provided by retailers (see also Chapter 15). There is both theoretical and empirical evidence of 20 a positive relationship between a company's environmental and financial performance (Delmas and 21 Nairn-Birch, 2011; Griffin et al., 2012). The specific effect of carbon footprinting on company 22 financial performance and investor valuation is not well researched, however, and the results are 23 ambiguous. In the United Kingdom, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) found limited investor interest in 24 the climate change-related data provided by retailers, while a from the United States and Canada 25 concludes that investors do care about companies' GHG emission disclosures, whether these occur 26 through a voluntary scheme or informal estimates (Griffin et al., 2012). A longitudinal study of firms 27 in the United States across found that increasing carbon emissions positively impact financial 28 performance when using accounting based measures while it has a negative impact on market based 29 measures of financial performance; supply-chain (versus company-level) emissions significantly drive 30 these findings (Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2011). (See also Chapter 15.)

31 Product carbon footprinting could also have unintended effects, such as increasing costs and 32 reducing demand for products made abroad, including in developing countries (Edwards-Jones et al., 33 2009; Erickson et al., 2012). Implementation of carbon footprint standards through certification 34 schemes may also affect competitiveness and trade (Brenton et al., 2009) and could violate WTO 35 trade rules. Furthermore, a one-sided focus on GHG emissions in product development and 36 consumer choice could involve serious (and unnoticed) trade-offs with other sustainability 37 dimensions (Finkbeiner, 2009). For example, products or systems fulfilling similar functions may 38 show similar carbon footprints but differ significantly with respect to other environmental impacts, 39 notably those related to emissions of toxic substances (Laurent et al., 2012). These observations 40 suggest a need to use more broadly encompassing concepts and tools to assess and manage 41 sustainability.

### 42 *Choice of accounting method*

In the last decade, new accounting methods for assessing GHG emissions have emerged and 43 44 proliferated in response to interest in 1) determining whether nations are reducing emissions (Bows 45 and Barrett, 2010; Peters et al., 2011, 2012), 2) allocating GHG responsibility ("Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions"; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Bows and Barrett, 2010), 3) assuring the 46 47 accountability of carbon markets (Stechemesser and Guenther, 2012), 4) determining the full 48 implications of alternative energy technologies (Von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007; Martínez et al., 49 2009; Cherubini et al., 2009; Soimakallio et al., 2011), 5) helping corporations become greener 50 (Wiedmann et al., 2009), and 6) encouraging consumers to reduce their carbon footprints (Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010; Jones and Kammen, 2011). Most methods simply address CO<sub>2</sub>; some also include other GHGs, while others also consider a range of non-GHG environmental impacts. Methods differ, with normative implications, on whether consumers or producers of products are responsible; whether emissions embedded in past or potential replacement of capital investments are included; and whether indirect emissions, for example, through global land-use change resulting from changing product prices, are included (Finkbeiner, 2009; Plevin et al., 2010; Plassmann et al., 2010).

7 Most emissions accounting methods use a life-cycle assessment approach, but differ as to whether 8 the analysis uses environmentally extended economic input-output (EIO) tables to assess emissions 9 (LCA-EIO) or the analysis tailors the approach to the best data and assumptions for the particular 10 uses to which the analysis may be put. LCA-EIO provides analytical consistency across products but 11 incorporates historic average emissions by economic sector level (Wiedmann and Minx, 2007). 12 Tailored approaches such as activity-based or process LCA can use more recent and specialized data, 13 be more forward-looking, and address incremental changes. Hybrid LCA methods combining LCA-EIO 14 and process-LCA are increasingly been applied (Suh and Nakamura, 2007; Williams et al., 2009; 15 Peters, 2010). Global, multi-region input-output (MRIO) models are a type of EIO model in which 16 imports to a region are modelled using the technology of the region of origin (as opposed using the 17 technology of the importing region) and are considered state-of-the-art for assigning "consumer 18 responsibility" (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Wiedmann, 2009). Comprehensive uncertainty 19 analyses of process LCA and EIO-type models are generally rare but with important exceptions 20 (Finnveden et al., 2009; Lenzen et al., 2010). See Annex II for further discussion of these methods.

21 Systems of GHG emissions accounting are constructed according to certain conventions and 22 purposes ("Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions"). Better ways may be excessively 23 expensive given the plausible importance of the value of better information in the decision process. 24 Some interests will plead for standardized techniques based on past data because it favours them. 25 Others will argue for tailored approaches that make their technologies or products look good. 26 Producers favour responsibility being assigned to consumers, as do nations that are net exporters of 27 industrial goods. Controversies over accounting approaches play into issues of GHG and 28 environmental governance more broadly. Whether a consumption decision in one country affects 29 GHG emissions in other countries through the supply chain depends heavily on whether those other 30 countries have and enforce GHG policies. Whether carbon markets are effective or not depends on 31 good accounting and enforcement, but what will be enforced will depend on the accounting 32 measures agreed upon.

### 33 **4.4.2.2** Consumption-based versus territorial approaches to GHG accounting

34 Consumption-based accounting of GHG emissions (or carbon footprinting) at national level differs 35 from the production-based or territorial framework because of imports and exports of goods and 36 services that, directly or indirectly, involve GHG emissions ("Consumption-based accounting of CO2 37 emissions"; Peters et al., 2011). The territorial framework allocates to a nation those emissions that are physically produced within its territorial boundaries. The consumption-based framework 38 39 allocates the emissions associated with (released by the supply chain of) goods and services 40 consumed within a nation irrespective of their territorial origin. The difference in inventories 41 calculated based on the two frameworks are the emissions embodied in trade (Peters and Hertwich, 42 2008; Bows and Barrett, 2010) (Annex II gives details on accounting methods). It should be noted 43 that territorial and consumption-based accounting of emissions as such represent pure accounting 44 identities measuring the emissions embodied in goods and services that are produced or consumed, 45 respectively, by an individual, firm, country, region, etc. Responsibility for these emissions only 46 arises once it is assigned within a normative or legal framework, such as a climate agreement, 47 specifying rights to emit or obligations to reduce emission based on one of these metrics (see 48 below). As detailed below, the two approaches function differently in a global versus a fragmented climate policy regime. 49

Steckel et al. (2010) show that within a global regime that internalizes a cost of GHG emissions, the 1 2 two approaches are theoretically equivalent in terms of their efficiency in inducing mitigation. For 3 example, with a global cap-and-trade system with full coverage (i.e., an efficient global carbon 4 market) and given initial emission allocations, countries exporting goods benefit from export 5 revenues, with costs related to GHG emissions and any other negative impacts of production of 6 those goods priced in, such that the choice of accounting system has no influence on the efficiency 7 of production. Nor will it influence the welfare of countries, irrespective of being net exporters or 8 importers of emissions, since costs associated with these emissions are fully internalized in product 9 prices and will ultimately be borne by consumers. In practice, considerations such as transactions 10 costs and information asymmetries would influence the relative effectiveness and choice of 11 accounting system.

12 In the case of a fragmented climate policy regime, one argument put in favour of a consumption-13 based framework is that, unlike the territorial approach, they do not allow current emissions 14 inventories to be reduced by outsourcing production or relying more on imports to meet final 15 demand. Hence, it is argued, this approach gives a fairer illustration of responsibility for current 16 emissions (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Bows and Barrett, 2010). Carbon footprinting also increases 17 the range of mitigation options by identifying the distribution of GHG emissions among different 18 activities, final uses, locations, household types, etc. This enables better targeting of policies as well 19 as voluntary actions by citizens, corporations, and cities (Bows and Barrett, 2010; Jones and 20 Kammen, 2011).

21 On the other hand, reducing emissions at the "consumption end" of supply chains requires changing 22 deeply entrenched lifestyle patterns and specific behaviours among many actors with diverse 23 characteristics and preferences, as opposed to among the much fewer actors emitting GHGs at the 24 source. It has also been pointed out that – identical to the accounting of production-based emissions 25 - there is no direct one-to-one relationship between changes in consumption-based and global 26 emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2012) - i.e., if some goods or services were not consumed, global 27 emissions would not necessarily decrease by the same amount of emissions generated for their 28 production. This has been shown for China (Peters et al., 2007) and India (Dietzenbacher and 29 Mukhopadhyay, 2007): while these countries are large net exporters of embodied carbon, territorial 30 emissions would remain roughly constant or even increase if they were to withdraw from 31 international trade (and produce their entire current consumption domestically instead). That is, 32 without international trade, consumption-based emissions of these countries' trade partners would 33 likely be reduced, but not global emissions.

34 For this reason, it has been argued that a more detailed understanding of the underlying 35 determinants of emissions is needed than what is currently provided by either territorial or 36 consumption-based accounts, in order to guide policies that will effectively reduce global emissions 37 in a fragmented climate policy regime (Jakob and Marschinski, 2012). In particular, a better 38 understanding of system interrelationships in a global economy is required in order to be able to 39 attribute how, e.g., policy choices in one region affect global emissions by transmission via world 40 market prices and associated changes in production and consumption patterns in other regions. 41 Furthermore, as market dynamics and resource use are driven by both demand and supply, it is 42 conceivable to rely on climate policies that target the consumption as well as the production side of 43 emissions, as is done in some other policy areas.

44

FAQ 4.3 IPCC and UNFCCC focus primarily on GHG emissions within countries. Aren't consumers
 responsible for all the emissions linked to the goods and services they use, even if they come from
 other countries?

For any given country, it is possible to compute the emissions embodied in its consumption or those emitted in its productive sector. The consumption-based framework for GHG emission accounting

allocates the emissions released during the production and distribution (i.e. along the supply chain) 1 2 of goods and services to the final consumer and the nation (or another territorial unit) in which she 3 resides, irrespective of the geographical origin of these goods and services. The territorial or 4 production-based framework allocates the emissions physically produced within a nation's territorial 5 boundary to that nation. The difference in emissions inventories calculated based on the two 6 frameworks are the emissions embodied in trade. Consumption-based emissions is more strongly 7 associated with GDP than is territorial emissions. This is because wealthier countries satisfy a higher 8 share of their final consumption of products through net imports compared to poorer countries.

9 FAQ 4.4 What kind of consumption has the greatest environmental impact?

10

11 The relationship between consumer behaviours and their associated environmental impacts is well 12 understood. Generally, higher consumption lifestyles correspond to greater environmental impacts, 13 which connects distributive equity issues with the environment. Beyond that, research has shown 14 that food accounts for the largest share of consumption-based GHG emissions (carbon footprints) 15 with nearly 20% of the global carbon footprint, followed by housing, mobility, services, 16 manufactured products, and construction. Food and services are more important in poor countries, 17 while mobility and manufactured goods account for the highest carbon footprints in rich countries.

#### 18 4.4.3 Sustainable consumption and production – SCP

The concepts of "sustainable consumption" and "sustainable production" represent, respectively, 19 20 demand- and supply-side perspectives on sustainability. Moisander el al. (2010) remind us that the 21 efforts by producers to minimize the environmental or social impact of a product are futile if 22 consumers do not buy the good or service. Conversely, sustainable consumption behaviour depends 23 on the availability and affordability of such products in the marketplace. Below we introduce the 24 international policy developments that have been key drivers of the increasing research efforts in 25 these areas, and then we discuss the two perspectives in turn.

#### 26 4.4.3.1 SCP policies and programmes

27 The idea of sustainable consumption and production (SCP) was first placed high on the policy agenda 28 at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and was made part of Agenda 21. The World Summit on 29 Sustainable Development in 2002 led to the development of a 10-year Framework of Programmes 30 (10YFP) initiated in 2003 as The Marrakech Process (Tukker et al., 2010b; Schrader and Thøgersen, 31 2011; Pogutz and Micale, 2011). The 10YFP was formalised in a document adopted by the Rio+20

- 32 conference in 2012 that stated:
- 33 "Fundamental changes in the way societies produce and consume are indispensable for achieving
- 34 global sustainable development" [... and] "support for regional and national initiatives is
- 35 necessary to accelerate the shift towards [SCP] in order to promote social and economic
- 36 development within the carrying capacity of ecosystems by addressing and, where appropriate,
- 37 decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation by improving efficiency and
- 38 sustainability in the use of resources and production processes and reducing resource
- degradation, pollution and waste" (United Nations, 2012b, p. 2). 39

40 National and regional SCP policies have also been developed lately (see Ch. 10.11.3). For example, in 2008, the European Commission approved the "Sustainable Consumption and Production and 41 42 Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan", which includes proposals that aim to "contribute to improving the environmental performance of products and increase the demand for more 43 sustainable goods and production technologies" and to "encourage EU industry to take advantage of 44 45 opportunities to innovate" (European Commission, 2008). Other international organizations have placed new emphasis on SCP, for example, the Worldwatch Institute (Worldwatch Institute, 2010) 46 47 and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2011). Such policies and initiatives 48 differ as to whether they involve a strong or weak approach to sustainability (Sec. 4.2), i.e., whether they target a general substitution of fossil technologies and of material growth paths or "merely" an

2 increase in the demand for sustainable products.

### 3 4.4.3.2 Sustainable consumption and lifestyle

4 A rich research literature on sustainable consumption has developed over the past decade, including 5 several special issues of international journals (Tukker et al., 2010b; Le Blanc, 2010; Kilbourne, 2010; 6 Black, 2010; Schrader and Thøgersen, 2011). Several books, such as Prosperity without Growth 7 (Jackson, 2009), discuss the unsustainable nature of current lifestyles, development trajectories, and 8 economic systems, and how these could be changed in more sustainable directions. Several 9 definitions of sustainable consumption have been proposed within policy, business and academia 10 (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). At the Oslo symposium on Sustainable Consumption in 1994, sustainable 11 consumption (and production) was defined as the "use of goods and services that respond to basic 12 needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimizing the use of natural resources, toxic materials 13 and emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle, so as not to jeopardize the needs of future 14 generations" (Norwegian Ministry of Environment, 1994). At another meeting in Oslo, in 2005, 15 scientists proposed a more encompassing and integrating perspective:

- 16 *"The future course of the world depends on humanity's ability to provide a high quality of life for*
- 17 a prospective nine billion people without exhausting the Earth's resources or irreparably
- 18 damaging its natural systems ... In this context, sustainable consumption focuses on formulating
- 19 strategies that foster the highest quality of life, the efficient use of natural resources, and the
- 20 effective satisfaction of human needs while simultaneously promoting equitable social
- 21 *development, economic competitiveness, and technological innovation" (Tukker et al., 2006).*
- 22 This perspective encompasses not only demand-side but also production issues, and it addresses all
- three pillars of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental) as well as equity and
- 24 well-being, illustrating the complexity of sustainable consumption and its connections to a range of
- 25 other issues.

26 Research has demonstrated that consumption practices and patterns are influenced by a range of 27 economic, informational, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors, operating at different 28 levels or spheres in society, including the individual, the family, the locality, the market and the work 29 place (Thøgersen, 2010). Furthermore, consumers' preferences are often constructed in the 30 situation (rather than pre-existing) and their decisions are highly contextual (Weber and Johnson, 31 2009) and often inconsistent with values, attitudes, and perceptions of themselves as responsible 32 and green consumers and citizens (Barr, 2006; de Barcellos et al., 2011), as elaborated below. (See 33 the discussion of behaviour in Ch. 2 and 3).

- 34 The sustainable consumption of goods and services can be viewed in the broader context of lifestyle 35 and everyday life. For example, Hall (2011) observes that ethical consumer discourses inform everyday family consumption processes and narratives. Conversely, sustainable consumption 36 37 practices are bound up with perceptions of identity, ideas of good life, and so on, and considered 38 alongside other concerns such as affordability and health. Ethical consumption choices are also 39 negotiated among family members with divergent priorities and interpretations of sustainability. 40 Choosing a simpler lifestyle ("voluntary simplifying") seems to be related to environmental concern 41 (Shaw and Newholm, 2002; Huneke, 2005), but frugality, as a more general trait or disposition, is not 42 (Lastovicka et al., 1999; Pepper et al., 2009).
- Other research draws attention to the constraints placed on consumption and lifestyle choices by factors beyond the influence of the individual, family or community, which tends to lock consumption into unsustainable patterns by reducing "green agency" at the micro level (Thøgersen, 2005; Pogutz and Micale, 2011). These structural issues include product availability, cultural norms and beliefs, and working conditions which favour a "work-and-spend" lifestyle (Sanne, 2002). Brulle and Young (2007) found that the growth in personal consumption in the USA during the 20<sup>th</sup> century

is partly explained by the increase in advertising, after controlling for disposable income, 1 2 demographics, and income distribution. The effect of advertising on spending is concentrated on 3 luxury goods (household appliances and supplies and automobiles) while it is nonexistent in the field 4 of basic necessities (food and clothes). Observations such as these make Moisander et al. (2010) 5 question the individualistic view of the consumer as a powerful political agent and market actor. 6 Instead, they propose that green consumer behaviour be analyzed in the context of the different 7 networks of power that constitute the conditions of subjectivity and agency in a market that is highly 8 shaped by the political economy in which it is embedded.

9 The strength and pervasiveness of political economy factors such as those mentioned above, and the 10 inadequate attention to them by policy, is an important cause of the lack of real progress towards more sustainable consumption patterns (Thøgersen, 2005; Tukker et al., 2006; Le Blanc, 2010). 11 12 Furthermore, the unsustainable lifestyles in industrialized countries are being replicated by the 13 growing elites (Pow, 2011) and middle-class populations in developing countries (Cleveland and 14 Laroche, 2007; Gupta, 2011). Finally, we observe that SC studies are generally done in a consumer 15 culture context, which tends to compromise discussion of instances where sustainable consumption 16 has pre-empted the consumer culture.

### 17 **4.4.3.3** Consumer attitudes to the environment and to carbon footprinting

Despite the overwhelming impact of structural factors on consumer practices, choices and 18 19 behaviour, it is widely agreed that the achievement of more sustainable consumption patterns also 20 depends on how consumers value environmental quality and other dimensions of sustainability 21 (Jackson, 2005a; Thøgersen, 2005; Bamberg and Möser, 2007). It also depends on whether people 22 believe that their consumption practices make a difference to sustainability (Frantz and Mayer, 23 2009; Hanss and Böhm, 2010), which in turn is influenced by their value priorities and how much 24 they trust the environmental information provided to them by scientists, companies, and public 25 authorities (Kellstedt et al., 2008). The motivational roots of sustainable consumer choices seem to 26 be substantially the same, although not equally salient in different national and cultural contexts 27 (Thøgersen, 2009; Thøgersen and Zhou, 2012).

28 In a survey of European attitudes towards sustainable consumption and production (Gallup 29 Organisation, 2008a), 84% of EU citizens said that the product's impact on the environment is "very 30 important" or "rather important" when making purchasing decisions. Similarly, 77% said they always 31 or often take energy efficiency into account when buying electricity or fuel-consuming products. 32 These attitudes are rarely reflected in behaviour, however. There is plenty of evidence demonstrating the presence of an "attitude-behaviour" or "values-action" gap whereby consumers 33 34 expressing "green" attitudes fail to adopt sustainable consumption patterns and lifestyles (Barr, 35 2006; Young et al., 2010; de Barcellos et al., 2011). To a large measure, this gap can be attributed to 36 many other goals and concerns competing for the person's limited attention (Weber and Johnson, 37 2009). The impact of multiple competing goals and limited attention is reflected in the substantial 38 difference in the level of environmental concern that Europeans express in opinion polls when the 39 issue is treated in isolation, and when the environment is assessed in the context of other important 40 societal issues. For example, in 2008, 64% of Europeans said protecting the environment was "very 41 important" to them personally when the issue was presented in isolation (Gallup Organisation, 42 2008b) while only 4% pointed at environmental pollution as one of the two most important issues 43 facing their country at the moment (Gallup Organisation, 2008a). When there are many important 44 issues competing for the person's limited attention and resources, those that appear most pressing 45 in everyday life are likely to prevail.

The likelihood that a person will act on his or her environmental concern is further diminished by a range of factors affecting everyday decisions and behaviour, including the structural factors mentioned above, but also more specific factors such as habit, high transactions costs (i.e., time for information search and processing and product search), availability, affordability, and the influence 1 of non-green criteria such as quality, size, brand, and discounts (Young et al., 2010). Some of these

factors differ across different product categories and within sectors (McDonald et al., 2009). The impact of all of these impeding factors is substantial, calling into question the capacity of "the green

4 consumer" to effectively advance sustainable consumption and production (Csutora, 2012).

5 Third-party eco-labels and declarations have proven to be an effective tool to transform consumer 6 sustainability attitudes into behaviour in many cases (Thøgersen, 2002). One of the reasons is that a 7 trusted label can function as a choice heuristic in the decision situation, allowing the experienced 8 consumer to make sustainable choices in a fast and frugal way (cf. Chapter 2 and Thøgersen et al. 9 (2012)). Labelling products with their carbon footprint may help to create new goals (e.g., to reduce 10  $CO_2$  emissions) and to attract and keep attention on those goals, in the competition between goals (Weber and Johnson, 2012). According to the Gallup survey mentioned above, there is strong 11 12 support for product carbon labelling in Europe: 72% of EU citizens thought that carbon labelling 13 should be mandatory. However, only 10% of European consumers found the carbon footprint to be 14 the most important information that an eco-label should contain (Gallup Organisation, 2008a). In 15 Australia, Vanclay et al. (2010) found a strong purchasing response of 20% when a green-labelled 16 product (indicating relatively low life-cycle CO<sub>2</sub> emissions) was also the cheapest, and a much 17 weaker response when green-labelled products were not the cheapest. Hence, consumers, at least 18 in developed countries, show interest in product carbon footprint information and many consumers 19 would prefer carbon-labelled products and firms over others, other things being equal (Bolwig and 20 Gibbon, 2010). But consumers are also sceptical about "climate-friendly" claims made by retailers 21 and producers (ibid.). Finally, it is important to note that the impeding factors and the related 22 "attitudes-behaviour" gap severely limit how far one can get towards sustainable consumption with 23 labelling and other information-based means alone.

24 Research on these topics in the developing world is lacking. Considering the notion of a hierarchy of 25 needs (Maslow; Chai and Moneta, 2012) and the challenges facing consumers in developing 26 countries, carbon footprints and other environmental declarations might be seen as a luxury concern 27 that only developed countries can afford. Countering this view, Kvaløy et al. (2012) find 28 environmental concern in developing countries at the same level as in developed countries. 29 Furthermore, eco-labelled products increasingly appear at retail level in developing countries, 30 especially in supermarkets targeting the urban middle and upper classes (Roitner-Schobesberger et 31 al., 2008; Thøgersen and Zhou, 2012).

### 32 4.4.3.4 Sustainable production

33 Research and initiatives on sustainable production have been concerned with increasing the 34 resource efficiency of, and reducing the pollution and waste from, the production of goods and 35 services through technological innovations in process and product design at the plant and product 36 levels, and, more lately, through system-wide innovations at the level of the value chain or 37 production network (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). Policies that incentivise certain product choices have 38 also been developed (see Ch. 10.11.3). Eco-efficiency (Schmidheiny and WBSCD, 1992) is the main 39 management philosophy guiding sustainable production initiatives among companies (Pogutz and 40 Micale, 2011) and is expressed as created value or provided functionality per caused environmental 41 impact. Moving towards a more eco-efficient production thus means creating the same or higher 42 value or functionality while causing a lower environmental impact. Discussions of eco-efficiency 43 involve consideration of multiple environmental impacts across scales, ranging from global impacts 44 like climate change over regional impacts associated with air and water pollution, to local impacts 45 caused by use of land or water.

A strong increase in the eco-efficiency of production is a pre-requisite for developing a sustainable society (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). The I=PAT equation expresses the environmental impact I as a product of the population number P, the affluence A (value created or consumed per capita), and a

49 technology factor T perceived as the reciprocal of eco-efficiency. Considering the foreseeable growth

in P and A, and the current unsustainable level of I for many environmental impacts it is clear that the eco-efficiency (1/T) must increase many times (a factor 4 to 20)<sup>6</sup> to ensure a sustainable production. While a prerequisite, even this kind of increases in eco-efficiency may not be sufficient since A and T are not mutually independent due to the presence of rebound – including market effects; indeed, sometimes a reduction in T (increased eco-efficiency) is accompanied by an even greater growth in A, thereby increasing the overall environmental impact I (Pogutz and Micale, 2011).

8 With its focus on the provided function and its broad coverage of environmental impacts, life cycle 9 assessment, LCA, is an environmental analysis tool that is frequently used for evaluation of the eco-10 efficiency of products or production activities (Hauschild, 2005; Finnveden et al., 2009) (see Annex 11 II.4.2). LCA has been standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 14040 12 and ISO 14044) and is a key methodology underlying standards for ecolabelling and environmental 13 product declarations. LCA is also the analytical tool underlying DFE (design for environment) 14 methods that support the reduction of the life cycle impacts of products (Bhander et al., 2003; 15 Hauschild et al., 2004).

16 With the globalization and outsourcing of industrial production, analyzing the entire product life 17 cycle (or product chain) gains increased relevance when optimizing the energy and material 18 efficiency of production. A life-cycle approach will reveal the potential problem shifting that is 19 inherent in outsourcing and that may lead to increased overall resource consumption and GHG 20 emissions of the product over its life cycle in spite of reduced impacts of the mother company (Shui 21 and Harriss, 2006; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Herrmann and Hauschild, 2009). Indeed, a life cycle-based 22 assessment is generally needed to achieve resource and emissions optimization across the product 23 chain. It must consider all stages in the product chain, including transportation and the use and end-24 of-life ones. Especially the use stage can be very important for products that use electricity or fuels 25 to function (Wenzel et al., 1997; Samaras and Meisterling, 2008; Yung et al., 2011; Sharma et al., 26 2011). Improvement potentials along product chains can be large, in particular when companies shift 27 from selling only products to delivering product-service systems (Manzini and Vezzoli, 2003). 28 Exchange of flows of waste materials or energy can also contribute to increasing eco-efficiency. 29 Under the heading of "industrial symbiosis", such mutually beneficial relationships between independent industries have emerged at multiple locations, generally leading to savings of energy 30 31 and sometimes also materials and resources (Chertow and Lombardi, 2005; Chertow, 2007; Sokka et 32 al., 2011) (see Ch. 10.5).

33 While the broad coverage of environmental impacts supported by LCA is required to avoid unnoticed 34 problem shifting between impacts, a more narrow focus on climate mitigation in relation to 35 production would be supported by considering energy efficiency, which, like resource and eco-36 efficiency, can be addressed at different levels from the individual process over the production 37 facility and the product chain (or life cycle) up to a higher level industrial system (industrial 38 symbiosis). At the process level, the operation of the individual process and consideration of the use-39 stage energy efficiency in the design of the machine tools and production equipment would be addressed.<sup>7</sup> Improvements in energy efficiency of manufacturing processes have focused on both 40 41 the design and operation of a broad variety of processes (Gutowski et al., 2009; Duflou et al., 2010; 42 Herrmann et al., 2011; Kara and Li, 2011), finding improvement potentials at the individual process 43 level of up to 70% (Duflou et al., 2012), and on the system of processes at the plant level by re-using 44 e.g. waste heat from one process for heating in another (Hayakawa et al., 1999). Exergy analysis and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Factor 4 to factor 20 increases can be calculated depending on the expected increases in P and A and the needed reduction in I (Von Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Schmidt-Bleek, 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Ch. 10.4 for further discussion of energy and resource efficiency in the manufacturing of material products.

energy pinch analysis are used to identify potentials for reutilization of energy flows in other
 processes (Creyts and Carey, 1999; Bejan, 2002).

Analyses of the social dimensions of production systems have addressed such issues as worker conditions (Riisgaard, 2009), farm income (Bolwig et al., 2009), small producer inclusion into markets and value chains (Bolwig et al., 2010; Mitchell and Coles, 2011) and the role of standards in fostering sustainability (Bolwig et al., In press; Gibbon et al., 2010). Recently, the LCA methodology has been elaborated to include assessment of social impacts along the life-cycle of products, such as labour rights (Dreyer et al., 2010), in order to support the identification and assessment of problem shifting

9 and trade-offs between environmental and social dimensions (Hauschild et al., 2008).

### 10 4.4.4 Relationship between consumption and well-being

As noted earlier, global material resource consumption continues to increase despite substantial gains in resource productivity or eco-efficiency, causing further increases in GHG emissions and overall environmental degradation. In this light it is relevant to discuss whether human well-being or happiness can be decoupled from consumption or growth (Ahuvia and Friedman, 1998; Jackson, 2005b; Tukker et al., 2006). We do this here by examining the relationship between different dimensions of well-being and income (and income inequality) across populations and over time.

17 Happiness is an ambiguous concept that is often used as a catchword for subjective well-being 18 (SWB). SWB is multidimensional and includes both cognitive and affective components (Kahneman 19 et al., 2003). The former refers to the evaluative judgments individuals make when they think about 20 their life and are found in life satisfaction or ladder-of-life data, whereas affective or emotional well-21 being refers to the emotional quality of an individual's everyday experience and are captured by surveys about the intensity and prevalence of feelings along the day (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010).<sup>8</sup> 22 23 Camfield and Skevington (2008) examine the relationship between SWB and quality of life (QoL) as 24 used in the literature. They find that SWB and QoL are virtually synonymous; that they both contain 25 a substantial element of life satisfaction, and that health and income are key determinants of SWB 26 or QoL, while low income and high inequality are both associated with poor health and high 27 morbidity.

28 The "Easterlin paradox" refers to an emerging body of literature suggesting that while there is little 29 or no relationship between SWB and the aggregate income of countries or long-term GDP growth, 30 there is robust evidence that within countries, those with more income are happier (Easterlin, 1973, 31 1995). Absolute income is, it is argued, only important for happiness when income is very low, while 32 relative income (or income equality) is important for happiness at a wide range of income levels 33 (Layard, 2005; Clark et al., 2008). These insights have been used to question whether economic 34 growth should be a primary goal of government policy (for rich countries), instead of, for example, 35 focusing on reducing inequality within countries and globally, and on maximizing subjective well-36 being. For instance, Assadourian (2010) argues against consumerism on the grounds that increased 37 material wealth above a certain threshold does not contribute to subjective well-being.

38 The Easterlin paradox has been contested in comparisons across countries (Deaton, 2008) and over 39 time (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Sacks et al., 2010), on the basis of the World Gallup survey of 40 well-being. These works establish a clear linear relationship between average levels of ladder-of-life satisfaction and the logarithm of GDP per capita across countries, and find no satiation point beyond 41 42 which wealthier countries have no further increases in subjective well-being. Their time series 43 analysis also suggests that economic growth is on average associated with rising happiness over 44 time. On this basis they picture a strong role for absolute income and a more limited role for relative 45 income comparisons in determining happiness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Kahneman and Deaton (2010) define emotional well-being as "the frequency and intensity of experiences of joy, fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, and affection that makes one's life pleasant or unpleasant".

These results contrast with studies of emotional well-being, which generally find a weak relationship 1 2 between income and well-being at higher income levels (Kahneman and Deaton 2010). In the US, for 3 example, Kahneman and Deaton (2010) find a clear satiation effect, i.e. beyond around \$75,000 4 annual household income (just above the mean US household income) further increases in income no longer improve individuals' ability to do what matters most to their emotional well-being.<sup>9</sup> But 5 6 even for life satisfaction, there is contrasting evidence. In particular, in Deaton (2008) there is a lot of 7 variation of SWB between countries at the same level of development, and in Sacks et al. (2010) the 8 long term positive relationship between income and life satisfaction is weakly significant and 9 sensitive to the sample of countries (see also Graham (2009), Easterlin et al. (2010), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010)). An important phenomenon is that all components of SWB, in various degrees, 10 11 adapt to most changes in objective conditions of life, except a few things, such as physical pain 12 (Kahneman et al., 2003; Layard, 2005; Clark et al., 2008; Graham, 2009; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 13 2010).

The great variability of SWB data across individuals and countries and the adaptation phenomenon suggest that these data do not provide indices of well-being that are comparable across individuals and over time. Respondents have different standards when they answer satisfaction questions at different times or in different circumstances. Therefore, the weakness of the observed link between growth and SWB is not only debated, but it is quite compatible with a strong and firm desire in the population for ever-growing material consumption (Fleurbaey, 2009). Decoupling growth and wellbeing may be more complicated than suggested by raw SWB indicators.

21 It has been found that inequality in society has a marked negative effect on average SWB. For 22 example, using General Social Survey data from 1972 to 2008 in the United States, Oishi et al. (2011) 23 found that Americans were on average happier in years with less national income inequality than in 24 years with more inequality. They further demonstrated that this inverse relation between income 25 inequality and happiness was explained by perceived fairness and general trust in the case of lowerincome respondents: These Americans trusted other people less and perceived other people to be 26 27 less fair in the years with more national income inequality than in the years with less national 28 income inequality.

### 29 **4.5 Development pathways**

### 30 **4.5.1 Development pathways: definition and examples**

Though widely used in the literature, the concept of development path has rarely been defined.<sup>10</sup> According to AR4, a development path is "an evolution based on an array of technological, economic, social, institutional, cultural, and biophysical characteristics that determine the interactions between human and natural systems, including consumption and production patterns in all countries, over time at a particular scale" (IPCC, 2007, Glossary, p. 813). AR4 also indicates that "alternative development paths refer to different possible trajectories of development, the continuation of current trends being just one of the many paths".

- 38 Though the AR4 definition suggests that a development path is global, the concept is used in the
- 39 literature to describe development trajectories at other scales: regional (e.g., Li and Zhang (2008)),
- 40 national (e.g., Poteete (2009)) and subnational (e.g., Dusyk et al. (2009) at provincial scale and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This includes such as aspects as spending time with people they like, avoiding pain and disease, and enjoying leisure. It is stressed that this result is based on a comparison across US households and do not refer to the effects of a *change* in a person's income.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Development path and development pathway are synonymous. We prefer to use development path because a "development pathway" already has a precise signification in another field, namely biology (in which it denotes "a sequence of biological or biochemical events that are involved in embryological or cellular development" (National Cancer Institute (NCI), 2011)).

1 Yigitcanlar et Velibeyoglu (2008) at city scale). In the present report, a development path will 2 characterize all the interactions between human and natural systems in a particular territory,

3 regardless of scale.

Development path is a holistic concept. It is thus broader than the development trajectory of a particular sector, or of a particular group of people within a society. As a result, a wide range of economic, social and environmental indicators are necessary to describe a development path, not all

7 of which may be amenable to quantitative representation.

8 As defined by AR4, however, a "path" is not a random collection of indicators. It has an internal 9 narrative and causal consistency that can be captured by the *determinants* of the interactions 10 between human and natural systems. The underlying assumption is that the observed development 11 trajectory – as recorded by various economic, social and environmental indicators – can be explained by identifiable drivers. This roots the concept of development path in the (dominant) intellectual 12 13 tradition according to which history has some degree of intelligibility, while another tradition holds 14 that history is a chaotic set of events that is essentially not intelligible (Schopenhauer, 1819). This 15 choice has two important methodological consequences.

Looking backward, assessing past development paths amounts not only to describing how a given society has evolved over time, but also to understanding the mechanisms that have shaped this evolution. A large literature describes observed development trajectories for given territories and analyses the underlying processes. In the field of economics only, this literature encompasses most of the growth literature and a large part of the (macro) development literature.<sup>11</sup> In the present chapter, section 4.3 reviews the drivers of sustainable development literature, and Chapter 5 reviews the determinants of GHG emissions.

- Looking forward, the elaboration of scenarios is based on a conception of the causal mechanisms and assumptions about the future evolution of exogenous variables. There is, again, a large literature of forward-looking studies that construct plausible development paths for the future and that examine the way by which development might be steered towards one path or another. Box
- 4.5.1 briefly reviews the main forward-looking development paths published since AR4.
- 28

29

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Box 4.5.1. Prospective Development Paths, new developments since AR4

Forward-looking development paths aim at illuminating the universe of possible futures, and at providing a sense of how these futures might be reached or on the contrary avoided. Plausible paths can be constructed using various techniques, ranging from simulations with numerical models to qualitative scenario construction or group forecasting exercises (Van Notten et al., 2003).

New sets of plausible development paths for the future have been proposed in the literature since the AR4 review (Sathaye et al. (2007), Sec. 12.2.1.2). At the global scale, they include, inter alia, the World Bank 2010 climate smart path (World Bank, 2010), the Tellus Institute scenarios (Raskin et al. (2010)), and degrowth strategies (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010).

In addition, a set of new scenarios is being developed under the IAMC consortium (Moss et al., 2010)
 to update the 2000 SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). These scenarios are constructed

41 based on factors that would make mitigation and adaptation easier or harder for any given target

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This literature can itself be divided in two main groups: papers aimed at identifying individual mechanisms that drive development trajectories, and papers aimed at identifying broad patterns of development. One example of the former is the so-called "EKC" literature on the relationships between GDP and emissions, discussed in Chapter 5. One example of the latter is the so-called "investment development path" literature, which, following Dunning (1981), identifies stages of development for countries based on the direction of foreign direct investment flows and the competitiveness of domestic firms on international markets.

(what is called "shared socio-economic pathways"); climate policy assumptions; and representative
 concentration pathways (RCPs). They are described in detail in Chapter 6, [though Chapter 6
 database of scenario is based on RCPs only].

4 Since AR4, there has also been considerable effort in designing sectoral pathways, e.g., on 5 biodiversity (Leadley et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010), health (Etienne and Asamoa-Baah, 2010), or 6 agriculture (Paillard et al., 2010).

7 At the national level, a relevant event since AR4 is the emerging "green growth" concept (OECD, 8 2011). The term does not have a consensus definition, but there is agreement that green growth "is 9 about making growth processes resource efficient, cleaner and more resilient without necessarily 10 slowing them" (Hallegate et al., 2011), effectively reconciling the economic and environmental 11 pillars of sustainable development. The green growth debate has spurred many short- to mediumterm scenario exercises at national or regional level (e.g. Republic of Korea (2009), Jaeger et al. 12 13 (2011)); as well as renewed discussions on sustainable development trajectories (e.g., (Jupesta et al. 14 2011)).

Similarly, there is growing research on the ways by which societies can transition towards a "low carbon economy" or a "low carbon society", considering not only mitigation and adaptation to climate change, but also the need for social, economic and technological transitions (P. R. Shukla, Dhar, et Mahapatra 2008).

### 19 4.5.2 Path dependence and lock-ins

20 An important issue for policy-making is to understand how and to which extent the mechanisms that 21 drive the pathways create "path dependence" – the tendency for past decisions and events to self-22 reinforce, thereby diminishing and possibly excluding the prospects for alternatives to emerge. If 23 path dependence is identified ex ante, it provides a basis for making better-informed decisions. For 24 example, development of inter-city highways may make further extension of the road network more 25 likely (if only for feeder roads) but also make further extension of rail networks less cost-effective by 26 drawing out traffic and investment financing [see Chapter 12]. Taking these mechanisms into 27 account does not necessarily mean that the inter-city highway system is not socially beneficial - it 28 merely acknowledges that the presence of an extensive highway system influences and may diminish the future prospects for alternative transportation investments. 29

Page (2006) provides a taxonomy and distinguishes between outcome-dependent processes – in which the outcome at one period depends on past outcomes – and equilibrium-dependent processes – in which the long-run distribution over outcomes depends on past outcomes. Second, he distinguishes between recent path dependence, in which outcome at year *t* depends only on outcomes at recent periods, and early path dependence, in which outcomes at year *t* depend only on the outcomes of a finite set of early periods. In the latter case, outcomes at year *t* are *locked-in*.

36 Page (2006) also explores the mechanisms underlying path- and equilibrium-dependence. Best 37 known are "increasing returns" mechanisms – those in which an outcome in one period increases 38 the probability of generating that same outcome in the next period, which comprise, inter alia, 39 increasing returns to scale, learning by doing, induced technological change, or agglomeration 40 economies. The concept of increasing returns has a long tradition in economic history, and the 41 implications of increasing returns mechanisms have been systematically explored over the past 42 three decades or so, notably around issues of monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), 43 international trade (Krugman, 1979), economic geography (Fujita et al., 1999), economic growth 44 (Romer, 1990), industrial organizations or adoption of technologies (Arthur, 1989).

Yet increasing returns are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate path- and equilibriumdependence. They are not sufficient because competing increasing returns can cancel out. And they are not necessary because other mechanisms might generate path- and equilibrium-dependence. For example, choices typically involve the use of scarce resources, such as land, labour or exhaustible natural resources. Decisions made at one point in time thus constrain future agents' options, either temporarily (for labour) or permanently (for exhaustible resources). Similarly, in the presence of switching costs – e.g., costs attached to premature replacement of long-lived capital stock – decisions made at one point in time can partially or totally lock-in decision-makers' subsequent choices (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). The key message is that it is essential to look broadly for mechanisms that may generate path-and equilibrium-dependence when analyzing the determinants of pathways (past or anticipated).

8 Lock-in is the most extreme manifestation of path dependence. Though widely used in the economic 9 and innovation literature, "lock-in" does not have a single definition, but rather various (if related) 10 meanings. In the presence of switching costs, decisions made at one point in time can partially or totally lock-in decision-makers' subsequent choices – making it very costly to reverse ex post choices 11 12 that were not necessarily economically distinguishable ex ante (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). One 13 famous example is the competition between technology standards, for example between the 14 AZERTY and the QWERTY keyboards, or between the VHS and BETAMAX video standards. In the 15 economic geography literature, similarly, positive feedback such as agglomeration economies can 16 also lock in the growth/expansion path of locations/regions once initial choices are made (Fujita et 17 al., 1999).

18 Lock-ins are not "good" or "bad" per se (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009), but identifying risks of "bad" lock-19 ins and taking advantage of possible "good" lock-ins matters for policy-making, so that ex ante 20 decisions are not regretted ex post (Liebowitz and Margolis (1995)). The literature, however, underlines that lock-ins do not stem only for lack of information. There are also many cases in which 21 22 rational agents might make decisions based only on part of the information available, because of, 23 inter alia, differences between local and global optimum, time and resource constraints on the 24 decision-making process or information symmetry (Foray, 1997) ; which points to the process of 25 decision-making (See 4.3.2 on Governance and Political Economy.).

### 26 **4.5.3 Strategies towards sustainable development paths**

27 There are many conceptions about how to make our development path sustainable. While most 28 proponents of sustainable development agree with the Brundtland Report's objectives to reconcile 29 social, economic and environmental goals, models of sustainable development have emerged in 30 many different forms and combinations. A common theme is that technology can bring benefits for 31 environmental protection. Von Weizsäcker et al. (1997), for example, argued that technical 32 innovation could cut global resource use in half while doubling wealth, for a four-fold productivity 33 increase; a 2009 follow-up argues that productivity can actually increase by a factor of five through 34 improvements in resource and energy productivity innovation in industry, technical innovation and policy (Von Weizsäcker et al., 2009). There is also widespread support for a dramatic increase in 35 36 energy efficiency and change in energy use from fossil fuels to renewable sources (Flavin and 37 Lenssen, 1994).

38 Some have supported the idea of separating economic from ecological issues (Gallopín, 2003). One 39 approach argues that sustainable development is predominantly of concern in the developing world 40 (McCormick, 1991) and therefore, the process of implementing sustainable development should be 41 accompanied by a high level of growth benefiting the poor. From the perspective of a sustainable 42 economic development, the underlying assumption is that economic affluence is the best way to 43 overcome most of the problems faced by societies (Allaby, 1983). This perspective is in line with the 44 "status quo" approach described in Hopwood et al. (2005), which considers that economic 45 prosperity is "the driver towards sustainability".

In the climate change debate, this perspective leads some to argue that instead of investing in mitigation, wealthier countries should make direct transfers to poorer countries to support development, on the assumption that richer future generations in developing countries will be more able to cope with the impacts of (unmitigated) climate change (Schelling, 1995, 2006). The need for change is recognized, but primarily when it focuses on building sustainable economies that provide strategic economic advantages in the global economy. Moreover, as has been strongly argued (Jasanoff 2004; Singer 2004; Speth and Haas 2006; Kjellen 2008), climate change is only one of many global problems – environmental, economic, and social – that will require effective cooperative global governance if development – and indeed human welfare – is to be sustained. A contrasting line of thought is that sustainability is primarily about ecological issues – which, from this point of view, should be predominant in the debates about sustainable development (Gallopín, 2003).

8 Beyond the deep connection between meeting human needs and preserving the natural 9 environment, alternative paradigms of sustainable development are considering the idea that 10 sustainable development is a multidimensional process which requires strong interlinkages between 11 economic, environmental, socio-cultural, political and technological factors to be effectively 12 achieved (Hopwood et al., 2005; Udo and Jansson, 2009).

Hopwood et al. (2005) and O'Brien (2011) suggest a "transformatory approach" which embraces the view that environmental degradation and inequities will persist unless a strong commitment to social equity is achieved in order to promote access to economic opportunities, livelihood and good health. This approach also recognizes environmental justice as a key determinant of social transformation, which may lead to fulfilling human needs and enhancing the quality of life.

18 Other approaches stress the need to embrace a plurality of perspectives on sustainable 19 development, but with a greater emphasis on freedom-oriented development (Gallopín, 2003; 20 Sneddon et al., 2006). This implies recognizing, for instance, the need for innovative approaches 21 relating to people-centred development and right-based approaches to development (NGLS, 2002).

22 Feminist scholars have advanced sustainable development approaches that build on women's 23 experiences and aspirations. They have raised the need to take a fuller account of gender relations 24 affecting fertility, childbirth and resource consumption in proposing solutions to environmental and 25 social problems (Arizpe et al., 1994) and called for placing "social reproduction" at the centre of new 26 development perspectives. Di Chiro (2008), paraphrasing Bakker and Gill (2003), defines social 27 reproduction as "the intersecting complex of political-economic, socio-cultural, and material 28 environmental processes required to maintain everyday life and sustain human cultures and 29 communities on a daily basis and inter-generationally".

30 There are interesting regional perspectives. For instance, there is growing research in India and 31 China on sustainable development approaches that aim to build a "low-carbon economy" or "low-32 carbon society" and, in the process, meet the mitigation and adaptation challenges of climate 33 change, including the need for social, economic and technological transitions (Sukla et al., 2008). 34 Studies in China show that controlling emissions without proper policies to counteract the negative 35 effects will have an adverse impact on the country's economic development, reducing its per capita 36 income and the living standards of both urban and rural residents (Wang Can et al., 2005; Wang Ke, 2008). China is developing indicators for low-carbon development and low-carbon society (UN 37 38 (2010), with many citations) with specific indicators tested on selected cities and provinces (Fu, 39 Jiafeng et al., 2010), providing useful data on challenges and gaps as well as the need for clearly defined goals and definitions of "low-carbon" and its sustainable development context. 40

### 41 **4.5.4** Indicators of sustainability for development paths

In this section we examine how sustainability can be assessed on development path scenarios. Ideally, models that produce development paths should (i) be framed in a consistent macroeconomic framework, (ii) impose the relevant technical constraints in each sector, such as views about the direction of technical change, (iii) capture the key relationships between economic activity and the environment, e.g., energy and natural resources consumption or greenhouse gases emissions, (iv) have a horizon long enough to assess "sustainability" – a long-term horizon which also implies, incidentally, that the model must be able to represent structural and technical change – yet (v) recognize short-term economic processes critical for assessing transition pathways, such as market
 imbalance and rigidities, all this while (vi) providing an explicit representation of how economic
 activity is distributed within the society, and how this retrofits into the growth pattern.

4 The review of indicators in section 4.2 reveals that no sustainability indicator in circulation provides 5 a direct evaluation of the risk of future downturns in well-being or in the state of the ecosystems. 6 Martinet (2011) proposes a general approach in which thresholds can be posited for well-being or 7 for various natural or man-made stocks and which can explicitly deal with uncertainty. Sustainability 8 is considered to be achieved when the predicted future path remains forever above the defined 9 thresholds. When the future is uncertain, sustainability can be assessed by the probability that 10 thresholds will be crossed. 11 However, section 4.2 distinguishes between two sustainability issues. One is to predict whether the

12 current situation (welfare, environment) will be preserved in the future: Are we on a sustained 13 development path, i.e., a path without downturn? Another is to determine whether the current

14 generation's decisions leave it possible for future generations to achieve such a path: Is a sustained

development path possible given what the current generation does? The latter does not require

16 predicting future decisions, only future constraints and opportunities. For instance, negative genuine

17 savings is a sufficient condition for a negative answer to the former question, whereas positive net


investment at maximin prices is a sufficient condition for a positive answer to the latter question.Standard predictions of GDP and human development are inspired by the former, whereas Green

20 GDP and the ecological footprint are concerned with the latter.

In this light, a straightforward indicator of sustainability for the first question, in line with Martinet's proposal, could take the form of a family of curves describing the future evolution of a relevant indicator (e.g., of well-being or of the state of the environment) at different probabilities – or at different degrees of confidence if probabilities are hard to specify. Figure 4.5.1 illustrates the idea by comparing hypothetical scenarios involving (a) a risky path that promises high growth on average

but with a growing risk of unsustainability over time, and (b) a less risky path that promises less on

average but is more secure for sustainability.



28

Figure 4.5.1 Sustainability of the current path measured by risk curves. (The probability that the path
 will fall below a curve is equal to the number assigned to this curve.)

An appealing criterion for the second question would focus on the comparison between the current situation and the greatest sustainable level (of whatever quantity one seeks to sustain) for future generations. The former is known, albeit imperfectly, and the latter can be predicted in probabilistic terms. The probability that the former is greater than the latter then provides a good indicator of the risk of unsustainability.

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


Figure 4.5.2 Possibility of a sustainable path measured by the comparison of current level with future sustainable level. (The bell curve is the probability density of the latter.)

The curve displayed in Figure 4.5.2 also provides information about the risk of the future sustainable level falling well below desirable levels. For a given risk of unsustainability, one may prefer a

6 situation with a lower probability for catastrophic situations. Again, variants of this indicator that

7 involve only qualitative descriptions of confidence can readily be constructed.

8 4.5.5 Transition between development paths: Frameworks for analysis

9 Shifting from a high- to a low-emissions development path could potentially be as important for
10 climate mitigation as implementing "climate" policies (Halsnaes et al., 2011). However, it is not easy
11 to devise transition strategies given the complexity of the system and the associated uncertainties.

12 In addition, a development path results from the interactions of decisions by multiple agents, at all

13 levels. Thus public policies<sup>12</sup> alone cannot trigger changes in pathways, and cooperation between 14 governments, markets and civil societies are necessary (Sathaye et al., 2007).

A central theme of the present report is to explore the conditions of a transition towards development paths with lower emissions, globally (Chapter 6), sectorally (Chapters 7-12) and regionally (Chapters 13-15). The present section discusses frameworks within which transitions between pathways can be analyzed. Two key strands of the literature are reviewed. First, the conceptual frameworks that stem from the growing literature on technological transitions are presented. Second, the conceptual basis of the economic modelling of development paths (the results of which are reviewed in details in Chapter 6) are discussed.

### 22 Frameworks stemming from the technological transitions literature

23 Changes in technologies, their causes, and their implications for societies have been actively studied 24 in social sciences since the late 18th century by historians, economists and sociologists. A common 25 starting point is the observation that "technological change is not a haphazard process, but proceeds 26 in certain directions" (Kemp, 1994). For example, processors tend to become faster, planes to 27 become lighter, etc. To characterize these regularities, scholars have developed the concepts of 28 technological regime (Nelson and Winter, 2002) and technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982; Dosi and 29 Nelson, 1994). Technological regimes refer to shared beliefs among technicians about what is 30 feasible. Technological paradigms refer to the selected set of objects engineers are working on, and 31 to the *selected* set of problems they choose to address.

The determinants of changes in technological regimes (such as the development of information technologies) are a subject of intense research. The development of radical innovations (e.g., the steam engine) is seen as a necessary condition. But the drivers of radical innovation themselves are not clearly understood. In addition, once an innovation is present, the shift in technological regime is not a straightforward process: The forces that maintain technological regimes (e.g., increasing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Both "climate" and "non-climate" – though that distinction is being over time as climate considerations pervade all spheres of public action.

1 returns to scale, vested interests, network externalities) are not easy to overcome – all the more so

that new technologies are often less efficient, in many respects, than existing ones, and competing
technologies may coexist (Arthur, 1989)see 4.5.2 above). History thus suggests that the diffusion of
new technologies is a slow process (Kemp, 1994) (Fouquet, 2010).

5 Over the past 20 years, a subset of technology scholars has focused more specifically on 6 "sustainability transitions". They study the formation of new socio-technical configurations and 7 develop frameworks for analyzing prevailing socio-technical structures, with two major perspectives 8 (Truffer and Coenen, 2012): the multi-level perspective on socio-technical systems (Geels, 2002) and 9 concept of technological innovations systems (Bergek et al., 2008).

10 The multi-level perspective on socio-technical systems distinguishes three levels of analysis: niche 11 innovations, socio-technical regimes, and socio-technical landscape (Geels, 2002). Technological 12 niche is the micro-level where radical innovations emerge. Socio-technical regimes correspond to an 13 extended version of the technological regime discussed above. And the socio-technical landscape 14 corresponds to the regulatory, institutional, physical and behavioural environment within which the 15 innovations emerge. The last level has a lot of inertia. Changes in socio-technical regimes emerge 16 from interactions between these three levels, with several possible paths depending on how these 17 interactions proceed. Geels and Schot (2007) introduce a typology with four different paths. 18 Transformation paths correspond to cases where moderate changes in the landscape at a time 19 where niche innovation are not yet developed result in a modification in the direction of 20 development paths - an example of which is the implementation of municipal sewer systems in 21 Dutch cities (Geels, 2006). De-alignment and realignment correspond to sudden changes in the 22 landscape that cause actors to lose faith in the regime; if no clear replacement is ready yet, a large 23 range of technologies may compete until one finally dominates and a new equilibrium is reached. 24 One example of such path is the transition from horse-powered vehicles to cars. If new technologies 25 are already available, then a transition substitution might occur, as in the case of the replacement 26 between sailing and steamships between 1850 and 1920. Finally, reconfiguration might occur when 27 innovations are initially adopted as part of the regime and progressively subvert it into a new one, an 28 example of which is the transition from traditional factories to mass production in the United States.

29 The Technological Innovation Systems approach (Bergek et al. 2008) adopts a systemic perspective 30 by considering all relevant actors, their interactions and the institutions relevant for innovation 31 success. Early work in this approach argues that beside market failures, "system failures" such as, 32 inter alia, actor deficiencies, coordination deficits or conflicts with existing institutional structures 33 (institutional deficits) can explain unsuccessful innovation (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). More 34 recent analysis focus on core processes critical for innovation. The Technological Innovation Systems 35 concept was developed to inform public policy on how to better support technologies deemed 36 sustainable with an increasing focus on "system innovations" as opposed to innovation in single 37 technologies or products (Truffer and Coenen, 2012).

### 38 Economic frameworks for modelling transitions in the context of sustainable development


A first approach to analyzing transitions between development paths using economic models consists of building several plausible images of the future with a model (e.g., general equilibrium model), and compare them (comparative statics). The focus is on the internal consistency of each image, and on the distance between them. By construction, however, the paths from the present on to each possible future, let alone the transitions between paths, are left out of the analysis.

Comparative statics, however, can already provide insights on the sustainable character of the longterm images, to the extent that the model captures critical variables for sustainability such as natural resources use or impact of economic activity on the environment (e.g., GHG emissions). This is a challenge because it is difficult to construct robust relationships between aggregate monetary indicators and physical flows, since national accounts typically add up multiple products with very different material and energy contents, and very different prices. Similarly, static models can provide some insights on the social components of sustainability to the extent they include some form of representation of the *distribution* of economic activity within the society, notably across income groups (see Section 4.4.1). Again, the associated data challenge is significant.

4 Still, one needs dynamic models in order to depict the path towards desirable (or undesirable) long-5 term futures. However, the relevance of dynamic models for discussing transitions depends on their structure, content, and way they are used. Most of the modelling literature on climate mitigation 6 7 relies on Solow-like growth models (Solow, 1956). In this model, long-term growth is ultimately 8 driven by the sum of population growth and exogenous total factor productivity growth (exogenous 9 technical change), and it is always possible to adapt savings rate to reach a balanced growth path in 10 the long-run. In the simplest version of the Solow model, there is thus only one "pathway" to speak of, as determined by human fertility and human ingenuity. "Transition" (rather short-term 11 12 adjustments) will typically take the form of a temporary savings rate aimed at adjusting the capital 13 to labour ratio to the optimal level given exogenous labour and technology growth. As a result, 14 Solow growth models have limited utility in explaining observed patterns of short-term growth (e.g. 15 Easterly (2002)).

16 Discussions about transitions are richer when models differentiate short-term economic processes 17 from long-term ones. The general point is that the technical, economic and social processes 18 represented in the models often exhibit more rigidities in the short- than in the long-run. . As Solow 19 (2000) suggests, at short-term scales, "something sort of 'Keynesian' is a good approximation, and 20 surely better than anything straight 'neoclassical'. At very long time scales, the interesting questions 21 are best studied in a neoclassical framework and attention to the Keynesian side of things would be 22 a minor distraction". Among those rigidities, a lot of attention has been paid to long-lived physical 23 capital, the premature replacement of which is typically very costly (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009), and 24 the dynamics of which have important implications for the costs, timing and direction of climate 25 policies (see e.g., (Wing 1999) (Lecocq et al., 1998)). However, other important rigidities include, 26 inter alia, rigidities associated with the location of households and firms, changes which take time; 27 the preferences of individuals; the production technologies of firms; or the system of institutions, for 28 example the institutions that drive labour market response to price shocks (Céline Guivarch et al. 29 2011). Such rigidities may not only affect the transition, but may also lead to bifurcations towards 30 different long-term outcome (i.e., equilibrium-dependence and not just path-dependence as in 31 section 4.5.2) (Hallegatte et al., 2007).

32 A second key element for the analysis of transitions is to relax the full information hypothesis under 33 which many models are run. If information increases over time, there is a rationale for a sequential 34 decision-making framework (Arrow et al., 1996), in which choices made at one point can be re-35 considered in light of new information. Thus, the issue is no longer to select a path once and for all, 36 but to make the best first-step (or short-term) decision, given the structure of uncertainties and the 37 potential for increasing information over time. Inertia plays an especially important role in this 38 context, as the more choices made at one point constrain future opportunity sets, the more difficult 39 it becomes to make advantage of new information (e.g., Ha-Duong et al. (1997)). Another way by 40 which uncertainty can be captured in models is to abandon the intertemporal optimization objective 41 altogether and use simulation models instead, with decisions made at any time based on imperfect 42 expectations. Such shift has major implications for the transition path, but this route is still largely 43 unexplored (Sassi et al. 2010). Figure 4.5.3 maps these different forms of models.



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Figure 4.5.3 Evolution of conceptual thinking about sustainable development pathways: Towards a
 realistic view of transitions

4 No model today meets all these specifications. Current models can be classified along two major 5 fault lines: bottom-up vs. top-down, and long-term vs. short-term. By design, computable general 6 equilibrium (CGE) models provide a comprehensive macroeconomic framework, and they can be 7 harnessed to analyze distributional issues, at least amongst income groups, but they typically fail to 8 embark key technical constraints. Conversely, bottom-up engineering models provide a detailed 9 account of technical potentials and limitations, but their macro-engine, if at all, is most often 10 rudimentary. Emerging "hybrid" models developed in the context of climate policy assessment are 11 steps towards closing this gap. A similar rift occurs with regard to time horizon. Growth models like 12 Solow's are designed to capture key features of long-term development paths, but they do not 13 include short- or medium-term economic processes such as market rigidities. On the other hand, 14 short-term models (econometric or structural) will meet requirement but are not designed to look 15 deep in the future. Again, emerging models include short-/medium-term processes into analysis of 16 growth in the long-run, but this pretty much remains an open research field.

# 4.6 Mitigative capacity and mitigation, and links to adaptive capacity and adaptation

The concept of mitigative capacity initially stressed financial resources and access to technology but 19 20 soon expanded to include the availability of renewable resources, possibilities for greater efficiency, 21 and governance, including scientific, capabilities, even political willingness and other factors (Winkler 22 et al., 2007b). The concept of adaptive capacity arose in the process of differentiating between levels 23 of vulnerability to the consequences of climate change. Adaptive capacity and mitigative capacity 24 were soon found to be quite similar(Yohe, 2001; Burch and Robinson, 2007; Burch, 2010; Pelling, 25 2010)(Winkler et al., 2007b)(Winkler et al. 2007b). Next, some mitigative and adaptive responses 26 were found to be complementary, thus more valuable to undertake, blurring the distinction between mitigative and adaptive capacity, and leading to the argument that there is simply 27 28 "response capacity" (Tompkins and Neil Adger, 2005; Wilbanks, 2005). As climate change occurred 29 more rapidly than expected, adaptive capacity took on greater importance (Paavola and Adger, 30 2006; Adger, 2006).

There are multiple and strong relationships between mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development (Pelling, 2010; Burch, 2011). The more effective is mitigation, the easier it will be for

nations to adress environmental sustainability and achieve social justice without also having to 1 2 adapt to climate change. Being able to adapt to climate change more readily means more efforts can 3 be dedicated to SD. Simlarly, mitigative and adaptive capacities now merge with sustainability 4 development capacity (Udo and Jansson, 2009). There is now a literature on adaptive environmental 5 governance (Folke et al., 2005; Folke, 2007; Brunner and Lynch, 2010). Adaptation, morever, has 6 become central to ecosystem management in practice (Holling, 1978; Walters and Holling, 1990; 7 McFadden et al., 2011; Williams, 2011). More recently, the idea that the earth's system has moved 8 from the Holocene into the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000), where people are the most 9 important drivers of the earth's dynamics, adaptation plays an even larger, indeed dominant, role in 10 SD (Chapin III et al., 2010; Folke, Jansson, Rockström, et al., 2011; Polasky et al., 2011; Biermann et 11 al., 2012). Complementing this shift in understanding, there is now a literature on developing for environmental and social system resilience so that the consequences of climate change have 12 13 smaller, more temporary consequences (Fatma Denton and Thomas Wilbanks, 2012) as well as a 14 literature stressing that transformational shifts and a new form of capacity will be necessary to cope 15 in the Anthropocene (Kates et al., 2012).

#### 4.7 Integration of framing issues in the context of sustainable development 16

Chapters 2 and 3 of this report review the framing issues related to risk and uncertainty (Chapter 2) 17 18 and social, economic and ethical considerations guiding policy (Chapter 3). They examine how these 19 issues bear on climate policy, both on the mitigation and on the adaptation side of our response to 20 the challenge of climate change. Their general analysis is also directly relevant to the understanding 21 of sustainable development and equity goals. This section briefly examines how the notions 22 developed in these chapters shed light on the topic of the present chapter. This section then draws 23 on this broader perspective to introduce to the issues of equity in burden-sharing in some detail.

#### 24 4.7.1 Risk and uncertainty in sustainability evaluation

25 The sustainability ideal seeks to minimize risks that compromise future human development 26 (sections 4.2 and 4.5). This objective is less ambitious than maximizing an expected value of social 27 welfare over the whole future. It focuses on avoiding setbacks on development, and is therefore well 28 in line with Chapter 2 (Sec. 2.3) highlighting the difficulty of applying the standard decision model 29 based on expected utility in the context of climate policy, and it is directly akin to the methods of risk management listed there (Subsec. 2.3.2.3 and Sec. 2.6), in particular those focusing on worst-case 30 31 scenarios. The literature on adaptation has similarly emphasized the concept of resilience, which is 32 the ability of a system to preserve its functions in a risky and changing environment (WG2-Sections 33 2.4 and 20.3, Folke et al. (2010), Gallopin (2006)).

34 This chapter has reviewed the actors and determinants of support for policies addressing the climate 35 challenge (sections 4.3 and 4.6). Among the relevant considerations, one must include how risk 36 perceptions shape the actors' awareness of the issues and their willingness to do something about 37 them. Chapter 2 (Sec. 2.5) has described how framing and affective associations can be effective and 38 manipulative, how absence or presence of a direct experience of climate extremes makes individuals 39 distort probabilities, and how gradual changes are easy to underestimate.

40 Risk and uncertainty are also relevant to the dimension of equity, in relation to sustainability, 41 because various regions of the world and communities within those regions are submitted to 42 unequal degrees of climate risk and uncertainty. Better information about the distribution of risks 43 between regions and countries also affects the policy response and negotiations. Lecocq and Shalizi 44 (2007) argue that reduced uncertainty about the location of impacts may reduce incentives for mitigation, and Lecocq and Hourcade (2010) show that the optimal level of mitigation may also 45

46 decrease.

### 1 4.7.2 Socio-economic evaluation

2 Chapter 3 has reviewed the principles of social and economic evaluation and equity in a general way. 3 In section 3.4 it recalls that there is now a consensus that methods of cost-benefit analysis that 4 simply add up compensating or equivalent variations are consistent and plausible only under very 5 specific assumptions (constant marginal utility of income and absence of priority for the worse off) 6 which are empirically dubious and ethically controversial. It is thus necessary to introduce weights 7 that embody suitable ethical concerns and restore consistency of the evaluation. Adler (2011) also 8 makes a detailed argument in favour of this "social welfare function" approach to cost-benefit 9 analysis. This approach is followed by Anthoff et al. (2009), refining on previous use of equity 10 weights by Fankhauser et al. (1997) and Tol (1999). Note that an advantage in having a well-specified methodology for the choice of weights is the ability to reach more precise conclusions, and to 11 12 transparently relate such conclusions to ethical assumptions (such as the degree of priority to the 13 worse off).

14 Chapter 3 describes the general concepts of social welfare and individual well-being. In applications 15 to the assessment of development paths and sustainability, empirical measures are needed. Several 16 methods are discussed in Stiglitz et al. (2009) and Adler (2011). In particular, the capability approach 17 (Sen, 2001, 2009) is well known for its broad measure of well-being that synthesizes multiple 18 dimensions of human life and incorporates considerations of autonomy and freedom. Most 19 applications of it do not directly rely on individual preferences (Alkire, 2010). Fleurbaey and Blanchet 20 (2013) defend an approach that relies on individual preferences, in a similar fashion as money-metric 21 utilities. Some authors (e.g., Layard et al. (2008)) even propose to use satisfaction scores directly as 22 utility numbers. This is controversial because different individuals use different standards when they 23 answer questions about their satisfaction with life (Graham, 2009).

24 One reason why well-being may be useful as a guiding principle in the assessment of sustainability, 25 as opposed to a more piecemeal analysis of each pillar, is that it helps evaluate the weak versus 26 strong sustainability distinction. As explained in Sec. 4.2, weak sustainability assumes that produced 27 capital can replace natural capital, whereas strong sustainability requires natural capital to be 28 preserved. From the standpoint of well-being, the possibility to substitute produced capital to 29 natural capital depends on the consequences on living beings. If the well-being of humans depends 30 directly on natural capital, if there is option value in preserving natural capital because it may have 31 hidden useful properties that have yet to be discovered, or if non-human living beings depend on 32 natural capital for their flourishing, this gives powerful reasons to support a form of strong 33 sustainability.

Additionally, Chapter 3 (in particular Sec. 3.1 and 3.2) mentions other aspects of equity that are relevant to policy debates and international negotiations on climate responses. Chapter 3 discusses these issues at the level of ethical principles, and given the importance of such issues in policy debates about mitigation efforts, they will be developed in more detail in the next subsection, discussing how these principles have been applied to the issue of burden-sharing in climate regime, and used to develop indicators of obligation and burden-sharing frameworks based on those indicators.

## 41 4.7.3 Equity and burden-sharing in the context of international cooperation on climate 42 change

Throughout this chapter, we have examined the links between equity, sustainable development, climate change and climate policy. This subsection discusses the specific issue of equitable burdensharing, first highlighting the general equity principles that are typically invoked in discussions of equitable burden-sharing, and finally reviewing several categories of burden-sharing frameworks that have been presented as options for the allocation of burdens in an international climate regime.

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1 2

### FAQ 4.5 Why is equity relevant in climate negotiations?

3 The international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC are working toward a collective global 4 response to the threat of climate change. As with any cooperative undertaking, the total required effort will be allocated in some way among countries, including both domestic action and 5 6 international financial support. At least three lines of reasoning have been put forward to explain 7 the relevance of equity in allocating this effort: (i) a *moral* justification that draws upon widely 8 applied ethical principles, (ii) a legal justification that appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements to cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles, and (iii) 9 10 an effectiveness justification that argues that an international collective arrangement that is perceived to be fair has greater legitimacy and is more likely to be internationally agreed and 11 12 domestically implemented, reducing the risks of defection and a cooperative collapse.

**4.7.3.1** Equity principles pertinent to burden-sharing in an international climate regime

14 Though the UNFCCC clearly invokes the vision of equitable burden-sharing, Parties did not articulate its meaning in any quantified detail. They had, however, agreed on general guidance as to the 15 16 allocation of obligations among countries by identifying categories of countries based primarily on 17 per capita income and assigning them distinct obligations: developed countries (listed in Annex 1) 18 are distinguished from developing countries (often called "non-Annex 1" countries), and are obliged 19 to "take the lead on combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof". A subset of Annex 20 1 countries consisting of wealthier developed countries (and listed in Annex 2) are further obliged to 21 provide financial and technological support to developing countries to enable them to meet their 22 **UNFCCC** obligations.

23 Beyond this, however, the burden-sharing arrangement is unspecified. Because there is no absolute 24 standard of equity, countries (like people) will tend to advocate interpretations of the UNFCCC and 25 equity in general which tend to favour their (often short term) interests (Heyward, 2007; Lange et 26 al., 2010; Kals and Maes, 2011). It is tempting in this light to say that no reasoned resolution is 27 possible, and to advocate, a purely procedural resolution (Müller, 1999). However, there is a basic 28 set of shared ethical premises and precedents that apply to the climate problem, and impartial 29 reasoning (as behind a Rawlsian (Rawls, 2000) "veil of ignorance") can help put bounds on the 30 plausible interpretations of what equity may mean in the burden sharing context. Even in the 31 absence of a formal, globally agreed burden-sharing framework, such principles are important in 32 establishing expectations of what may be reasonably required of different actors. They influence the 33 nature of the public discourse, the concessions individuals are willing to grant, the demands citizens 34 are inclined to impose on their own governments, and the terms in which governments represent 35 their nogitiating positions both to other countries and to their own citizens.

Chapter 3 reviews the overarching equity principles in the philosophical literature and their implications for thinking about different aspects of climate change. Here we assess the applied literature regarding burden-sharing in a global climate regime, which draws upon the general literature and understanding of ethics, with emphasis on the particular equity principles laid out in UNFCCC Article 3.

41 From the perspective of an international climate regime, many analysts have considered the range 42 of principles for equitable burden-sharing, taking into account the major characteristics of climate 43 change and its causes (Rose, 1990; Hayes and Smith, 1993; Baer et al., 2000; Metz et al., 2002; 44 Ringius et al., 2002; Aldy et al., 2003; Ghersi et al., 2003; Gardiner, 2004; Caney, 2005, 2009, 2010; 45 Heyward, 2007; Page, 2008; Vanderheiden, 2008; Winkler, Jayaraman, et al., 2011). The principles of 46 equitable burden-sharing have been most frequently applied to costs of mitigation, though similar 47 issues arise with regard to adaptation (Baer, 2006; Jagers and Duus-Otterstrom, 2008; Dellink et al., 48 2009; Grasso, 2010; Hartzell-Nichols, 2011).

1 We discuss these principles, organized along four key dimensions – responsibility, capacity, equality,

2 and the right to sustainable development, expanding on the moral philosophical arguments

3 presented in Chapter 3.

### 4 **Responsibility**

5 There has been an extensive discussion of responsibility in the climate literature, distinguishing 6 moral responsibility from causal responsibility, and substantially focused on the moral significance of 7 knowledge of harmful effects (Neumayer, 2000; Caney, 2005; Müller et al., 2009). Common sense 8 ethics (and legal practice) hold persons responsible for harms or risks they knowingly impose, and 9 furthermore for harms or risks that could reasonably been foreseen, and, in certain cases, regardless 10 of whether they could have been foreseen. In the climate context, responsibility is a fundamental 11 principle, appearing in the UNFCCC in the form "common but differentiated responsibilities," and 12 alluded to in the statement noting that "the largest share of historic emissions has originated in 13 developed countries." Responsibility most directly relates to responsibility for contributing to the 14 climate problem, via emissions of greenhouse gases. It is thus closely connected to the Polluter Pays 15 principle, and the burden-sharing principles which derive from it hold that countries should be 16 accountable for their contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts.

17 Responsibility can be taken to include not only current emissions, but cumulative historical 18 emissions as well (Grübler and Fujii, 1991; Smith, 1991; Neumayer, 2000; Rive et al., 2006; Wei et al., 19 2012). This has been justified on three main grounds. First, climate change and its impacts results 20 from the stock of accumulated historic emissions in the atmosphere. Second, the total amount of 21 net greenhouse gases that can be emitted to the atmosphere must be constrained (to a level 22 determined by society's particular choice of global climate stabilization goal), and thus constitutes a 23 finite common resource, and users of this resource should be accountable for that use since it 24 depletes the resource and precludes the access of others whether that use is current or historical. 25 Third, historical emissions reflect the use of a resource from which benefits have been derived, i.e., 26 wealth, fixed capital, infrastructure, and other physical and technological assets. These benefits 27 constitute a legacy based in part on consuming a common resource that (a) should be paid for, and 28 (b) provides a basis for mitigative capacity (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2006, 2010). The latter argument 29 carries the notion of responsibility further back in time, assigning responsibility for the emissions of 30 previous generations to current generation, to the extent that they have inherited benefits from 31 those earlier generations. This argument links responsibility with the capacity equity principle 32 discussed below (Gardiner, 2011). If conventional development continues, the relative responsibility 33 of some nations who currently have relatively low cumulative emissions would match and exceed by 34 mid century the relative responsibility of some nations who currently have high responsibility 35 (Höhne and Blok, 2005; Botzen et al., 2008), on an aggregate – if not per capita – basis. Such 36 analyses do not necessarily provide an ethical argument that the future threat of emissions imposed 37 by a nation ought to determine the responsibility of a nation to respond. However, they do illustrate 38 that the relative distribution of responsibility among countries could vary substantially over time, 39 and that a burden-sharing framework must dynamically reflecting evolving realities if they are to 40 faithfully reflect ethical principles. A second point illustrated by such analyses is that projections of 41 future emissions provide a basis for understanding where mitigation might productively be 42 undertaken, though not necessarily who should be obliged to bear the costs.

43 Each nation's responsibility for emissions is typically defined (as in the IPCC inventory 44 methodologies) to entail emissions within the nation's territorial boundary. An alternative 45 interpretation, which was considered early on (Fermann, 1994) and has become more salient as international trade has grown more important, is to include emissions embodied in internationally 46 47 traded goods that are consumed by a given nation. Recent studies (Lenzen et al., 2007; Pan et al., 48 2008; Peters et al., 2011) have provided a quantitative basis for better understanding the 49 implications of a consumption-based approach to assessing responsibility. In general, at the 50 aggregate level, developed countries are net importers of emissions, and developing countries are net exporters. The relevance of this to burden-sharing may depend on further factors, such as the distribution between the exporting and importing country of the benefits of carbon-intensive production, and the presence of other climate policies such as border carbon tariffs (See also Sections 3.9, 4.4 and 4.5.)(See also Sections 3.9, 4.4 and 4.5.)

5 Many analysts have suggested that all emissions are not equivalent in how they translate to 6 responsibility, distinguishing the categories of "survival emissions", "development emissions", and 7 "luxury" emissions (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1993; Baer, Kartha, et al., 2009; Rao and Baer, 8 2012).

9 Determining responsibility for current, present and future emissions in order to allocate responsibility raises methodological questions. In addition to the standard questions about data 10 11 availability and reliability, there are also equity-related questions to address. For instance, there are 12 various rationales for determining how far in the past historical emissions should be reckoned. One 13 rationale is that the 1990s should be the earliest date, reflecting the timing of the First IPCC 14 Assessment Report and the creation of a global regime that imposed obligations to curb emissions 15 (Posner and Sunstein, 2007). Some argue that the date should be earlier, corresponding to the time 16 that climate change was became reasonably suspected of being a problem, and greenhouse gas 17 emissions thus identifiable as a pollutant worthy of policy action. For example, based on the 18 published warnings issued by scientific advisory panels to the United States presidents Johnson (U.S. 19 National Research Council Committee on Atmospheric Sciences, 1966; MacDonald et al., 1979) and 20 Carter (MacDonald et al., 1979), and the first G7 Summit Declaration highlighting climate change as a 21 problem and seeking to prevent further increases of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Group of 7 22 Heads of State, 1979), one might argue for the 1970s or 1960s. Others argue that a still earlier date 23 is appropriate because the damage is still caused, the stock depleted, and the benefits derived, 24 regardless of whether there is either a legal requirement or knowledge. They would argue that the 25 date may be as early as can be allowed by the availability of emissions data and plausible scientific 26 inference of emissions rates.

Another issue is the question of accounting for the residence time of emissions into the atmosphere, as an alternative to simply considering cumulative emissions over time. In the case of carbon dioxide, responsibility could include past emissions that are no longer resident in the atmosphere, on the grounds that those emissions (a) have contributed to the warming and climate damages experienced so far, and upon which further warming and damages will be additive, and (b) have been removed from the atmosphere predominantly to the oceans, where they are now causing ocean acidification, which is itself a serious environmental problem (See AR5 WGI Chapter 6).

### 34 Capacity (or, Ability to Pay)

Beyond the obligation to act that arises from a moral responsibility for causing emissions, a second motivation for action arises from the capacity to contribute to solving the climate problem (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2010). Generally, this is interpreted to mean that the more one can afford to contribute, the more one should, and this is precisely how societies tend to distribute the costs of preserving or generating societal public goods, i.e., most societies have progressive income taxation.

This view can be apply at the level of countries, or at a lower level, recognizing inequalities between
individuals. Smith et al. (1993) suggested GDP as an income based measure of ability-to-pay, subject
to a threshold value, determined by an indicator of quality of life. This was developed in Kartha et al.
(2009) and Baer et al. (2010), taking into account intra-national disparities.

As discussed in section 4.6, response capacity refers to more than just financial wherewithal, encompassing also other characteristics that affect a nation's ability to contribute to solving the climate problem. It recognizes that effective responses require not only financial resources, but also technological, institutional, and human capacity. This issue has been treated by Winkler, Letete and Marquard (2011) by considering Human Development Index as a complement to income in

considering capacity. Capacity, even in this broader sense, can be distinguished from mitigation 1 2 potential, which refers to the presence of techno-economic opportunities for reducing emissions 3 due to, for example, having renewable energy resources that can be exploited, a legacy of high-4 carbon infrastructure that can be replaced, or a rapidly growing capital stock that can be built based 5 on low-carbon investments.. Mitigation potential is a useful characteristic for determining where 6 emissions reductions can be located geographically for reasons of cost-effectiveness, but this can be 7 distinguished from burden-sharing per se, in the sense of determining on normative grounds which 8 country should pay for those reductions. This distinction is reflected in the economist's notion that 9 economic efficiency can be decoupled from equity (Coase, 1960).

### 10 Equality

Equality means many things, but a common understanding in international law is that each human being has equal moral worth and thus should have equal rights. This has been argued to apply to access to common global resources, and has found its expression in the perspective that each person should have an equal right to emit (Grubb, 1989; Agarwal and Narain, 1991). This equal right is applied by some to current and future flows, and by some to the cumulative stock as well. (See further below.)

17 Some analysts (Caney, 2009) have noted, however, that a commitment to equality does not necessarily translate into an equal right to emit. Egalitarians generally call for equality of a total 18 19 package of "resources" (or "capabilities" or "opportunities for welfare") and thus may support 20 inequalities in one good to compensate for inequalities in other goods (Starkey, 2011). For example, 21 one might argue that poor people who are disadvantaged with respect to access to a resources such 22 as food or drinking water may be entitled to a greater than per capita share of emissions rights. 23 Second, some individuals may have greater needs than others. For example, poorer people may 24 have less access to alternatives to fossil fuels because of higher cost or less available technologies, 25 say, and thus be entitled to a larger share of emission rights.

Others have suggested that equality can be interpreted as requiring equal sacrifices, either by all parties, or by parties who are equal along some relevant dimension. Then, to the extent that parties are not equal, more responsibility (Gonzalez Miguez and Santhiago de Oliveira, 2011) or capacity (Jacoby et al., 2009) would imply more obligation, all else being equal.

### 30 Right to development

The right to development approach is closely related to the notion of *need* as an equity principle, in that it posits that the interests of poor people and poor countries in meeting basic needs are a global priority (Andreassen and Marks, 2007). In particular, compared to the need to solve the climate problem, meeting basic needs has clear moral precedence, or, at the very least, it should not be hindered by measures taken to address climate change.

The UNFCCC acknowledges "the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty" and recognizes that "economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties."

### 40 **4.7.3.2** Frameworks for equitable burden-sharing

41 There are various ways of interpreting the above equity principles and applying them to the design 42 of a burden-sharing framework. It is helpful to categorize climate change burden-sharing frameworks into two broad classes. The first, "resource-sharing" frameworks, are aimed at applying 43 44 ethical principles to establish a basis for sharing the available agreed "global carbon budget". The second, "effort-sharing" frameworks, are aimed at applying ethical principles to establish a basis for 45 46 sharing the costs of the global climate response. The resource-sharing frame is the natural point of 47 departure if climate change is posed as a tragedy of the commons type of collective action problem; 48 if it is posed as a free-rider type of collective action problem, the effort-sharing perspective is more

natural perspective. Neither of these framings is objectively the "correct" one, just as neither 1 2 collective action framing of the climate change problem is correct. Both can inform policymakers 3 judgments in different ways. Indeed, the two approaches are complementary: any given resource-4 sharing framework implies a particular distribution of the effort, and any given effort-sharing 5 framework implies a particular distribution of the resource. Within these two broad categories, 6 burden-sharing frameworks are typically formulated as emission entitlements to be used in a cost-7 effective allocation mechanism such as a trading system or global climate fund through which 8 countries with obligations greater than their domestic mitigation potential can fund reductions in 9 countries with obligations that are less than their domestic mitigation potentia. (See Chapter 13.)

One important dimension along which both resource sharing and burden-sharing proposals can be compared is the number of categories into which countries are grouped. The UNFCCC in fact had three categories – Annex I, Annex II (the OECD countries within Annex I), and non-Annex 1. Many of the proposals discussed below reproduce this binary distinction. Others increase the number of "bins" to as many as six (the South/North Dialogue). Finally, many others eliminate any qualitative categories, instead allocating emissions rights or obligations on the basis of a continuous index.

### 16 **Resource sharing approaches**

The resource-sharing approach starts by acknowledging that global greenhouse gas sink capacity, or "atmospheric space", is finite and exhaustible, with its size defined by the agreed climate stabilization target. Emissions by any one nation directly reduce the amount that can be used by other nations.

21 The most straightforward of resource sharing approaches is an equal per capita approach (Grubb, 22 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001), which is premised on the equal rights to the 23 atmospheric commons to all individuals, and allocates emission allowances to each country in 24 proportion to its population, consistent with the target global emission pathway. In response to the 25 concern that an equal per capita allocation would provide an incentive for more rapid population 26 growth, some analysts have argued that the effect would be negligible in comparison to other 27 factors affecting population, and others have proposed solutions such as holding population 28 constant as of some agreed date (Jamieson, 2001), establishing standardized growth expectations 29 (Cline, 1992), or allocating emission in proportion only to adult population (Grubb, 1990).

30 In response to the concern that unrealistically rapid reductions would be required in those countries 31 whose current emissions are far above the global average, some have proposed a gradual transition 32 from grandfathered emission rights to per capita emission rights (Grubb and Sebenius, 1992; 33 Welsch, 1993; Meyer, 2004). This rationale applies specifically to a framework intended to 34 determine actual physical emission pathways, in which case an immediate per capita framework 35 would lead to a global distribution of mitigation action that would not be economically efficient. For 36 a framework intended to assign endowments in rights to emit, rather than emissions, the rationale is 37 questionable: the opportunity to acquire additional allocations through emissions trading or some 38 other transfer system would allow a cost-effective transition and lessen, though not eliminate, the 39 political challenges, of an immediate equal per capita allocation.

40 A variant on the above that aims to address the concern that many developing countries would be 41 required to reduce their emissions from very low levels is "Common but Differentiated 42 Convergence" (Höhne et al., 2006), under which a developing country is required to begin 43 converging only once its per capita emissions have exceeded a specified (and progressively declining) 44 threshold. Chakravarty et al. (2009) put forward a variant that looked beyond average national 45 indicators of emissions by examining the distribution of emissions across individuals at different 46 income levels within each country.

Extending the concept of equal per capita rights to include the historical and future carbon budget gives the "equal cumulative per capita emission rights" family of frameworks (Bode, 2004; German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 2009; Oberheitmann, 2010; CASS/DRC Joint Project Team, 2011; Jayaraman et al., 2011). This approach accounts for the fact that some countries (which tend to be higher income countries that industrialized earlier) have consumed more than an equal per capita share of the total global budget. This results in a negative allocation for the future, which some analysts have linked to the notion of a "carbon debt" or "climate debt" (Pickering and Barry, 2012) and tried to quantify and monetize (Smith, 1991; den Elzen et al., 2005), and which is a subset of a larger "ecological debt", explored for example by Srinivasan et al. (2008).

### 8 Effort sharing approaches

9 In contrast with the resource sharing frame, the "effort sharing" frame begins by looking at the costs 10 to be incurred from reducing GHG emissions to an agreed level, and asking how those costs should 11 be fairly divided (effort sharing approaches can also address adaptation costs in a way that resource sharing approaches do not). Two of the equity principles discussed above are typically drawn upon 12 13 to suggest how to equitably share the costs of solving a problem: "those who bear responsibility for 14 causing the problem should pay", and "those who have the capacity to solve the problem should 15 pay". Many of the philosophers engaged with the question of burden-sharing in the climate regime 16 have argued that obligations should be proportional in some fashion to responsibility and capacity. 17 (See, for example the analyses of Shue (1993); or Caney (2005)). These principles are widespread in 18 proposed climate policy architectures as well (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009).

19 An early effort-sharing approach was the Brazilian proposal to use historic responsibility for 20 emissions and thus global temperature rise as a basis for setting Kyoto Protocol targets. This 21 approach has been quantitatively analyzed (Höhne and Blok, 2005) and discussed in the global 22 political context recently (Gonzalez Miguez and Santhiago de Oliveira, 2011). Various approaches 23 have developed an indicators based on capacity alone such as GDP/capita (Wada et al., 2012) as a 24 basis for effort-sharing, or have combined capacity and responsibility, including the Greenhouse 25 Development Rights framework (Kartha et al., 2009) and close variants (2011)(Yue and Wang, 26 forthcoming; Cao, 2008), which take into account a "development threshold" defined at an income 27 level modestly above a global poverty line. Some frameworks introduce indicators of mitigation 28 potential, either alongside indicators of capacity and responsibility (e.g., (Den Elzen et al., 2007)) or 29 solely (Den Elzen et al., 2010).

### 30 **4.8 Implications for subsequent chapters**

### 31 **4.8.1** Why sustainability and equity matter

The primary implication of this chapter as a framing for subsequent chapters is to underscore the importance of explicitly scrutinizing the candidate mitigation technologies, approaches, and policies for their broader equity and sustainability implications. This is because the relevant stakeholders and decision-makers have various priorities, in particular regarding economic and human development, which may conflict with climate goals. This report would not be as useful if it focused on climate issues and disregarded the broader context in which decisions are made.

In the context of seeking a balance between multiple objectives and addressing the trade-offs between development and climate response, the idea of sustainable development has gained a lot of popularity. Moreover, there are important synergies which make sustainable development appear not just as a compromise but as a truly favourable frame for long-term planning and the promotion of climate effective responses.

- Equity considerations are pervasive in this perspective, as they underpin the very ideas of
   sustainability and of development, but also appear prominently in the debates about practical
   allocations of costs and benefits of specific climate policies, in particular emission rights as discussed
- 46 in 4.7, thereby determining the participation and involvement of various stakeholders.

Hence, the analyses of mitigation technologies, approaches, and policies presented in this assessment report are especially helpful and policy-relevant to the extent they are not limited to their mitigation potential and the corresponding cost per tCO2 equivalent, but also assess how these mitigation options contribute to (or undermine) broader sustainable development and on equity objectives.

### 6 **4.8.2** Three levels of analysis of sustainability consequences of climate policy options

7 Various definitions and indicators of SD have been introduced in this chapter (in particular in 8 4.2,.4.5). This subsection offers a simple taxonomy of approaches for the assessment of 9 sustainability.

10 Long-term evolution of the three pillars. The outcomes of climate policy options can generally be observed in the three spheres related to the three pillars of sustainable development: the economic, 11 12 the social, and the environmental sphere. Sustainability in the economy refers to the preservation of 13 standards of living and the convergence of developing economies toward the level of developed 14 countries. Sustainability in the social sphere refers to fostering the quality of social relations and 15 reducing causes of conflicts and instability, such as excessive inequalities and poverty, lack of access 16 to basic resources and facilities, and discriminations. Sustainability in the environmental sphere 17 refers to the preservation of biodiversity, habitat, and natural resources.

18 Long-term evolution of well-being. The way the three spheres (and pillars) flourish can be viewed as 19 contributing to the preservation of well-being for humans as well as for other living creatures. 20 Human well-being depends on economic, social, and natural goods, and the other living beings 21 depend on the quality of the ecological system. It may therefore be convenient to summarize the 22 multiple relevant considerations by saying that the ultimate end result, for sustainability assessment, 23 is the well-being of all living beings. Measuring well-being is considered difficult for humans because 24 there are controversies about how best to depict individual well-being, and about how to aggregate 25 over the whole population. However, as explained in Chapter 3 and Section 4.7, many of the 26 difficulties are exaggerated and practical methodologies have been developed. Truly enough, it still 27 remains difficult to assess the well-being of all living beings, humans and non-humans together. 28 But, even if current methodologies fall short of operationalizing comprehensive measures of well-

being of that sort, it is useful for experts who study particular sectors to bear in mind that a narrow notion of living standards for humans does not cover all the aspects of well-being for the purposes of assessing sustainability. It is also useful to try to assess how various interactions between the three spheres can impact on well-being. When there are trade-offs between different aspects of the economic, social, and ecological dimensions, one has to make an assessment of their relative priorities. Well-being is the overarching notion that helps thinking about such issues.

35 Current evolution of capacities. Sustainability can also be assessed in terms of capital or capacities, 36 as suggested by some indicators such as genuine savings. Preserving the resources transmitted to 37 the future generation is a key step in guaranteeing a sustainable path. Again, it is useful to think of 38 the capacities underlying the functioning of the three spheres: economic, social, ecological. The 39 economic sphere needs various forms of productive capital and raw materials, infrastructures and a 40 propitious environment, but also human capital, institutions, governance, and knowledge. The social 41 sphere needs various forms of institutions and resources for sharing goods and connecting people, 42 which involve certain patterns of distribution of economic resources, transmission of knowledge, 43 and forms of interaction, coordination and cooperation. The ecological sphere needs to keep the 44 bases of its stability, including habitat, climate, and biological integrity. In general, climate policy 45 options can affect capacities in all of these spheres, to varying degrees.

### 46 **4.8.3** Sustainability and equity issues in sectoral chapters

[Note from the authors: We will revise this section based on (i) on the actual topics related to SD and
equity covered by subsequent chapters (i.e., after completion of Table 4.8.1 below) and on (ii) the

use of indicators as presented in the sectoral chapters. Include a table including the indicators that 1

2 are included in the report and assess them. (Note at end of table a disclaimer recognizing that there

3 are many other indicators.)]

4 Sustainability and equity issues are addressed throughout the present report. Based on a detailed 5 description of SD and equity issues (mainly rooted in the "three pillars" approach for SD, see section 6 4.8.2), it provides a map and a reader's guide for the report from the SD and equity perspective. 7 Table 4.8.1 shows that sustainable development and equity issues are addressed throughout the 8 report, reflecting increased attention paid to the link between mitigation, development and equity in 9 the literature.

10 Most of the discussions in subsequent chapters are framed in the terms of SD and equity 11 implications of different mitigation options. This is the "development in the climate lens" approach 12 outlined in IPCC AR4 Ch.12. Table 6.5 sums up the co-benefits and risks tradeoffs (see section 6.6.2) 13 identified in Chapters 7-11 for individual mitigation options. "Climate in the development lens" 14 approaches that analyze the implications of key development policies for mitigation and mitigative 15 capacity are less often addressed, revealing a gap in the literature [Note from the authors: See SOD

16 of Chapters 5, 6 and policy chapters].

17 Table 4.8.1 also points to gaps in the literature on SD and equity. Some topics, such as health co-18 benefits and risk tradeoffs associated with mitigation policies, appear already well covered in the 19 literature. Others, on the other hand, are scarcely addressed, notably distributional issues (both 20 distributional implications of mitigation policies and implications of different distributional settings 21 for climate policies); and employment issues. Those are very important gaps in the literature as

22 those are among the key sustainable development goals that policymakers will consider.

23 Sustainability indicators at the sector level have a very limited role to play in the assessment of 24 global sustainability. The reason is that sustainability involves the combination of actions and 25 conditions (co-evolution) in various parts of the society, the economy, and the environment. It is the 26 combination that makes sustainability possible, not any single part in isolation. There is no simple 27 formula that would compute general sustainability as a function of sectoral indicators, except with 28 the genuine savings approach that relies on capital accounting (see Box 4.2.1). Consider for instance 29 the transportation sector. The development of a particular form of transportation may be 30 compatible with sustainability only provided that other sectors evolve in a specific way. It may even 31 happen that the best contribution to sustainability that the transportation sector can make depends 32 on how other sectors evolve. For instance, when high density urbanization is developed, the most 33 sustainable organization of transportation (network, modality) may be quite different from the best 34 formula for low density habitat. What happens in the energy sector is also of course of key relevance 35 for the transportation sector.

## **Table 4.8.1** Map of sustainable development and equity issues within AR5 WGIII. [Note from the authors: Final Table will include section numbers in all cells (and not just xes) as other chapters SOD become available]

		Sectoral chapters					
	6	7	8 9		10	11	12
	Transition	Energy	Transport	Buildings	Industry	Land Use	Cities
Equity							
Distribution (Within countries, income categories, across countries and over time) Procedural equity (Participation /					<ul> <li>10.4 Demand reduction: New products may be targetted for poor more.</li> <li>Material efficiency: Marginal/disposal Land site will be freed, a valuable asset may be freed for redistribution to other better alternative activity.</li> <li>10.4 Recycling: increase participation and involvment of different sectors</li> </ul>	x	
involvement, including institutional issues)							
Economic							
Costs <sup>1</sup>		7.8 Levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for various low carbon energy supply technologies show broad ranges, indicating that costs are dependent on location and country-specific conditions. The overall LCOE of many low carbon technologies has come down considerably since AR4. However, French and US nuclear reactors have seen a strong increase in their investment over the past few decades to meet efficiency and safety standards. Investment costs of CCS plants also remain higher compared to conventional plants, and with no commercial large-scale coal-fired CCS power plant in operation, the estimation of their projected costs are carried out on the basis of design studies and a few existing pilot projects. Altering future energy supply to reduce GHG emissions may also require investments in ancillary infrastructure beyond those needed in a BAU future, imposing additional costs, although these future costs are uncertain and difficult to define.	x	x	10.4; 10.8 Increase in productivity via reduced use of energy or raw materials inputs and resultant production cost reduction	x	X
Income					10.4 Material efficieny and recycling in different industries increase income	x	

National budgets, international trade, growth				<ul> <li>10.4 Demand reduction material efficiency and recyling, energy efficiency and renewables promote a decline in trade deficit.</li> <li>10.4 Demand reduction: New</li> </ul>	x	
New technologies				technology to meet new product /service will emerge; New technological development linked to material efficiency and recycling; New technology linked to new industrial processes		
Induced effect on long lived capital stock when there is path dependancy				10.4 Demand reduction reduces need for landfill /waste disposal sites		
Social						
Poverty alleviation	7.9 There is a correlation between modern energy consumption and economic and social development, both within and across countries. Higher Human Development Index (HDI) correlates well with higher energy consumption, and higher per capita emissions. This trend continue up to 100 GJ per capita, and tends to flatten beyond this point.		x	10.4 Recicling: poor in informal waste recyling market can get better opportinity in formal recycling sector.	x	
Access to and affordability of basic services	7.9 More than 1.3 billion people worldwide, especially the rural poor in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are estimated to lack access to electricity and between 2.7 to 3 billion are estimated to lack access to modern fuels for heating and cooking. Income poverty and cost of technology are critical impediments to widening access to energy services.	x				
Food security					x	
Education and learning				10.4 Demand reduction, material efficiency and recycling imply new lifestyle and ethic concept away from use and throw, sharing. New technologies require new skill development		
Employment			x	10.4 recycling, material efficiency: job creation due to new market segments	x	

Health	7.9 Beyond their GHG emissions, energy supply options differ with regard to their overall environmental and health impacts. Combustion-related emissions cause substantial human and ecological impacts, leading to the pre-mature deaths of 2.5 million people due to outdoor pollution and over 2 million children per year due to high levels of indoor pollution. Reducing biomass and fossil fuel combustion can reduce many forms of pollution and may thus yeild co- benefits for human wellbeing and ecosystems.	×	×	10.8.1		
Displacements				10.4 Demand reduction, material efficieny and recycling: Reduced threat of displacement from reduced demand for landfill sites		
Others						
Environmental						
End-of-life of capital stock						
Local pollution and global emissions				10.4; 10.8.1 Reduced pollution due to energy efficiency, renewables and production reduction		
Biodiversity			x	10.4 Demand reduction, material efficieny and recycling: less use of natural resources.	x	
Land-use				See displacements	x	
Water, soils and other natural resources		x	x	10.4 Demand reduction, material efficiecny and recycling: less use of natural resources. 10.4.2; 10.4.4; 10.4.5 New technologies for cement, pulp and paper and aluminium production reduce water use	x	

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]	Policy chapters				
	13 14		15	16	
	Global	Regional	National	Finance	
Equity					
Distribution (Within countries, income categories, across countries and over time)		14.1 We study regional distribution emissions as they develop over time (production and consumption- based); we also provide information on intra-regional and inter-regional distribution of key development outcomes	We mainly dealt with distribution within countries at any one moment in time. This was for instance discussed in relation to fuel taxes which are not found to be generally regressive as often believed. In fact, in many (particularly low-income) countries they are progressive.	16.2 Distribution across countries and over time is addressed in so far as information on current financial flows are presented, including their origin and destination. Moreover estimates for future investment required in different scenarios are assessed. We refer to the UNFCCC commitment of developed countries to assist developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts, especially the USD 100 billion commitment from 2009. However, we do not indicate how much exactly should be provided by whom and to whom. Time wise we will come to the conclusion that there is no robust evidence to favour a rapid and massive deployment of low-carbon technologies to avoid lock-in effects over a time-phased action supported by an expected cost digression of future technological innovation.	
Procedural equity (Participation / involvement, including institutional issues)				16.5Procedural equity will be addressed implicitly when discussing governance issues regarding climate finance, especially by presenting the recent developments on national level, where a number of independent funds has been established to improve ownership and alignment ot national demand and interest.	
Economic					
Costs <sup>1</sup>			We focus mainly on allocative efficiency costs but mentiona also political costs and distribution of costs.		
Income					
National budgets, international trade, growth		We discuss the tole of trade for emission transfers between regions			
New technologies		We discuss opportunities for technological transfer between regions	We speak of the costs that are implied by the barriers to the adoption and development of new technologies.		
Induced effect on long lived capital stock when there is path dependancy					

Social			
Poverty alleviation	We discuss poverty differences and the challenges of poverty reduction		
Access to and affordability of basic services			
Food security		The issues of food security is indirectly involved mainly in the discussion of bioenergy development and the possible conflicting demands for land.	
Education and learning			
Employment		Employment effects are not analysed extensively. We believe that there is little that can be said with certainty on the general relationship between employment and climate policy.	
Health		Ancillary benefits or costs of various policies such as reduction in black carbon for human health are mentioned but not exhaustively analyzed per se.	
Displacements			
Others			
Environmental			
End-of-life of capital stock			
Local pollution and global emissions		Ancillary benefits or costs of various policies for local pollution are mentioned but not in detail analyzed.	
Biodiversity		Ancillary benefits or costs of various policies for biodiversity are mentioned briefly particularly in relation to REDD.	
Land-use	We discuss regional differences in land use patterns and the trade-offs with poverty reduction	Ancillary benefits or costs of various policies for land use are dealt with very briefly	
Water, soils and other natural resources			

# 1 **4.9 Gaps in knowledge and data**

- The relationship between countries' human capital levels and their national and international engagement in climate change policy would benefit from additional studies.
- There is a need to investigate further how developing countries can best pull together the resources and capabilities to achieve SD and climate mitigation objectives and how to leverage international cooperation to support this process.
- There is a need to explore the development of economic and policy frameworks for the
   compensation of foregone benefits from exploiting fossil fuels in resource-rich countries.
- There is no comprehensive evaluation of funding necessary to implement UNFCCC mitigation
   and adaptation activities and clear methodologies and processes are needed as a basis for
   accurate estimates.
- There is a need to better assess the unrealized potential for reducing the environmental impact of economic activity and to understand how this potential can be realized.
- The relative importance in a transition toward SD of changes in values, as opposed to standard economic instruments influencing behaviors and economic activity, remains hard to assess.
- A better understanding is needed of the potential of frugality (life-styles and consumption patterns involving lower expenditures on goods and services) versus ecologically-conscious behaviour (lifestyles and consumption patterns involving less use of material resources and less environmental harm without necessarily reducing expenditure) for promoting sustainable development and equity.
- A better understanding is needed of the non-economic motivations for climate-friendly
   behaviours, particularly regarding the respective role of social considerations or values (e.g.
   universalism regarding fellow human beings) versus ecological considerations (universalism
   regarding the environment), and the extent to which these drivers can be separated.
- The predictive power of values for ecologically conscious consumer behaviour is often low, typically less than 20%, due to a range of factors operating at different levels. There is need to better understand the causes of this 'value-action gap' regarding especially behaviours that increase or limit GHG emissions
- The measurement of well-being, for the purpose of public policy, remains a controversial field, and there is a need to better understand the potential uses of subjective data, and also to seek ways to improve the quality of data on well-being.
- The current methodologies for the construction of scenarios do not yet deliver sufficiently detailed and sufficiently long-term data in order to assess development paths at the bar of sustainability and equity.
- Economic models could substantially improve by integrating transition issues (short-medium term) into long-term analysis, and also by adopting a sequential structure compatible with the resolution of uncertainty over time.

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