

Anna-Sara Malmgren
CURRICULUM VITAE
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Academic Employment

- Professor II at CSMN, University of Oslo, 2013 – 2015. (15% research position.)
- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2011 – present.
- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2008 – 2011.

Education

- PhD in Philosophy, New York University, 2009.
Committee: Paul Boghossian (supervisor), Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright.
- BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, Oxford, 2001.
1st Class Honours with Distinction.
- BA in Philosophy, King's College, University of London, 1999.
1st Class Honours with Distinction.

Areas of Specialization

- Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind.

Areas of Competence

- Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics.

Articles

- 'A Priori Testimony Revisited', in *The A Priori In Philosophy*, edited by A. Casullo and J. Thurow, Oxford: Oxford University Press, October 2013.
- 'Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements', *Mind*, vol. 120: 478, pp. 263 – 327, April 2011.

- ‘Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?’, *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 115:2, pp. 199 – 241, April 2006.

Reviews

- Review of *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by Herman Cappellen, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, April 2013. (<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39362/>)
- Review of *Relying on Others* by Sanford Goldberg, *Mind*, vol. 120: 480, pp. 1251 – 1258, October 2011.

Work in Progress

- *On Inference*, monograph, under contract with Oxford University Press.
- ‘Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure’, article.

Awards and Fellowships

- William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University, 2014 – 5.
- APA Article Prize 2012 (for ‘Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements’).
- Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews, May – June 2010.
- Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin, 2008 – 2010.
- Dean’s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, Fall 2008.
- Dean’s Dissertation Award, New York University, 2006 – 2007.
- Frankel Fellowship, New York University, 2005 – 2006.
- McCracken Fellowship, New York University, 2001 – 2006.
- Scatcherd Scholarship, Oxford University, 1999 – 2001.
- Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King’s College London, 1998.
- Sambrooke Exhibition, King’s College London, 1997.

Invited Talks and Commentaries

- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Arizona State University, April 2015.
- ‘The Normativity of the Sub-Personal’ Högre Seminariet, University of Göteborg, April 2015.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Oberlin College, March 2015.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, 48th Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy, UNC, October 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Simon Fraser University, October 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Reasoning Conference, University of Konstanz, July 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Högre Seminariet, University of Göteborg, June 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, (co-organized with Olav Gjelsvik), CSMN, Oslo University, June 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, UC Irvine, May 2014.
- ‘Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure’, UCLA, May 2014.
- ‘Inference and the Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation’, University of Notre Dame, April 2014.
- ‘On Getting Started’, Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University, February 2014.
- ‘A Puzzle about Inference’, University of Copenhagen, June 2013.
- ‘A Puzzle about Inference’, 5th Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, June 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, CSLI Workshop, June 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, University of Arkansas, April 2013.

- Response to ‘Intuitive Knowledge and the Benacerraf Problem’ by John Bengson, Pacific APA, March 2013.
- ‘Philosophy Without *What?*’, Symposium on *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by Herman Cappellen, The Institute of Philosophy (London University) and CSMN (Oslo University), February 2013.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, LEMMING Graduate Conference (keynote), University of Cologne, November 2012.
- ‘Inference: Explanation and Justification’, University of Victoria, November 2012.
- ‘Particularistically Unreasonable’, Workshop on Intentions, University of Leeds, June 2012.
- ‘Inferential Justification and Inferential Processes’, Symbolic Systems Forum, Stanford University, February 2012.
- ‘A Priori Testimony Revisited’, Harvard University, November 2011.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (keynote), University of St Andrews, October 2011.
- ‘A Priori Testimony Revisited’, North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2011.
- Response to ‘Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism and the Transparency of Justification’ by Ram Neta, Pacific APA, April 2011.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Workshop on the Philosophy of Richard Feldman, University of Texas at San Antonio, February 2011.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Stanford University, February 2011.
- ‘Quine’s Two Dogmas’, University of Oslo, December 2010.
- ‘Varieties of Inference’, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2010.
- Response to ‘Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem’ by Carlos Montemayor, UT-UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness, University of Texas at Austin, October 2011.

- ‘Varieties of Inference’, King’s College London, July 2010.
- ‘Sub-Personal Reasons’, Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reason, University of Leeds, June 2010.
- ‘The Content Problem’ and ‘Varieties of Inference’, Arché Methodology Seminar, University of St Andrews, June 2010.
- Response to ‘McKinsey One More Time’ by Crispin Wright, Conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, CSMN at University of Oslo, June 2010.
- ‘Warrant-Preservation and Testimony’, Forry and Micken Lecture Series on the Philosophy of Testimony, Amherst College, March 2010.
- ‘Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori’, Basic Knowledge Workshop VI, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, March 2010.
- Response to ‘Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief’ by Dylan Murray, Central APA, Chicago, February 2010.
- ‘The Justification of Intuitive Judgments’, Workshop on Thought Experiments and The A Priori, University of Fortaleza, August 2009.
- ‘Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance’, Filosofidagarna, Lund University, June 2009.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University College London, March 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, Cornell University, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Rochester, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Western Ontario, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of California Berkeley, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Pittsburgh, February 2008.
- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of Texas at Austin, January 2008.

- ‘Intuitions by Inference’, University of California Davis, January 2008.
- Response to ‘Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?’ and ‘We’re Right, They’re Wrong’ by Peter van Inwagen, Workshop on Science and Religion, New York Institute of Philosophy, March 2007.
- ‘What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn’t Know – And *How* Do We Know It?’, University of Texas at Austin, December 2006.
- ‘Intuitions and The A Priori’, Arché Epistemology Seminar, University of St Andrews, July 2006.
- Response to ‘Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals’ by Timothy Williamson, Anders Wedberg Lectures, Stockholm University, April 2006.
- ‘A Priori Knowledge by Testimony’, Logic and Language Seminar, Stockholm University, June 2003.
- ‘Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?’, Cumberland Lodge Weekend, University of London, October 1997.

Professional and Departmental Service

- Reader for Oxford University Press, *Dialectica*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis*, *Inquiry*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*, *Thought*, and Bellingham Summer Conference.
- Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language for *Thought* (February – August 2013).
- Chair of Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee (Fall 2011 – Spring 2014).
- Member of Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee (Spring 2013, Spring 2015), and Search Committee (Fall 2013 – present).
- Member of sakkyndig komité, IFIKK, University of Oslo (Spring 2015).
- Member of Samuel Asarnow’s Dissertation Committee (Spring 2013 – present) and Peter Hawke’s Dissertation Committee (Fall 2013 – present).
- Member of UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee, and UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee, Fall 2010 – Spring 2011.

— Member of Jenn Nielson's Dissertation Committee, Spring 2010.

Courses Taught

— 'Rule-Following', Fall 2014.
(Graduate Seminar)

— Advanced Dissertation Seminar, Stanford University, Fall 2013 – Spring 2014, Fall 2014 – Spring 2015.

— 'Bounded Rationality', Stanford University, Fall 2013.
(Freshman Seminar)

— 'Philosophy of Mind', Stanford University, Spring 2013, Spring 2014, Winter 2015.
(Mixed-level Lecture course)

— 'Explanation and Justification', Stanford University, Winter 2013, Winter 2014.
(Undergraduate Seminar)

— Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar, Stanford University, Fall 2012, Spring 2013.

— 'Theory of Knowledge', Stanford University, Spring 2012.
(Mixed-level Lecture course)

— 'Metaphysics', Stanford University, Spring 2012.
(Mixed-level Seminar)

— 'What's an Inference?' Stanford University, Winter 2012, Fall 2012.
(Graduate Seminar)

— 'Thought Experiments', University of Texas at Austin, Spring 2010.
(Graduate Seminar)

— 'Theory of Knowledge', University of Texas at Austin, Spring & Fall 2010, Fall 2009.
(Advanced Undergraduate Lecture course)

— 'Knowledge and Reality', University of Texas at Austin, Fall 2009 & 2010.
(Honors Seminar)

— 'Minds and Machines', New York University, Spring 2008.
(Undergraduate Lecture course)

— ‘Belief, Truth and Knowledge’, New York University, Fall 2007, Summer 2005.
(Undergraduate Lecture course)

Referees

Paul Boghossian
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Department of Philosophy
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Stephen Schiffer
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Department of Philosophy
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