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A history of intelligence reporting from high, if ineffectual, political levels.

**MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM PETER TO TITO**

Because of President Roosevelt's interest in Balkan affairs, one of the most extensive and detailed series of memoranda contained in the OSS Reports to the White House¹ is formed by those that trace the evolution from monarchist Yugoslavia to the Tito dictatorship, a course of events in which Roosevelt and particularly Winston Churchill played a hand. In Yugoslavia OSS had representatives with both of the feuding resistance leaders Mihailovich and Tito, and it once proposed to include among the latter the man whom Churchill later forced upon King Peter as prime minister and who still later became Tito's first foreign minister, the Croatian leader Ivan Subasic. In London it had a representative who enjoyed the intimate confidence both of Subasic and of Peter and whose reports reflect minutely the political developments. The most important of the documents are excerpted below.

21 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

During my last conversation with you, you showed a great deal of interest in the Balkan Theater of Operations. Since that time I had a very interesting talk with the Ban² of Croatia, whose letter to you I am enclosing herewith.

The Ban is willing to go for OSS first to Italy and later to make an appearance in Yugoslavia proper in order to establish direct contact with the political and military leaders of Croatia. He understands

¹ Described in the first of these articles, subtitled "Sunrise," in *Studies* VII 2, p. 73 ff.

² Ban is an old title equivalent to Governor, notably under the Austro-Hungarian empire.

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Peter to Tito

that he will go merely as a soldier and patriot to assist us in our fight against the enemy. . . .

The Ban told me that it would aid him tremendously in carrying out his duties, and would greatly facilitate his future tasks, if he could have an interview with you, not in his diplomatic capacity,³ but merely as a patriot who is working for the common cause. . . .

The Ban, who fought in the last war as a Serbian officer, is very popular among the 5,000,000 Croats. They regard him as their champion and leader.

I believe that the Ban can be of great value to us in paving the way for our forces. . . .

28 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . here is additional information on the Balkan situation:

"1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces, are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are composed of two parts—the Cetniks, lead⁴ by Mihailovitch, and the Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily exaggerated. . . . These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances among the population are created by Mihailovich's title as Yugoslav commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed to fact.

"2. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz. Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They are made up of men from every region of the country and they are engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovich's relative lack of activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing. . . .

"3. Included in the political goals of the Partisans is the establishment of federated Jugoslavia with a government selected by democratic

³In 1942 he had been named by the government in exile to a mission for organizing the Yugoslavs in the United States.

⁴Misspellings retained as a matter of documentary interest throughout.

elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual foundation for the allegation of communism made against the Partisans. Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and file or the leaders.

"4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. . . . The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile.

. . .

"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged, during the war, to Alexandra.

"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union. The principal barrier to such an understanding is Mihailovitch. Although it is frequently stated in rumors, there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord between the Partisans and the Soviet Union. . . ."

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. Attached is a copy of memorandum which I am submitting today to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has to do with the British request for concurrent withdrawal of British and American officers now with Mihailovich.

Attached to the memorandum is an intelligence report by an OSS officer who has been with Mihailovich during the past six months. I believe that it will be of much interest to you.

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Peter to Tito

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a digest of discussions had by a representative of ours with King Peter:

King Peter's sojourn in Cairo was both futile and difficult for the following reasons:

(a) General Zivkovic was engaged in plots directed toward deposing Peter and placing Prince Tomislav, the brother of Peter, on the throne. Supposedly, Prince Tomislav is the bastard son of General Zivkovic and Queen Marie.

(b) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Marshal Tito.

(c) Cabinet underlings have issued inflammatory decrees favoring General Mihailovic and have been affixing King Peter's signature to these decrees without his consent. This has made it hard to work for an understanding with Tito.

(d) The British have followed a policy of keeping King Peter practically a prisoner. King Peter verified newspaper accounts reporting this fact, although he was forced to refute them publicly at the time.

The foregoing factors, as well as his desire to affect American and British policy in favor of General Mihailovic and to expedite his marriage were responsible for his wishing to go back to London.

The agreed policy of the Purich cabinet and King Peter is the backing of General Mihailovic not only as a force opposed to the Nazis but also as a guarantee of Peter's ultimate return to the Yugoslav throne. They are also agreed on the policy of securing material assistance for Mihailovic. King Peter . . . intimated that if the British did not order him to do otherwise, he would keep Purich in his present position. . . .

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From our London office, we learn the following:

"1. Effort is being made to construct the basis of a new government which will stand for the potential middle element between Tito and

Purich. . . . No Croats have been asked to participate in the discussions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached among the Serbian factions. . . .

3. Neither the King nor the British Foreign Office has been contacted by this group as yet; . . ."

10 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a report sent to me by one of our representatives on statements made by the Ban of Croatia on his departure for England:

". . . The Yugoslav crisis is due primarily in his opinion to the utter weakness of the present government. His advice, if sought by the King, will be to suggest the formation of a strong government under the King. . . .

"The great mistake in the past has been that the Allied governments, because of the weakness of the Yugoslav governments-in-exile, dealt directly with General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito. . . .

"The Shepherd⁵ believes that if a strong government is set up the first task would be to relegate General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito to their legitimate tasks, namely, military commanders of the resistance forces within the respective areas controlled by each one of them separately. The only effective way to bring about such a situation would be for the Allies to give all military assistance and supplies through the government only. . . .

"Finally, the Shepherd stated that if a strong government is now formed, it must seek, as stated above, by exercising its authority, to consolidate all resistance forces throughout Yugoslavia in order to achieve the maximum effort to conquer the enemy. . . ."

22 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following report of the meeting on 21 May between the Ban of Croatia and Mr. Churchill was prepared for me by my special assistant, Mr. Bernard Yarrow. . . .

⁵ Apparently not an additional or alternative title but a code designation. The plan to make use of him was called the Shepard project.

In view of the secrecy maintained by the British on this conference, apart from this report to you, I am having only the Secretary of State advised. . . .

"The Ban informed me yesterday that he had received a telephone call from Churchill's secretary, requesting him to have dinner with Churchill at the latter's country place . . . on Sunday, 21 May . . . The Ban, . . . accompanied by Mr. Stevenson, British Minister to Yugoslavia, . . . arrived there about noon. . . .

"At one o'clock, Mr. Churchill joined them and during the dinner he had the Prime Minister of Holland seated at his right and the Ban at his left. Addressing his guests and pointing to the Ban, Mr. Churchill said: 'I want you to meet the next Prime Minister of Yugoslavia.' Noticing the expression of surprise on the Ban's face, Mr. Churchill said to him: 'Why don't you know that you are going to be the Prime Minister of the new Yugoslav Government?' The Ban replied: 'The King consulted with me regarding the formation of a new government but has not as yet informed me of the fact that I am to be the Prime Minister of that Government and that I will be entrusted with its formation.' Mr. Churchill then said: 'Why of course. That is the reason I asked you to come here.'

Thereafter . . . Mr. Churchill stated . . . that he consulted, of course, with the President of the United States about the formation of this new government under the premiership of the Ban and was assured of his complete approval.

"Turning to the Ban, Churchill then said: 'You will form this government and I assure you that Great Britain and the United States will regard yours as the only government of the Yugoslav people, and within four or five weeks you will get all the support and assistance we can possibly render to your country to increase its resistance to the enemy.' . . .

"Churchill further added: 'We shall continue to have friendly relations with Tito because he is conducting a vigorous campaign in Yugoslavia, but we shall look to you and your cabinet as the only legitimate government of Yugoslavia.'

"Churchill informed the Ban that he had informed Tito that, if he is in favor of the new government, his support will be very welcome, but at any rate he must refrain from attacking it and thereby disrupting the earnest attempt which will be made by the new government to

unify Yugoslavia. . . . He frankly did not know what the attitude of Stalin would be. He expressed the hope that the USSR will join with England and America in giving whole-hearted support to the new government but had no information on that point up to the present.

“ . . . On the way home Mr. Stevenson spoke to the Ban about the conference with Churchill. The Ban pointed out to him that whereas the Prime Minister took it for granted that he is the future Premier, the King has not advised him as yet that he is entrusted to form the government. The Ban then said that he is contemplating calling King Peter tomorrow, Monday, May 22nd, and informing him of the conference with Churchill so as to bring the matter to a head. . . .”

27 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a paraphrase of a cable from General Donovan which he asked be delivered to you:

“I had lunch with General Sir Maitland Wilson today. General Wilson stated that the conversations between Tito and Subasich went better than anticipated. The following was agreed upon:

- “1. The Subasich Government would have a Tito representative.
- “2. As part of his Army, Tito would accept Mihailovich troops who would be allowed to wear the Royal insignia as distinguished from Tito's red star. This would also apply to Naval forces.
- “3. That ultimate determination of the King's position would be put off until after the war was over.

Wilson remarked that the chasing around the mountains which the Nazis gave Tito had had a healthful effect. Both Peter and Subasich are going back to London.”

25 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Donovan (who is presently in London) has asked that the following report of a conversation he had on 21 August with Prime Minister Subasich be sent to you from him:

"I talked with Subasich on Monday and he told me the following:

"On August 20 I had a conversation with Adam Pribicevich, Vice President of Draga Mihailovich's Committee. When Pribicevich asked for my help to stop the Partisans' fight against the Chetniks, which is now raging with full intensity and when he asked me whether we could bring about a reconciliation between the Partisans and the Chetniks, I answered:

"... If you wish to fight the Partisans as Communists—conscious of the fact that they are sons of our nation—and to this end, accept the help and collaboration of the Germans, you cannot expect anything from the King, the Royal Government or the Allies. . . ."

There has also been received from our representative in Bern the following Boston Series report⁶ which is of direct relevance to the matters discussed in General Donovan's talk with Subasic. . . .

"During the second week of August, 1944, Hermann Neubacher, German special plenipotentiary for the Balkan area, is reported to have made the following comments on Mihailovich and the political situation in Yugoslavia:

"... The position of those Chetniks who advocate cooperation with the Germans is strengthened by the fact that the latter may soon be forced to evacuate Serbia. This would be the signal for a show-down engagement between the Communists and the Nationalists. Mihailovich therefore probably intends to cooperate with the German Army while it is still in Serbia, in order to lessen the effectiveness of Tito's Partisans. By emphasizing the common fight against Communism, Mihailovich would obtain as many weapons as possible from the Germans. He feels that he will then be able to take over the German positions easily when the German army leaves. Informal negotiations between Mihailovich and the Germans are said to have been initiated, and may possibly be followed by an official conference at a later date. . . ."

⁶ See *Studies* IX 1, p. 81 ff.

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence has just been relayed to us from Caserta:

"2 C-47's, with stars on the rudders, landed on Vis Monday evening with Russian Yak fighter escort. Tito left in one of them near midnight for parts unknown, according to information we have received here. Source of information is U.S. Air Command Vis. Major Alston and Colonel Maxwell, British Army, have checked and verified Tito's departure."

24 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am sending to you the following paraphrase of message sent by General Wilson to Marshal Tito on 16 September, and a report from our Bari office concerning an order issued by Marshal Tito's headquarters on 20 September restricting intelligence operations both of ourselves and the British. . . .

General Wilson's message to Marshal Tito:

"1. A communication was addressed by you on the 5 of September to the British and American missions at your Headquarters, in which you made a statement to the effect that the Chetniks were being sent supplies and afforded other aid by the Allies, and that the Allied command in Italy is maintaining relations with Draga Mihailovich.

"2. It is not my plan to send these to either the British or the United States governments as a strong exception to these allegations is taken by me personally. I am perfectly competent to take care of the situation as the Allied officer personnel to which you made reference in your communication of the 5 of September are under my direct orders.

"3. In any event, you have apparently been misinformed. The statement that we are sending Mihailovich any supplies or maintaining relationship with him is absolutely false. At the time, you were made aware of the special reasons for which the two American missions have been in the region that Mihailovich controls. The evacuation of Allied air personnel in Yugoslavia was

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Peter to Tito

the specific reason of the first mission, the air crew rescue unit. A small unit under direction of Col. McDowell, the second mission, is in no way accredited to General Draga Mihailovich; its sole object is to collect intelligence in Serbia.

...

"6. The fact that on a few occasions rescued American airmen were brought out garbed in Chetnik clothing because of the loss of their own, may have caused some misunderstanding. A few supplies, which may have been dropped in the wrong area, may have fallen into the hands of the Chetniks. The complaints made by you must be wholly based on erroneous reports which resulted from distortion of the facts stated above."

Report concerning order issued by Marshal Tito's Headquarters on 20 September:

"Tito's headquarters issued orders on September 20 to all Partisan corps commanders to the effect that no Allied missions may operate henceforth with units smaller than a corps and further that no Allied military personnel are to travel inside the country unless Tito has given them written permission to do so. The Partisan Istrian Corps Headquarters has ordered one of our officers stationed in Slovenia to report to the headquarters without delay. This order was in fulfillment to Tito's order.

"According to the British military mission, similar communications have been received by its representatives in other areas. All supply drops were immediately cancelled by the British and also all flights to remove Partisan wounded. Nothing further will be done along either line until the situation is clarified. . . .

"Probably the motive behind Tito's move is his desire to curtail and control American and British military representation in the country now that he believes the civil war is all but in the bag and now that British and American supplies are no longer needed. He evidently does not wish American and British representatives to observe and report developments of his plans to consolidate his military victory in the political and economic field. The order, significantly enough, was issued at a moment when Tito was almost certainly with the Russian leaders in Bulgaria or Rumania. He has not come back to Vis since he left for an undisclosed

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destination in Russian planes. There is no way of knowing if the Russians come under the phrase "allied" personnel.

"The Russians have for a long time had the closest possible liaison with Tito and his staff and have probably taken part in his political and military councils.

30 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received word from Colonel Huntington, Chief of our group with Tito, that the Partisan Headquarters have been moved to Serbia.

The British and Russian groups, as well as our own, are in the process of transferring their personnel to the new headquarters.

2 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that you will find of interest the following report of conversations which our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, had with the King of Yugoslavia and with Subasic:

"On Wednesday September 27, I saw the King. He gave me a warm welcome and spent an hour with me chatting about the present situation. He told me . . . that Winston Churchill sent a sizzling telegram to Tito telling him in effect that the British Government has sent supplies and arms to Tito to fight the enemy and not to fight his own people. The King also said that this cable which was of a challenging tone and the sharpest yet delivered to Tito was provoked by a certain note sent by Tito to Churchill. Two days later this . . . was confirmed by Subasic independently and without any questioning on my part. Subasic told me that Tito sent a cable to Churchill protesting vehemently against assistance rendered by the British to certain Chetniks in Switzerland and to other acts of assistance to Mihailovich. Subasic further informed me that Churchill sent to Tito a reply in which he rebuked him sharply for using arms and ammunition supplied by the British Government to fight the Yugoslav people instead of fighting the enemy.

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Peter to Tito

5 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received the following dispatch from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning a cable which Subasic has received from Stalin:

"Tonight Subasic informed me that he received a cable directly from Stalin in which Stalin stated that the National Committee of Liberation agreed to the Red Army's entrance into Yugoslavia.

"Stalin stated that the Red Army will liberate the Yugoslav people from the yoke imposed by the enemy. Stalin extended his best wishes to Subasic personally as the Prime Minister of Royal Yugoslav Government to carry out successfully the policies inaugurated by his government.

"Subasic asked that contents of cable from Stalin to him not be wired to Washington because he has not informed the British about it."

In view of the nature of this communication and the fact that the value of our informant might be seriously jeopardized, Mr. Yarrow has requested that contents of the message not be revealed.

6 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following report from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

". . . Subasic lunched with Churchill on August 3 and asked him to provide two divisions to invade Yugoslavia, promising to capture Belgrade with assistance of Yugoslav troops within short time. Churchill stated cannot spare two divisions but assured Subasic of whole-hearted support. Before leaving for Quebec, Anthony Eden spoke to Subasic about moving government to Italy in anticipation of liberation of Yugoslavia. Subasic heard no more about it and is mystified by British verbal promises of support and lack of any real backing. Subasic believes that British in concert with Soviets working with Tito only, disregarding royal Government."

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10 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following dispatch which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

"Saturday October 7 Churchill conferred with King Peter. The King telephoned Subasic from 10 Downing Street asking him to prepare a speech to be broadcast by the King upon liberation of Belgrade. Churchill wanted to see the speech by 5 P.M. The speech was prepared on time. Briefly, the King will congratulate people of Yugoslavia for bringing about their own liberation. He will thank Tito, Red Army, and American and British Allies for assistance rendered, and will appeal for unity.

"Subasic believes Tito still in Serbia with troops, not in Moscow as rumored."

14 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the following report which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow:

"Saw King today, October 10. He related to me his conversation with Churchill on October 7, before latter's departure for Moscow. Churchill said that he is dissatisfied with Tito's continuous non-cooperation, and will find new ways to bring pressure to bear upon him. He assured the King that he will discuss with Marshal Stalin the whole situation and will seek Stalin's assistance to exert his influence over Tito with thought of forming a single government upon liberation of Belgrade."

26 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the attached memorandum which the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave to one of our representatives in London for transmission to the State Department.

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Peter to Tito

MEMORANDUM FROM PRIME MINISTER SUBASIC

. . . The Royal Yugoslav Government have decided to adopt the following measures:

1) Instructions will be sent immediately to the Army personnel in the Middle East and elsewhere ordering them to join up with the National Army of Liberation in one single front. . . .

3) Officers and men who . . . fail to join up with the National Army of Liberation . . . will be demobilised and will assume the status of refugees. . . . It is to be expected that those who assume the status of refugees . . . will not be allowed to return to Yugoslavia at the end of the war. . . .

6) . . . The Royal Yugoslav Government have already issued the strictest instructions to their Ambassador in Ankara for . . . dealing with the group in Turkey (Istanbul) who have operated a secret wireless station and . . . engaged in propaganda . . . in opposition to . . . the National Army of Liberation. . . .

7) . . . The Red Cross personnel in Cairo will be changed and an inquiry concerning their activities will be instituted. . . .

10) The intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government in resorting to these measures is to carry out the terms of the agreement which was signed with Marshal Tito on behalf of the National Committee of Liberation on June 16 at Vis . . .

28 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . King Peter saw Churchill this afternoon. Herewith report as given me [Yarrow] by King. Stalin and Churchill discussed general Balkan situation. . . . Yugoslavia military operations and administration upon liberation will be under joint British-Russian control.

. . . Stalin was not in principle against re-establishment of Monarchies in Balkans. He said, 'If a King can be more useful in waging war against enemy and maintaining stability after victory, he would prefer him to a makeshift Republic.' Specifically as to Peter Stalin said, 'He seems to be a young man who is close to his people.' But insisted that question of King's return be postponed until people express will by plebescite. Churchill added, 'When time comes I shall see to it that plebescite is conducted under British, Russian and American super-

vision.' Churchill smilingly said, 'I shall manage your campaign when time comes.'

King informed Churchill that he learned . . . that Subasic before departure harbored plan to create Regency commission and appointing himself as member of same. King expressed anxiety that Subasic will attempt to perpetuate own political power and is not person upon whom King can rely to fight for his return. Churchill said that this regency idea was news to him and that it is despicable that Subasic promoted it. He assured King that if regency is suggested to him by Subasic or anyone, he will rudely reject it. He said, 'You are neither minor nor at your death bed or mentally deficient, therefore there can be no question of appointing regent.' Churchill amplified that if regent were appointed his acts of malfeasance would be charged against King hence unacceptable. Churchill made a note to send word immediately to British representative participating Tito-Subasic conferences and warn him of Subasic's regency scheme. . . . Churchill said that when he met with Tito and Subasic in Italy it was he who fought the battle of the Monarchy with Tito and not Subasic. Churchill said that Tito is only a Communist and will try to put one of his followers as Prime Minister who will exercise very little power, Tito retaining same.

King asked Churchill to arrange conference between him and Tito in Churchill's presence. Churchill said, 'It is premature now but I will seek the [U.S.] President's opinion as to the advisability of such a meeting.'

Churchill expressed view that King should not under any circumstances be on Yugoslav soil at present. First because he does not wish by King's presence to legalize some of the misdeeds perpetrated by Tito against some of Yugoslav people. Second that it would be easy to assassinate him and then claim that he was murdered by German agent or Mihailovich henchmen. Churchill expressed annoyance at . . . Minister of Defence placing Royal Yugoslav Air Force and Navy under Tito's command. He said that he received word from his Admiral commanding Mediterranean that he will not tolerate same.

Finally Churchill reassured King that he need not worry about Subasic-Tito conference for any agreement will have to get his sanction. He said that Stalin was not unreasonable about general Balkan situation but that of course Stalin is a very shrewd man and situation will have to be watched.

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Peter to Tito

King requests you to keep this report confidential. He is concerned that Churchill may be annoyed if he suspects that King is talking.

3 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From Mr. Yarrow:

"The King received a telephone message from Sir Alexander Cadogan requesting an audience at 2:30 P.M. on 2 November. Cadogan stated he had a message from Mr. Churchill and handed a written memorandum the text of which is as follows:

'Memorandum on agreement reached between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, King Peter would appoint a council of 3 regents to represent his Majesty in Yugoslavia, pending the decision of the country on the ultimate form of government. . . . The regents would form a government of 18 ministers from the members of Dr. Subasic's government and of the National Committee. It would be the task of the united government to conduct the plebiscite which would eventually decide upon the form of government of the country. . . . The Prime Minister would be Marshal Tito, who would also be Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief. . . . Dr. Subasic is proceeding to Moscow . . . to ascertain for himself the attitude of the Soviet Government towards Yugoslavia. . . .'

"Cadogan then asked the King whether he had any message for Mr. Churchill. The King stated, 'Please tell Mr. Churchill that . . . I was shocked by this agreement and I shall not accept it.' Cadogan then informed the King that Mr. Churchill expressed consternation at sudden departure of Subasic for Moscow without first reporting to Churchill and to King Peter. He further stated that he was not consulted by Subasic as to details of the agreement. Churchill accordingly, said Cadogan, sent a cable to the British Ambassador in Moscow instructing him to ask Subasic to proceed immediately to London to report to King Peter and Churchill. Churchill also sent cable to Stalin informing him that neither Churchill nor King Peter were consulted by Subasic during his conference with Tito with respect to agreement and specifically asked him not to make any decisions until Churchill had opportunity to get a complete report of the agreement and until King Peter had opportunity to study same. . . ."

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We have also received from our representative in Belgrade a concurrent report concerning the Tito-Subasic agreement . . . :

“. . . Subasic said that Tito was very reasonable although urged by followers who are anxious to set up a federated republic immediately. Subasic indicated the regency compromise agreement by Tito was only to obtain immediate recognition of United States and England. If this recognition is withheld I feel that the agreement might weaken.

“Subasic plans to go to Moscow tomorrow for three or four days and will sign agreement when he returns provided presumably Peter agrees.”

21 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has forwarded the following account of an interview between Prime Minister Churchill and King Peter. The information was received from King Peter immediately following the interview on 17 November:

Churchill, holding in his hand a copy of the proposed agreement between Tito and Subasich, commented to King Peter that the draft could have been worse and that it represented at least a partial victory because it recognized, for the time being, the constitutional Monarchy. “As you know,” Churchill added, “I am against a Regency. . . . I thought Subasich was statesman enough to see the inadvisability of such a step. But I believe this clause may be eliminated; the agreement is not yet final.”

King Peter told Churchill that he regarded the agreement as a polite way to oust the King quietly, that . . . he wished to disavow Subasich immediately for transgressing his powers and for proceeding to Moscow without first reporting to him. This comment, however, is said to have infuriated Churchill, who warned the King under no circumstances to take any action before Subasich has returned to London. . . .

Churchill reportedly added: “You know I do not trust Tito. He surreptitiously flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin before my arrival in London. He is nothing but a Communist thug, but he is in power and we must reckon with that fact. President Roosevelt, Stalin, and I have agreed that there will be a plebiscite by which the people of Yugoslavia will decide on the question of the Monarchy. Your re-

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Peter to Tito

turn, therefore, will have to be postponed until the plebiscite takes place." The King replied, "What chance have I in a plebiscite when Tito is in Yugoslavia? It will be nothing but a farce." Churchill then stated that he would insure that the plebiscite would be supervised by "impartial umpires" including "British, Americans and Russians."

During the conversation, the King said, "I have followed your advice, Mr. Prime Minister, since I escaped from Yugoslavia, and look where I am today." To which Churchill replied, "Would you have been better off if you had followed Mihailovich?"

9 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . In a lengthy conversation with the OSS representative in Belgrade on 5 December, Subasich indicated that his visit to Moscow had been a difficult ordeal. Much time was spent discussing questions of government procedure pending a plebiscite, which Subasich feels will take place six months after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia. According to Subasich, Stalin insisted on the free expression of popular opinion in Yugoslavia and expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav "experiments" in Communism or Bolshevism. Stalin appeared shocked to learn that some delegates to the Serb congress (the Supreme Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Serbia, held in mid-November 1944) were elected by acclaim, which he characterized as an undemocratic procedure.

Subasich reportedly admitted to British authorities in Belgrade that the return of King Peter was out of the question at present. To the OSS representative Subasich admitted surprise at the attitude of the Serbs, whom he had considered monarchists, and added that if King Peter were to return it would cause riots and disorders. . . .

11 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . MacLean has shown the OSS representative in Belgrade a lengthy, strongly-worded, and slightly menacing message from Churchill to Tito, protesting against the non-cooperative and discourteous attitude of Tito and his subordinates toward the British. The message mentioned a number of incidents involving British naval and military

operations on the Dalmatian coast. MacLean states that Tito appeared much disturbed by the communication and offered profuse apologies. At the same time, however, Tito complained that the British had failed to keep him informed of their operations, and stated that the incidents were due largely to the unexpected appearance of strong British forces in various areas.

Churchill's message also emphasized the necessity for genuinely democratic elections in implementing the Tito-Subasich agreement, and expressed the hope that all democratic groups will be free to put forward their candidates and support them in election campaigns. Churchill added that he expects the question of the monarchy will be put directly to the electorate and that the vote will be by free and secret ballot. (Subasich had informed the OSS representative in Belgrade that present plans call for a constitutional assembly and not the electorate to decide this issue.)

14 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow . . . :

"King saw Churchill at 3:00 P.M. on 13 December. The conference lasted 1 hour. . . .

"In discussing Tito-Subasic agreement Churchill said, 'I advise you to sign this agreement for with it the constitutional monarchy is helped to some extent and it is not as bad as it looks. If you sign it there is still a chance for you. If you refuse to sign Tito may form his own government and banish you forever from Yugoslavia. I cannot make up your mind for you. It will have to be your own decision. You are your own master. Think about it and don't rush. You can take your time and we shall discuss it further.' Churchill suggested that King and Subasic meet with him on Friday at 5:00 P.M. King agreed. . . ."

Subsequent to the receipt of the report set forth above we have just received another dispatch dated 14 December 1944 from Mr. Yarrow, which reads as follows:

"King Peter decided to seek advice and assistance of godfather, King George of England. Peter telephoned him today and will see King George this afternoon or tomorrow morning."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Peter to Tito

23 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received by pouch a report of a conference which our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow had with Subasic on 15 December 1944. . . .

"Yesterday, December 15, I had a long discussion with Prime Minister Subasic. Knowing him as I do for the last two years, I should like to say that I am pretty certain that he spoke his mind to me and was utterly frank in those matters which he related. . . .

"When Subasic got to Bari on his last trip, he was met by an official of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Philip Broad. Mr. Broad suggested that he accompany the Prime Minister on his trip to Yugoslavia, to which the Prime Minister replied that he appreciated very much the kindness of Mr. Broad to be of assistance to him but he preferred to conduct his negotiations with Tito alone. He amplified his statement by saying that he did not wish it to be said among the National Committee of Liberation that he was traveling around with a British representative of the Foreign Office. . . .

"The Prime Minister related to me that when he first got to Belgrade after its liberation he knew by that time that he was condemned on an alleged indictment that he was responsible for the death of many communists, whom he interned before the Germans advanced into Yugoslavia, because he did not release them in time. Instead of evading the issue, said the Prime Minister, he delivered a two hour talk before the National Committee of Liberation in the presence of Tito, who brought him into the Assembly. He told me how, after the two hour talk, he convinced them that he was not responsible in any manner for the deaths at the hands of the Germans.

"He told them of his impressions of America and I could gather that he tried to give them the impression that he was very well acquainted with the policy of the American Government, has contacts with officials of that Government and would be in a position to handle Yugoslav affairs more successfully because of his presence in America for two years and the contacts established by him there.

"The attitude of the members of the National Committee of Liberation towards him was, according to Subasic, most cautious and distant. He heard rumors that they were regarding him as a spy and agent for King Peter II and were most uncommunicative with him.

"The Russians, during his stay in Belgrade, were exceedingly cordial to him and showed every sign of consideration and attention. He struck up a friendship with General Kornieff, who was the head of the Russian military mission in Yugoslavia. It was Kornieff who had a large comfortable chair built in the Douglas plane which took him eventually from Belgrade to Rumania. Later on Subasic got to know and became very friendly with Colonel Melnikoff, who, although a colonel in rank, has more authority and power, according to Subasic, than General Kornieff. It was Melnikoff who accompanied the Prime Minister to Russia when he undertook his trip to see Stalin.

"The Prime Minister related to me the following incident: before his departure from Yugoslavia to Ploesti, General Kornieff asked him whether he would prefer to fly in a Russian or Yugoslav plane, that they were both of the Douglas model built in Russia. Kornieff said he was asking the question because on the Yugoslav plane there was the Red Star emblem. The Prime Minister replied to Kornieff that he did not mind the star as long as the plane was a Yugoslav plane.

"The Prime Minister spoke to me at length about Tito. He told me he found Tito to be exceedingly reasonable, that although he is a devoted communist by 'religion' he found no traces of his ideology as far as Yugoslavia is concerned. He regards him primarily as a Croat and a good Yugoslav. Tito became exceedingly friendly to Subasic, according to his report.

"Tito told Subasic that he is surrounded by a bunch of incompetent persons who, although good communists at heart, know very little about how to handle affairs of state. He complained to him time and again of the troubles they cause him by their ignorance and incompetence. Said Tito, 'You, Subasic, can be of the greatest assistance to me and Yugoslavia. You can handle delicately and tactfully our relations with the western democracies and America. It is too bad that we are both Croats but we shall manage and make Yugoslavia in the future a happy democratic state.'

"The Prime Minister related to me that when he was brought by Major General Velebit to Yugoslavia, it was to Vrsac where Tito's headquarters were located that he was escorted. The General left him in the hall where he waited for fifteen minutes and when Tito

came out he turned to Velebit in great rage and said, 'My instructions were not to bring the Prime Minister to me. You always mix things up. You know that I wanted to come and greet the Prime Minister at his villa instead of him coming to me.' The Prime Minister cited to me that incident as an example of the respect with which Tito is treating him. He said that it was at Tito's request that he saw Stalin. He stated that it was exceedingly important for him to meet with Stalin and discuss with him in detail the state of affairs of Yugoslavia and therefore he took the trip at Tito's request.

"Another incident related to me by Subasic as proof of Tito's trust in him was that the Prime Minister suggested to appoint Dr. Ante Pavelic, formerly his secretary in New York, as Counsel General and perhaps Minister in South Africa. Subasic told Tito that of course it was a bit embarrassing to appoint Dr. Pavelic to that post because he bears the very same name as the Croatian quisling. Tito, however, dismissed that obstacle saying, 'What difference does it make what his name is. If you find him reliable I shall appoint him as Minister to South Africa when I become Prime Minister.'

". . . Tito begged the Prime Minister to accept the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the Prime Minister, Tito assured him that he will give him complete freedom of action and will be guided entirely in the field of foreign policy by Subasic's suggestions and ideas. Tito told the Prime Minister that he is contemplating to cultivate the close cooperation of the western democracies and America.

. . .

"Prime Minister related to me further that Tito, although he will never pursue a policy against the interest of Russia, will nevertheless attempt his utmost to build up a closer economic and diplomatic relationship between Yugoslavia and Great Britain and the United States.

"The Prime Minister told me that Tito was distressed a couple of weeks ago when he received a letter from Churchill, couched in the sharpest language he has ever received from Churchill. Subasic told me that he personally saw that letter and gave me the following account of same:

"It seems that Churchill recently sent a request to Tito for permission to land several divisions of Anglo-American troops in western

Croatia along the Dalmatia coast. Tito refused categorically to permit Anglo-American troops to land in Croatia. Thereafter Churchill sent his famous letter to Tito in which he upbraided Tito in no uncertain terms and told him that Allied troops can land wherever they wish if the military operations require it.

"Tito, according to Subasic, was terribly shaken up and distraught over the message and took the point of view that he would not give in to Churchill because he was fearful, as he stated to Subasic, that the Croatian separatists and all elements in Croatia who are against Tito, would seize upon the opportunity to separate from Yugoslavia. Tito was very nervous that the presence of Allied troops in Croatia and Dalmatia would jeopardize his position and would afford the Croatian nationalistic elements an opportunity to rally against the National Committee of Liberation.

"Subasic told me confidentially that he shared entirely Tito's point of view. He told me that he knows only too well that the Vatican is trying to organize a federation of Catholic states into which Croatia should be included and that he favors Tito's feeling that Croatian separatists would avail themselves of the opportunity when the Allied troops landed in Yugoslavia to march against the Partisans.

"Subasic told me that Churchill was exceedingly nervous and jittery when he left for Moscow but that he, Subasic, could see no other way and hopes to pacify Churchill when he sees him. He will try to explain to him that he did it for one reason only: to come to an agreement with Tito and that he needed Stalin's backing in dealing with the members of the National Committee of Liberation.

"In relating his story yesterday, Dr. Subasic told me that at the very beginning Stalin opened the conversation saying, 'You understand, Ivan Oissipovic, (addressing him in Slavic style, calling him by his first name and the first name of his father) that Churchill and I have agreed to work out our arrangement on Yugoslavia on a fifty-fifty basis.' He said Stalin was very cautious with him when they spoke about diplomatic matters, but again, the Prime Minister reiterated, Stalin warned him not to try to emulate Soviet Russia. Stalin allegedly said, 'You have not the territory of Russia nor the people of Russia. You are a small country of small landowners in the heart of Europe. You will have to build your state upon democratic principles with equal representation for all the national groups of Yugo-

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Peter to Tito

slavia. You will have to seek economic assistance from America the way we here in Russia are planning to do after the war is over.' Stalin, according to Subasic, spoke in 'very warm terms about the United States.'

"Discussing the monarchy, Stalin wanted to know from Subasic what the people's feelings are about King Peter, II. Subasic confided in me for the first time that the King is not popular in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia but that he has some following, of course, in Serbia, and that he told this to Stalin. Stalin replied that he does not care whether there is a monarchy or a republican form of government but no one should force the people to accept a monarchy if they do not wish it.

"Upon returning to Yugoslavia from Moscow, Subasic told me that his prestige went up tremendously in Yugoslavia. The members of the National Committee of Liberation who condemned him first and treated him like a spy and agent for the monarchy made every effort to cultivate his friendship. He told me that he found an entirely different attitude when he returned to Yugoslavia. That was one reason why he is glad that he took the trip to see Stalin. . . .

"Talking further to me about King Peter, Subasic confided in me in no uncertain terms that he regards King Peter's chances to return to Yugoslavia as absolutely nil. He said that he is convinced that King Peter will never return but added, 'Why should I destroy his hopes.'

". . . Subasic told me as a deep secret that there are several Partisan divisions at the Dalmatian coastline and that if the British troops should land in Yugoslavia along the Dalmatian coast they will meet with a formidable resistance on the part of the Partisans. He said that he hopes Churchill will not repeat the mistake in Yugoslavia that he made in Athens. . . ."

29 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From . . . Yarrow:

"Saw Subasic yesterday December 27th. He expressed great annoyance at the King's failure to see him during last week. Subasic stated that if King refuses to sign agreement he will forever forfeit his chances to be King. Signing of agreement will in Subasic's opinion

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arouse sympathy for King and enhance his prestige. Subasic added that in event of King's refusal to sign, a new government will be formed nevertheless. Subasic has not seen Churchill.

"Saw King this afternoon December 28th. King contemplating to prepare extensive memorandum explaining unconstitutionality of present agreements. Told me he will forward copies of same when ready to Churchill, British Foreign Office, Ambassador Patterson and may even send copy to Moscow. King determined to insist upon naming regency. Princess Aspasia and Queen Alexandra exerting utmost pressure on King not to yield."

8 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From . . . Yarrow:

"Dined with Subasic last night, very perturbed over present situation. Has appointment with Churchill Monday afternoon, 8 January, prior to British cabinet meeting dealing with Yugoslavia problem.

"King George of Greece saw King Peter and told latter that he was given the '3rd degree'. He spent with Churchill from 1000 p.m. to 0500 a.m. when he finally weakened and gave consent to Regent's appointment. Peter is full of determination not to follow same path."

11 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On the night of 10 January, at 2300 hours, King Peter completed deliberations with his advisors concerning his final reply to Churchill on the proposed agreement between the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and Marshall Tito's Partisan administration. The letter to Churchill [rejecting the proposals concerning a regency and the delegation of legislative powers to the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council] was to be delivered on the morning of 11 January. At 1200 noon on 11 January it was planned to release the King's decision in a communique.

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Peter to Tito

At 1100 on the morning of 11 January, British Ambassador Stevenson learned from King Peter's adjutant the contents of the proposed communique . . . Stevenson telephoned to King Peter and Princess Aspasia Eden's instructions and warning not under any circumstances to release the communique to the press. Eden himself telephoned King Peter at his country residence requesting an immediate interview. 42 press representatives who had gathered at the Royal Yugoslav Court to receive the promised communique were informed, much to their annoyance, that last-minute developments had prevented its publication. . . .

11 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

In a recent conference with the OSS representative, Premier Subasich summarized his conference of 8 January with Prime Minister Churchill. . . .

According to Subasich, Churchill declared: "I do not like this agreement. It appears to set up a dictatorship by Tito, who has the army under his control. But I do not see any other way to solve the problem and I shall advise the King to sign the agreement." Churchill further pointed out that the agreement does not provide for the free functioning of other political parties [than those included in the Partisan movement] and emphasized that the members of the Avnoj [the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation] are not elected representatives of the people. Subasich replied that he is contemplating the possibility of broadening the Avnoj by inclusion of former parliamentarians now in Yugoslavia.

In conversation with the OSS representative, Subasich complained of not having seen King Peter for three weeks. He expressed concern over the "unfounded fears" of Britain and the United States that a Communist dictatorship will be installed in Yugoslavia, adding that the people of Yugoslavia want only a democracy and will insist on this form of government. Even Stalin himself, said Subasich, does not wish a Communist regime in Yugoslavia. Finally, Subasich expressed his hope that "the King will himself grant concessions rather than have them taken by the masses themselves."

29 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On 27 January, Ambassador Stevenson handed Subasich a written communication from the British Foreign Office, stating that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from Stalin with reference to Churchill's speech of 16 January. The telegram expressed Stalin's opinion that the Yugoslav Government should depart at once for Belgrade and fuse with the Tito government, which would then name a Regency. Churchill replied to this telegram that he wanted United States consent, which had not yet been received.

In spite of this information, the Yugoslav Cabinet again expressed itself as unanimously opposed to leaving London until a settlement had been reached with King Peter. Peter is still holding firmly to his position, but desires help "in defense of the people's liberties." Partisan General Velebit is conferring with leaders of the progressive democratic parties. Subasich is in a state of physical collapse and has begged the King for two days rest.

14 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

Premier Subasich has stated that the entire Yugoslav Cabinet will leave on Thursday, 15 February, for Belgrade with the consent of King Peter. The King's nominations for the Regency, Milan Grol, Yuray Shutay (Sutej), and Dushan Sernets (Sernec), will be submitted by Subasich for Tito's approval.

26 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade:

Premier Subasich, who is currently negotiating with Partisan leaders in Belgrade, states that he continues to find Marshal Tito most reason-

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able, but that Tito's subordinates are more difficult. Many of the latter, Subasich explains, have had little opportunity to learn about the United States or Britain, and hence underrate their importance. Subasich said he would endeavor to carry out King Peter's instructions concerning the regency council, but if this should be impossible and the King should refuse to ratify the counterproposals of Tito and Subasich, the result would be "very bad." Subasich would not say whether, in such case, he would proceed without the King's approval, but stated that he definitely would not return to London.

Edvard Kardely, Vice President of the National Liberation Committee (the Partisan provisional cabinet) and one of the leading negotiators, asserted on 22 February that the basic conflict between the King and Tito is due to the fact that the King insists on nominating politically prominent men to the regency, while Tito feels the regents should exercise only the royal prerogatives and should be non-political figures. "Otherwise," added Kardely, "we would have a regency following one political line while we would be following another." This, said Kardely, was Tito's reason for rejecting Milan Grol and Yuray Shutej (Sutej), the latter of whom is unacceptable to the Partisans for other reasons as well. . . .

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade:

In Serbia there is reported to be considerable dissatisfaction with the lack of a genuine Serb in the newly appointed Yugoslav regency council. [Srdjan Budisavlyevich is a Serb from Croatia, who is believed to have little or no following in Serbia.] The disappointment of anti-Partisan Serbs has contributed to a general feeling of despair among those Yugoslavs who had hoped that Subasich would exercise a restraining influence on the Partisans. General Alexander's visit to Belgrade also contributed to this feeling. At first the opposition interpreted Alexander's arrival as a sign of Allied pressure on Tito. When the General's convoy of fifty jeeps entered Belgrade, rumors quickly spread that this was the vanguard of an Allied armored corps, and Alexander himself was greeted by spontaneous demonstrations. The opposition's hopes were soon dashed, however, by the realization

that the Western Allies were not prepared to rescue them from their predicament. In this atmosphere the announcement of the regency, while relieving the uncertainty of past weeks, has produced little evidence of the general rejoicing reported in Belgrade by the BBC.

30 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach summary and conclusions of a report from Lt. Col. Charles Thayer, who is in charge of our mission in Yugoslavia.

15 April 1945

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

. . . . Aside from the restoration of essential services, Tito has made little progress in solving his economic problems. What steps he has taken are toward a centralized state-directed economy which under an inexperienced bureaucracy have not improved a bad situation. . . .

Although Tito has continued to assert that democracy and freedom are his ultimate aims, his methods have in reality been completely dictatorial, and the system of control he has imposed on the country has been in effect no less thorough and rigorous than those of the German dominated puppet regimes that preceded him.

Under the guise of military necessity, a censorship has been enforced that permits of no criticism either in the press or in public utterances. Active non-conformists are arrested and imprisoned until they can satisfy Tito's followers that they are no longer dangerous.

The Yalta recommendation to broaden the base of the supreme legislative organ by including uncompromised members of the last parliament is being carried out by a committee composed exclusively of veteran Partisans and dominated by the Communists who may be expected to apply strict standards, peculiarly their own in determining the eligibility of former Yugoslav politicians to participate in the future political life of the country.

Similarly, if past performance is any guide, future elections will be dominated by the National Liberation Front which heretofore has in practice had the exclusive right of nominating candidates in local elections. The Front, together with its affiliated organizations among

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the youth and the women has already managed to penetrate every city ward, every block, and practically every house. Similarly, every office and factory has its political organizers who are establishing a disciplined control over the workers.

In addition he has organized a political police force and an espionage system recruited from his most loyal followers, who, with fanatical zeal seek out their internal enemies and dispose of them with little regard for those legal rights which form the basis of a genuine democratic government. . . .

In foreign affairs, as in internal affairs, Russia is the lodestone governing Tito's policies. In every international issue, whether it is the direct concern of Yugoslavia or not, Tito and his press assiduously follow Moscow's lead. In fact, Tito and his followers exhibit a servility toward the Kremlin which contrasts strangely with their otherwise dynamic individuality. It is enough for Moscow to express a view and the Belgrade press reprints it in toto, adding a few biting words of its own. Under these circumstances it is no small wonder that in Belgrade one finds no evidence of a corps of Russian agents directing the activities of individual ministries or agencies. Should the necessity arise for specific guidance, no doubt a brief message from Stalin to Tito would suffice. . . .

13 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message came in yesterday from our representative in Belgrade:

"Yesterday morning Air Vice Marshall Lee and myself were summoned to the office of Arso Jovanovic, Chief of Staff for Tito. He advised us curtly that Tito had ordered our missions to leave, including both the Belgrade mission and those in the field. He stated that our work should be taken over by the Military Attaches. Obviously this is in retaliation for our strong stand on Trieste and Corinthia. I made no commitment to him on time of withdrawal, and I do not intend to hurry. Lee stated that he presumed the Yugoslav missions in Cairo, Rome and Bari would be withdrawn. Arso obviously had not thought of this but was forced to say yes.

As he had no word of appreciation for the missions, I reviewed for him what the missions had done for Yugoslavia in bringing recogni-

tion to the Partisans and in providing material aid. He replied that the Partisans would have won with or without our support and that the materials we provided were their right to receive. He then launched into a tirade about who occupied Trieste and Venezia Giulia first."

16 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the following dispatch which we have received from our representative at Caserta:

"1. Following memorandum reported to have been distributed to all Yugoslav Army Officers: 'It has been seen in the past that Yugoslavian officers do not mix with the officers of the USSR and we wish to have greater brotherhood between the officers of these two countries. Do not be afraid to talk of military information and army movements to the Russian officers are to be considered as instructors and brothers and our only allies.' (Signed Tito). . . ."

5 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

OSS representatives in Rome, Madrid and Kunming have transmitted the following information, as of 1 September, concerning underground movements and secret intelligence activities continuing at the present time in the following areas:

YUGOSLAVIA: Royal Yugoslav missions and Chetnik groups (Yugoslav nationalists, some of whose leaders cooperated with the Germans) are operating in Italy under cover of a Yugoslav welfare society which recently established a new branch in Milan. Under the leadership of Zhivko Topalovich (President of Mihailovich's anti-Partisan "National Committee") energetic steps are being taken to unite numerous Serb, Croat and Slovene anti-Tito groups into one so-called "democratic bloc." Detention and refugee camps for Yugoslavs in Italy are being combed for recruits to this new organization. Late in August the organization dispatched a Chetnik agent to renew contact with clandestine anti-Partisan groups in Yugoslavia. . . .

¹ Sic.

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Peter to Tito

14 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, bearing on the Yugoslav elections scheduled for 11 November, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade and is dated 10, 11 and 12 September:

Partisan Attitude. The official Partisan attitude toward the elections was outlined by Lieutenant General Milovan Djilas, Minister of State for Montenegro in the Tito cabinet and an influential member of the Partisan Liberation Front, in a recent speech to a plenary assembly of the (Partisan) Anti-Fascist Youth Organization. Djilas stated: "Our enemies at home and the foreign reactionaries who are helping them regard these elections as if they were to decide the destiny of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia. The leaders of the National Liberation struggle, however, do not consider the elections to involve any question of the survival of the National Liberation Front. . . . We consider the question of our national government actually to have been decided by our armed struggle. These elections by the peoples of Yugoslavia should only endow the results of our struggle with legality and constitutionality. We consider the question of monarchy versus republic to have been settled by our struggle. It has not been formally settled, as far as the final legalization of the form of government in Yugoslavia is concerned, but in actual practice it is already decided. What then is the purpose of these elections? Their purpose is to enable us to continue along the lines of the national liberation struggle." . . .

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