

Europolis and the European Wide Public Sphere:

Empirical Explorations of a Counter-factual Ideal¹

James Fishkin, Robert C. Luskin and Alice Siu

There is an extensive debate on whether there is, or could be, a European wide public sphere. The debate turns in part on what one expects such a sphere to comprise. Minimal accounts argue that it is in the process of being achieved already. Ambitious accounts argue that it is impossible or virtually unthinkable.

The use of Deliberative Polling on a European wide basis allows us to push the boundaries of ambitious speculation by piloting, in microcosm, what an ambitious version of such a sphere might look like under favorable conditions. Europolis, the second European wide Deliberative Poll, allows this discussion to go farther than ever before because it took place just before European wide elections and asked questions about voting intention before and after deliberation. If EU wide deliberation about policy choices was connected to voting intention, then an ambitious version of the ideal would have been piloted for a microcosm of the European public.

A European wide public sphere would have to do at least the following:

- a) Allow for communication among citizens across all the 27 states.
- b) That communication should include a sharing of substantive arguments or considerations for and against competing choices, whether those choices concern policies or elections.
- c) One of the conditions for such communication is that it should take place in a context of sufficient mutual respect that participants will not only offer arguments or state positions, but also listen to those offered by others and hopefully, learn from them.
- d) The participation in such a public sphere should be interactive. We are talking about more than “audience democracy.”
- e) The topics discussed in the public sphere should be connected in some way to democratic devices of accountability making a claim to equality or equal consideration of the views of the public.

Note that these conditions offer a picture of a unified European wide public sphere, crossing the boundaries of the 27 member states and their respective languages and national communication systems. The unified European public sphere, connected to some decision process offering a combination of political equality and accountability of public officials to the mass public was the original, Habermasian ideal. While it has long been the subject of speculation, it has been so far from realistic realization, that most discussions of the public sphere have moved to much more partial and segmented notions, silos by nation state, hints of EU wide media coverage across national boundaries, indications of interest in EU issues, etc. Instead of these glimmerings of a partial picture, however important, the Europolis experiment offers, for the first time, a coherent picture and practical implementation of the unified public sphere in the context of a mechanism of accountability embodying political equality—namely, the European Parliamentary elections. Hence, within this framework, we are particularly concerned with the following:

- 1) The representativeness of the microcosm.
- 2) Any indications of successful communication across the boundaries of language and nationality

¹ This paper is part of a larger collaborative effort for the Europolis project led by Pierangelo Isernia. We are much indebted to Pierangelo and to the entire collaborate group. This is a first draft of a work in progress. It was presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, 2011.

- 3) Any indications of mutual respect across those boundaries as well as European identity as opposed to merely national identity.
- 4) Evidence of learning about the subjects discussed
- 5) Changes in policy attitudes or in empirical premises (typically contested causal connections) relating to policy.
- 6) Changes in voting intention.
- 7) Evidence that changes in policy attitudes or changes in empirical premises about policy are coherently connected to changes in voting intention.

Respondents were interviewed at home (time 1), on arrival (time 2) on departure (time 3) and several weeks after the election (time 4). Some of the policy attitude questions were asked in all four waves, but some were only asked at time 1 and time 3, while a more extensive battery was asked via self completion questionnaires at time 2 and time 4. The control group was interviewed at time 1 and time 4. In what follows we will focus mostly on questions that were asked at time 1 and time 3, taking note of the other waves when appropriate. The tables below provide more information. TNS Sofres, who have extensive European wide experience with the Eurobarometer, did the survey work.

Representativeness

The representativeness of the 348 participants can be checked by comparing them to the nonparticipants—the original 4,384 interviewees who did not attend. In terms of age, class and other demographics, the participants and nonparticipants were very similar, although men were slightly over-represented among participants (54%). On the standard 0 to 10 left right scale, participants and non-participants were virtually identical. The two groups also had nearly identical pre-deliberation attitudes on climate change, although the participants had slightly more liberal attitudes on immigration. The participants were also more interested in politics, had a stronger sense of civic duty, included somewhat more people intending (at the time of the initial interview) to vote for the center right group of parties, the EPP (European People’s Party) and somewhat fewer intending to vote for the PES (the Party of European Socialists). These modest differences, in our view, are unlikely to affect the results. In the full version of the paper we plan to do a matching analysis with propensity scores weighted to a separate control group of 391 also interviewed at time 1, to investigate this further. That analysis is not yet available.

Communication and Mutual Respect

The event evaluations offer indications of successful communication and mutual respect. Asked to rate the event as a whole on 0 to 10 scale, 86% rated it at 8 or above, and 59% gave it a perfect 10. The ratings of the plenary sessions both with politicians and with experts were also high, with each being found useful by 74%. The ratings of the small group discussions were still higher, with 92% finding them useful.

These evaluations also offer hints of deliberative quality. On average, the participants thought the event extremely balanced. Of those who said that they had had read more than half of the briefing materials (a large majority of the participants), roughly two-thirds saw them as balanced, and only 11% saw them as clearly favoring some positions over others. Similarly, 69% agreed that their small group moderator —tried to make sure that opposing arguments were considered, while 86% disagreed that the moderator —sometimes tried to influence the group with her/his ideas.

The participants also considered the quality of the discussion to be high. More than 60% saw their fellow group members as participating equally in the discussion. Almost 90% thought that they —had ample opportunity to express their own views. And these expressions seemed to take place in

an atmosphere of mutual respect. 84% felt that their fellow participants “respected what I had to say, even when they didn’t agree”. They also saw their fellow participants as taking their roles seriously: 87% saw them as “express[ing] what was truly on their mind.” Only 18% considered that they “expressed strong views without offering justifications”, while only 23% considered that they “had made up their minds [so that] the discussion had little effect on them.”

The experience of meeting and talking with other people from all across the continent and from all walks of life also had an impact: 81% thought that they learnt “a lot about people different from me—about who they are and how they live.”

European Identity

Simply participating in a Deliberative Polling event that brought together fellow participants from across the EU had a significant effect on participants’ attitudes towards Europe and the EU. Before deliberation 37% of participants considered their country’s membership of the EU to be a very good thing’. After deliberation, this figure rose to 52%. Before deliberation, 47% of participants considered it their duty to vote in EU elections; after, the equivalent figure was 56%. Before the event, 72% of participants thought of themselves —as just being from their own country. After deliberation, this percentage fell dramatically to 56%. Exposure to open political discussion among people from all parts of the EU made people less nationalistic and fostered a sense of European identity in addition to national identity.

Knowledge Gain

The participants clearly learned a great deal about both immigration and climate change — and also about the EU. They were asked nine knowledge questions, three each about each of those three topics. For each topic, two of those three questions were first asked in the initial interview, while the remaining one was first asked only at the beginning of the event some weeks later. Since the participants begin learning from the moment they are initially interviewed and invited to the event (and are sent the briefing materials well in advance), the six items first asked in the initial interview show a distinctly greater gain than the three asked only on arrival (16.5% versus 7.5%). The participants presumably learned about as much on the latter as on the former; it is just that on the latter our earliest measurement (on arrival) occurs too late to capture all the learning. There was also a noticeable difference in how much the participants learned by topic. They learned most about immigration (a 20.2% before-after knowledge gain), next most about the EU (10.5%), and least—though still very significantly—about climate change (9.9%). All these numbers are probably underestimates, because all three indices include one item measured only from arrival.

Policy Attitudes: Climate Change

The respondents were asked to choose between the view that —we should do everything possible to combat climate change even if that hurts the economy” and “we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate change.” Before deliberation 49% wanted to maximize combating climate change, After deliberation this rose to 61%. Similarly, respondents were asked to choose between the view that the EU “should reduce greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly and as much as possible even if that means we have to make radical changes in the way we live” and the contrasting view that “the EU should make no effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions even if that means that climate change will get much worse.” Before deliberation, 72% wanted the EU to do as much as possible. After deliberation this increased to 85%. After deliberation the participants became more enthusiastic about energy efficiency (increasing from 75% to 84%) and the use of an emissions trading system (increasing from 39% to 49%). Support for renewable energy like wind and solar started high and increased slightly (89% to

91%). But opposition to investing in nuclear energy increased from 35% to 43% and support for investing in biofuels decreased from 55% to 50%.

Table 6 lists the elements of a climate change index composed of two questions: the seriousness of the problem of global climate change (on a 0 to 10 scale) and “On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that we should do everything possible to combat climate change, even if that hurts the economy, '10' means that we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate change.” In the index the question was transformed so that higher numbers reflected greater effort or concern about climate change.²

Immigration

Among all participants, the belief that immigration is an important problem increased from 44% before deliberation to 64% afterwards. Before deliberation, participants were divided between those who want to send illegal immigrants back to their country (23%), and a larger group (40%) that wanted to legalize them. Deliberation left this division virtually unchanged, with equivalent figures of 22% and 40%.

Deliberation affected participants' views of how governments should deal with immigration. The percentage in favor of reinforcing border controls fell from 66% before deliberation to 59% afterwards. By contrast, those who favored imposing penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants' increased from 74% to 88%.

The deliberators also became more tolerant in relation to the criteria for admitting non-EU immigrants. Before deliberation, 69% considered it important that immigrants be committed to the receiving country's way of life; after deliberation only 52% did so. There were comparable, though smaller, falls in the importance of coming from a similar culture' (from 25% to 17%); and in being Christian' (13% to 9%). This increased tolerance extended to policies for dealing with illegal immigrants living in EU countries. Before deliberation, 63% of participants agreed that illegal immigrants should be eligible for national health care'; afterwards, this figure increased to 71%.

Prior to deliberation, when invited to describe immigrants on a set of five characteristics, 26% of the participants consistently viewed them negatively on all five; 32% consistently viewed them positively. After deliberation, those taking a consistently positive view rose to 39%. For example, the percentage of respondents who considered immigrants honest increased from 25% to 34%, while those agreeing that immigrants have a lot to offer our cultural life' rose from 37% to 43%. In a similar vein, those who thought that immigration increases crime in our society' fell from 48% to 40%.

Table 6 gives the elements of an index of 9 questions on immigration. These include: the seriousness of the problem of immigration; whether or not illegal immigrants should be eligible for benefits such as national health care or whether their children should be eligible to attend public school; whether employers who hire them should be penalized; whether the respondent's country has too many non-citizens; whether or not Muslim immigrants have a lot to offer their country's cultural life; whether immigrants take jobs from native born citizens. These nine questions asked at both time 1 and time 3 are used as an index for explaining vote intention below.

Explaining Voting Intention

Table 5 shows the voting intention for the major party groupings before and after

² This index was used in the regressions detailed below because it used questions available at times 1 and 3. We have done some further analyses with a more elaborate index of questions not available at time 1 and produced similar but in fact stronger results at time 3. We will report on those in the fuller version of this paper.

deliberation. We focused on four major European wide party groupings in the Parliament: the European People’s Party (EPP) a center right grouping, the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) a center left grouping and the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) who obviously have an environmental focus.

The key question for piloting a European wide public sphere in the context of electoral choice is whether the post deliberation policy preferences are connected to the final voting intentions. In particular we are interested in the connection after deliberation between the climate change and immigration indices and support for the major parties.

Table 8 presents OLS regressions at time 1 and time 3 with the immigration and climate change indices as explanatory variables and voting intention as the dependent variable. The results presented are two-tailed tests. Those who chose other parties or no parties at all constitute the omitted category.

Both before and after deliberation, support for stronger action on climate change negatively affects support for the EPP (the center right grouping). After deliberation, a more tolerant or open position on immigration also negatively affects support for the EPP. These results make sense as the EPP was less supportive of climate change and more negative on immigration than the other major party groupings listed here. the effect of climate change support Turning to the PES (Socialists), a more accepting policy toward immigration positively affects support for the Socialists, both before and after deliberation. Support for further action on climate change also has a negative effect at time 1 but this is no longer anywhere near significant at time 3.

In the case of ALDE (the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) we have little basis for explaining the vote intentions. It is worth noting that we had only a small N in this case and respondents may not have been well aware of their party positions. In any case, support for more aggressive efforts on climate change produces a negative effect on the vote for ALDE at time 3.

In the case of the Greens/EFA support for a tolerant approach to immigration produces increased support for the Greens/EFA at both time 1 and time 3. Furthermore, support for more aggressive efforts on climate change produces more support for the Greens, more so after deliberation than before.

Overall, these results make eminent sense. Deliberators were able to connect the center right policies of the EPP to their degree of support for the EPP. And the more supportive views of the Socialists on immigration and climate change are connected to vote intention. Lastly the dramatic rise in support for the Greens has a coherent connection to their views on both climate change and immigration.

Overall, the aspiration to model in microcosm a unitary version of the unitary European wide public sphere and then to connect it to voting intention in the conduct of an actual European election seems to have met with some success. We get a clearer picture of what would happen if EU elections were to develop from second order elections to real elections in which policy positions were connected to votes. Even more unusual, in this case the process connected deliberative policy views with voting intentions on a European wide level. The process demonstrates that a scientific sample of ordinary EU citizens, representative of the EU polity as a whole, are capable of performing a role that had been thought utopian—acting as ideal EU citizens in a real European parliamentary election.

Table 1: Demographics – Participants vs. Non-Participants

	Participants (N)	Non-participants (N)
Gender **		
Female	47.41% (165)	54.86% (1490)

Male	52.59% (183)	45.14% (1226)
Total	100% (348)	100% (2716)
Age in years	48.75 years (348)	48.45 years (2716)
Education (Two indicators)		
***Age of completion	21.09 years (310)	19.34 years (2495)
** % still in school ¹	8.33% (29)	5.3% (143)
Nationality²***		
Belgium	1.44% (5)	2.54% (69)
Denmark	1.44% (5)	0.29% (8)
Germany	16.38% (57)	10.27% (279)
Greece	1.72% (6)	2.06% (56)
Spain	8.62% (30)	12.89% (350)
Finland	1.15% (4)	0.59% (16)
France	12.07% (42)	11.45% (311)
Ireland	1.72% (6)	0.15% (4)
Italy	10.63% (37)	11.52% (313)
Luxembourg	0.57% (2)	1.80% (49)
Netherlands	3.45% (12)	2.87% (78)
Austria	1.72% (6)	0.88% (24)
Portugal	1.72% (6)	1.99% (54)
Sweden	1.72% (6)	0.92% (25)
United Kingdom	9.77% (34)	11.63% (316)
Bulgaria	1.15% (4)	0.96% (26)
Cyprus	0.86% (3)	1.73% (47)
Czech Republic	0.86% (3)	2.61% (71)
Estonia	1.72% (6)	0.26% (7)
Hungary	1.72% (6)	1.99% (54)
Latvia	1.44% (5)	0.18% (5)
Lithuania	1.44% (5)	0.22% (6)
Malta	0.86% (3)	1.73% (47)
Poland	8.62% (30)	12.89% (350)
Romania	3.74% (13)	5.04% (137)
Slovakia	1.72% (6)	0.26% (7)
Slovenia	1.72% (6)	0.26% (7)
Total	100% (348)	100% (2716)
Voting Intention, 10-point scale (N) ***		
Leaning toward not voting (0 – 4)	9.8% (34)	20.18% (535)

Exactly in the middle	8.9% (31)	14.64% (388)
Leaning toward voting (6 – 10)	82.27% (282)	65.18% (1728)
Average	8.12 (347)	6.91 (2651)
Class (N) ***		
Upper Class	1.48% (5)	1.40% (37)
Upper-middle Class	38.17% (129)	24.88% (659)
Lower-middle Class	34.32% (116)	33.67% (892)
Working Class	23.96% (81)	38.28% (1014)
None of above	2.07% (7)	1.77% (47)
Total	100% (338)	100% (2649)
Religion (N) *		
Catholic	49.56% (168)	53.56% (1401)
Orthodox	8.85% (30)	10.05% (263)
Protestant	11.50% (39)	8.98% (235)
Other Christian	4.42% (15)	5.24% (137)
Jewish	0.29% (1)	0.19% (5)
Muslim	0.59% (2)	0.46% (12)
Sikh	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)
Buddhist	0.88% (3)	0.23% (6)
Hindu	0.59% (2)	0.04% (1)
Atheist / Agnostic	23.30% (79)	21.25% (556)
Total	100% (339)	100% (2616)
Attend religious services (N)		
More than once /wk	3.18% (11)	5.19% (139)

Once a week	18.79% (65)	18.44% (494)
About once a mo.	10.69% (37)	10.82% (290)
Once every 2-3 mo.	7.51% (26)	7.84% (210)
Only special occas.	14.74% (51)	15.08% (404)
About once a year	10.40% (36)	9.00% (241)
Less often	10.12% (35)	8.47% (227)
Never	24.57% (85)	25.16% (674)
Total	100% (346)	100% (2679)
Birthplace		
Home country	92.82% (323)	95.54% (2593)
Other EU country	5.17% (18)	2.43% (66)
Non-EU country	0.57% (2)	0.59% (16)
Asia, Africa, or Latin America	1.15% (4)	1.29% (35)
North American, Japan, or Oceania	0.29% (1)	0.15% (4)
Total	100% (348)	100% (2714)
Parents' Birthplace		
Both parents born in home country	88.18% (306)	91% (2467)
One parent born in home country and other parent born in other EU country	3.17% (11)	2.99% (81)
Both parents born in other EU country	4.03% (14)	2.55% (69)
At least one parent born outside of EU country	4.61% (16)	3.47% (94)
Total	100% (347)	100% (2711)
Left-Right Scale (10-point, 0=Left)		
% Left-leaning (0 – 4)	35.05% (116)	31.52% (755)
% Exactly in the middle (5)	30.82% (102)	32.57% (780)

% Right-leaning (6 – 10)	34.14% (113)	35.91% (860)
Average	5.06 (331)	5.18 (2395)

Note. Percentages shown with cell frequencies in parentheses. All significance tests are two-sample t-tests unless otherwise noted. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table 2: Demographics (by Participants, Non-Participants, Control Group and Full Sample)

	Participants	Non-participants	Control Group	Full Sample
Gender (N)				
Female	47.83% (187)	54.92% (1468)	54.92% (725)	54.29% (2380)
Male	52.17% (204)	45.08% (1205)	45.08% (595)	45.71% (2004)
Total	(391)	(2673)	(1320)	(4384)
Age in years (N)	48.09 (391)	48.54 (2673)	49.54 (1320)	48.80 (4384)
Education (N)				
Age of completion	21.38 (349)	19.27 (2456)	19.57 (1225)	19.55 (4030)
% still in school	8.4% (391)	5.2% (2673)	4.8% (1320)	5.4% (4384)
Nationality (N)				
Belgium	1.53% (6)	2.54% (68)	3.03% (40)	2.60% (114)
Denmark	1.53% (6)	0.26% (7)	3.03% (40)	1.21% (53)
Germany	16.11% (63)	10.21% (273)	9.09% (120)	10.40% (456)
Greece	2.05% (8)	2.02% (54)	2.88% (38)	2.28% (100)
Spain	8.95% (35)	12.91% (345)	5.30% (70)	10.26% (450)
Finland	1.02% (4)	0.60% (16)	3.11% (41)	1.39% (61)
France	11.25% (44)	11.56% (309)	7.65% (101)	10.36% (454)
Ireland	1.53% (6)	0.15% (4)	3.11% (41)	1.16% (51)
Italy	11.25% (44)	11.45% (306)	7.65% (101)	10.29% (451)
Luxembourg	0.51% (2)	1.83% (49)	0.00% (0)	1.16% (51)
Netherlands	3.07% (12)	2.92% (78)	3.79% (50)	3.19% (140)
Austria	1.53% (6)	0.90% (24)	3.03% (40)	1.60% (70)
Portugal	1.53% (6)	2.02% (54)	3.03% (40)	2.28% (100)
Sweden	1.53% (6)	0.94% (25)	3.03% (40)	1.62% (71)
United Kingdom	9.97% (39)	11.63% (311)	7.58% (100)	10.26% (450)
Bulgaria	1.28% (5)	0.94% (25)	3.03% (40)	1.60% (70)
Cyprus	0.77% (3)	1.76% (47)	0.00% (0)	1.14% (50)
Czech Republic	1.02% (4)	2.62% (70)	4.47% (59)	3.03% (133)
Estonia	1.53% (6)	0.26% (7)	3.11% (41)	1.23% (54)
Hungary	1.53% (6)	2.02% (54)	3.03% (40)	2.28% (100)
Latvia	1.53% (6)	0.15% (4)	3.03% (40)	1.14% (50)
Lithuania	1.28% (5)	0.22% (6)	2.95% (39)	1.14% (50)
Malta	0.77% (3)	1.76% (47)	0.00% (0)	1.14% (50)
Poland	9.46% (37)	12.83% (343)	5.30% (70)	10.26% (450)
Romania	4.09% (16)	5.01% (134)	3.79% (50)	4.56% (200)

Slovakia	1.53% (6)	0.26% (7)	3.18% (42)	1.25% (55)
Slovenia	1.79% (7)	0.22% (6)	2.80% (37)	1.14% (50)
Total	100% (391)	100% (2673)	100% (1320)	100% (4384)
Voting Intention, 10-point scale (N)	8.09 (390)	6.90 (2608)	7.17 (1296)	7.09 (4294)
Class (N)				
Upper Class	1.58% (6)	1.38% (36)	1.40% (18)	1.40% (60)
Upper-middle Class	38.42% (146)	24.63% (642)	25.78% (332)	26.20% (1120)
Lower-middle Class	33.95% (129)	33.72% (879)	33.54% (432)	33.68% (1440)
Working Class	23.95% (91)	38.51% (1004)	35.87% (462)	36.42% (1557)
None of above	2.11% (8)	1.76% (46)	3.42% (44)	2.29% (98)
Total	100% (380)	100% (2607)	100% (1288)	100% (4275)
Religion (N)				
Catholic	48.56% (185)	53.77% (1384)	45.63% (579)	50.85% (2148)
Orthodox	9.45% (36)	9.98% (257)	12.29% (156)	10.63% (449)
Protestant	10.76% (41)	9.05% (233)	12.06% (153)	10.11% (427)
Other Christian	3.94% (15)	5.32% (137)	7.01% (89)	5.71% (241)
Jewish	0.26% (1)	0.19% (5)	0.00% (0)	0.14% (6)
Muslim	0.52% (2)	0.47% (12)	1.18% (15)	0.69% (29)
Sikh	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)
Buddhist	0.79% (3)	0.23% (6)	0.24% (3)	0.28% (12)
Hindu	0.52% (2)	0.04% (1)	0.24% (3)	0.14% (6)
Atheist / Agnostic	25.20% (96)	20.94% (539)	21.36% (271)	21.45% (906)
Total	100% (381)	100% (2574)	100% (1269)	100% (4224)
Attend religious services (N)				
More than once /wk	3.09% (12)	5.23% (138)	2.53% (33)	4.23% (183)
Once a week	18.81% (73)	18.43% (486)	13.97% (182)	17.12% (741)
About once a mo.	10.82% (42)	10.81% (285)	10.97% (143)	10.86% (470)
Once every 2-3 mo.	6.70% (26)	7.96% (210)	8.14% (106)	7.90% (342)
Only special occas.	14.43% (56)	15.13% (399)	15.96% (208)	15.32% (663)
About once a year	9.54% (37)	9.10% (240)	13.12% (171)	10.35% (448)
Less often	10.82% (42)	8.34% (220)	11.44% (149)	9.50% (411)
Never	25.77% (100)	24.99% (659)	23.87% (311)	24.72% (1070)
Total	100% (388)	100% (2637)	100% (1303)	100% (4328)
Birthplace				
Home country	92.58% (362)	95.62% (2554)	95.75% (1263)	95.39% (4179)
Other EU country	4.86% (19)	2.43% (65)	1.52% (20)	2.37% (104)
Non-EU country	1.02% (4)	0.52% (14)	0.91% (12)	0.68% (30)
Asia, Africa, or Latin America	1.28% (5)	1.27% (34)	1.59% (21)	1.37% (60)
North American, Japan, or Oceania	0.26% (1)	0.15% (4)	0.23% (3)	0.18% (8)
Parents' Birthplace				

Both parents born in home country	87.44% (341)	91.15% (2432)	91.33% (3974)	90.88% (3974)
One parent born in home country and other parent born in other EU country	3.08% (12)	3.00% (80)	2.59% (34)	2.88% (126)
Both parents born in other EU country	4.10% (16)	2.51% (67)	2.05% (27)	2.52% (110)
At least one parent born outside of EU country	5.38% (21)	3.34% (89)	4.03% (53)	3.73% (163)
Total	100% (390)	100% (2668)	100% (1315)	100% (4373)
Left-Right Scale (10-point, 0=Left)	5.03 (371)	5.19 (2355)	5.23 (1209)	5.19 (3935)

Table 3: Attitudinal Representativeness

* = p <.05; ** = p<.01	Participants	Non-Participants	Sig.
Q7. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "no problem at all", '10' is "the most serious problem we face", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how serious a problem or not would you say immigration is?	0.532	0.585	**
Q8a. Some people think that [COUNTRY] should send all illegal immigrants back to the countries they came from. Suppose these people are at one end of a 0-to-10 scale, at point 0. Other people think that [COUNTRY] should legalize all the illegal immigrants currently here. Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale, at point 10. People who are exactly in the middle are at point 5, and of course other people have opinions at other points between 0 and 10. Where would you place your views on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?	0.537	0.477	**
Q9_1. Illegal immigrants should be eligible for national health care	0.650	0.596	**
Q9_2. The children of illegal immigrants should be eligible to attend public school	0.785	0.726	**
Q9_3. Decisions about what immigrants to admit should take no account of what country they are from	0.673	0.675	
Q10_1. Having job skills that employers need	0.673	0.688	
Q10_2. Having close family in [COUNTRY]	0.486	0.538	**
Q10_3. Being able to speak [NATIONAL LANGUAGE. WHEN MORE THAN ONE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE, THEN LANG. 1 OR LANG.2]	0.675	0.735	**
Q10_4. Being Christian	0.220	0.287	**
Q10_5. Being White	0.109	0.161	**
Q10_6. Being able to support oneself financially	0.711	0.753	*
Q10_7. Commitment to the [NATIONALITY] way of life	0.679	0.700	
Q10_8. Coming from a similar culture	0.355	0.731	**
Q11_1. Reinforcing border controls	0.711	0.765	**
Q11_2. Imposing penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants	0.771	0.764	
Q12. Generally speaking, what is your opinion on the number of people living in [COUNTRY] who are not citizens of the European Union countries? Are there...?	0.640	0.704	**
Q13_1. The contributions from working immigrants will help maintain the pension system	0.699	0.642	**
Q13_2. Immigration increases crime in our society	0.544	0.608	**
Q13_3. Amnesty given to illegal immigrants will increase illegal immigration	0.648	0.680	
Q15. On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that Muslim immigrants have a lot to offer to [COUNTRY]'s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim immigrants threaten [NATIONALITY] culture, and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you	0.490	0.540	**

position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?			
Q16. On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that immigrants take jobs from native-born [NATIONALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts of jobs that [NATIONALITY] don't want and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?	0.666	0.629	*
Q20. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "no problem at all", '10' is "the most serious problem we face", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how serious a problem or not would you say global climate change is?	0.753	0.757	
Q21. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that we should do everything possible to combat climate change, even if that hurts the economy, '10' means that we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate change and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?	0.414	0.430	
Q22a. How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement: How much a country is asked to pay to combat climate change should depend on how rich or poor it is.	0.747	0.735	
Q30_1. Fighting unemployment	-	-	**
Regional level	15.5	18.2	
National level	50.9	49.7	
EU level	20.1	22.3	
Not an area to be dealt with by any level of government / More than one	13.5	7.3	
Don't know	0.000	2.430	
Q30_2. Climate change	-	-	
Regional level	3.2	4.8	
National level	17.0	18.3	
EU level	65.2	63.5	
Not an area to be dealt with by any level of government / More than one	13.5	10.9	
Don't know	1.149	2.430	
Q30_3. Immigration policy	-	-	*
Regional level	2.9	4.9	
National level	42.0	40.9	
EU level	44.5	44.9	
Not an area to be dealt with by any level of government / More than one	10.3	6.6	
Don't know	0.287	2.835	

Q30_4. Fight against crime	-	-	**
Regional level	9.8	13.4	
National level	45.1	46.8	
EU level	29.0	27.7	
Not an area to be dealt with by any level of government / More than one	16.1	10.4	
Don't know	0.000	1.694	
Q33a. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "not at all", '10' is "completely", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how much would you say you think of yourself as being European?	0.710	0.663	**
Q33b. And on the same 0 to 10 scale, how much would you say you think of yourself as just being from your [COUNTRY]?	0.768	0.830	**
Q34. And if you had to choose just one of the following alternatives, what would you say you see yourself as...?	2.202	1.906	**
[NATIONALITY] only	14.4	28.1	
[NATIONALITY] and European	60.1	57.9	
European and [NATIONALITY]	19.0	9.6	
European only	2.6	2.6	
None of the above	3.736	1.325	
Don't know	0.287	0.479	
Q35. Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]'s membership of the European Union is...?	0.774	0.709	**
Q36. On a 0 to 10 scale, where '0' means that [COUNTRY] has "not benefitted at all" from being a member of the EU, '10' means it has "benefitted enormously", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", using this scale, would you say that on balance [COUNTRY] has benefitted or not benefitted from being a member of the EU?	0.659	0.606	**
Q37. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "not at all", '10' is "passionately", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how interested or not would you say you generally are in politics?	0.667	0.546	**
Q38. On the whole, how satisfied or not are you with the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]? Are you...?	0.501	0.485	
Q39. On the whole, how satisfied or not are you with the way democracy works in the European Union? Are you...?	0.526	0.519	

Table 4
Knowledge Gain (Based on All Available Items)

Knowledge Items	T1 (% Correct)	T2 (% Correct)	T3 (% Correct)	Diff.
Q43. Is the main decision-making body of the European Union the...? (Council of Ministers)	10.1	15.8	23.6	13.5***
Q44. Only one of the following statements about the European Parliament is false. Which one is it? (It passes all EU laws)	11.8	22.4	23.6	11.8***
Q45. Is the European Union represented on the international stage by the...? (European Commission)	-	39.9	46.0	6.1*
Q46. Which of the following is true of Blue card workers? (They must have university education)	6.6	23.9	30.5	23.9***
Q47. Which of the following is true about the ways in which immigration policy is currently made? (The EU sets the basic rules about entry and residency requirements)	22.1	36.5	46.8	24.7***
Q48. Which of the following is true of the EU's immigrants? (Most illegal immigrants enter the EU legally but outstay their visas)	-	44.5	56.7	12.1***
Q49. The percentage of the EU's total energy consumption that comes from fossil fuels (coal, gas or oil) is about ...? (80%)	22.4	18.4	30.2	7.8*
Q50. Which of the following produces the most greenhouse gases? (China)	45.7	49.7	63.2	17.5***
Q51. Which of the following is true about wind power in the European Union? (Wind power's share of EU energy consumption is increasing by about roughly 30% a year)		15.5	19.8	4.3*
Knowledge Index 1 (9 item)		29.6	37.8	18.0***
Knowledge Index 2 (6 item)	19.8	27.8	36.3	16.5***

Table 5 Vote Intentions

Vote Intentions Comparison Participants T1-T3

Parties	T1 %	T3 %
EPP	26.6	31.2
PES	15.7	21.5
ALDE	6.6	8.0
Greens/EFA	5.6	18.6
Other Parties/No choice	45.5	20.6

Table 6 Indices Before and After Deliberation

Index	Before Deliberation (T1)	After Deliberation (T3)	Diff. (T3-T1)	Sig.
Immigration	.490	.487	-.003	.595
Climate Change	.668	.747	.079	.000

Note: Don't Knows were placed at the midpoint; indices consist of questions available at T1.

Table 7 Components of Indices

Questions Included for Immigration and Climate Change Indices

Immigration Index ($\alpha=.749$)
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "no problem at all", '10' is "the most serious problem we face", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how serious a problem or not would you say immigration is?
How strongly would you agree or disagree with...? Illegal immigrants should be eligible for national health care
How strongly would you agree or disagree with...? The children of illegal immigrants should be eligible to attend public school
And how strongly would you favor or oppose...? Reinforcing border controls
And how strongly would you favor or oppose...? Imposing penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants
Generally speaking, what is your opinion on the number of people living in [COUNTRY] who are not citizens of the European Union countries? Are there...far too many, somewhat too many, about the right number, somewhat too few, far too few?
How strongly would you agree or disagree with...?Immigration increases crime in our society
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that Muslim immigrants have a lot to offer to [COUNTRY]'s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim immigrants threaten [NATIONALITY] culture, and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that immigrants take jobs from native-born [NATIONALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts of jobs that [NATIONALITY] don't want and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?

Climate Change Index ($\alpha=.494$)
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "no problem at all", '10' is "the most serious problem we face", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how serious a problem or not would you say global climate change is?
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that we should do everything possible to combat climate change, even if that hurts the economy, '10' means that we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate change and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about that?

Table 8 Explaining Voting Intention

		BEFORE DELIBERATION			AFTER DELIBERATION		
Parties		B	S. E.	Sig.	B	S. E.	Sig.
EPP	Intercept	0.756	0.555	0.173	2.319	0.841	0.006
	Immigration	-0.575	0.838	0.492	-1.937	1.181	0.101
	Climate Change	-1.566	0.650	0.016	-1.383	0.870	0.112
PES	Intercept	-1.807	0.697	0.010	-0.203	0.922	0.826
	Immigration	3.040	1.031	0.003	2.193	1.306	0.093
	Climate Change	-1.196	0.760	0.115	-1.093	0.948	0.249
ALDE	Intercept	-2.307	0.973	0.018	0.271	1.194	0.821

GREENS/EFA	Immigration	1.678	1.424	0.239	0.833	1.772	0.638	
	Climate Change	-0.660	1.088	0.544	-2.192	1.250	0.079	
	Intercept	-7.923	1.492	0.000	-4.955	1.163	0.000	
	Immigration	6.941	1.795	0.000	5.853	1.458	0.000	
	Climate Change	2.393	1.489	0.108	2.167	1.130	0.055	
				(N=348)				(N=311)
				$\chi^2(df=8) = 777.18$				$\chi^2(df=8) = 846.82$
				Pseudo R ² = .151				Pseudo R ² = .191

NOTE: Reference Category are participants that selected other parties or do not offer a selection.