

2004-05 Economics Seminars

Fall 2004	Speaker	Title
September 22	Eilon Solan Northwestern and Tel Aviv	Timing Games with Informational Externalities
October 6	David Levine UCLA	Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi
October 13	Rani Spiegler Tel Aviv	Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations
October 20	Elchanan Ben-Porath The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel	Rationalizable Expectations
October 27	Sergei Severinov Duke University	Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
November 5 Joint w/ AME	R. Preston McAfee California Institute of Technology	Dynamic Price Discrimination: Theory and Airline Behavior
November 10	Atila Abdulkadiroglu Columbia University	Better Mechanism Design
December 1	Laura Veldkamp New York University	Information Acquisition and Portfolio Under-Diversification
December 8	Philippe Jehiel UCL	Inefficiencies in Bargaining: Departing from Akerlof and Myerson-Satterthwaite
Winter 2005	Speaker	Title
January 18	Jonathan Weinstein MIT	Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium
January 19	Andrei Hagiu Princeton University	Two-Sided Platforms: Pricing and Social Efficiency
January 20	Deran Ozmen Yale University	Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems
January 21	Alex Gershkov Hebrew University	Optimal Voting Scheme with Costly Information Acquisition
February 23	Robert Hall Stanford University	The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain with Paul Milgrom
March 2	Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Stanford University	Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy
March 9	Hector Chade Arizona State	Simultaneous Search
March 16	Eric Maskin Princeton University	Bargaining, Coalitions, and Externalities
Spring 2005	Speaker	Title
March 30	David McAdams MIT	One-with-Many Bargaining and the Role of Rich and Lazy Intermediaries
April 13	Yeon-Koo Che University of Wisconsin	Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types
April 20	Roger Lagunoff Georgetown University	A "Super" Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games
April 27	Oliver Hart Harvard University	Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In
May 4	Ilan Kremer Stanford University	Online Algorithms and Option Pricing
May 11	Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky PSE Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques	Non-classical (Quantum) Logic: Toward a Theory of Actualized Preferences (Type)
May 18	Hugo Hopenhayn UCLA	Trading Favors: Optimal Exchange and Forgiveness
May 25	Faruk Gul Princeton University	The Canonical Model of Interdependent Preferences
June 1	Adam Brandenburger New York University	Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlations?

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October 1	Ilya Segal Stanford	The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets
October 8	Chris Phelan Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis	Opportunity and Social Mobility
October 22	Muhamet Yildiz MIT	Rationalizability and Finite-Order Implications of Equilibrium
November 5	Marco Scarsini Universita di Torino	A Folk Theorem for Minority Games
November 12	Mark Satterthwaite Northwestern	Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition
November 19	Xavier Gabaix MIT	A Theory of Large Fluctuations in Stock Market Activity
November 26	Rann Smorodinsky Israel	Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations - The Anonymous Case
December 3	David Parkes Harvard	Overcoming Rational Manipulation in Mechanism Implementations
December 10	Luis Rayo Chicago	On The Foundations of Happiness
Winter 2004	Speaker	Title
January 7	Avinash Dixit Princeton	Arbitration and Information
February 18	David Autor MIT	Screening for Hourly Wages Jobs: Is there a Trade-Off between Efficiency and Equality?
February 25	Abraham Neyman Jerusalem	Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players
March 3	Hans Hvide Stanford	Delegated Job Design
March 10	Michael Schwartz Stanford	Equilibrium Information Disclosure: Grade Inflation and Unraveling
March 17	Larry Samuelson Wisconsin-Madison	Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
Spring 2004	Speaker	Title
April 7	V. Bashar University of Essex	Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment; Contracting to Play a Game: Private versus Public Contracts
April 14	Amil Dasgupta London School of Economics	Trading Volume with Career Concerns
April 21	Ichiro Obara UCLA	The Full Surplus Extraction theorem with Hidden Actions
April 28	Stephen Morris Yale	Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
May 5	Jean Pierre Ponsard France	Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games
May 12	In-Koo Cho Illinois	Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions; Learning Aspiration in Repeated Games
May 19	Lars Stole Chicago	Market Participation in Common Agency Games
May 26	Hongbin Cai UCLA	Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration

2002-03 Economics Seminars

Fall 2002	Speaker	Title
September 25	Jeff Ely Northwestern	When is Reputation Bad?
October 2	Paul Milgrom Stanford	Combining Auctions and Matching Theory: A Progress Report
October 9	Liran Einav Stanford	A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
October 16	Drew Fudenberg Harvard	Competing Auctions Additional Reading: Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
October 24	Robert Gibbons MIT	The (Long-Dormant) Relational-Adaptation Theory of the Firm
October 30	Chris Tyson Stanford	The Foundations of Imperfect Decision Making
November 6	Muriel Niederle Stanford	Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
November 13	Brian McManus Washington University	Nonlinear Pricing in an Oligopoly Market: The Case of Specialty Coffee
November 20	Douglas Bernheim Stanford	A Solution Concept for Dynamic Problems in Political Economy
December 4	Zvika Neeman Boston University	Markets Versus Negotiations: the Predominance of Centralized Markets
Spring 2003	Speaker	Title
April 2	Larry Epstein University of Rochester	An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating
April 16	Matthew Rabin Berkeley	Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes
April 23	Phil Reny University of Chicago	Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views
April 29	Werner Guth	From Teleology to Evolution
April 30	Gossner Olivier Université Paris	An Invitation to Online Information Transmission
May 7	John Geanakoplos Yale	Liquidity, Default and Crashes
May 14	Martin Schneider UCLA	Learning Under Ambiguity
May 21	George Baker Harvard	Volatility, Noise and Incentives
May 28	Ulrike Malmendier Stanford	Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
June 4	Thomas Wiseman University of Texas at Austin	Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture
June 11	Susan Athey Stanford	Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks

2001-02 Economics Seminars

Fall 2001	Speaker	Title
September 26	Sushil Bikhchandani UCLA	Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
October 3	Marciano Siniscalchi Princeton	Vector-Adjusted Expected Utility
October 10	John Morgan Princeton	Relative Profit Auctions
October 17	Igal Milchtaich	Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium
October 24	Yossi Feinberg Stanford	Subjective Reasoning I Subjective Reasoning II
October 31	Steve Tadelis Stanford	Apprenticeships: Human Capital and Competitive Signaling in a Dynamic Labor Market
November 7	Lones Smith Michigan	Aspirational Bargaining
November 14	Matthew Jackson Caltech	Social Networks and the Dynamics of Employment and Wages
November 20	Dirk Bergemann Yale	Robust Mechanism Design
December 5	Sergei Severinov Wisconsin	Mechanism Design and Communication Costs
December 7	Maurice Obstfeld Berkeley	Globalization and Capital Markets
Winter 2002	Speaker	Title
February 6	Edward Glaeser Harvard	Education and Religion
February 13	Marco Ottaviani London Business School	The Strategy of Professional Forecasting
February 20	Ilya Segal Stanford	Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand
February 27	Andrew Postlewaite Pennsylvania	Social Assets
March 6	Chris Shannon Berkeley	Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets
March 13	Dino Gerardi Yale	Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
March 20	Joe Harrington	Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
March 26	Sergiu Hart	Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction
Spring 2002	Speaker	Title
April 3	Ulrich Doraszelski Hoover	An R&D Race with Knowledge Accumulation
April 10	Aner Sela University of Negev	Contest Architecture
April 17	Ed Lazear Stanford	The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline
April 24	Markus Mobius Harvard	Trading Favors
May 8	Vincent Crawford UCSD	Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games
May 15	Bentley Macleod USC	On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
May 22	Sandeep Baliga Northwestern	Arms Races and Negotiations
May 29	Kim-Sau Chung Northwestern	Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion
June 5	Rohan Pitchford Australia	A Solution to the Holdup Problem involving Gradual Investment

2000-01 Economics Seminars

Fall 2000	Speaker	Speaker
October 4	David McAdams Stanford	Collusive-Seeming Equilibria in the Uniform-Price Auction
October 11	Eric Van den Steen Stanford	
October 13	Yoram Weiss Tel Aviv University	Status Concerns and the Organization of Work
October 18	Phil Reny Chicago	An Efficient Multi-Unit Auction Joint with Motty Perry
October 25	Laura Veldkamp Stanford	Slow Boom, Big Crash
November 1	Susan Athey MIT	Optimal Collusion with Private Information
November 8	Marco Battaglini Princeton	Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk Joint with the Economics Department
November 15	Holger Mueller Manneheim	Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital Market Discipline Joint with Roman Inderst and the Economics Department
December 6	Ben Polak Yale	Free Love, Fragile Fidelity, and Forgiveness: Rival Social Conventions under Hidden Information by J. Lindsey, B. Polak & r. Zeckhauser Joint with the Economics Department
Spring 2001	Speaker	Speaker
March 21	Kenneth Judd Hoover	The Economic Effects of New Assets: An Asymptotic Approach
April 4	Matt Mitchell University of Minnesota	Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Patents Prizes and Buyouts
April 11	Thomas J. Holmes University of Minnesota	Do Mergers Lead To Monopoly in the Long Run? Results From the Dominant Firm
April 18	Phil Reny University of Chicago	An Efficient Auction
May 2	Ran Spiegler Oxford	Procedurally Rational Experimentation in Infinite-Horizon Games
May 9	Ilan Kremer and Matt Jackson Stanford	On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies
May 16	Pierre-André Chiapporri University of Chicago	Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some
May 23	Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer Stanford	Noisytalk.com
May 30	Hanming Fang Yale	Affiliated Value Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
June 6	Johannes Horner Northwestern University	Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead
June 13	Jacques Crémer Toulouse	Vertical Integration, Information Flows and the Power of Incentives