STANFORD BUSINESS GRADUATE SCHOOL OF

2015-16 Economics Seminars

Spring 2016

Speaker	Title
Ben Golub Harvard University	Expectations, Networks, and Conventions Joint with Stephen Morris, Princeton
Ran Spiegler Tel Aviv University and University College London	Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations Managing Non-Rational Expectations: A ìMonetary PolicyîExample
Michael Peters University of British Columbia	Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers' Market Information
Pietro Ortoleva Columbia University	Designing Dynamic Contests
Jeff Ely Northwestern University	Moving the Goalposts
Caroline Thomas University of Texas at Austin	Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence: A Dynamic Signalling Model
Balazs Szentes London School of Economics	Buyer-optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing
Jack Fanning Brown University	Mediation in Reputational Bargaining
Alessandro Pavan Northwestern University	Dynamic Matching Auctions: Experimentation and Cross-Subsidization

Winter 2016

Speaker	Title
Isaiah Andrews MIT	Unbiased Instrumental Variables Estimation Under Known First-Stage Sign
Jie Bai MIT	Melons as Lemons: Asymmetric Information, Consumer Learning, and Seller Reputation
Treb Allen Northwestern University	Volatility, Insurance, and the Gains from Trade Joint with David Atkin
Fanny Camara Brown University	Preemption and Forecast Accuracy: A Structural Approach

Fall 2015

Speaker	Title
Sylvain Chassang Princeton University	Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement

Marek Pycia UCLA	Efficient Bilateral Trade
Tamas Fleiner Eötvös Loránd, Budapest	Stable Matchings Through the Eyes of a Mathematician
Anne-Katrin Roesler Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University	Is Ignorance Bliss? Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing
Roland Strausz Humboldt University of Berlin	A Theory of Crowdfunding — A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
Roger Myerson University of Chicago	Local Agency Costs of Political Centralization
Eduardo Faingold Yale University	The Value of a Reputation Under Imperfect Monitoring Joint with Martin W. Cripps, UCL
Glenn Ellison MIT	Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Models: A Lyapunov Approach Joint with Drew Fudenberg and Lorens A. Imhof
Alex Frankel Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago	Selecting Applicants