

## 2007-08 Economics Seminars

### Spring 2008

Date	Speaker	Title
Apr 2	<b>Peter Hammond</b> University of Warwick	Mechanism Design for Monte Carlo Simulations of Macroeconomies
Apr 23	<b>Tai-Wei Hu</b> Penn State	Complexity and Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Apr 30	<b>Luis Rayo</b> University of Chicago GSB	Status, Market Power and Veblen Effect
May 7	<b>Simon Grant</b> Rice University	Mean-Dispersion Preferences
May 14	<b>Francis Bloch</b> GREQAM and Université de la Méditerranée	Markovian Assignment Rules
May 21	<b>Daniel Hojman</b> Harvard University	Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement
May 28	<b>Mihai Manea</b> Harvard University	Bargaining on Networks
Jun 4	<b>Leonardo Felli</b> London School of Economics	Statute Law or Case Law?

### Winter 2008

Date	Speaker	Title
Jan 14	<b>Denis Nekipelov</b> Duke University	Entry Deterrence and Learning Prevention on eBay
Jan 18	<b>Eran Shmaya</b> California Institute of Technology	Many Inspections are Manipulable
Jan 21	<b>Shing-Yi Wang</b> Yale University	Credit Constraints, Job Mobility and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from a Property Reform in China
Jan 24	<b>Matthew Weinzierl</b> Harvard University	The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Tax
Jan 25	<b>Robin Lee</b> Harvard University	Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
Jan 28	<b>Xun Tang</b> Northwestern University	Bounds on the Counterfactual Distribution of Revenues in Auctions with Reserve Prices
Jan 31	<b>Tomasz Strzalecki</b> Northwestern University	Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences
Feb 4	<b>Gregory Fischer</b> MIT	Contract Structure, Risk Sharing, and Investment Choice

Feb 6	<b>Bruno Strulovici</b> Oxford University	Voting and Experimentation
Feb 8	<b>Tamara Bowen</b> Georgetown University	On Dynamic Compromise
Feb 20	<b>Julio Rotemberg</b> Harvard Business School	Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a Matching Model
Feb 27	<b>Martin Hellwig</b> Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods	Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy
Mar 12	<b>Richard Holden</b> MIT	Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information

## Fall 2007

Date	Speaker	Title
Sep 24	<b>Aleh Tsyvinski</b> Harvard University	A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation
Sep 26	<b>Sergei Izmalkov</b> MIT	Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
Oct 3	<b>Michel Balinski</b> École Polytechnique, France	A Theory: Measuring, Electing and Ranking
Oct 10	<b>Yeon-Koo Che</b> Columbia University	Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
Oct 17	<b>Eduardo Faingold</b> Yale University	Uniform Topology on Types and Strategic Convergence
Oct 24	<b>Salvador Barbera</b> Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona	Top Monotonicity: A Weak Domain Restriction Encompassing Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and Order Restriction
Oct 31	<b>Marcin Peski</b> University of Chicago	Learning Through Theories
Nov 7	<b>Johannes Horner</b> Northwestern University	Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
Nov 14	<b>Colin Stewart</b> Toronto University	Testing Multiple Forecasters
Nov 28	<b>Peyton Young</b> Brookings Institution	Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence and Social Learning
Dec 5	<b>Alexandre Mas</b> UC Berkeley	: