

2016-17 Economics Seminars

Spring 2017

Speaker	Title
Pietro Ortoleva Columbia University	Deliberately Stochastic <i>joint with Simone Cerreia Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Gil Riella</i>
Michihiro Kandori University of Tokyo	Cooperation and Dynamic Network Formation: A Game Theoretic Case Study <i>joint with Shinya Obayashi</i>
Yonatan Aumann Bar Ilan University	A Conceptual Foundation for the Theory of Risk Aversion
Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi Columbia Business School	Foundations of non-Bayesian Social Learning <i>joint with Pooya Molavi and Ali Jadbabaie</i>
Marciano Siniscalchi Northwestern University	Structural Rationality in Dynamic Games
Jacob Leshno Columbia Business School	The Simple Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice <i>joint with Irene Lo</i>
Maryam Farboodi Princeton University	The Emergence of Market Structure <i>joint with Gregor Jarosch and Robert Shimer</i>
Eduardo Azevedo University of Pennsylvania	Market Failure in Kidney Exchange <i>joint with Nihkil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Clayton Featherstone, and Omer Karaduman</i>
Matthew Elliott University of Cambridge	Efficiency in Matching Markets (Related paper: Decentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core <i>joint with Francesco Nava</i>) (Related paper: Commitment and (In) Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment <i>joint with Marina Agranov</i>)

Winter 2017

Speaker	Title
John Eric Humphries University of Chicago	The Causes and Consequences of Self-Employment over the Life Cycle
Ben Roth MIT	Keeping the Little Guy Down: A Debt Trap for Informal Lending
Meredith Startz Yale University	The Value of Face-to-Face: Search and Contracting Problems in Nigerian Trade
Natalie Cox UC Berkeley	Pricing, Selection, and Welfare in the Student Loan Market: Evidence from Borrower Repayment Decisions

Fall 2016

Speaker	Title
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Guillaume Roger
The University of Sydney

Scale Effects in Dynamic Contracting

Luciano Pomatto
Caltech

Rachel Kranton
Duke University

Rumors and Social Networks
joint with Francis Bloch, and Gabrielle Demange

Tim Roughgarden
Stanford University

Data-Driven Optimal Auction Theory

Vasilis Syrgkanis
Microsoft Research

Econometrics for Learning Agents

Vasiliki Skreta
University College London

Selling With Evidence
joint with Frederic Koessler

Volker Nocke
Universität Mannheim
joint with Applied Microeconomics

Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach
joint with Nicolas Schutz

Ran Shorrer
Pennsylvania State University

Putting Matching Theory to Work: The Redesign of the Israeli Psychology Masters Match

Mira Frick
Department of Economics, Yale University

Dynamic Random Expected Utility
joint with Ryota Iijima and Tomasz Strzalecki

Emir Kamenica
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Signals as Convex Functions: Three Applications
