

Fitting In or Standing Out? The Tradeoffs of Structural and Cultural Embeddedness

Amir Goldberg,^a Sameer B. Srivastava,^b
V. Govind Manian,^a William Monroe,^a
and Christopher Potts^a

Abstract

A recurring theme in sociological research is the tradeoff between fitting in and standing out. Prior work examining this tension tends to take either a structural or a cultural perspective. We fuse these two traditions to develop a theory of how structural and cultural embeddedness jointly relate to individual attainment within organizations. Given that organizational culture is hard to observe, we develop a novel approach to assessing individuals' cultural fit with their colleagues based on the language expressed in internal e-mail communications. Drawing on a unique dataset that includes a corpus of 10.24 million e-mail messages exchanged over five years among 601 employees in a high-technology firm, we find that network constraint impedes, whereas cultural fit promotes, individual attainment. More importantly, we find evidence of a tradeoff between the two forms of embeddedness: cultural fit benefits individuals with low network constraint (i.e., brokers), whereas network constraint promotes attainment for people with low cultural fit.

Keywords

culture, social networks, language, embeddedness, cultural fit, distinctiveness, formal organization, computational linguistics, individual attainment

Is it better to fit in with or stand out from others? This core social dilemma pervades, but is often implicit in, sociological research (e.g., Goffman 1986; Simmel 1950). Whether in the schoolyard (Fine 1979) or the boardroom (Kunda 2006), people frequently confront the tradeoffs of complying with or deviating from the expectations of their peers. Recent work, particularly studies of individual attainment in organizations, tends to examine this tradeoff from two distinct vantage points: one primarily *structural* and the other predominantly *cultural*.

A consistent theme in the structural line of work is that excessive embeddedness can have adverse consequences for individuals' career

success. Perhaps the most commonly studied form of structural embeddedness is network constraint—the quality of having contacts who also have ties to one another. Across a wide range of organizations, the absence of constraint—or network brokerage—has been linked to such outcomes as higher compensation

^aStanford University

^bUniversity of California, Berkeley

Corresponding Author:

Sameer B. Srivastava, University of California, Berkeley, 2220 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94720

E-mail: srivastava@haas.berkeley.edu

(Burt 1992), greater upward mobility (Podolny and Baron 1997), and increased job satisfaction (Seibert, Kramer, and Liden 2001). In other words, standing out from others structurally can have positive career consequences.

Separately, a burgeoning literature theorizes about, and studies the implications of, cultural variation for individuals and their careers (Rivera 2012; Van Maanen and Barley 1984). In particular, organizational scholars have investigated the effects of cultural fit, in the form of normative compliance, on career outcomes such as job satisfaction and commitment (e.g., Chatman 1991; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell 1991). Across a variety of empirical settings, this work has demonstrated the benefits individuals accrue when they fit in culturally (for a review, see Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, and Johnson 2005). That is, whereas standing out structurally is often advantageous, fitting in with others culturally generally can yield benefits.

Other accounts are more nuanced, acknowledging that individuals face conflicting pressures to fit in with or stand out from the pack (Brewer 1991; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001). Previous work suggests this tension is best resolved by either choosing a position that is optimally poised between integration and distinctiveness (Leonardelli, Pickett, and Brewer 2010) or by shifting one's level of conformity over time—initially adopting a compliant identity to gain acceptance and then donning a more nonconforming identity that highlights one's distinctiveness from others (Zuckerman et al. 2003).

With few exceptions, these two bodies of scholarship—one focused on network sources of advantage and the other on cultural fit—have remained largely disconnected from one another. The former tends to emphasize the information-based benefits of brokerage but pays relatively little attention to its potential identity-based costs. By contrast, the latter focuses on the advantages of having a social identity that hews to colleagues' normative expectations but tends to overlook the relationship with actors' network positions.

We fuse these two literatures and propose a novel theoretical account of how the tension

between fitting in and standing out can be resolved. Building on Zukin and DiMaggio (1990), we argue that people can be embedded within their organization in two conceptually distinct ways: structurally and culturally. Previous accounts have identified mechanisms such as social influence and homophily that create mutually reinforcing linkages between structural and cultural embeddedness (Carley 1991; DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy 2015). We extend this line of reasoning and contend that career benefits accrue to people who are embedded in one of these dimensions and disembedded in the other. Stated differently, the informational returns to spanning structural holes are greater for people who fit culturally with their colleagues in an organization, whereas individuals who are structurally embedded—that is, have high levels of network constraint—can enjoy the benefits of cultural distinctiveness. Thus, career success is, in part, a two-dimensional balancing act of structural and cultural embeddedness.

We test this proposition using a unique dataset that includes detailed personnel records—including employee start dates, exit dates, nature of exit (voluntary or involuntary), and managers' ratings of employee performance—as well as a corpus of 10.24 million e-mails exchanged over a period of more than five years among 601 employees in a U.S.-based technology firm. We propose that e-mail archives can provide a window into both network structure and an important facet of culture—the extent to which the language people use within their organizations conforms to the linguistic style of their colleagues. E-mail metadata enable us to locate individuals over time within the organizational network and assess the extent to which they occupy structurally constrained positions (Burt 1992; Kleinbaum 2012). Computational linguistic techniques allow us to translate the unstructured natural language of e-mail content into a novel measure of cultural fit. In sum, we consider *whom* people communicate with to assess their structural embeddedness, and *how* they communicate with these colleagues to derive a measure of their cultural embeddedness.

We assess how network constraint, cultural fit, and the interaction between these two dimensions of embeddedness relate to two distinct indicators of attainment: the hazard of experiencing involuntary exit from the firm (i.e., negative attainment) and the likelihood of receiving a favorable performance rating (i.e., positive attainment). Together, our findings illuminate how structure and culture operate independently and in tandem to shape career outcomes and illustrate that the benefits and disadvantages of structural and cultural embeddedness are inherently contingent on one another.

THEORY

Fitting In or Standing Out: The Tradeoffs of Embeddedness

People constantly face cross-pressures to integrate with, and distinguish themselves from, the social groups to which they belong (Brewer 1991; Davis 1963). Although this tension is by no means unique to organizations, resolving it is particularly challenging in organizational settings where members are often evaluated for their individual performance, yet their productivity typically depends on interpersonal coordination. This tradeoff of fitting in versus standing out is what sociologists—following Granovetter's (1985) influential popularization of the term—often implicitly invoke when referring to the concept of embeddedness. Although the vast majority of this literature treats embeddedness primarily through a network prism (Krippner and Alvarez 2007), people are, in fact, embedded in their social worlds along multiple social dimensions.¹

Following Zukin and DiMaggio (1990), we distinguish between two forms of embeddedness. *Structural embeddedness* relates to the configuration of interpersonal networks and the extent to which individuals are anchored in tightly-knit social communities. *Cultural embeddedness* references the extent to which individuals share similar norms and taken-for-granted assumptions about appropriate behavior with those around them and

how these shared understandings shape their interactions with others. We use the terms “integration” and “assimilation” to denote structural and cultural embeddedness, respectively. As we will discuss, the tension between fitting in and standing out is a recurring (if mostly implicit) theme in work that examines the link between structural and cultural embeddedness and individual attainment.² It relates to the extent to which one is integrated, or assimilated, with one's colleagues in an organization. These tradeoffs are considered explicitly in the arguments we will develop.

Structural Embeddedness and Attainment in Organizations

The tradeoff between integration and differentiation has long animated social network research. Granovetter's (1973) classic distinction between strong and weak ties, which has dominated sociological work on social networks over the past four decades, echoes this tension. As Burt (1992) points out, whereas members of tightly knit circles tend to develop strong ties with one another, weak ties more commonly connect people who are otherwise embedded in different social worlds. The relative benefits of occupying positions of network brokerage versus closure have been a major focus in recent scholarship on social networks.³

A preponderance of empirical evidence demonstrates that structural embeddedness—in the form of network constraint—is negatively associated with individual attainment (for a recent review, see Burt, Kilduff, and Tasselli 2013). Given this negative relationship, occupying disembedded (brokerage) positions confers information-based advantage: because brokers bridge otherwise disconnected parts of the social network, they have access to valuable, non-redundant information. Abundant empirical evidence shows that organizational actors who span structural holes tend to receive greater compensation, are more highly regarded by their peers, and are more likely to generate better ideas than their colleagues who operate in more constrained networks (Burt 1992).

The structural position of brokerage confers a variety of benefits, but it can also come at a price. Being anchored in multiple social worlds may also imply projecting an incoherent social identity (Podolny and Baron 1997). Moreover, network closure engenders trust because it facilitates enforcement of behavioral norms through peer sanctioning (Coleman 1988; Reagans and McEvily 2003). Consequently, when others have uncertainty about actors' skills or intentions (Podolny 2001) or the quality of their output (Fleming, Mingo, and Chen 2007), brokerage can become a liability rather than an advantage. Moreover, diversity comes at the expense of tie intensity and depth, which can, in turn, stymie access to novel information (Aral and Van Alstynne 2011) and impede the transfer of complex knowledge (Hansen 1999). The benefits of brokerage also depend on an actor's context (for a review, see Pachucki and Breiger 2010): the returns to brokerage decrease as the number of peers engaged in the same work as the focal individual increases (Burt 1997).

Cultural Embeddedness and Attainment in Organizations

Like structural embeddedness, cultural embeddedness entails both benefits and costs. Before explicating these tradeoffs, we first define what we mean by cultural fit. Sociological consensus on the definition and foundational elements of culture has been elusive (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010). Nevertheless, most accounts recognize that culture rests on taken-for-granted, shared understandings that relate to deep-rooted beliefs and assumptions about the world, as well as to normative and explicit agreements that enable interpersonal coordination (DiMaggio 1997; Patterson 2014). Our conceptualization of cultural fit focuses on the latter: the extent to which organizational members' behaviors are normatively compliant.⁴

Whereas the extant literature on organizational culture tends to conceptualize cultural fit with respect to the organization as a whole (e.g., Rivera 2012; Schein 2010), we focus on the extent to which individuals fit in culturally

with their interlocutors in an organization. This set of interaction partners is determined, in part, by positions in formal and semiformal structure—for example, the job roles that people occupy or the work groups and task forces to which they are assigned—and in part by the informal relationships they choose to form (Biancani, McFarland, and Dahlander 2014). Because semiformal and informal relations tend to span formal organizational subunits (Srivastava 2015), these interaction partners are typically drawn from a wide cross-section of an organization. Our conceptualization of cultural fit allows for the possibility of cultural differentiation or fragmentation within an organization and does not assume that the various subcultures that exist within an organization map directly onto its formal subunits (Martin 1992). This mirrors our approach to conceptualizing structural embeddedness: both network constraint and cultural fit relate to one's local embeddedness within an organization.

Scholarship on organizational culture tends to highlight the benefits of cultural assimilation for individual outcomes. People who fit in culturally are expected to achieve greater attainment for a variety of reasons. First, culture can serve as an alternative to formal mechanisms of control. Employees who have internalized shared normative expectations are more likely to behave in ways that align with and contribute to an organization's strategic goals (Schein 2010). Second, culture functions as a form of tacit knowledge that facilitates seamless task coordination among organizational members (Weber and Camerer 2003). In addition, individual cultural attachment to an organization instills motivation and a sense of shared destiny (Baron and Kreps 2014). People who are more culturally invested in an organization are therefore more likely to be committed to its success (O'Reilly et al. 1991), and people who are culturally incompatible with their friends at work tend to experience dissatisfaction with their jobs (Krackhardt and Kilduff 1990). Employers recognize the advantages of cultural assimilation and, through a process that is sometimes tacit and driven by emotion,

hire on the basis of cultural matching (Rivera 2012, 2015).

At the same time, other forces push individuals to culturally differentiate themselves from their organizations. These forces are both internal and external to the individual. For example, studying a technology firm similar in some respects to the one that serves as our research setting, Kunda (2006) reports that organizational members, especially those in the lower ranks of the formal hierarchy, are torn between their identification with the company and a need to assert their independent identities through acts of cultural resistance. Rather than being denounced, however, public displays of dissent are often embraced as acts of authenticity that ritually reenact group boundaries and commitment.

The need for differentiation is driven not only by a desire for distinctiveness but also by the internalization of others' expectations. Work in economic sociology demonstrates that people who enact culturally nonconforming identities are generally devalued by others because of their lack of a clear social identity (e.g., Goldberg, Hannan, and Kovács 2016; Hsu and Hannan 2005). Yet cultural noncompliance can still be a risk worth taking because it can result in disproportionate rewards. Innovative breakthroughs, for example, emerge from unconventional combinations of ideas (Fleming 2001). Although such combinations are sometimes received with suspicion, devaluation is replaced by enthusiasm when audience skepticism is overcome. Actors who already enjoy favorable reputations have more latitude to engage in cultural noncompliance. Famous chefs, who are granted the artistic license to erode established cuisine categories, illustrate this ability to overcome audience skepticism (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005).

Baseline Accounts of Structural and Cultural Embeddedness and Attainment

The tension between fitting in and standing out is implicitly woven into these sociological

accounts of structural and cultural embeddedness. They are usually latent narratives, however. In fact, most previous studies of brokerage and cultural fit overlook the fitting-in-versus-standing-out tension by assuming that the advantages of being on one end of the embeddedness continuum outweigh the benefits of being on the other end.

Although recent work highlights various scope conditions and contingent effects of brokerage, structural accounts overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the information-based advantages that come with spanning structural holes. Brokers are assumed to benefit because of their privileged access to information. Cultural accounts, on the other hand, highlight the identity benefits of cultural conformity. This is particularly true in organizational contexts, where actors are engaged in highly interdependent and non-routine activity. Although they may seek to have their contributions viewed by others as unique and difficult to replace, people in organizational settings face stronger pressures to don culturally legitimate identities that facilitate coordination with their colleagues (de Vaan, Stark, and Vedres 2015).

Thus, considered independently, one would expect that structural embeddedness will retard attainment, whereas cultural embeddedness should promote it. Existing literature therefore suggests two baseline hypotheses:

Baseline Hypothesis 1: Employees with higher levels of structural embeddedness will experience lower levels of attainment.

Baseline Hypothesis 2: Employees with higher levels of cultural fit will experience higher levels of attainment.

A Theory of Balanced Embeddedness and Attainment in Organizations

More nuanced theoretical perspectives acknowledge that standing out or fitting in embodies tradeoffs. One prevailing view is that people will seek to occupy positions that are optimally distinctive (Brewer 1991). In other words, people will seek positions that

strike a balance—within a given dimension of embeddedness—between fitting in and standing out.⁵ Work in this vein implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between embeddedness and individual attainment, such that people located at the sweet-spot will maximize their performance. A second common perspective assumes that the tradeoffs between standing out and fitting in can be resolved by varying embeddedness temporally.

Consistent with the former view, network studies provide evidence for the benefits of occupying positions that—in different respects—straddle network integration and brokerage. Vedres and Stark (2010), for example, argue that entrepreneurial teams that connect cohesively embedded members from distant groups—a network topology they call a “structural fold”—exhibit high performance. In a study on the garment industry, Uzzi (1999) similarly finds that firms with a blend of embedded and arm’s length ties outperform firms on either end of the brokerage-closure continuum. Likewise, Uzzi and Spiro (2005) report that creativity peaks in Broadway when the structure of production teams and the overall network of collaboration between artists are poised between cohesion and brokerage.

Similarly, cultural research acknowledging the tension between standing out and fitting in mostly focuses on the tradeoff between identity conformity and distinctiveness. In the realm of consumer marketing, for example, Chan, Berger, and Boven (2012) report that consumers resolve the conflict of assimilation by conforming to the cultural scripts associated with their social identities in the choice of salient product features and by seeking uniqueness in the choice of more marginal features. Similarly, scientists whose novel findings are anchored in conventional scientific knowledge, but who also combine scientific knowledge in unique ways, have the greatest impact through their work (Uzzi et al. 2013).

Research in the second vein emphasizes the role of time in diffusing the tension between fitting in and standing out. Taking a structural viewpoint, Burt and Merluzzi

(forthcoming), for example, contend that network advantage can be optimized when actors oscillate between positions of network closure and brokerage over time. On the cultural dimension, work espousing the “two-stage valuation” mechanism argues that actors who initially conform to categorical codes establish recognition and legitimacy and, at later stages, can reap the rewards of distinctiveness through categorical noncompliance (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003).

In general, the prevailing approaches to studying brokerage and cultural fit—(1) research that implicitly disregards the fitting-in-versus-standing-out tension, and work that resolves it through (2) assumption of an optimal position or (3) intertemporal balance—explore structural and cultural embeddedness in isolation from one another.⁶ Each approach is thus fragmentary. The first tacitly resolves the standing-out-or-fitting-in tension by assuming that one position is inherently better than the other. It privileges either the informational benefits of structural disembodiedness or the identity advantages of cultural embeddedness. The second and third imply that actors have to compromise on the potential benefits of standing out or fitting in—whether by finding an optimal position or by transitioning between positions temporally—because they need to offset each position’s inherent downsides. In specific empirical contexts, it is not readily obvious when such a balance is achieved.⁷

In contrast, we argue for the value of considering the interpenetration of the two dimensions of embeddedness and suggest that organizational members can resolve the dual pressures to fit in with and stand out from others by offsetting the advantages (and downsides) of structural embeddedness against those of cultural embeddedness. Previous research on the interrelationships between network structure and culture highlights the role of social influence and homophily as mechanisms that connect the two spaces. Whereas prior work emphasizes the ways structural embeddedness can lead to greater cultural embeddedness and vice versa (Carley 1991;




Figure 1. Two Dimensions of Embeddedness

DellaPosta et al. 2015), we instead focus on how being embedded in one dimension and disembedded in the other can enable actors to occupy unique positions that confer career advantages. Such actors can reap the informational advantages of structural brokering by counterbalancing them with the identity benefits of cultural conformity or realize the potential returns to cultural distinctiveness because they are buffered by the integration benefits of structural cohesion.

Figure 1 depicts our conceptual framework. The axes represent the two dimensions of embeddedness. Quadrants I and III represent the two possible extremes: *doubly embedded actors* and *disembedded actors*. Individuals in these positions are either relative outsiders—both structurally and culturally—or deeply integrated and assimilated into their locales within the organization. Neither of these positions adequately resolves the fitting-in-versus-standing-out tension. *Doubly embedded actors* enjoy the advantages of a coherent social identity that confers acceptance and trust within the organization. At the same time, their structural position makes them less likely to produce valuable innovations or gain access to non-redundant information, and their cultural lack of distinctiveness makes it difficult for their contributions to be recognized as unique and irreplaceable. *Disembedded actors* are at greater risk of producing novel ideas and of

having access to unique information; however, because their identities do not conform to colleagues' expectations, whatever novelty they produce will likely be regarded with suspicion and disregarded by their peers.

In contrast, Quadrants II and IV represent positions that strike a better balance between fitting in and standing out because they combine embeddedness in one dimension and disembeddedness in the other. We propose that their occupants will achieve higher levels of attainment than people in positions that are disembedded or doubly embedded.

Assimilated brokers (occupants of Quadrant II) enjoy the informational benefits of brokering, and their enculturation buffers them from experiencing the deleterious identity effects of being perceived as untrustworthy or nakedly self-serving. As Krackhardt (1999) points out, brokering can become a liability when the network cliques on the two ends of the network bridge being traversed impose inconsistent normative and role expectations. Such conflicting expectations can lead to identity imbalance, affecting actors' self-perceptions as well as how they are evaluated by their peers (Bearman and Moody 2004). Relative to *disembedded actors*, *assimilated brokers* are more likely to enjoy the rewards of spanning structural holes through the projection of a multivocal identity that diffuses identity incongruence (Padgett and Ansell 1993).

On the other end, *integrated nonconformists* (people in Quadrant IV) occupy a structural position of network closure and a cultural position of distinctiveness. Although their structural constraint does not expose them to as many non-redundant ideas as their counterparts who are brokers, it facilitates trustworthy and information-rich relationships. These nonconforming individuals are therefore more likely to introduce unconventional and potentially valuable ideas, and, by virtue of their position of network cohesion, eschew the penalties associated with such behaviors. Indeed, experimental evidence suggests that normatively noncompliant behavior is perceived as a signal of competence and commitment as long as the individuals in question enjoy status parity with their peers (Ridgeway 1981). Compared to *doubly embedded actors*, we expect *integrated nonconformists'* contributions will more likely be perceived as distinctive and therefore valuable. Overall, our arguments suggest the following:

Main Hypothesis: There will be a tradeoff between the two forms of embeddedness such that (1) cultural fit will promote (inhibit) attainment for individuals with low (high) network constraint, and (2) network constraint will promote (inhibit) attainment for individuals with low (high) cultural fit.

LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO CULTURAL FIT

Although the literature on organizational culture is vast, the conceptions of, and methods used to study, culture in the extant literature also have significant limitations. This is the case for three main reasons. First, much of the work on organizational culture focuses on cultural content and its consequences for group effectiveness. These studies investigate which values and beliefs and what forms of cultural enactment are conducive to superior organizational performance (Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicki 2011; Hofstede et al. 1990; Schein 2010). Yet a focus on cultural content necessarily orients the researcher toward the norms

and taken-for-granted understandings that are shared by organizational members while tending to neglect points of divergence.

Second, even scholars who do not take a content approach to the study of organizational culture tend to focus on differences among, rather than within, organizations. A commonly used theoretical framework emphasizes the distinction between strong and weak organizational cultures. Sørensen (2002), for example, uses survey data to compare cultural strength across a variety of firms and demonstrates that strong cultures contribute to performance in non-volatile industries where organizational consistency is key to success. Research in the economics of organizations literature shows how cultural homogeneity in the form of shared beliefs can lead to faster coordination but also to less experimentation and information collection, thereby contributing to culture clash when two firms that are internally homogeneous but different from each other merge (Van den Steen 2010). Heterogeneity in cultural fit at the individual level is easier to theorize about with abstract mathematical models that treat enculturation as a continuous variable. Even in such studies, however, cultural variation is mostly explored relative to its impact on organizational, as opposed to individual, outcomes (Harrison and Carroll 2006).

Finally, research that emphasizes how individuals vary in cultural assimilation and considers its consequences for their careers tends to rely on self-report measures that often provide relatively coarse-grained indicators of cultural fit. For example, the Organization Culture Profile (OCP) assesses cultural fit using the Q-sort method (O'Reilly et al. 1991). Respondents are first asked to force-rank a set of cultural values. Cultural fit is calculated by correlating each individual's ranking to the firm's culture, which is induced from the average Q-sort ranking produced by key informants within the organization. Although this technique represented a breakthrough in the study of organizational culture when it was introduced, it also has some important limitations.

OCP and other self-report measures tap into individuals' espoused values. Yet there is often a discrepancy between the values that individuals profess to support and those that guide their behavior (Schein 2010). For example, Srivastava and Banaji (2011) found in an organization with a culture emphasizing norms of collaboration that self-reports of individuals' orientations toward collaboration had no relation to the pattern of collaborative networks they formed within the organization. By contrast, an indirect measure of collaborative tendencies that tapped into implicit, automatic forms of cognition was positively related to boundary-spanning collaborative networks.

In addition, self-reports of cultural fit often rely on cultural categories that are defined by the researcher or a small group of organizational elites and may not reflect the categories that matter to rank-and-file employees. Moreover, these approaches often make the simplifying but frequently invalid assumption of cultural homogeneity across the various subgroups that exist within organizations (Goldberg 2011; Martin 1992). Finally, these methods can also be time-consuming to implement and only provide a snapshot of individuals and the organization at one point in time. Researchers must deploy them repeatedly to observe how an individual's cultural fit changes over time. Doing so can have unintended consequences—for example, inducing respondent survey fatigue that in turn erodes data quality.

We propose that the *language* through which organizational members communicate with their colleagues can provide a novel window into an important facet of cultural fit. We begin with the premise that language is central to how organizational members negotiate, codify, and uphold the norms and taken-for-granted understandings that constitute organizational culture. The way people use language provides a window into the semantic categories with which they construe meanings out of their daily experiences (DiMaggio 1997; Jackendoff 2002; Patterson 2014). Consistent with this notion, experimental studies of organizational culture—for example, about the consequences

of cultural conflict following the merger of two firms—have used language as the means to operationalize culture (Weber and Camerer 2003). In a similar vein, Carley and Palmquist (1992) developed a semi-automated technique to measure cultural similarity, or shared mental maps, within a work group from the concepts, and the relationships among concepts, that materialize in textual responses to open-ended survey questions. Although this approach also represented a methodological advance when it was introduced, it is cumbersome to implement, requires researcher input to define which concepts to filter, and operates in the context of a well-defined and bounded work group. It is therefore not well-suited to deriving time-varying indicators of how well individuals fit culturally with their colleagues in an organization.

In contrast, our empirical strategy assesses cultural fit based on the content of internal e-mail messages exchanged over time among organizational members. Although this approach is not without limitations—for example, it does not consider language expressed in face-to-face or telephone interactions or culture as manifest in physical artifacts and other nonlinguistic forms—it overcomes many disadvantages of traditional self-report measures. First, it derives measures of culture and cultural fit based on the natural language that people use rather than values or beliefs they choose to communicate to researchers. Thus, it is less susceptible to impression management and social desirability bias that can plague self-report measures. Second, most organizations maintain archives of past e-mail communications, which can be readily downloaded and used to construct time-varying measures of cultural fit. Finally, the categories of language used to assess culture can come from the data themselves or from well-established linguistic dictionaries (Pennebaker et al. 2007) and are therefore less susceptible to biases or blind spots on the part of researchers or organizational elites.

In light of these advantages, recent years have seen a proliferation of research that uses the techniques of computational linguistics to

measure underlying social processes through natural language. For example, McFarland, Jurafsky, and Rawlings (2013) show that rituals of romantic courtship exhibit distinct linguistic signatures, and Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and colleagues (2012) demonstrate how linguistic accommodation between interlocutors can reveal their relative status. Building on and adapting these techniques to the context of formal organizations, we conceptualize cultural fit as the linguistic distance between a focal individual and a reference group within an organization. We define the reference group as the subset of organizational members with whom a focal individual communicates by e-mail in a given period—in our case, a given month. Cultural fit is simply the inverse of linguistic distance from the reference group. People whose vocabularies are aligned with the reference group, we argue, are more normatively congruent with their interlocutors.

Our approach is similar to that used by Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and colleagues (2013), who study linguistic dynamics in two online beer enthusiast communities, but we adapted it to suit an organizational context. Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and colleagues (2013) show that individuals' propensity to adapt to evolving linguistic norms relates to their level of attachment to a community. Users initially align their language with that of the community, but they eventually cease to adapt to new vocabulary as they near the end of their active involvement in the community. Whereas Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and colleagues (2013) use cross-entropy-over-bigram language models to compute linguistic distance, our data exhibit greater topical and linguistic variation and thus require a different language model. Moreover, while the cross entropy approach assumes homogenous linguistic norms shared by all members of the community, ours allows for greater linguistic variation within the organization. It also accounts for the fact that, at any given time, people are in communication with only a subset of individuals in the organization, and it is normative conformity with these individuals (rather than with the organization as a whole) that has consequences for

a person's cultural fit and attainment in the organization.

METHOD

Empirical Setting and Data

A mid-sized technology firm served as our research site. The company was organized functionally into departments, including operations, technology, sales, marketing, engineering, human resources, and legal. Conversations with the firm's senior leaders and our own observations led us to conclude that the firm had cultivated a strong corporate culture, which emphasized innovation, rapid growth, collaboration, and an energizing work environment. These cultural tenets were distilled in widely disseminated artifacts, such as company brochures shared with all prospective and newly hired employees, and reinforced in communications from senior management and through employee recognition programs.

The company provided us access to the complete corpus of electronic messages—including not only metadata but also content—exchanged among the 601 full-time employees who were employed at the firm between 2009 and 2014. Although they lack the nonlinguistic cues and gestures that facilitate face-to-face communication, e-mail messages still require use of semiotic tactics that enable people to interpret one another's intentions (Menchik and Tian 2008). In other words, e-mails contain important cultural content. E-mail metadata also provide a window into changing network structure (Kleinbaum, Stuart, and Tushman 2013; Kossinets and Watts 2006; Srivastava 2015). Electronic communication networks generally correspond to those derived from network surveys, but they have some important advantages. For example, surveys are susceptible to recall bias, whereas e-mails reveal actual communication flows (Quintane and Kleinbaum 2011).

To protect employee privacy and company confidentiality, we agreed to a number of restrictions in working with the e-mail data.⁸ Our resulting dataset included approximately

10.24 million messages. In addition to e-mail data, we obtained human resource records that included employee age, gender, and tenure.⁹

Dependent Variables

The human resource records also identified all employees who had departed from the company, the date of their departure, and the nature of the exit—voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary exits do not provide a clear indicator of attainment, because employees can choose to leave for a variety of reasons—for example, because their progress has stalled out within the company or because they have been poached by a competitor following a period of stellar performance. By contrast, involuntary exits provide a sharper signal of (negative) attainment. Although people with solid performance can sometimes experience involuntary exit when business conditions deteriorate, a person is at greatest risk of experiencing involuntary exit when his performance is weak. Thus, our first dependent variable, *involuntary exit*, is set to 1 in the month a person experiences involuntary exit and 0 otherwise.

In addition, for a subset of the observation period—2011 to 2013—we obtained the performance ratings that employees received from their managers. The rating system changed somewhat during this period. In 2013, the company adopted a rating system that ranged from 1 (does not meet expectations) to 4 (exceeds expectations). For consistency, we transformed ratings from prior years when a different scale was used into this four-point scale. Consistent with how the company itself defined effective performance, we constructed an indicator, *favorable rating*, which is set to 1 for employees who received a rating greater than or equal to 3 and represents our second attainment measure.¹⁰

Our dependent variables reflect not self-perceptions but rather a focal employee's attainment based on others' perceptions and evaluations. Organizational members experience involuntary exit, or receive low performance appraisals, when their peers and

managers perceive their contributions to be unsatisfactory.

Independent Variables: Structural Embeddedness

Our measure of structural embeddedness is Burt's (1992) widely used *network constraint*.¹¹

$$C_i = \sum_j \left(p_{ij} + \sum_q p_{iq} p_{qj} \right)^2, i \neq q \neq j$$

where C_i is network constraint on person i , p_{ij} is the proportion of person i 's network activity spent directly on person j (as reflected in the proportion of e-mails sent to that person), and the second summation represents the proportion of person i 's network activity spent indirectly on person j .

Independent Variables: Cultural Embeddedness

We derive the cultural fit measure in two steps. First, we used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) lexicon (Pennebaker et al. 2007) to code each e-mail relative to a predefined set of cognitive, semantic, and emotional categories. Introduced more than two decades ago, LIWC has become a well-established and widely used framework for detecting categories of meaning and linguistic style in natural text (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010).

The categorization process entails analyzing free text and assigning weights for categories such as "anxiety" or "leisure." Formally, a LIWC category l is a set of words. An e-mail message m 's weight for a LIWC category l is the total number of words w in m such that $w \in l$. These counts are normalized into a conditional distribution over categories.¹²

Next, for each individual i for an observation window t (which we define as one month), we divided the set of e-mail messages into outgoing and incoming messages and mapped each set of messages into a probability distribution over the LIWC categories, resulting in distributions O_{it} and I_{it} , respectively. We used the Jensen-Shannon divergence statistic

(Lin 1991) to measure the difference between these two probability distributions. Let \mathcal{L} be the set of LIWC categories. The Kullback-Leibler divergence is defined as

$$KL(O \parallel I) = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} O(l) \ln \frac{O(l)}{I(l)}$$

and measures the divergence of distribution O from I . The Jensen-Shannon divergence is a smoothed and symmetric transformation of Kullback-Leibler, which is defined as

$$JS(O \parallel I) = \frac{1}{2} KL(O \parallel M) + \frac{1}{2} KL(I \parallel M)$$

where $M = \frac{1}{2} (O + I)$. The Jensen-Shannon divergence equals zero when the two distributions are identical and increases as they diverge. We define individual i 's cultural fit at time t as the negative log transformation of her distance from her interlocutors in that period:¹³

$$CF_{it} = -\ln(JS(O_{it} \parallel I_{it}))$$

Srivastava and colleagues (forthcoming) provide further details about the procedure we followed to derive this e-mail-based measure of cultural fit and include illustrations of this approach based on publicly available e-mail datasets.

Intuitively, i 's cultural fit measures the extent to which the semantic categories in her outgoing messages correspond to the categories in her incoming messages. The more e-mails she sends that exhibit different stylistic, topical, and emotional characteristics than the ones she receives, the lower her cultural fit. Note that our choice of i 's interaction partners as the reference group means we measure her fit relative to the set of people with whom she chooses to, or is required to, communicate, given the job role to which she is assigned. Moreover, we use raw distributions, rather than weighting inversely by the frequency of interaction with different partners. In other words, our measure of cultural fit represents the extent to which a person is culturally aligned with the people with whom she corresponds on a frequent basis, rather

than with the average person in her department or in the organization more broadly. Our choice of the reference group has two advantages. First, it accounts for potential cultural variability within the organization. Second, it measures the extent to which an actor is culturally assimilated with her active interaction partners, whom she is primarily dependent on for productivity and who are most likely to evaluate her performance. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of this variable. Consistent with the view that structure and culture represent distinct but interconnected dimensions on which a person can fit in or stand out, the correlation between *network constraint* and *cultural fit* is relatively low ($r = -.12$).

To help validate this measure of cultural fit, we conducted a supplemental analysis using a publicly available dataset: the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA; <http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/>). The online supplement (<http://asr.sagepub.com/supplemental>) reports these results, which indicate that TV and radio shows broadcast by the same network are more culturally similar to one another (based on our measure of cultural fit) than are shows broadcast by different networks.

In summary, we have three main independent variables. We test Baseline Hypothesis 1—that structural embeddedness impedes attainment—with *network constraint*. Baseline Hypothesis 2—that cultural embeddedness promotes attainment—is tested using *cultural fit*. Finally, we assess the Main Hypothesis—that the effects of structural and cultural embeddedness on attainment will be contingent upon one another—by considering the interaction term, *network constraint* \times *cultural fit*.¹⁴ In the analyses reported here, both measures of embeddedness are standardized for ease of interpretation.

Control Variables

We include as a control another well-established network structural variable: *network centrality*, which is based on an individual's eigenvector centrality. This measure corresponds to an individual's power and status in an organization (Bonacich 1987; Rossman, Esparza,




Figure 2. Distribution of Raw Cultural Fit Measure

and Bonacich 2010) and therefore should affect access to resources and perceptions of productivity. As is often the case, *network constraint* and *network centrality* are moderately correlated ($r = -.24$). To rule out the possibility that our results are influenced by multicollinearity between network measures, we also estimate models that exclude *network centrality*. In addition, we include an indicator, *manager*, that is set to 1 for employees who have direct reports. Finally, in models that do not include individual fixed effects, we control for employee age, age-squared, gender, and departmental affiliation.

Estimation

We estimate two sets of models that correspond to the two dependent variables. First, we model the rate of involuntary exit, or the “hazard rate,” as

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\text{prob}(t \leq T < t + \Delta t | T \geq t)}{\Delta t}$$

The hazard rate can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability that a person experiences involuntary exit at time T between times t and $t + \Delta t$, given that she was at risk of experiencing involuntary exit at time t . Because our theoretical aims are not related to time dependence, we estimate semiparametric proportional hazard models (Cox 1972). The model is specified as

$$\log h(t) = a(t) + \mathbf{B}'\mathbf{X}$$

where $h(t)$ is the hazard rate, $a(t)$ is any function of time, and \mathbf{B} is a vector of parameters describing the effects of covariates \mathbf{X} . Cox’s (1972) method of estimating such models obviates the need to specify $a(t)$. Only the part of the hazard rate that does not depend on time is parameterized (Popielarz and McPherson 1995).

Second, we estimate fixed-effect conditional logit models in which the dependent variable is *favorable rating*. Although based on fewer observations, these models account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among employees—for example, stable personality traits, past work experiences, and communication skills—that might be endogenously related to both attainment and structural and cultural embeddedness. Because they control for such unobserved heterogeneity, these models estimate the effects of within-person variance in network constraint or cultural fit on performance evaluations and therefore afford a more conservative test of the hypotheses.

RESULTS

Main Results

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics, and Table 2 provides correlations among the main variables of interest. Table 3 reports results of Cox proportional hazard rate models based on our first measure of (negative) attainment: involuntary exit. Coefficients are reported as hazard ratios: coefficients greater than one

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max.
Age (at time of entry)	601	33.2	9.71	19.8	66.8
Tenure (months)	601	19.6	15.5	1	89
Manager	601	.245	.430	0	1
Female	601	.331	.471	0	1
Exited	601	.373	.484	0	1
Exited: Voluntary	601	.148	.355	0	1
Exited: Involuntary	601	.225	.418	0	1
Favorable Rating	480	.748	.435	0	1
Network Centrality	12,722	.063	.050	0	.577
Network Constraint	12,722	.198	.234	.002	2
Cultural Fit	10,924	2.083	.453	.228	3.39

Note: *Network centrality*, *network constraint*, and *cultural fit* are calculated on a person-month basis. The other measures are calculated at the person level over the complete window of observation. Performance ratings were missing for 121 individuals.

Table 2. Correlation Matrix

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Age					
(2) Female	.068				
(3) Manager	.214	-.009			
(4) Network Centrality	.133	.039	.141		
(5) Network Constraint	-.048	.050	-.133	-.249	
(6) Cultural Fit	.076	.020	.259	.316	-.120

indicate increased risk of exit; coefficients less than one suggest decreased risk. Models 1 to 3 test the baseline hypotheses, with Models 1 and 2 corresponding to separate tests of Baseline Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively, and Model 3 testing both simultaneously. Models 4 and 5 test the Main Hypothesis, with Model 5 including both *network constraint* and *network centrality*. We exclude *network centrality* from Models 1 to 4, to demonstrate that the results are not driven by multicollinearity between network measures.

Unsurprisingly, *age* is positively associated with an increased hazard of involuntary exit throughout these models; the *age*² coefficient is significant in Model 1 and marginally significant in Models 2 through 5, implying a weak curvilinear relationship between age and the risk of involuntary exit. *Female* is not significant in Models 1 through

5, suggesting that, when structural and cultural variables are taken into account, gender is not consequential for negative attainment in the form of involuntary exit.¹⁵

Consistent with Baseline Hypothesis 1—that structural embeddedness is negatively related to attainment—*network constraint* is significant in Model 1, with a hazard ratio greater than one. When network and cultural variables are included in the same model (Model 3), however, the positive effect of network constraint on involuntary exit is no longer significant, suggesting that the direct effect of constraint on attainment is mediated by cultural fit.

In contrast, Baseline Hypothesis 2—that cultural embeddedness in the form of linguistic fit with interlocutors in the organization is positively related to attainment—is supported whether or not network variables are included

in the model (Models 2 and 3). As expected, *cultural fit* is highly significant, with a hazard ratio less than one. The effect is substantial: an increase in one standard deviation in cultural fit is associated with a reduction in the hazard of involuntary exit by slightly more than 50 percent.

Models 4 and 5 provide a test of our Main Hypothesis—that the effects of structural and cultural embeddedness on attainment are contingent upon one another such that (1) cultural fit is associated with higher (lower) attainment for individuals with low (high) network constraint, and (2) network constraint is associated with higher (lower) attainment for individuals with low (high) cultural fit. Consistent with this expectation, the interaction term *network constraint* \times *cultural fit* is significant, with a hazard ratio greater than one, regardless of whether *network centrality* is included (Model 5) or excluded (Model 4) as a control.

Figure 3 provides a representation of the effect. For individuals who are either at the median level of constraint or are brokers (i.e., at the 10th percentile of constraint), there is a strong negative association between cultural fit and the hazard ratio of involuntary exit. This negative relationship is especially steep for the latter. In our terminology, *assimilated brokers* fare better than *disembedded actors*. In fact, a broker who is two standard deviations below the mean on cultural fit (identified as a *disembedded actor* in Figure 3) is at a risk of involuntary exit that is an order of magnitude times greater than that of a comparably structurally disembedded broker who is two standard deviations above the mean (identified as an *assimilated broker*). The hazard of involuntary exit for individuals at median or below median levels of constraint drops below one only when their cultural fit is at or above mean levels. In other words, only people who are culturally assimilated with others appear to reap the advantages of structural brokerage.

By contrast, cultural fit becomes an obstacle for people who are embedded in constrained networks (i.e., at the 90th percentile).

This effect is also substantial: a structurally constrained employee who is two standard deviations above the mean on cultural fit (identified as a *doubly embedded actor* in Figure 3) is over three times more likely to be involuntarily terminated than a similarly constrained co-worker who is two standard deviations below the mean on cultural fit (identified as an *integrated nonconformist* in Figure 3). Thus, *integrated nonconformists* fare better than *doubly embedded actors*.

For comparison, Models 6 through 8 in Table 3 replicate the analyses using voluntary exit, which is less directly tied to attainment and is more directly influenced by self-identification with the reference group of colleagues. Modeled separately, *network constraint* is associated with an increase in the hazard of voluntary exit (Model 6), whereas *cultural fit* is associated with a decrease (Model 7); however, these effects are no longer significant when structural and cultural variables are included in the same model (Model 8). Importantly, the interaction term *network constraint* \times *cultural fit* is not significant. Taken together, results from Table 3 support our Main Hypothesis and establish that these effects pertain specifically to (negative) attainment in the form of involuntary exit rather than to any kind of exit.

We turn next to the second measure of attainment: the likelihood of a person receiving a favorable performance rating. Table 4 reports these results. Because performance ratings were available only for a subset of individuals and for a portion of the observation period, and given that they are collected only on an annual basis, the sample for these models is considerably smaller than that used for the hazard models.¹⁶ Recall also that we estimate fixed-effect models, which identify the effects of structural and cultural embeddedness on attainment based on within-individual variation. These models afford a more conservative test of hypotheses because they account for unobserved heterogeneity; however, they lack the statistical power of the hazard models. Again, from all models except the last, we exclude *network centrality* to rule

Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Exit by Type of Exit, Involuntary and Voluntary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Voluntary	Voluntary	Voluntary
Age	1.232*** (3.36)	1.260* (2.53)	1.266** (2.58)	1.229* (2.21)	1.303** (2.66)	.816** (-3.03)	.955 (-.42)	1.042 (.37)
Age ²	.998** (-2.68)	.998 (-1.79)	.998 (-1.84)	.998 (-1.47)	.998 (-1.95)	1.002** (2.79)	1.001 (.39)	.999 (-.40)
Female	1.065 (.36)	1.196 (.71)	1.208 (.74)	1.194 (.69)	1.452 (1.36)	1.100 (.45)	1.796 (1.88)	2.084* (2.29)
Manager	.514* (-2.09)	1.087 (.19)	1.119 (.25)	1.126 (.27)	1.811 (1.27)	.785 (-.60)	.989 (-.02)	1.448 (.77)
Network Centrality					.205*** (-3.39)			.355* (-2.47)
Network Constraint	1.412*** (5.60)		1.177 (.78)	1.717* (2.41)	1.667 (1.31)	1.562*** (7.20)		1.667 (1.51)
Cultural Fit		.446*** (-6.85)	.447*** (-6.74)	.499*** (-5.58)	.676** (-2.71)		.599*** (-4.20)	.763 (-1.88)
Network Constraint × Cultural Fit				1.572*** (2.70)	2.143** (3.07)			1.060 (.34)
Department Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12,722	9,885	9,885	9,885	9,885	12,722	9,885	9,885
chi ²	68.751	95.936	97.325	101.331	107.630	94.257	40.303	55.299
ll	-935.012	-358.065	-357.851	-355.590	-339.022	-635.695	-232.992	-225.549

Note: Coefficients reported as hazard ratios; t-statistics are in parentheses.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).




Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Cultural Fit on the Hazard Ratio of Involuntary Exit, at Varying Levels of Network Constraint

Note: The x-axis represents the number of standard deviations a person is from the mean level of cultural fit. Low constraint corresponds to the 10th percentile, and high constraint to the 90th percentile. Hazard ratios are calculated relative to an individual with mean values for all control variables. The y-axis is logarithmically scaled. For illustration, we identified positions that correspond to the four ideal types of actors in our framework.

Table 4. Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit of Favorable Performance Rating

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating
Manager	3.724** (2.73)	3.593* (2.53)	3.408* (2.26)	3.384* (2.04)	3.351* (2.05)
Network Centrality					-.130 (-.13)
Network Constraint	-2.309 (-1.80)		-4.243* (-2.43)	-5.622** (-3.13)	-5.682** (-3.08)
Cultural Fit		.925* (2.15)	1.236* (2.57)	-.011 (-.02)	.004 (.01)
Network Constraint × Cultural Fit				-2.518** (-2.82)	-2.526** (-2.82)
N	185	166	166	166	166
Pseudo R ²	.149	.133	.215	.244	.244
ll	-56.818	-51.925	-47.014	-45.294	-45.284

Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors. All models include individual fixed effects. **p* < .05; ***p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

out the possibility that our results are driven by collinearity between network measures.

Models 1 through 3 assess the Baseline Hypotheses, with the first two models testing the effects of structural and cultural variables separately and the latter combining them. *Manager* is consistently significant and positive, suggesting that promotion into a

managerial position boosts a person’s chances of receiving a favorable performance rating. *Network constraint* is, as expected, negatively associated with favorable performance but significantly so only when modeled together with cultural embeddedness. *Cultural fit*, on the other hand, is significant and positively predictive of a favorable performance




Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Cultural Fit on the Predicted Probability of Receiving a Favorable Performance Rating, at Varying Levels of Network Constraint

Note: The x-axis represents the number of standard deviations a person is from the mean level of cultural fit. Low constraint corresponds to the 10th percentile, and high constraint to the 90th percentile. Probabilities are calculated assuming mean values for control variables, and assuming that individual fixed effects are zero. Gray shading corresponds to 95% confidence intervals.

evaluation whether modeled separately (Model 2) or together with *network constraint* (Model 3). In other words, we find partial support for Baseline Hypothesis 1: increases in constraint reduce the likelihood of receiving a favorable performance rating—but only in some specifications. By contrast, we find more consistent support for Baseline Hypothesis 2: as people become more culturally embedded within the organization, they experience higher levels of attainment.

Our main models of interest are Models 4 and 5, which include the interaction term, *network constraint* \times *cultural fit*. In both cases, the interaction between *network constraint* and *cultural fit* is negative and significant. In sum, models based on the second measure of attainment—favorable performance ratings—provide additional support for our Main Hypothesis.

Figure 4 shows the interaction effect. For individuals at the median level of constraint, there is a steep, positive relationship between cultural fit and attainment. This effect is even more pronounced for people with low constraint (i.e., brokers). We again find that *assimilated brokers* do better than *disembedded actors*. The benefits of brokerage drop dramatically below mean cultural fit, reduced from an almost 100 percent predicted probability of

receiving a favorable performance evaluation to roughly 80 percent for individuals whose cultural fit is two standard deviations below the mean.

By contrast, we find a negative relationship between cultural fit and attainment for employees who are highly constrained. The predicted probability of receiving a favorable evaluation for a constrained actor who is two standard deviations above the mean on cultural fit is close to 0, whereas it is nearly 50 percent for a constrained actor who is two standard deviations below the mean on cultural fit.¹⁷ As with the hazard models, the analyses based on performance ratings also indicate that *integrated nonconformists* are more likely to reach high levels of attainment than are *doubly embedded actors*.

Robustness Checks

The Appendix contains results of supplemental analyses designed to assess the robustness of our results and rule out plausible alternative explanations. Tables A1 and A2 report results based on an alternative measure of cultural fit that does not rely on the LIWC categories but instead defines fit relative to the thousand most frequently used words by a focal actor in the corpus. These analyses help

establish that our results are not an artifact of the choice to use LIWC categories. Tables A3 and A4 report results of additional robustness checks that demonstrate our results remain consistent when we operationalize cultural fit differently and are not driven by (1) our choice of reference group, (2) communication with supervisors, or (3) communication mediated through e-mail distribution lists.

DISCUSSION

Our findings provide support for, and add nuance to, the prevailing narratives in the sociological and organizational literatures about the consequences of brokerage and cultural fit. On the one hand, we reproduce two fundamental findings that served as our Baseline Hypotheses: evaluated independently, structural brokerage and cultural assimilation are associated with greater attainment, all else being equal. In most specifications, we reproduce the finding—which has by now almost become axiomatic in the literature—that network constraint is associated with lower levels of attainment. This is especially pronounced in Figure 4, which shows that highly constrained individuals generally perform poorly compared to their peers, except at very low levels of cultural fit. Across specifications, we also find a robust and substantial positive association between cultural fit and attainment, all else being equal.

Our results also demonstrate, however, that considering the two dimensions of embeddedness independently can lead to an overestimation of the benefits of structural brokerage and the costs of low cultural fit. Actors occupying positions of network constraint do not always underperform brokers. Rather, as Figure 3 illustrates, constrained actors with very low cultural fit (two standard deviations below the mean)—that is, *integrated nonconformists*—have a predicted hazard of experiencing involuntary exit that is about five times less than the hazard experienced by comparably unassimilated brokers—*disembedded actors* in our terminology. “People with networks rich in structural holes,” as Burt (2005:18) argues, “are the

people who know about, have a hand in, and exercise control over more rewarding opportunities.” Absent the trust and reputation afforded by network closure, however, capitalizing on such opportunities requires a social lubricant. We propose that cultural fit can serve as just such an emollient.

In fact, differences in the predicted probabilities of receiving a favorable performance rating across low, median, and high levels of constraint vary dramatically by cultural fit (Figure 4). Thus, the nearly taken-for-granted negative relationship between constraint and attainment may just represent the special, albeit not uncommon, case of individuals who are “typical” in their level of cultural fit with their immediate peers in an organization.

In a similar vein, low cultural fit is generally detrimental for attainment, including for people at the median level of constraint and for those with low constraint (brokers). By contrast, having low levels of cultural fit actually seems to benefit highly constrained individuals—presumably because it enables them to stand out from their structurally overlapping crowd.

In recent years, work on attainment in organizations has overwhelmingly focused on the structural underpinnings of individual career success. It tends to treat culture as epiphenomenal of, and therefore secondary to, structure, assuming that individuals who span structural holes necessarily bridge between groups with different beliefs and normative arrangements and that such brokers are adept at enacting different social identities (Burt et al. 2013). While this may often be the case, it is not necessarily so. In fact, our findings suggest that not all brokers are *assimilated brokers*; some, at least, are *disembedded actors*. Similarly, among people with high levels of cultural fit, it is useful to distinguish *integrated nonconformists*, who can reap the rewards of being culturally different, from *doubly embedded actors* who are culturally indistinguishable from their peers.

What mechanisms lead *integrated nonconformists* and *assimilated brokers* to fare better than their counterparts who are not embedded in one dimension and disembedded in the other? In line with previous work on social

networks and economic sociology, we posit that the effects of network position on attainment operate primarily through the channel of information access (both direct access by focal actors and indirect access through their alters), whereas the effects of cultural fit on attainment are mostly related to an identity channel that affects how an actor is perceived by others. That is, networks influence an actor's productive output, whereas cultural fit affects how this productivity is perceived and valued by others.¹⁸ When properly aligned, these two channels can complement, rather than counteract, one another. Brokers have access to varied and novel information, but they are short on trust and reputation; a stable and congruent cultural identity is useful for offsetting this shortage. Positions of network closure, on the other hand, provide interactional consistency and facilitate a wide informational bandwidth; under such circumstances, cultural uniqueness can become a reputational asset and a signal of competence, rather than a liability.

Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to directly test these mechanisms. We do not measure employees' quality of output independently of how they are evaluated by others. Thus, we cannot differentiate between channels that directly affect productivity and those that affect peer perceptions. Previous work suggests that structural processes also have identity ramifications, whereas cultural processes affect information exchange. Networks function as both pipes and prisms (Podolny 2001), and culture is part and parcel of how co-workers coordinate tasks and is therefore central to the realization of interpersonal complementarities in organizations (Weber and Camerer 2003). These nuances might lead to the development of additional hypotheses about how the interaction between structural and cultural embeddedness is consequential for attainment in organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

For decades, a central, although mostly implicit, tension has energized sociological research on topics as diverse as job search

(Granovetter 1973), creativity (Fleming et al. 2007), immigration (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993), political voting behavior (Liu and Srivastava 2015), and scientific production (Foster, Rzhetsky, and Evans 2015): the dual pressures that people face to fit in with or stand out from others. These research strands have mostly examined structural and cultural processes in isolation from one another. Structural accounts predominantly focus on the tension between brokerage and closure; cultural accounts on the tension between conformity and distinctiveness. We argued that these different accounts are, in fact, two sides of the same coin: they are the structural and cultural manifestations of the challenge of balancing social belongingness with differentiation, which, we contend, stands at the heart of what Granovetter (1985) termed the "problem of embeddedness" three decades ago.

We integrate these otherwise disparate bodies of research by developing a theory of the tradeoffs associated with two distinct forms of embeddedness: structural and cultural (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). In our account, neither form of embeddedness is subservient to the other. Rather, building on previous work, we theorize that each operates autonomously to influence individual attainment. Yet we also propose a novel conceptual pathway for individuals to resolve the fitting-in-versus-standing-out tension. Unlike prevailing theories that assume people resolve the tension by either finding a sweet spot of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer 1991) or by transitioning between fitting in and standing out over time (Burt and Merluzzi forthcoming; Zuckerman et al. 2003), we argue that people can gain advantage by occupying a position that is embedded in one domain and disembedded in the other. Consequently, we posit that the effects of structural and cultural embeddedness are inherently contingent on one another.

Analyses of personnel records and a unique corpus of e-mail messages exchanged among employees in a U.S.-based technology firm lent strong support for our theory. Transforming e-mail metadata into network structural measures and using computational

linguistic techniques to translate the unstructured natural language of e-mail communications into a novel measure of cultural fit, we found evidence of a tradeoff between the two forms of embeddedness.

Although sociological research such as the present study frequently relies on empirical patterns observed in a particular organization (e.g., Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000), care must always be taken in generalizing from such work. The organization we studied was typical in many respects of U.S.-based, mid-sized technology firms; however, it remains unclear how the patterns we observed would vary across different types of organizations—for example, organizations that vary in the strength of their culture (Sørensen 2002), in the degree of heterogeneity that exists among the subcultures of the departments and functions they house (Dougherty 1992), or in the nature of the relationship between individual performance and organizational success (Jacobs 1981). We conjecture that our findings are not limited to organizations or to professional attainment. Rather, we anticipate that the contingent advantages of structural and cultural embeddedness should play out similarly in social settings that are not strictly organizational. Replications of our approach across these varied contexts would help identify the contingencies and boundary conditions of the theory we developed.

Although our models of individual attainment based on performance ratings include individual fixed effects that accounted for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity, we acknowledge that our empirical approach cannot rule out threats to causal identification from other forms of endogeneity (e.g., unobserved attributes of individuals that change over time and are associated with network constraint or cultural fit). Given that random assignment of individuals to structural positions of varying constraint or to differing levels of cultural fit is typically infeasible in organizational settings, future research will likely need to take advantage of exogenous changes—for example, stemming from an unanticipated restructuring (Srivastava

2015)—to more firmly pin down the causal relationships among network constraint, cultural fit, and individual attainment.

These limitations notwithstanding, our work makes a number of noteworthy contributions, both substantive and methodological. Our theoretical fusion of work on social networks and on the cultural underpinnings of economic action makes contributions to both literatures. First, it brings fresh insight to research on the contingent effects of structural brokerage (e.g., Podolny 2001; Reagans and McEvily 2003; Vedres and Stark 2010). For example, previous work has found that the advantages of brokerage are contingent on the number of a broker's peers engaged in similar work (Burt 1997) or on the extent to which national and organizational culture is collectivist (Xiao and Tsui 2007). By contrast, our work highlights that the returns to brokerage depend on an individual's level of cultural fit with the peers she communicates with by dint of the structural position she occupies within a firm. This finding is consistent with and enriches our understanding of earlier work on the characteristics of boundary-spanning individuals in organizations. Tushman and Scanlan (1981), for example, point to the importance of "informal internal linkages"—acquired through transfers and rotations across different parts of the organization—and a "professional orientation" that propels individuals with high perceived competence into boundary-spanning roles. We suspect these linkages and orientations are manifestations of cultural fit, which enable individuals to successfully traverse formal organizational boundaries.

Similarly, our approach sheds new light on work in economic sociology that focuses on the contingent effects of categorical conformity (e.g., Ferguson and Hasan 2013; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak 2009; Leung 2014; Smith 2011). For the most part, these studies have found that, while categorical noncompliance is conventionally frowned upon, culturally nonconforming actors who already enjoy a prestigious reputation (e.g., Rao et al. 2005) or who have established their legitimacy in a

field (e.g., Zuckerman et al. 2003) are more likely to be perceived as path blazing than as deviant. Here too our work highlights that returns to cultural noncompliance depend on one's structural position: people ensconced in tight-knit networks are more likely to benefit from culturally unconventional behavior.

Methodologically, this study also has important implications for research that seeks to characterize and systematically measure different facets of culture (e.g., Goldberg 2011). In contrast to prevailing self-report methods (e.g., O'Reilly et al. 1991) or text mapping tools (e.g., Carley and Palmquist 1992), we develop an analytic approach to measuring cultural fit over time using e-mail data that, although drawing on cultural content to infer cultural similarity among individuals, takes a distributional approach to culture that is ultimately content-agnostic (Harrison and Carroll 2006). We neither theorize about nor model the implications of the cultural meanings being exchanged among organizational members; rather, we examine how these meanings are distributed to derive measures of cultural variance within the organization.

This technique can, in principle, be replicated with relative ease and limited cost in any organization that maintains e-mail archives. Prior research in this vein has used e-mail metadata (Kleinbaum et al. 2013; Kossinets and Watts 2009; Srivastava 2015) or the mapping of individuals to e-mail distribution lists within an organization (Liu, Srivastava, and Stuart 2016) to characterize different facets of individuals' structural positions. Studies that utilize e-mail content, rather than just metadata, remain quite rare—typically because of the difficulty of gaining research access to information that is often considered proprietary and sensitive and the challenge of installing adequate safeguards to protect employee privacy and company confidentiality. Studies that do exist have used e-mail message content to derive measures of information diversity (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011) but stopped short of using these data to measure facets of culture and cultural fit. In

this regard, the present work may represent a substantial methodological advance.

Access to readily available, time-varying measures of cultural fit opens up several avenues for future research that are both conceptually important and practically relevant. For example, one could use such data to address the following questions: (1) What kinds of individuals (based on observable, pre-hire characteristics such as their job application materials) are most likely to enculturate successfully into an organization? (2) What kinds of employees are best suited to different forms of internal mobility (e.g., transfers and rotations across departments or geographic units)? (3) In an organizational restructuring, which organizational subunits would be easier or harder to combine or separate based on considerations of cultural compatibility? and (4) In the interorganizational context, how culturally compatible are two firms that are contemplating merging or forming a joint venture or alliance? The present study represents but an initial foray into questions such as these.

We conclude by returning to Granovetter's (1985) manifesto on embeddedness. As others have noted (e.g., Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Uzzi 1996; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990), although embeddedness has been a useful construct for rethinking neoclassical economics, it suffers from theoretical vagueness. In building on these commentators' work, we attempted to inject additional conceptual precision to the term by drawing the distinction between structural and cultural embeddedness and by explicating the trade-offs inherent in each form of embeddedness and in their intersection. We also developed an analytic approach to operationalize the two forms of embeddedness as a system of measures that would appear to have widespread applicability. Ultimately, we hope that, by recasting the problem of embeddedness as balancing the tensions of fitting in and standing out, this work will help reinvigorate this concept's analytic purchase and advance the enduring sociological project of uncovering the interplay between structure and culture.

APPENDIX: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

We conducted further analyses to evaluate the robustness of our findings to alternative measures of cultural fit. To begin, rather than considering Jensen-Shannon divergence between the probability distributions of incoming and outgoing messages over a vector of LIWC categories, we instead assessed divergence over a vector of the thousand most popular words used by the focal actor across the entire corpus. This measure has the advantage of using categories that emerged naturally within this particular empirical setting; however, it is a noisier measure than the one based on LIWC categories (for more details about the construction of this LIWC-based measure and for illustrations of the approach based on publicly available e-mail datasets, see Srivastava et al. forthcoming).

Table A1 reports comparable models to those in Table 3 using this alternative measure of cultural fit, and it largely replicates the results reported in Table 3. In Model 1, *network constraint* is positively associated with negative attainment in the form of involuntary exit, whereas *cultural fit* is negatively associated with involuntary exit in Model 2. When both measures are included together (Model 3), *network constraint* is no longer significant. In support of the Main Hypothesis, *network constraint* \times *cultural fit* is positive and significant in Models 4 (without *network centrality* as a control) and 5 (with *network centrality* as a control).

Table A2 reports models using the alternative measure of cultural fit and is comparable to Table 4. *Network constraint* is of the expected sign but not significant in Model 1, and *cultural fit* is of the expected sign but not significant in Model 2. In Model 3, which includes both terms, *network constraint* is negative and significant. In Models 4 (without *network centrality* as a control) and 5 (with *network centrality* as a control), the interaction term, *network constraint* \times *cultural fit*, is negative and significant. Thus, we again find support for the Main Hypothesis.

Together, the analyses reported in Tables A1 and A2 indicate that our results are not an artifact of the particular method we used to operationalize *cultural fit*.

To further establish the robustness of the results reported in Tables 3 and 4, we estimated models with three other variants of the cultural fit measure. First, to account for the possibility that the sorting of people into networks (i.e., their particular set of interaction partners in a given month) might bias our estimates of the effects of cultural fit on career outcomes, we derived a measure of cultural fit in which the reference group was not a focal actor's interlocutors in a given month, but rather *all employees* in the firm except for the focal actor. Tables A3 (Models 1 and 2) and A4 (Models 1 and 2) report these results. In both cases, the main effect of this alternative cultural fit measure is significant and of the expected sign. In the hazard model of involuntary exit (Table A3, Model 2), the interaction between network constraint and cultural fit is also significant and of the expected sign. In the performance model (Table A4, Model 2), the interaction is of the expected sign and marginally significant. Note, however, that this alternative measure of cultural fit is not as sensitive to cultural heterogeneity within the firm compared to the one that uses the reference group of a focal actor's interaction partners. We therefore chose to use the latter in the main models.

Second, to account for the possibility that our results do not indicate the importance of cultural fit in general, but instead simply reflect subordinates' ability to successfully manage impressions with their supervisor, we developed an alternative measure of cultural fit that attempts to remove focal actors' communication with their supervisor. The dataset we obtained from the company did not identify each employee's supervisor, so we used the following procedure to gather this information. First, we identified each employee's membership on one of three e-mail distribution lists: managers, directors, and executives. (These represented categories of rank within the organization in ascending order.) Next, we

Table A1. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Exit by Type of Exit, Involuntary and Voluntary, Using Alternative Measure of Linguistic Fit (Top 1,000 Words)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Voluntary	Voluntary	Voluntary
Age	1.232*** (3.36)	1.244* (2.40)	1.246* (2.42)	1.220* (2.14)	1.309** (2.69)	.816** (-3.03)	.948 (-.50)	1.042 (.36)
Age ²	.998** (-2.68)	.998 (-1.71)	.998 (-1.73)	.998 (-1.47)	.998* (-2.02)	1.002** (2.79)	1.001 (.43)	.999 (-.41)
Female	1.065 (.36)	1.245 (.86)	1.250 (.87)	1.227 (.79)	1.460 (1.38)	1.100 (.45)	1.879* (2.04)	2.056* (2.29)
Manager	.514* (-2.09)	1.312 (.60)	1.328 (.62)	1.346 (.65)	1.949 (1.44)	.785 (-.60)	1.171 (.32)	1.493 (.82)
Network Centrality					.258** (-3.17)			.437* (-2.10)
Network Constraint	1.412*** (5.60)		1.081 (.37)	1.684* (1.98)	1.763 (1.36)	1.562*** (7.20)		1.339 (.64)
Cultural Fit (Top 1,000)		.366*** (-8.18)	.367*** (-8.09)	.417*** (-6.75)	.546*** (-4.43)		.473*** (-5.96)	.571*** (-3.39)
Network Constraint x Cultural Fit (Top 1,000)				1.503* (2.06)	1.856* (2.49)			.941 (-.26)
Department Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12,722	9,885	9,885	9,885	9,885	12,722	9,885	9,885
chi ²	68.751	130.110	130.561	126.583	122.990	94.257	55.479	65.376
ll	-935.012	-348.522	-348.473	-347.184	-333.982	-635.695	-226.874	-221.926

Note: Coefficients reported as hazard ratios; *t*-statistics are in parentheses. Linguistic fit measure based on a mapping of words not over the LIWC categories but rather over the thousand most popular words used by the focal actor across the entire corpus.
p* < .05; *p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Table A2. Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit of Favorable Performance Rating, Using Alternative Measure of Linguistic Fit (Top 1,000 Words)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating
Manager	3.724** (2.73)	3.760* (2.57)	3.665* (2.49)	3.610* (2.24)	3.648* (2.33)
Network Centrality					.167 (.17)
Network Constraint	-2.309 (-1.80)		-3.462* (-2.07)	-5.129** (-2.99)	-5.039** (-2.79)
Cultural Fit (Top 1,000)		.445 (1.04)	.442 (.85)	-.475 (-.86)	-.488 (-.89)
Network Constraint × Cultural Fit (Top 1,000)				-2.108* (-2.49)	-2.087* (-2.41)
N	185	166	166	166	166
Pseudo R^2	.149	.109	.180	.206	.207
ll	-56.818	-53.331	-49.106	-47.535	-47.516

Note: *t*-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors. All models include individual fixed effects. Linguistic fit measure based on a mapping of words not over the LIWC categories but rather over the thousand most popular words used by the focal actor across the entire corpus.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

assumed that a person's supervisor was the individual at the next highest rank with whom she communicated most frequently in a given month. We then derived a cultural fit measure in which we removed the identified supervisor from a focal actor's reference group. Results based on this measure are reported in Table A3 (Models 3 and 4) and Table A4 (Models 3 and 4) and are largely consistent with those in the main tables; however, *network constraint* × *cultural fit* is marginally significant in Table A3, Model 4, and both *cultural fit* and *network constraint* × *cultural fit* are marginally significant in Table A4, Models 3 and 4, respectively (where, due to the individual fixed-effects specification, we have a significant decrease in statistical power). These results demonstrate that cultural fit matters not only for subordinate-supervisor relations but for interactions with a broader set of colleagues (whose judgments of the focal actor presumably also shape how a supervisor evaluates the actor).

Finally, a question arises as to whether our main findings are driven by communication mediated through e-mail distribution lists. For

example, perhaps people more deliberately seek to fit in with others when they are sending a message to a company-wide listserv but do not make such attempts when sending messages to individual recipients. In our data, most messages sent via distribution lists were targeted to a small number of recipients. For example, lists containing five members accounted for the greatest number of distribution list messages. By contrast, large lists (i.e., with 40 or more members), which might represent venues for more deliberate forms of impression management, accounted for a relatively small fraction of messages sent. Given these patterns, it seems unlikely that distribution list communication is primarily responsible for generating the main results we document. Still, to assess the robustness of our findings, we derived a very conservative measure of cultural fit that excludes *all* distribution list communication. Results based on this measure are reported in Table A3 (Models 5 and 6) and Table A4 (Models 5 and 6). The models based on involuntary exit (reported in Table A3) are consistent with those reported in

Table A3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Involuntary Exit; Additional Robustness Checks

	Cultural Fit: All Other Employees		Cultural Fit: Without Supervisor		Cultural Fit: No Distribution Lists	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary	Involuntary
Age	1.213** (2.82)	1.353*** (3.96)	1.229** (2.60)	1.341** (3.25)	1.240** (2.65)	1.341** (3.17)
Age ²	.998* (-2.12)	.997*** (-3.31)	.998 (-1.91)	.997** (-2.63)	.998* (-1.99)	.997** (-2.58)
Female	1.244 (1.14)	1.607* (2.29)	1.105 (.44)	1.436 (1.47)	1.174 (.71)	1.422 (1.47)
Manager	.510 (-1.75)	1.072 (.17)	.591 (-1.14)	.875 (-.29)	.664 (-.93)	1.051 (.11)
Network Centrality		.169*** (-5.62)		.191*** (-4.42)		.206*** (-4.62)
Network Constraint		1.638* (2.40)		1.376 (.93)		1.616 (1.70)
Cultural Fit	.535*** (-7.65)	.735** (-3.22)	.619*** (-4.20)	1.008 (.04)	.583*** (-5.68)	.899 (-.62)
Network Constraint × Cultural Fit		1.585** (2.88)		2.164† (1.91)		2.222* (2.39)
Department Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	11,831	11,831	11,100	11,100	11,003	11,003
chi ²	95.187	121.423	60.755	75.726	77.618	102.944
ll	-722.926	-675.330	-505.684	-476.590	-506.256	-474.877

Note: Coefficients reported as hazard ratios; *t*-statistics are in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 use a variant of cultural fit based on the reference group of all employees in the firm except for the focal actor. Models 3 and 4 use a variant of cultural fit based on the focal actor's interlocutors but removing the focal actor's assumed supervisor. Models 5 and 6 use a variant of cultural fit that is based on person-to-person messages only (i.e., excluding approximately 30 percent of messages sent via distribution lists). †*p* < .10; **p* < .05; ***p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Table 3. In the performance models (reported in Table A4), the main effect of the alternative cultural fit measure is positive and significant; however, the interaction between network constraint and cultural fit is not significant. It is, however, important to note that this alternative measure of cultural fit excludes over 30

percent of e-mails that are sent to distribution lists. It seems likely that the majority of these e-mails represent signal (e.g., messages sent to moderately sized project teams) rather than just noise. Taken together, these supplemental analyses help establish the robustness of our findings to plausible alternative explanations.

Table A4. Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit of Performance Evaluation; Additional Robustness Checks

	Cultural Fit: All Other Employees		Cultural Fit: Without Supervisor		Cultural Fit: No Distribution Lists	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating	Favorable Rating
Manager	3.350** (2.69)	3.094* (2.31)	3.568* (2.40)	3.412* (2.19)	3.756* (2.32)	3.630* (2.00)
Network Centrality		-.362 (-.40)		-.408 (-.40)		-.227 (-.26)
Network Constraint		-4.122* (-2.21)		-3.671* (-2.28)		-4.897* (-2.57)
Cultural Fit	.654* (2.16)	-.255 (-.46)	1.024† (1.89)	.421 (.65)	1.376* (2.42)	.550 (.49)
Network Constraint × Cultural Fit		-2.084† (-1.94)		-1.512† (-1.73)		-2.219 (-.84)
N	175	175	175	175	172	172
Pseudo R^2	.128	.200	.126	.184	.190	.267
ll	-55.067	-50.524	-55.216	-51.556	-50.270	-45.526

Note: *t*-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors. All models include individual fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 use a variant of cultural fit based on the reference group of all employees in the firm except for the focal actor. Models 3 and 4 use a variant of cultural fit based on the focal actor's interlocutors but removing the focal actor's assumed supervisor. Models 5 and 6 use a variant of cultural fit that is based on person-to-person messages only (i.e., excluding approximately 30 percent of messages sent via distribution lists).

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Acknowledgments

The first two authors listed are joint first authors; other authors are listed in alphabetical order. We thank Glenn Carroll, Jenny Chatman, Serena Chen, Paul DiMaggio, Mathijs DeVaen, Andreea Gorbatai, Mark Granovetter, Mike Hannan, Ming Leung, Sanaz Mobasseri, Jo-Ellen Pozner, Jesper Sørensen, Ann Swidler, András Tilcsik, and participants of the Bar-Ilan University Sociology & Anthropology Seminar, the Boston University Strategy and Innovation Seminar, the Hebrew University Sociology & Anthropology Seminar, the Stanford University Sociology Colloquium, the ION7 Conference at the University of Kentucky, and the Tel-Aviv University Sociology & Anthropology Seminar for helpful comments on prior drafts. We also thank Soomin Cho for providing valuable support as a research assistant. Finally, we thank representatives from the company that served as the research site for making the data available for research purposes. The usual disclaimer applies.

Funding

We are grateful for funding support from the Garwood Center for Corporate Innovation at Berkeley-Haas, the National Science Foundation (NSF BCS 1456077), and the Stanford Data Science Initiative.

Notes

1. "Embeddedness" is a theoretically charged term that has been used by sociologists in myriad ways (Krippner and Alvarez 2007). Whereas Granovetter (1985), and later Zukin and DiMaggio (1990), use it to denote, very broadly, that economic processes are contingent on social context, we conceptualize embeddedness as one's degree of anchoring in a social context. As Uzzi (1996) notes, Granovetter's programmatic statement suffers from conceptual vagueness; our purpose here is neither to critique it nor elaborate upon it. Rather, we follow Uzzi (1996, 1997) and others (e.g., Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) by operationally treating embeddedness as the strength of one's social embedding. Unlike these authors, we highlight both the structural and cultural dimensions of embeddedness.
2. Although we use the same language of "fitting in" and "standing out" for both dimensions, we recognize that these terms mean different things in the structural versus cultural realms. Following Carley (1991), we argue that the two realms are interrelated such that the same terms can be used to describe embeddedness on both dimensions. For example, someone who becomes more structurally embedded (fitting in structurally) might learn to adopt

- the linguistic style of his network partners (fitting in culturally) or might instead try to distinguish her linguistic style (standing out culturally) so her ideas and contributions are noticed and appreciated by others. In other words, choices of fitting in or standing out in one dimension have implications for the positions people will seek to occupy in the other. We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to clarify this point.
3. Closure is the theoretical construct of interest, and constraint is the corresponding measure. For ease of exposition, we use the two terms interchangeably.
 4. Such compliance may be merely conventional or reflect a more fundamental agreement in assumptions about the world (what Douglas [1986] calls “institutions”; see also Pinker [2007]). Importantly, peers may interpret compliance as an indication of the norms that guide a person’s behavior and the extent to which those norms align with the norms of others around the focal individual. Our assumption is that normative compliance is both a reflection and a cultural signal of one’s strength of membership in a “thought community” (Zerubavel 1997).
 5. Optimal distinctiveness is a psychological theory concerned with the individual motivations underlying self-identification with particular social groups. We extend its rationale to apply more broadly to the informational and identity-based consequences of fitting in with or standing out from one’s colleagues in an organization.
 6. Of course, sociologists have debated the culture-structure interplay extensively (e.g., Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Sewell 1992). Previous work has examined the cultural meanings associated with network ties (McLean 1998; Zelizer 2011), as well as how cultural repertoires facilitate, or impede, network formation (Erickson 1996; Lizardo 2006). Nevertheless, the implications of one’s structural and cultural positions on attainment (or other outcomes of interest) have mostly been studied independently of one another.
 7. For example, there is no conceptual answer to the question of how to achieve the optimal mix of embedded and arm’s length ties (Uzzi 1996). Similarly, extant theory provides no specific insight about when an actor has gained sufficient legitimacy to have the latitude to deviate from the conforming constraints of typecasting and thus enjoy the benefits of distinctiveness (Zuckerman *et al.* 2003).
 8. In particular, we agreed to four restrictions. First, we analyzed only messages exchanged among the firm’s employees—that is, we excluded all messages exchanged with external parties. Second, we dropped all messages exchanged among the seven executive team members. We did include messages that executive team members exchanged with individuals outside the executive team. A third restriction involved the legal department: we excluded any message exchange involving one of the company’s attorneys. Fourth, the raw data were extracted from company archives and stored on secure research servers that we purchased and had installed at the firm. After applying our natural language processing algorithms on the raw data, we deleted message content and all identifying information about employees.
 9. Because the company had only recently installed a human resource information system, data on department affiliation and hierarchical rank were not available on a consistent basis. We therefore relied on e-mail distribution lists to fill in these missing data. For example, the company maintained distribution lists for all employees who supervised the work of other employees. We identified employees as a manager if they belonged to one of these distribution lists in a given month. Because the outcome of interest is attainment—as indicated by involuntary exit and performance rating—we eliminated temporary employees and summer interns from the analyses because their exit dates were often predetermined and because they typically did not receive formal performance ratings. Similarly, the company maintained distribution lists for its various departments. We again used membership in these lists to identify an employee’s departmental affiliation in a given month. In certain cases, employees belonged to multiple departmental lists in a given month—perhaps because they belonged to one department but worked very closely with another. In such cases, we coded an employee as belonging to both departments, because there was no way to identify the primary departmental affiliation.
 10. Although the underlying performance rating variable is continuous, variation in the measure partly reflects the transformation we performed (changing some observations from a 10-point scale to a four-point scale) rather than meaningful changes in year-to-year performance. Thus, we consulted with the company to identify the performance threshold in each year that corresponded to a favorable rating and chose this cut-point as the basis of our dichotomous variable. Given the transformation, it was not appropriate to use the underlying continuous measure as a dependent variable. We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to clarify this point.
 11. We use the term “structural embeddedness” in characterizing brokerage versus constraint to parallel the language used for cultural fit; however, we acknowledge that the term introduces some ambiguities depending on how one conceptualizes embeddedness. For example, a person might be considered to have low embeddedness not because she is structurally autonomous but rather because she is structurally marginal without serving as a bridge. We acknowledge that structural embeddedness does not perfectly describe the continuum between brokerage and constraint, but we retain the term for ease of exposition. It is also worth noting that Burt’s (1992) earlier work on brokerage emphasized the advantage an actor derives from monopolizing pathways between other actors,

- whereas his later work focused on the advantage an actor gains from having access to information from a wider range of sources. The first view might favor the use of betweenness centrality as a measure of structural embeddedness; the latter is more consistent with the constraint measure we opted to use. We thank an anonymous reviewer for clarifying these points.
12. We used a variety of methods to remove textual headers and footers from e-mails and to remove non-informative stop words such as “the.”
 13. We log transform the distance to account for its skewed distribution. *Cultural fit* is defined only for individuals who exchange at least 20 messages in a given month. So, for example, if an employee enters the organization near the end of month or departs at the start of the month, *cultural fit* for that employee is likely to be missing for that month. For such reasons, the sample size drops in models that include this variable.
 14. Based on median values of *network constraint* and *cultural fit*, we identified the percentage of employee-month observations that fell into each of the four categories of our conceptual framework. The breakdown was as follows: assimilated brokers (33 percent), integrated nonconformists (23 percent), doubly embedded actors (17 percent), and disembedded actors (27 percent).
 15. We suspect that both age and gender are related to one’s capacity for cultural assimilation and structural integration, but we do not explore this further in this study.
 16. Because performance evaluations are conducted once a year, we transform monthly network and cultural variables into yearly variables by averaging them by person-year. Moreover, because these models include person fixed effects, they apply only to individuals for whom yearly performance is observed at least twice and who experience a change in performance evaluation. Fixed traits such as gender cannot be estimated in these models.
 17. Figure 4 depicts slopes for the median person in the sample. For managers (results available upon request), the negative effect of cultural fit for individuals with high constraint is more pronounced and statistically significant.
 18. Of course, output and perceptions are highly intertwined—productivity depends on one’s ability to communicate effectively with others, which in turn is shaped by how one is perceived. Nevertheless, we believe it is useful to think of these two channels—information access and identity—as analytically distinct.
- References**
- Aral, Sinan, and Marshall W. Van Alstyne. 2011. “The Diversity-Bandwidth Tradeoff.” *American Journal of Sociology* 117(1):90–171.
- Baron, James N., and David M. Kreps. 2014. “Employment as an Economic and a Social Relationship.” Pp. 315–41 in *The Handbook of Organizational Economics*, edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bearman, Peter S., and James Moody. 2004. “Suicide and Friendships among American Adolescents.” *American Journal of Public Health* 94(1):89–95.
- Biancani, Susan, Daniel A. McFarland, and Linus Dahlander. 2014. “The Semiformal Organization.” *Organization Science* 25(5):1306–1324.
- Bonacich, Phillip. 1987. “Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures.” *American Journal of Sociology* 92(5):1170–82.
- Brewer, Marilynn B. 1991. “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17(5):475–82.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1992. *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1997. “The Contingent Value of Social Capital.” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42(2):339–65.
- Burt, Ronald S. 2005. *Brokerage and Closure*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Burt, Ronald S., Martin Kilduff, and Stefano Tasselli. 2013. “Social Network Analysis: Foundations and Frontiers on Advantage.” *Annual Review of Psychology* 64(1):527–47.
- Burt, Ronald S., and Jennifer Merluzzi. Forthcoming. “Network Oscillation.” *Academy of Management Discoveries*. doi:10.5465/amd.2015.0108.
- Carley, Kathleen. 1991. “A Theory of Group Stability.” *American Sociological Review* 56(3):331–54.
- Carley, Kathleen, and Michael Palmquist. 1992. “Extracting, Representing, and Analyzing Mental Models.” *Social Forces* 70(3):601–636.
- Chan, Cindy, Jonah Berger, and Leaf Van Boven. 2012. “Identifiable but Not Identical: Combining Social Identity and Uniqueness Motives in Choice.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 39(3):561–73.
- Chatman, Jennifer A. 1991. “Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public Accounting Firms.” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 36(3):459–84.
- Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” *American Journal of Sociology* 94(S1):S95–S120.
- Cox, David R. 1972. “Regression Models and Life Tables.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B* 34(2):187–202.
- Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, Cristian, Lillian Lee, Bo Pang, and Jon Kleinberg. 2012. “Echoes of Power: Language Effects and Power Differences in Social Interaction.” Pp. 699–708 in *Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on World Wide Web*. Lyon, France: ACM.
- Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, Cristian, Robert West, Dan Jurafsky, Jure Leskovec, and Christopher Potts. 2013.

- "No Country for Old Members: User Lifecycle and Linguistic Change in Online Communities." Pp. 307–318 in *Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee.
- Davis, James A. 1963. "Structural Balance, Mechanical Solidarity, and Interpersonal Relations." *American Journal of Sociology* 68(4):444–62.
- de Vaan, Mathijs, David Stark, and Balazs Vedres. 2015. "Game Changer: The Topology of Creativity." *American Journal of Sociology* 120(4):1144–94.
- DellaPosta, Daniel, Yongren Shi, and Michael Macy. 2015. "Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?" *American Journal of Sociology* 120(5):1473–1511.
- DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. "Culture and Cognition." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23:263–88.
- Dougherty, Deborah. 1992. "Interpretive Barriers to Successful Product Innovation in Large Firms." *Organization Science* 3(2):179–202.
- Douglas, Mary. 1986. *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Jeff Goodwin. 1994. "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency." *American Journal of Sociology* 99(6):1411–54.
- Erickson, Bonnie H. 1996. "Culture, Class, and Connections." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(1):217–51.
- Ferguson, John-Paul, and Shariq Hasan. 2013. "Specialization and Career Dynamics: Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 58(2):233–56.
- Fine, Gary Alan. 1979. "Small Groups and Culture Creation: The Idioclature of Little League Baseball Teams." *American Sociological Review* 44(5):733–45.
- Fleming, Lee. 2001. "Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search." *Management Science* 47(1):117–32.
- Fleming, Lee, Santiago Mingo, and David Chen. 2007. "Collaborative Brokerage, Generative Creativity, and Creative Success." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 52(3):443–75.
- Foster, Jacob G., Andrey Rzhetsky, and James A. Evans. 2015. "Tradition and Innovation in Scientists' Research Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 80(5):875–908.
- Goffman, Erving. 1986. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Goldberg, Amir. 2011. "Mapping Shared Understandings Using Relational Class Analysis: The Case of the Cultural Omnivore Reexamined." *American Journal of Sociology* 116(5):1397–1436.
- Goldberg, Amir, Michael T. Hannan, and Balázs Kovács. 2016. "What Does It Mean to Span Cultural Boundaries? Variety and Atypicality in Cultural Consumption." *American Sociological Review* 81(2):215–41.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6):1360–80.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91(3):481–510.
- Hansen, Morten T. 1999. "The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing Knowledge across Organization Subunits." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 44(1):82–111.
- Harrison, J. Richard, and Glenn R. Carroll. 2006. *Culture and Demography in Organizations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hartnell, Chad A., Amy Yi Ou, and Angelo Kinicki. 2011. "Organizational Culture and Organizational Effectiveness: A Meta-Analytic Investigation of the Competing Values Framework's Theoretical Suppositions." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 96(4):677–94.
- Hofstede, Geert, Bram Neuijen, Denise Daval Ohayv, and Geert Sanders. 1990. "Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study across Twenty Cases." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 35(2):286–316.
- Hsu, Greta, and Michael T. Hannan. 2005. "Identities, Genres, and Organizational Forms." *Organization Science* 16(5):474–90.
- Hsu, Greta, Michael T. Hannan, and Özgecan Koçak. 2009. "Multiple Category Memberships in Markets: An Integrative Theory and Two Empirical Tests." *American Sociological Review* 74(1):150–69.
- Jackendoff, Ray. 2002. *Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Jacobs, David. 1981. "Toward a Theory of Mobility and Behavior in Organizations: An Inquiry Into the Consequences of Some Relationships between Individual Performance and Organizational Success." *American Journal of Sociology* 87(3):684–707.
- Kleinbaum, Adam M. 2012. "Organizational Misfits and the Origins of Brokerage in Intrafirm Networks." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 57(3):407–452.
- Kleinbaum, Adam M., Toby E. Stuart, and Michael L. Tushman. 2013. "Discretion within Constraint: Homophily and Structure in a Formal Organization." *Organization Science* 24(5):1316–36.
- Kossinets, Gueorgi, and Duncan J. Watts. 2006. "Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Social Network." *Science* 311(5757):88–90.
- Kossinets, Gueorgi, and Duncan J. Watts. 2009. "Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network." *American Journal of Sociology* 115(2):405–450.
- Krackhardt, David. 1999. "Ties that Torture: Simmelian Tie Analysis in Organizations." *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* 16:183–210.
- Krackhardt, David, and Martin Kilduff. 1990. "Friendship Patterns and Culture: The Control of Organizational Diversity." *American Anthropologist* 92(1):142–54.
- Krippner, Greta R., and Anthony S. Alvarez. 2007. "Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33(1):219–40.
- Kristof-Brown, Amy L., Ryan D. Zimmerman, and Erin C. Johnson. 2005. "Consequences of Individuals' Fit at Work: A Meta-Analysis of Person-Job, Person-

- Organization, Person-Group, and Person-Supervisor Fit." *Personnel Psychology* 58(2):281–342.
- Kunda, Gideon. 2006. *Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Leonardelli, Geoffrey J., Cynthia L. Pickett, and Marilyn B. Brewer. 2010. "Optimal Distinctiveness Theory: A Framework for Social Identity, Social Cognition, and Intergroup Relations." Pp. 63–113 in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 43, edited by P. Z. Mark and M. O. James. New York: Elsevier.
- Leung, Ming D. 2014. "Dilettante or Renaissance Person? How the Order of Job Experiences Affects Hiring in an External Labor Market." *American Sociological Review* 79(1):136–58.
- Lin, Jianhua. 1991. "Divergence Measures Based on the Shannon Entropy." *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory* 37(1):145–51.
- Liu, Christopher C., and Sameer B. Srivastava. 2015. "Pulling Closer and Moving Apart: Interaction, Identity, and Influence in the U.S. Senate, 1973 to 2009." *American Sociological Review* 80(1):192–217.
- Liu, Christopher C., Sameer B. Srivastava, and Toby E. Stuart. 2016. "An Intraorganizational Ecology of Individual Attainment." *Organization Science* 27(1):90–105.
- Lizardo, Omar. 2006. "How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks." *American Sociological Review* 71(5):778–807.
- Martin, Joanne. 1992. *Cultures in Organizations: Three Perspectives*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McFarland, Daniel A., Dan Jurafsky, and Craig Rawlings. 2013. "Making the Connection: Social Bonding in Courtship Situations." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(6):1596–1649.
- McLean, Paul D. 1998. "A Frame Analysis of Favor Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(1):51–91.
- Menchik, Daniel A., and Xiaoli Tian. 2008. "Putting Social Context into Text: The Semiotics of E-mail Interactions." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(2):332–70.
- O'Reilly, Charles A., Jennifer Chatman, and David F. Caldwell. 1991. "People and Organizational Culture: A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessing Person-Organization Fit." *Academy of Management Journal* 34(3):487–516.
- Pachucki, Mark A., and Ronald L. Breiger. 2010. "Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and Culture." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:205–224.
- Padgett, John F., and Christopher K. Ansell. 1993. "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434." *American Journal of Sociology* 98(6):1259–1319.
- Patterson, Orlando. 2014. "Making Sense of Culture." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40:1–30.
- Pennebaker, James W., Cindy K. Chung, Molly Ireland, Amy Gonzalez, and Roger J. Booth. 2007. *The Development and Psychometric Properties of LIWC2007* (LIWC.net).
- Petersen, Trond, Ishak Saporta, and Marc-David L. Seidel. 2000. "Offering a Job: Meritocracy and Social Networks." *American Journal of Sociology* 106(3):763–816.
- Phillips, Damon J., and Ezra Zuckerman. 2001. "Middle Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets." *American Journal of Sociology* 107(2):379–429.
- Pinker, Steven. 2007. *The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature*. New York: Penguin Group.
- Podolny, Joel M. 2001. "Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market." *American Journal of Sociology* 107(1):33–60.
- Podolny, Joel M., and James N. Baron. 1997. "Resources and Relationships: Social Networks and Mobility in the Workplace." *American Sociological Review* 62(5):673–93.
- Popielarz, Pamela A., and J. Miller McPherson. 1995. "On the Edge or In Between: Niche Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships." *American Journal of Sociology* 101(3):698–720.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Julia Sensenbrenner. 1993. "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 98(6):1320–50.
- Quintane, Eric, and Adam M. Kleinbaum. 2011. "Matter over Mind? E-mail Data and the Measurement of Social Networks." *Connections* 31(1):22–46.
- Rao, Hayagreeva, Philippe Monin, and Rodolphe Durand. 2005. "Border Crossing: Bricolage and the Erosion of Categorical Boundaries in French Gastronomy." *American Sociological Review* 70(6):968–91.
- Reagans, Ray, and Bill McEvily. 2003. "Network Structure and Knowledge Transfer: The Effects of Cohesion and Range." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 48(2):240–67.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1981. "Nonconformity, Competence, and Influence in Groups: A Test of Two Theories." *American Sociological Review* 46(3):333–47.
- Rivera, Lauren A. 2012. "Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms." *American Sociological Review* 77(6):999–1022.
- Rivera, Lauren A. 2015. "Go with Your Gut: Emotion and Evaluation in Job Interviews." *American Journal of Sociology* 120(5):1339–89.
- Rossmann, Gabriel, Nicole Esparza, and Phillip Bonacich. 2010. "I'd Like to Thank the Academy, Team Spillovers, and Network Centrality." *American Sociological Review* 75(1):31–51.
- Schein, Edgar H. 2010. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Seibert, Scott E., Maria L. Kramer, and Robert C. Liden. 2001. "A Social Capital Theory of Career Success." *Academy of Management Journal* 44(2):219–37.

- Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* 98(1):1–29.
- Simmel, Georg. 1950. *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. Translated by K. H. Wolff. New York: The Free Press.
- Small, Mario Luis, David J. Harding, and Michèle Lamont. 2010. "Reconsidering Culture and Poverty." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 629(6):6–27.
- Smith, Edward Bishop. 2011. "Identities as Lenses: How Organizational Identity Affects Audiences' Evaluation of Organizational Performance." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 56(1):61–94.
- Sørensen, Jesper B. 2002. "The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm Performance." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 47(1):70–91.
- Srivastava, Sameer B. 2015. "Intraorganizational Network Dynamics in Times of Ambiguity." *Organization Science* 26(5):1365–80.
- Srivastava, Sameer B., and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2011. "Culture, Cognition, and Collaborative Networks in Organizations." *American Sociological Review* 76(2):207–233.
- Srivastava, Sameer B., Amir Goldberg, V. Govind Manian, and Christopher Potts. Forthcoming. "Enculturation Trajectories and Individual Attainment: An Interactional Language Use Model of Cultural Dynamics in Organizations." *Management Science*.
- Tausczik, Yla R., and James W. Pennebaker. 2010. "The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 29(1):24–54.
- Tushman, Michael L., and Thomas J. Scanlan. 1981. "Characteristics and External Orientations of Boundary Spanning Individuals." *Academy of Management Journal* 24(1):83–98.
- Uzzi, Brian. 1996. "The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect." *American Sociological Review* 61(4):674–98.
- Uzzi, Brian. 1997. "Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42(1):35–67.
- Uzzi, Brian. 1999. "Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing." *American Sociological Review* 64(4):481–505.
- Uzzi, Brian, Satyam Mukherjee, Michael Stringer, and Ben Jones. 2013. "Atypical Combinations and Scientific Impact." *Science* 342(6157):468–72.
- Uzzi, Brian, and Jarrett Spiro. 2005. "Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem." *American Journal of Sociology* 111(2):447–504.
- Van den Steen, Eric. 2010. "Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity." *Management Science* 56(1):1718–38.
- Van Maanen, John, and Stephen R. Barley. 1984. "Occupational Communities: Culture and Control in Organizations." Pp. 287–365 in *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 6, edited by B. M. Staw and L. Cummings. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Vedres, Balázs, and David Stark. 2010. "Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping Groups." *American Journal of Sociology* 115(4):1150–90.
- Weber, Roberto A., and Colin F. Camerer. 2003. "Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach." *Management Science* 49(4):400–415.
- Xiao, Zhixing, and Anne S. Tsui. 2007. "When Brokers May Not Work: The Cultural Contingency of Social Capital in Chinese High-Tech Firms." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 52(1):1–31.
- Zelizer, Viviana. 2011. *Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1997. *Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Zuckerman, Ezra W. 1999. "The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(5):1398–1438.
- Zuckerman, Ezra W., Tai-Young Kim, Kalinda Ukanwa, and James von Rittmann. 2003. "Robust Identities or Non-Entities? Typecasting in the Feature Film Labor Market." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(5):1018–75.
- Zukin, Sharon, and Paul DiMaggio. 1990. *Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Amir Goldberg is Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and (by courtesy) of Sociology, School of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University. He received his PhD in Sociology from Princeton University. His research lies at the intersection of organization studies, cultural sociology, and network science. He is interested in understanding how culture emerges and evolves, and what role networks play in this process. His current work draws on linguistics and computational social science to explore the effects of cultural alignment and variation on individual and group success.

Sameer B. Srivastava is Assistant Professor and Harold Furst Chair in Management Philosophy and Values at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and is also affiliated with UC Berkeley Sociology. His research examines how social networks, culture, and cognition affect career dynamics and individual attainment within organizations. Although anchored in organizational sociology, his work also draws insight and perspective from neighboring disciplines such as psychology, political science, and linguistics. His current projects focus on applying the tools of computational linguistics to identify new ways of understanding and measuring organizational culture. Sameer holds a PhD in Sociology and Organizational Behavior from Harvard University.

V. Govind Manian is a PhD student at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. His current research focuses on the effects of organizational culture, measured using computational methods, on medical practices in hospitals. He earned a dual degree in Biomedical Engineering and Pure Mathematics from Purdue University (2012) and an MS in Management Science and Engineering from Stanford University (2015).

William Monroe is a PhD student in the Computer Science Department at Stanford. His research focuses on using computational approaches to understanding and producing language while incorporating the real-world

context. He holds a BS (2013) and MS (2015) in Computer Science, also from Stanford.

Christopher Potts is Professor of Linguistics and, by courtesy, of Computer Science, at Stanford, and Director of the Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI) at Stanford. In his research, he uses computational methods to explore how emotion is expressed in language and how linguistic production and interpretation are influenced by the context of utterance. He is the author of the 2005 book *The Logic of Conventional Implicatures* as well as numerous scholarly papers in computational and theoretical linguistics. He earned his BA from NYU in 1999 and his PhD from UC Santa Cruz in 2003.