by Steven R. Corman

A new “strategic framework” for U.S. Public Diplomacy has at long last been released. Oddly, it is a slide show rather than a paper, but perhaps that’s because it is to be the basis for a briefing today. My colleague Phil Seib has already expressed disappointment in the new proposal:

It is so lacking in imagination, so narrow in its scope, and so insufficient in its appraisal of the tasks facing U.S. public diplomats that it is impossible to understand why its preparation took so many months.

One particular way in which this is true is the plan’s conception of narrative.

The number one objective in the strategy is to “shape the narrative.” Its authors reckon that we are not dealing effectively with new media, that inaccurate information shapes our story before we have a chance to do the shaping ourselves, and that too little information is available to audiences around the world. Accordingly it specifies the following tactics (paraphrasing):

• Rapidly respond to inaccurate information and shape stories through engagement with international media
• Expand platforms for shaping dialogue, communicating our perspectives and countering misinformation
• Use new modes of communication

The slides say these goals are the first phase of developing a more detailed plan, which will be taken up by working groups. Fair enough.  But the framework will guide the way the working groups think about the problem, and the guidance seems to be based in an outdated message influence model of strategic communication that fails to take account of the rugged landscape on which U.S. public diplomacy operates.

First, the framework clearly conceives the narrative problem as one of inaccurate information. But this misses the point; narratives are not about facts, they are about how facts are framed and interpreted. Extremists work tirelessly to tie U.S. actions in the Middle East to a master narrative of the crusades. The facts of the crusades are not really in dispute. Western/Christian powers aimed to seize lands from the Arab/Muslim people–especially Jerusalem–and in doing so served their economic and political interests.

Many facts of present day U.S. actions in the Middle East resonate with this account. We provide military and economic support to Israel, which is determined to keep Jerusalem out of the hands of the Arabs. We have recently invaded an Arab country and maintain a large number of troops in the region for the purposes of protecting our interests. Our leader said in 2001 that we were on a crusade. Our soldiers have bible references inscribed on their weapons. I have first-hand reports that active duty military personnel are wearing this patch on their uniforms in Iraq, and maybe Afghanistan too. None of these facts are inaccurate.

The U.S. offers a couple of counter-narratives against the crusader portrayal. One is that we are involved in a fight between Good (represented by us) and Evil (represented by violent extremists). But one can imagine crusaders saying something similar, and the extremists simply argue that these roles are reversed.

We also say we are trying to bring democracy and freedom to the lands where we are fighting (something reiterated in the new framework). But extremist ideologues like Abu Yahiya al-Libi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Bakr Basyir argue forcefully that democracy is a form of polytheism that is part of the crusader plot to weaken the foundations of Islam.  Thus they turn our “gift of democracy” narrative against us.

Second, “shaping the narrative” is the wrong concept to use in the new strategic framework. It imagines that we can take an existing narrative and gradually use messages to alter its form. But in the case of the crusader narrative this is more akin to shaping a balloon. We press in one place and the balloon expands in another place to compensate. When we let go of the spot where pressure is being applied the balloon snaps back to its original shape. This happens because, as we have argued, the communication system has taken on a great deal of inertia such that new messages are readily assimilated to the existing structure.

A better goal would be to try to disrupt the existing narrative system–to pop the balloon–so a new narrative could be formed where our messages could get some purchase. With respect to the crusader narrative, a significant disruption would be some kind of breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would demonstrate that we are no longer complicit in the long-term project of the crusades. Needless to say, that is a tough nut to crack. But such is the nature of the challenge, and this or something like it is the only realistic way of changing the narrative.

Finally, the strategic framework seems to rely heavily on the idea of mastering the means of transmitting messages. It calls for better application of the tools of marketing, better utilization of new media platforms and social networking technologies, and better coordinated communication efforts. None of these are bad ideas in themselves. But they imply that the main problem is that we are not good enough at sending messages through newly available channels. If we could only do this better we would be more successful at shaping narratives. Yet in the absence of a more fundamental change in our communication strategy it is unlikely to do much good. Indeed it could make things worse if we more efficiently deliver messages that can be assimilated to the crusader narrative.

The narrative gap in the new stragegic framework lies in its assumptions that the problems are inaccurate information, lack of  shaping efforts, and inadequate use of media channels. In reailty the problems are that existing facts resonate better in the target audience with a crusader narrative than the alternatives we are offering, that the communication system is locked in a pattern of iterpretation that favors the extremists, and that just doing a better job of sending messages will do nothing to change things.

by Kristin Fleischer

In his book Fighting the War of Ideas like Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists, J. Michael Waller argues that the United States already has a “secret weapon worse than death,” and it is cheap, readily available and easy to deploy. That weapon is ridicule.

Although the suggestion that ridicule and satire are legitimate tools of strategic communication might receive some – dare I say it – ridicule, Waller’s argument is a good one. Ridicule and satire have a long history in warfare, and they have been deployed both offensively and defensively. In the U.S., ridicule was used in the Revolutionary War, both to mock the British troops and to raise the morale of the American fighters. In WWII, domestic use of ridicule targeted Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. In a more contemporary example, Waller cites Team America: World Police as an example of effective parody of Islamic terrorists and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il.  While a movie that features graphic sex between puppets might not have universal appeal, Waller is correct in pointing out that prior to the movie, American audiences would likely not consider the Korean dictator someone to laugh at.

Nor is humiliation merely a Western conception. In pre-Islamic society in the Middle East, law breakers were often mutilated – either whipped or dismembered – as much for purposes of humiliation as pain. They became living symbols of what befell criminals in the community. Ridicule was also used as a weapon of war in both pre-Islamic and early Islamic society and poets were often assassinated because of their power to create and spread ridicule. Today, Waller argues, “many extremists equate ridicule with pain or death.” Bin Laden himself has been quoted as saying he fears humiliation more than death. Well known strategic advice says ‘know your enemy.’ If your enemy fears humiliation over death – which would serve to make him a martyr – then the use of ridicule seems highly appropriate:

In nearly every aspect of society and across culture and time, ridicule works. Ridicule leverages the emotions and simplifies the complicated and takes on the powerful, in politics, business, law, entertainment, the media, literature, culture, sports and romance. Ridicule can tear down faster than the other side can rebuild. It can smash a theoretical or intellectual construct (p. 95).

Jarret Brachman makes a similar argument:

If there’s one thing I’ve learned about jihadis in my career it’s this: they are our secret weapon in the fight against jihadis… they are more than happy to point us in the directions of their weaknesses.

Brachman has coined the term ‘jihobbyists’ to refer to a growing number of armchair terrorists, who cheer on extremism from the web. The term, and the attitude that accompany it, have ‘stirred the pot’ in a most revealing way: “What you find by doing this is that the jihadis can’t not respond. And what they respond to is what they are most sensitive about.” And as Brachman points out, what really gets under the skin of these jihbbyists is not an insult to their ideology or religious beliefs, but the suggestion they still live in their mother’s basement. After all, it is very difficult to maintain a serious and terrifying self image when you get compared to this guy.

Waller’s suggestions regarding the strategic use of ridicule are an expansion of arguments he and others have made about the importance of language use in ‘the war of ideas.’ In ‘buying into’ terrorist’s language – especially by using terms such as jihad and mujahidin – Waller argues that the U.S. and its allies, “ceased fighting on our terms and placed our ideas at the enemy’s disposal” (p. 54). If this is a war of ideas, and words are weapons, then we need to be using the right ammunition, so to speak. More than that:

Being a declared adversary – even enemy – of the United States is a status symbol among the world’s terrorists, dictators, and political extremists. By taking that enemy too seriously, by hyping it up as a threat, the United States is unintentionally credentializing a heretofore insignificant individual or group, and giving it the stature it needs to rise above its own society, establish itself, attract recruits, and gain influence. Ridicule can cut the enemy down to size (p. 104).

According Waller (p. 109), ridicule is vital because:

• It sticks;
• The target can’t refute it;
• It is almost impossible to repress;
• It spreads on its own and multiplies with each re-telling;
• It boosts morale at home;
• Our enemy shows far greater intolerance to ridicule than we;
• Ridicule divides the enemy, damages its morale, and makes it less attractive to supporters and prospective recruits; and
• The ridicule-armed warrior need not fix a physical sight on the target. Ridicule will find its own way to the targeted individual. To the enemy, being ridiculed means losing respect. It means losing influence. It means losing followers and repelling potential new backers

While Al Qaeda and its ideological offshoots are certainly not insignificant, one recent event that would seem to support Waller’s case and would have been an excellent opportunity to ‘deploy’ ridicule is that of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, commonly known as the ‘underwear bomber.’ Although nothing these days drives the current 24-hour news cycle like the mention of terrorist activity, the facts are that the would-be bomber of the Christmas day flight quite literally sewed explosives into his underwear… and then couldn’t ‘get it off.’

Also, given Waller’s arguments, the appropriate response to Bin Laden’s (alleged) praise for the attack – nearly a month after the fact when intelligence analysis suggested that the video was an example of Al Qaeda struggling to maintain relevance – came not from major media outlets, but from The Daily Show. Snore indeed.  Another, more general example of ridicule that is aimed at the idea of the suicide bomber is a ventriloquist routine by comedian Jeff Dunham, titled Achmed the Dead Terrorist, an example Waller points to in his own blog.

This is not to suggest that the threat of terrorism is non-existent or a call to underestimate Al Qaeda’s ideological appeal or material capabilities, and Waller is quick to point out (correctly) that ridicule can be as dangerous as any kinetic weapon when improperly deployed. In the nine years since September 11, however, far more people in the United States have died of heart failure, diabetes, or car accidents than terrorist attacks. Given this, pointing out that Americans statistically have more to fear from a cheeseburger than a ‘guy in a cave’ is not only true, it’s good strategy.

Having recently returned from a brief (four-day!) trip to Indonesia and Singapore, I’ve been reminded of the value of simply being in a location with eyes and ears open in order to gain insight into current events. While in Indonesia, some interesting communication- and terrorism-related news emerged.

Facebook has been gaining ground in Indonesia, and in terms of absolute number of users, Indonesia is now ranked third in the world after the US and the UK. This is remarkable given the low rate of internet penetration in the country, but is explained by the high number of users of hand-held, internet accessible devices.  Facebook has been in the news in Indonesia lately, and there are two interesting examples. The first is a Facebook group with over 55,000 members that was formed to oppose the recently installed statue of US President Barack Obama in a public park in Menteng, Jakarta. The statue portrays Obama as a young boy, reflecting the years he spent living in Indonesia (1967-71). The Facebook users opposed the statue because they felt as though Obama had not done anything for Indonesia (although others point to his example that someone from modest means can achieve greatness). Eventually the government in Jakarta acquiesed to the demands of the Facebook group, and the statue was moved from the park to the elementary school that Obama attended. Obama will be visiting Indonesia in mid-March for the first time since his election.

The other Facebook-related phenomenon has to do with recent cases of rape, abduction and disappearances of young girls by predatory Facebook users. I drove past a large demonstration in Bandung protesting Facebook, organized by Muslim students. Of course this raises several questions. Is Facebook  itself somehow responsible for these criminal cases? Is there something inherently un-Islamic about Facebook, as the groups seem to claim? (Beyond the criminal behavior, some critics argue that Facebook allows un-Islamic behavior in the form of “hooking up” or no-strings sexual liaisons). Do these cases simply reflect the processes by which knowledge about online predation is disseminated and naive users eventually become more aware of the dangers of online behavior? Finally, it points to the presence of alternatives to Facebook, perhaps more Islam-friendly, by which these students must have organized the protest… because surely they couldn’t have used Facebook to organize the protest.

In the legal realm, Indonesia is considering repealing its very restrictive blasphemy law in the name of free speech, consistent with its more open press and newly embraced democratic ideals. Resistance to this 1965 law has come, not surprisingly, from Islamist sources, including political parties and civil society groups. What is somewhat surprising, however, is who the Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali decided to meet with in order to discuss the judicial review: representatives from the Islamic Defenders Front and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The former is a group of thugs with ties to the Suharto-era quasi-legal, extrajudicial “enforcement” group Pemuda Pancasila, that currently operates territorial “protection” rackets in the name of Islam and frequently runs afoul of the law; the latter is the Indonesian branch of a worldwide Islamist organization whose goal is a global caliphate. Although Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia doesn’t openly advocate violence to achieve its goals, it is banned in some countries, but not in Indonesia — perhaps ironically based on the same freedom of speech doctrine cited by those wishing to overthrow the blasphemy law. In a letter to the Jakarta Post, one writer compared this meeting to a government official in the US meeting on race relations with members of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-nazi groups.

Another legal case is moving through the courts as well. I wrote about it previously in another post a few months ago, and now the case of Mohammad Jibriel is going to trial. He is being tried on charges of providing material support to those responsible for the July 17 bombing in Jakarta of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Prosecutors claim he visited the Middle East where he asked for and received funding for the operation.

And in other news… the Islamist Indonesian Mujahadeen Council (MMI) elected a new leader, Syawal Yasin, who is the son-in-law of terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah co-founder Abdullah Sungkar. The MMI was founded by JI’s other co-founder, Abu Bakar Bashir, although he has since left the Council. Completing the incestuous circle of jihad, the MMI’s deputy chairman is Abu Jibriel, Mohammad Jibriel’s father. The move by the MMI is viewed as move toward a more hardline approach, with the goal of implementing shariah throughout Indonesia. Syawal’s credentials are cemented by his experience training in Afghanistan to wage jihad on the Soviets, credentials shared with many — living and dead – from the top tier of Jemaah Islamiyah.

In brighter news in Indonesia, pluralism carried the day at Jogjakarta’s Islamic University of Indonesia, where two 1,100-year-old Hindu temples were uncovered by a construction crew building a library. The temples are well preserved, thought to be the result of layers of ash covering them after a volcanic eruption, and contain a statue of Ganesha as well as linga and yoni, objects that represent male and female, and the Hindu deities Shiva and Shakti, respectively. As with pre-Islamic religious symbols most everywhere else in the Islamic world, the temples are to be restored and will remain on the universities campus.

Finally, the Philippine government is preparing for more retributive attacks from al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf after the Armed Forces of the Philippines killed six members of the group in a raid, including a senior rebel leader Albader Parad, in February on the island of Jolo. Parad was suspected of playing a major role in recent kidnappings carried out by AS, and his death is considered a serious blow to the organization. On February 27th, suspected AS members surrounded a village and killed 11 and and wounded around 20 people in Basilan. The attack was viewed as revenge for Parad’s death, as well as retribution for the rescue of two Chinese citizens earlier that day in Basilan.

by Jeff Halverson

In the war of ideas for the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world, cultural diplomacy can go a long way. The US government may not be very popular abroad, but our cultural products certainly are. Many Muslims hate our policies, but they still love our movies, listen to our pop music, and cheer for our athletes. Extremists, on the other hand, actively try to disseminate monolithic images of “the other” to their audiences. Al-Qaeda loves to reduce Americans to the archetypal “Crusader” with a singular malevolent purpose. Our films, music, arts, and athletes, can profoundly disrupt and subvert such efforts.

In the age of twenty-four hour news networks, websites, blogs and YouTube, there is no shortage of information out there for inquiring minds to consume. To command a sizable audience amidst such a saturated media landscape (mediascape), many outlets have resorted to promoting outrageous opinions and personalities to garner public attention (i.e. ratings and readers). Thus, the outrageous polarized voices of inflammatory right-wing pundits and snarky left-wing cynics have become a daily fixture of our mediascape and the “old school” journalism of Walter Cronkite has been relegated to the News Hour on PBS.

Even a casual glance through the headlines of the major news sites and magazine stands reveals a disturbing preoccupation with stories about people with names like “Snookie” or “J-Lo.”  Judging by these sorts of headlines, one might not think there’s much going on in the world. But according to UNICEF, some 16,000 children die every day from hunger-related causes (1 every 6 seconds). The world spends well over $1 trillion dollars each year on military expenditures.  Every twenty minutes another species goes extinct. And despite the recent attention, people were suffering and struggling in Haiti long before the devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. So why is the vapid cast of “Jersey Shore” still getting front page attention when the world has no shortage of urgent and horrific matters to report?

People love (even worship) celebrities.

This is nothing new, of course. Some celebrities have even used their cultural deification for good in the world and lent their names and images to important causes. Some of them might adopt causes for publicity or to fix a sullied public image (e.g. Paris Hilton), but I like to believe that most do it out of real compassion for their fellow human beings and the environment they live in. I guess I have “faith” in a few of these “gods.”

Last month, I was part of a planning committee for a grant proposal that would create a major conference on our campus featuring keynote speakers from academia, government, journalism, and the wild world of celebrity-activism. The core idea behind the conference was making specialized academic expertise about Islam accessible to public policymakers and the public-at-large. The inclusion of a celebrity-activist in our proposal was a response to the public’s preoccupation with celebrity-culture and how “ivory tower” intellectuals struggle to get their ideas and perspectives out into the crowded mediascape. After all, how many Americans would even know where Darfur is located if George Clooney hadn’t traveled to see Sudanese refugees with a film crew following him? The “bread and circuses” of the first world are too distracting for most people.

Communicating to a large public audience seems to require the aid of a celebrity spokesperson, ideally one with some credentials and intellectual clout who cannot simply be dismissed for adopting a “pet project.” A lot of NGOs and charities understand this concept. So why doesn’t our government?

No matter how hard they try to be “stars,” congressmen, senators, governors, and other politicians, are not “real” celebrities – although some admittedly exist in both worlds (e.g. Schwarzenegger, Franken, Reagan). President Obama certainly has celebrity status. But if the United States is truly interested in reaching out to the everyday people of the Muslim world and subverting the “clash of civilizations” rhetoric of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Awlaki, we need to bring out the big guns of celebrity firepower through cultural diplomacy.

Even people who hate the U.S. government and its policies love American cultural products, including our movies, music, and athletes. It’s easy for Bin Laden to talk about waging holy war on the land of the “Crusaders” George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, but it’s another thing to convince a kid in Cairo or Riyadh to wage jihad on Leonardo Dicaprio, LeBron James, Will Smith, and Johnny Depp. People in the Muslim world, many of which remain under authoritarian regimes, are understandably distrustful of governments and politicians. It’s easy for the Arab and Muslim street to dismiss the promises and claims of a Secretary of State or U.S. Ambassador reading a speech off of a teleprompter beside representatives of an unelected regime. An American movie star visiting a Muslim city with a charming smile and polite handshake would probably do a better job at disrupting the “Crusader” image constructed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates than a thousand government speeches and photo-ops. In 1971, we used table tennis or “ping-pong diplomacy” to improve U.S.-Chinese relations; what are we doing in the Muslim world today?

I propose a large-scale U.S. cultural ambassador program to university campuses and cities throughout the Muslim world. In 2007, the State Department conducted a program in China that featured Cal Ripken Jr. and organized youth baseball clinics in four cities. This was too brief to be truly effective. And as much as I love baseball, it is not a popular U.S. export to the Muslim world. So an extension of this program to a country like Syria or Jordan would likely be ill-advised. In terms of athletes, we’d be better off sending stars from the NBA – maybe the kids in Amman would enjoy seeing a dunk contest. Basketball is much easier to set-up and play than baseball – especially in crowded, impoverished and arid cities. Movie stars also need to be enlisted. American movies are everywhere. When I lived in Cairo, there were American movies on broadcast television a couple of times a week. The biggest obstacle might be convincing American movie stars to participate between awards ceremonies.

It is equally important to point out that this sort of cultural diplomacy needs to go both ways. There are a lot of people in the United States who – out of fear, ignorance, or anger – carry disturbing attitudes about Muslims that influence our public discourse and the conduct of our elected government (for the worse). These folks likely won’t listen to an informed professor down at the local university or pick up a copy of his or her over-priced academic hardcover at the bookstore, but they might show up to hear Natalie Portman talk about these issues and share her personal insights as someone who has worked and lived in the Middle East (Portman is Co-Chair of a village banking program with Queen Rania of Jordan). People might also sit down in a theater together to watch a play performed by American and Muslim actors, like the brilliant Ghassan Massoud of Syria. American audiences would undoubtedly find it hard to see the zealous jihadi of their fears in an actor creating a work of art on stage beside their fellow countrymen.

In all, the last thing America needs to do is allow U.S.-Muslim relations to be dictated by or restricted to the events on the battlefield when we are all a part of so much more than the characters imagined by both sides of the “War on Terror.”

Mahathir bin Mohamad

File away another patently offensive remark by former Malaysian Prime Minister (1981-2003) Mahathir bin Mohamad, who once again spewed anti-semitic and anti-Western conspiratorial claptrap. In Beirut last week for the 7th annual Conference for Al Quds, an organization that opposes what they view as Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Mahathir let fly with his invective. He argued that if the US could make Avatar, it could also have faked the 9-11 attacks (there’s the conspiracy!). And he argued that despite occasional massacres, Jews have thrived and hold some governments  “to ransom,” including the “Jewish lobby” in the United States. The Jakarta Globe story is here.

Anyone remotely familiar with Mahathir and Malaysian politics is familiar with these kinds of statements. It was Mahathir, after all, who blamed the 1997 East Asian financial crisis first on Jews, then on George Soros. The Anti-Defamation League has a brief compilation of some of Mahathir’s anti-semitic slurs here, dating to 1970. Offending Jews and others has long been Mahathir’s modus operandi, but since stepping down as Prime Minister, it seems as though he is after more attention (and adoration). But first let’s view his statements.

The “Avatar” argument is just silly. Aside from the conspiratorial element of the argument (which I realize still has many adherents, in the Muslim world but also here in the US), it is simply not logical. Avatar was produced in 2009 (although its roots are deeper; director James Cameron felt that the technology wasn’t ready for the film until 2005). The 9-11 attacks occured in 2001, eight (or four) years prior. This argument doesn’t makes sense temporally or logically… unless one buys whole hog into the conspiracy and leaves the real world behind. I suppose that is one of the great things about conspiracies: Logic doesn’t have to play much of a role in the thinking, and arguments that contradict the conspiracy are trotted out as proof of deeper conspiracy in a rapidly degenerating downward spiral. At least in subsequent statements Mahathir acknowledged that it was true the Twin Towers had fallen, but that the American/Zionist conspiracy remains.

Mahathir’s remarks about Jews, which seemingly condone the killing of Jews as a means to control their supposed influence, are simply a continuation of his ugly anti-semitic history. Although well regarded political scientists John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Kenneth Walt (Harvard) wrote a book in 2007 describing not a Jewish Lobby but an Israel Lobby (there is a significant difference), the book was only about the alleged Lobby’s effects — supposedly detrimental — to both American and Israeli foreign policy. The book caused much controversy, as the authors expected, and accusations of anti-semitism, which they flatly denied; more here.

Controversial academic writing is one thing, but one doesn’t usually expect this level of wacky conspiratorial thinking from the former leader of a state on friendly terms with the US. Mahathir’s explanatory statements on his comments at al Quds and a subsequent explanation of the explanation are in English here and here. I recommend reading the comments below the former PM’s posts; he’s got no shortage of sycophants who seemingly eat up his every word. Mahathir has attracted an audience outside of Malaysia as well, who are equally conspiratorial in their thinking. One of my favorite comments is from someone with a western name who feels sorry for Mahathir, who, like Iran’s Holocaust-denying President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has been “unfairly” labelled an anti-semite. That’s great company for the ex-PM to keep, but I thought that Ahmadinejad’s anti-semitism has been established by the words of Ahmadinejad himself, just as the responsibility for 9-11 has been admitted by al Qaeda.

I can’t comment as to whether Mahathir really holds these offensive beliefs. Trained as a medical doctor and skilled in politics, there is no doubt that he is an intelligent man. But events in Malaysia may help explain Mahathir’s ridiculous rants.

After developing a dislike for the policies of Anwar Ibrahim, the man he was grooming to take over as PM, Mahathir fabricated charges of sodomy in 1998 and had Anwar imprisoned. He chose who he thought would be a safe replacement, and then stepped down in 2003, handing the reigns to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Badawi pursued his own policies, at times rankling Mahathir, who found himself sidelined by his party, UMNO (after clearly hoping for a position similar to Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, who after stepping down as Prime Minister took the position of Mentor Minister, and who still plays a significant role in Singaporean politics). Despite trying to elbow his way back into the room, Mahathir remained marginalized. So he turned to the one outlet where he could still appear to be a player, the blogosphere, and where he became an armchair critic of the Badawi administration. Najib Tun Razak succeeded Badawi as PM in 2009.

It’s more than a little ironic that Mahathir, who controlled the Malaysian press with an iron grip during his rule, has turned to the kind of criticism that he would have jailed people for making during his own rule. But in this context it’s perhaps easier to understand why Mahathir would publish such rubbish in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence (remember that “overhwelming contradictory evidence” is often cited by conspiracy theorists as evidence of the conspiracy). The poor man still craves the attention (and adoration) he felt as Prime Minister, and has found his realm. Judging by the comments on his blogs, he has found like minded company that will remain, along with him, marginalized.

I almost feel bad responding as it gives Mahathir more attention. But when the former leader of an important state such as Malaysia makes comments such as these, it’s better to try understand his thinking. It’s clear he has his fans in Malaysia and elsewhere, but it’s also clear that they will remain a fringe element for whom logic does not apply.

by R. Bennett Furlow

Geert Wilders is a Dutch parliamentarian and head of the Party for Freedom (PVV).  He is also a very clear opponent of Islam.  Most critics of Islam are very careful to say that they oppose “radical Islam” or “Islamism” or “Islamic extremism,” but have no problem with the religion as a whole.  Not Wilders.  He has made it clear in no uncertain terms that he “hate[s] Islam.” He has compared the Qur’an to Mein Kampf, referred to Islam as fascist, and made a film, Fitna,(“discord” in Arabic), that juxtaposes passages from the Qur’an with images of 9/11, the Madrid bombings and other acts of terrorism.

Normally, unless their words lead directly to violence, advocates of hate can be dismissed.  Wilders gets a little more attention because he is an elected politician and is adept at using the media to promote himself and his beliefs.  Recently two things occurred that raised Wilders’ status.  First, he was banned from entering the United Kingdom.  This was seen by many (not just his supporters) as a violation of freedom of speech.  The ban was later overturned.  Second, Wilders was charged with violating hate speech laws in his native Netherlands.  Once again, Wilders is crying foul and saying his freedom of speech is being violated.  Wilders’ trial began January 20th.

The issue of Geert Wilders boils down to one of hate speech versus free speech.  Certainly one should be allowed to express one’s opinion freely and without fear of prosecution, but there are hate speech laws for a reason.  If Wilders’ intent is to bring about hostility toward a group (Muslims) then his speech is “hate speech” and the prosecution is justified.  If it is merely criticism, and not intended to cause harm to anyone then it is free speech and the prosecution is unjustified.  However, Wilders seems to want to make his trial not just about free speech but about Islam as well.  In a statement to the court Wilders said:

This trial is obviously about the freedom of speech.  But this trial is also about the process of establishing the truth.  Are the statements that I have made and the comparisons that I have taken, as cited in the summons, true?  If something is true then can it still be punishable?  This is why I urge you to not only submit to my request to hear witnesses and experts on the subject of freedom of speech.  But I ask you explicitly to honour my request to hear witnesses and experts on the subject of Islam.  I refer not only to Mister Jansen and Mister Admiraal, but also to the witness/experts from Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  Without these witnesses, I cannot defend myself properly and, in  my opinion, this would not be a fair trial.

Among those Wilders wants to call as “experts” are Robert Spencer, Wafa Sultan and Andrew Bostom, all of whom are highly critical of Islam.

The Wilders case illustrates a larger problem in Dutch society, and potentially across Europe.  While approximately five percent of the Netherlands is Muslim, they are increasingly victims of prejudice and even persecution.  Filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was killed by a Dutch Muslim (of Moroccan decent) over his short film, Submission,which crudely criticized Islam’s treatment of women.  Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a native Somali and former Dutch parliamentarian went into seclusion for a period and has since had significant security because of her statements about Islam (she was the writer of Submission).  These acts have in turn lead to an increase in attacks against Muslims in the Netherlands, including the burning of a Muslim school among other acts of violence.  Muslims in the Netherlands have a very low voter turnout rate.  They tend to be insular and stay within their particular communities, causing them to identify more and more with their  religion and less with their ethnicity or nationality.

A pattern has developed over the past ten years or so that goes as follows: A prominent non-Muslim figure speaks out against Islam, a Muslim reacts, sometimes violently, leading to more statements and actions against Islam, again a Muslim reacts, and so on.  All the while the Muslim community begins to turn further inward and embraces the status of a marginalized outsider.  The alienation of the Muslim community will obviously only create more strife and tension.  If this pattern continues, things will only get worse in the Netherlands, for both Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

The real issue in the Wilders case is one of motivation.  What is the purpose of his statements?  What is the strategic goal of this level of discourse?  Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and others use language like “infidel”, “crusader” and “apostate” to define their enemy in terms of “otherness.”  Once the designated (often abstract) enemy is seen as a violent oppressor it is easier to recruit followers and continue the cycle of violence, or so the theory goes.

Wilders seems to be the flip side of the coin.  His statements are attempts to define Islam not just in negative terms, but as a threat that should be met with violence.  He seems to desire a “clash of civilizations” much like Bin Laden.  Otherwise what is the point of his speech?  Obviously there is not going to be a mass exodus of Muslims from the Netherlands, nor are they going to convert to Christianity en masse.  So if violence is not the point, what is?

When a Muslim extremist commits an act of violence, many in the West call on extremist Muslim preachers to be held accountable for their inflammatory rhetoric.  This trial is the Dutch people calling Wilders out.  If his language is something beneficial to the people of the Netherlands, then he and others like him need to prove it by clarifying their goals.  Otherwise they are doing nothing but furthering the cycle of animosity and violence.

by Steven R. Corman

Yesterday the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan over the last year.  It concluded that “2009 proved to be the deadliest year yet for civilians since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.”  The surprise is what it says about the causes of these deaths, which in turn identifies an under-exploited opportunity to amplify ideological contradictions.

Sources of conflict-related civilian deaths in Afghanistan, 2009

Of the 2412 conflict-related deaths in 2009, 67%  were at the hands of “anti-government elements,” whereas 25% were attributable to ISAF and other pro-government forces.  Eight percent “died as a result of cross fire or by unexploded ordinance[sic].”

The anti-government figures represent an increase of 41% over 2008.  According to the report this is attributable to an increase in suicide and IED attacks.  Militants are also killing people they believe to be government supporters.

The pro-government numbers represent a decrease of 28% over the same period.  A report by Dexter Filkins in the New York Times attributes this welcome news to a tightening of restrictions on use of airstrikes.  To maintain the downward trend, American commanders also plan to reduce their use of night missions into villages, which often lead to unintended firefights with locals.

The state of affairs signaled by this report presents the UN/NATO/ISAF forces with a crucial opportunity.  As we argued in a white paper published last year, one of the critical functions of ideology is to smooth-over contradictions, like the one between the realities of extremist operations and the Qur’anic prohibition on killing innocents (especially when they are Muslim).

This function of ideology is why we were treated last month to a desperate video by Adam Gadahn, in which he said his buddies are not killing civilians, and are sorry for any civilians they have killed by accident. His dissembling is a clear sign of worry about the issue, and these new numbers show that there is good reason for worry on their part.

The pro-government response should be to push this contradiction into the open.  Norah Nilan, Chief Human Rights Officer for UNAMA, took a small step in this direction by saying in today’s release

Anti-Government elements remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian deaths, killing three times as many civilians as pro-Government forces. It is vital that determined efforts are now made by the insurgency to put into effect the Taliban “Code of Conduct” that calls on them to protect the lives of civilians.

She added that “Anti-Government elements must realize that they too have obligations under international law.”

To me this statement is too tepid and deferential to the Bad Guys.  It more or less says that they have good intentions but have problems with execution, and they need to do better.  This is not unlike Gadahn’s argument.

Yet this assessment is at odds with facts stated in the same report that a number of the casualties are from cold-blooded political executions.  And isn’t killing 70 adults and children (and wounding 65) by bombing a volleyball game in Pakistan something more than a failure to stick with policy?

A better statement would be that the extremists are insincere in their claims that they want to protect civilian lives.  The Good Guys should be putting Gadahn saying “we don’t kill Muslims,” and quotes from the Taliban “code of conduct” about protecting civilians, side-by-side with press reports about and images of the innocent civilians who they are killing.

They should ask how the extremists can say they value and protect civilian lives when they bomb volleyball games and execute people.  And how could it be true that the extremists value innocent civilians while the Western forces hate them, as Gadahn claims, when the extremists’ deaths are going up and the Westerners’ numbers are going down?

Muslim allies in the region should be branding the extremists al-Munafiqin (or perhaps an equivalent in local languages).  Because like the Hypocrites of Medina they say they accept the word of God, but then act contrary to it when they see some advantage in doing so.  They are pretending to be devout Muslims for the sake of political expediency, but they are not acting like devout Muslims.

These kinds of efforts would help amplify the extremists’ contradictions and show them for what they really are.  Chiding them about their obligations under international law, not so much.

by Steven R. Corman

In today’s Washington Post, Bruce Hoffman published an op-ed piece entitled “Al-Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one, too.” I have a lot of respect for Hoffman and whatever he says about terrorism bears consideration. But in this case I’m not too sure what he’s driving at.

As evidence for the existence of a new AQ strategy, Hoffman offers the following:

• They have graduated people from multiple countries from training camps and sent them to conduct operations.
• They are being opportunistic and are monitoring our defenses for openings in our security efforts
• They have killed our operatives in a foreign country
• They have involved our citizens in their organization and have used them to conduct attacks and attempted attacks here and abroad

Little of this strikes me as new.  The 9/11 attackers were AQ training camp alumni, and they conducted that attack by monitoring and exploiting our security weaknesses.  They killed our operatives in Iraq (though actual military ones rather than the quasi-military ones killed in the attack against the CIA in Afghanistan).  I suppose the involvement of Americans in high profile attacks is somewhat new.  On the other hand they have had involvement from American and British citizens for some time, and have always wanted to use those people to attack the West.  The recent attacks in the US have neither been numerous nor large in scale.

If there is a new strategy here, I wish Hoffman would tell us what it is. Or maybe I’m just being dense. If so please enlighten me with a comment.

In the rest of Hoffman’s piece there is little to disagree with:  We’re still being reactive, we’re defencing against yesterday’s threats, and we are not focusing enough on radicalization and recruitment.  But then again none of that is really new, either.

by Chris Lundry

In an AP wire story picked up by numerous print and online media, Russell Contreras writes about discovering the “new movement” of Muslim-Hindu punk bands (including Boston’s the Kominas). The implication is that we are witnessing a new youth music movement that might serve as a challenge to religious fundamentalism and its extremist outcomes.  It’s a great bit of publicity for the band, but it reflects the author’s lack of prior awareness about the music rather than a description of a breaking music movement.  In fact Muslim punk is nothing new.

Punk rock was invented by New York’s The Ramones, who took a couple chords, played them loud and fast, and added lyrics that reflected their comic books and B-movies sensibilities. After the Ramones played an early show in London, with future members of seminal British punk bands the Clash, the Damned, and the Sex Pistols in the audience, the music and movement quickly bloomed there. It went through the first of many changes, however, as British punk was more political (reflecting the direr economic situation there), and people such as Malcom McClaren linked it to colorful, shocking fashion and art. Musical skills increased on both sides of the Atlantic, but in the United States the bands began to eschew what had become peacock-like fashion for a simpler look and sound that lost some of the pop tinges of of both the Ramones and British punk, and thus “hardcore” was born. Punk rock and hardcore branched out in all sorts of directions: new wave and post punk, straight edge (whose adherents foreswear sex, alcohol and drugs), vegan hardcore, Krishnacore, emo, pop-punk, grunge, crossover and thrash (punk fused with heavy metal), and even so-called Christian punk, to name just a few.

All of this occurred mostly under the radar of mainstream media, until the early 1990s (or, as some state more precisely, 1991, “The Year Punk Broke“). Bands such as Sonic Youth and Nirvana played punk-influenced music that was radio friendly, and hence radio stations played them and they became huge. There were plenty of earlier bands that got some limited radio airplay in the United States, most notably the Clash (albeit far past their prime); in the late 1970s British punk bands were all over the British charts. Most of punk remained underground (although subjected to more outside attention that usual), but plenty of bands formed to play radio friendly pop with a “punk” edge and look, and this genre of music is now well established. It was also around this time that “jocks” stopped beating up “punks” and joined them at concerts.

Why the brief history of punk? Because throughout this entire evolution, punk bands formed all over the world, including Hindu and Muslim countries, and including Hindus and Muslims — nominal and practicing — in the United States, consistent with the DIY (do-it-yourself) ethos of the movement (often there was a time lag, but always there were local musical and cultural elements). Maximum Rock and Roll, the standard bearing ‘zine for hardcore and punk (published since 1982, with roots to 1977), published “Scene Reports” from around the world that chronicled bands and the scenes that supported them. Muslims playing punk rock is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is the environment today (or post 9-11) that is new.

Popular and “underground” music has always had an air of rebellion; punk rock merely turned up the volume. Music has provided a space for young people to express themselves and their identities, to question the cultural assumptions of their environments and to push for social change (COMOPS Journal has already published blog posts on heavy metal and rap). Social commentary and criticism has a long history in American music (from slaves’ work songs to Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit” to punk tours such as Rock Against Reagan).

So what about the Kominas and the so-called “Taqwacore”? To my ears half of their music stands close to the radio friendly side of punk, with others a bit noisier (some songs can be heard on their myspace page). Their tunes blend funk and ska, and borrow heavily from their forebearers. “Sharia Law in the USA” is derived from the Sex Pistols “Anarchy in the UK,” for example, and “Suicide Bomb the Gap” echoes the Big Boys’ taste for funk (and Kool and the Gang). Some of their music blends South Asian elements, but this isn’t new (remember the Rolling Stones “Paint it Black” and the Beatles “Norwegian Wood”?).

The notion of Taqwacore is interesting, although this is still American music played in the United States. They may face derision from some Muslim members of their audiences, but they won’t face beheading for apostacy. With the expansion of new media and the ease of global communication, it would be interesting to see if the Kaminas had any influence on bands elsewhere — I’m sure they’ve got fans whose only connection to the band is the internet. What would be infinitely more interesting, however, would be to see how punk bands made up of faithful Muslims are faring in Muslim countries with oppressive social environments and strong pressure to conform. They do exist — I’ve seen them in Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1990s — but it’s much harder for westerners to gain access to their music or to be able to gauge their impacts.

Interesting though this may be from a cultural point of view, the fact is that Muslims punk has been around for years.  It’s doubtful that this latest spurt from the movement signals anything new with respect to resisting extremism or the religious establishment.

Below is a list of the top ten most-viewed posts of 2009 on COMOPS Journal:

1. Why Israel’s Twitter Experiment Flopped (January 12).  Dawn Gilpin analyzes Israel’s use of Twitter during its excursion into Gaza, concluding that it failed because of a lack of understanding of symmetry, culture, and the structure of the different media platforms.
2. OK Now I’m Confused (April 17).  Steve Corman comments on an apparent blurring of lines between public affairs and public diplomacy in the State Department.
3. Introducing the PD Chief Count-Up Clock (April 10).  COMOPS Journal inaugurates a count-up clock to the appointment of a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  It ran for 129 days until the appointment of Judith McHale on May 26.
4. Understand What Narrative Is and Does (September 3).  Scott Ruston urges a more sophisticated view of narrative in the conflict in Afghanistan.
5. Getting Beat in the War of Ideas (February 26).  Steve Corman discusses on a poll released by WorldPublicOpinion.org showing dismal perceptions of the US in the Muslim world as of the end of the Bush administration.
6. NATO Conference on Strategic Communication (May 16).  Steve Corman reports on a NATO-sponsored meeting in Ankara, Turkey discussing main themes that emerged from the conference.
7. Recent Developments in Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts (September 10).  Chris Lundry analyzes developments in Indonesian anti-terrorism in the aftermath of the July 17 hotel bombings in Jakarta.
8. Rap is Da Bomb for Defeating Abu Yahya (September 14).  Jeff Halverson proposes an alternative strategy for undermining AQ ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi.
9. A Broader View of Internet Radicaliztion (March 26).  Pauline Cheong analyzes apparent disagreement in two reports about Internet radicalization.
10. Goodbye GWOT, Hello…Overseas Contingency Operation? (April 5).  Steve Corman critiques the Obama administration’s questionable effort to relabel the conflict formerly known as the global war on terrorism.

There were also some posts from previous years with staying power.  Here are the top five:

1. Did the Bad Guys Scuttle Their Own Forums? (October 13, 2008).
2. COMOPS Top Posts of 2008 (December 31, 2008).
3. Resisting Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta (November 6, 2008).
4. Analysis: Blogging Better at the State Department (October 9, 2007).
5. Strategic Communication by Any Other Name (September 30, 2008).

Many thanks to all our readers, and may you have a happy and prosperous 2010.