The U.S. Senate has discovered the internets.  Well, kind of.  What actually happened is that yesterday, at a gathering sponsored by CNAS, the Senate’s Global Internet Freedom Caucus launched.  The caucus -which is chaired by Senators Kaufman and Brownback (Having two, soon-to-be retired Senators as caucus chairs seems a tad shortsighted, no?), and has received broad bi-partisan support from the likes of Senators McCain, Casey, Lieberman, etc - will have three main charges: increasing awareness about global internet freedom; highlighting government attempts at restricting internet access; and promoting techniques to ensure access is as free as possible.

One idea that received a lot of discussion during the event was the notion that the expansion of internet freedom in closed societies would lead to an expansion of political freedom.  An analogy made by some of the participants was that just as Voice of America contributed to the opening of closed societies in Eastern Bloc countries, internet freedom has the power to create political openings in places like Iran and China. 

To me, this kind of thinking illustrates why it’s important to carry modest expectations about what the U.S. can realistically do to alter the behavior of other governments.  It’s certainly the case that during the Cold War, the U.S. could use Voice of America to offer a window into a wider world not otherwise seen by citizens of authoritarian countries.  Few would disagree with the argument that opening this window broadened the strictures of what was deemed acceptable politically acceptable in those countries.  However, any impact had by this opening was hemmed in by the autocratic governments' ability to do things like bribe, intimidate or imprison its citizens to ensure that they would not engage as participants in a broadened political discourse. 

The same goes for internet freedom.  When asked about the internet freedom\political freedom linkage, panelist Rebecca McKinnon had what I found to be a pretty insightful response: It depends on what else is happening in the larger environment.  McKinnon pointed out that there’s a tendency to look at this issue only in terms of access, but in most cases, it’s not just the blocking of websites or services that’s the problem, it’s all the other bad things usually done by authoritarian governments.  When governments can remove web content, surveil users, conduct cyber-attacks, control domain-name registration, etc, expanding access is, in most cases, insufficient for the creation of political liberalization.  As McKinnon put it, this is why the internet is not “freedom juice,” which magically results in democratization.  There are limits to what U.S. legislation or diplomacy can achieve if governments are bent on restricting their citizens’ internet activities. 

Still, I can’t help but feel optimistic that a well-formulated U.S. global internet policy could produce meaningful change for people living under oppressive governments.  The growing push to expand internet and social networking access for Iranian dissidents is one example.  A proposal backed by Google to incorporate censorship into the negotiation of trade agreements is another.  Hopefully the creation of the caucus will translate into political support for such ideas.  

But what happens if the U.S. switches spending from defense to social welfare? Who will protect what used to be known as the "Free World"? Who will police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression? Those are all responsibilities currently performed by America. But it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time. Something will have to give.

A couple of weeks ago I got into a blog dust-up with one David Rieff about the nature and implications of American exceptionalism. Damon Linker, over at TNR, has drafted the response that I wish I had written at the time:

Despite what one might conclude from the disastrous presidency of that liberal moralist George W. Bush, the imperative to support and encourage liberalism abroad does not necessitate stupidity. On the contrary, it demands intelligence and sobriety about how best to affect liberal change in divergent places at different historical moments. It demands that we temper our longing to fulfill our liberal duties with a clear-headed assessment of the possible unintended consequences of our actions. It demands that we remain forever mindful of the efficacy, as well as the limits, of our power (both hard and soft). It demands, in sum, that we combine grandly idealistic ends with cunningly realistic means, just as Niebuhr called on us to do, and as Lincoln showed us how to do. 

That we have often failed to achieve this synthesis is evidence of human (and American) imperfection as well as of the recalcitrance of a complicated, heartrending world. (Niebuhr thought it was also evidence of original sin, which is possible, though it's equally possible to make sense of tragedy in rigorously secular terms.) The proper response to these failures is redoubled resolution to do better, to be smarter, to choose more efficacious means, in the future. It is most certainly not to give up on the ends, as Rieff appears prepared to do.

This is a very smart way for progressives to talk about exceptionalism and one that highlights the flaw in Rieff's deterministic - and depressing - notion that American exceptionalism has led to terrible excesses in the past  . . . and thus will always lead to terrible excesses in the future. Now to be fair, Rieff does have history on his side; a point that he never ceases to make. But to follow his argument to its apparent conclusion is to believe that the best course of action for the US is simply to vacate the field because in the end we are likely do more harm than good. Certainly this is a legitimate point of view, but it's not terribly helpful or illuminating from a policy perspective (and indeed if there is a policy prescription hiding out in Rieff's recent blog posts perhaps others can help me locate it).

Over at World Politics Review, I have a new piece highlighting the various obstacles to an effective US national security strategy and what steps I believe the Obama Administration should take to right the ship:

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama famously declared that he was running for the nation's highest office not simply to end the war in Iraq, but to change the mindset that got America involved in Iraq in the first place. More than a year into his presidency, he is discovering that such a seminal transformation is far easier said than done.

From Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay to repairing America's impaired global image, precious energy and political capital is being spent extricating America from the disastrous impact of the Bush administration's stewardship of U.S. foreign policy. But as catastrophic as the individual policies were, the greatest damage of the Bush years may have been in diverting U.S. attention away from the fundamental transformations taking place in the global arena, changes on which Obama and his foreign policy team are now being forced to play catch-up.

More and more, the underpinnings of American power are being challenged by a host of aggressive and increasingly prominent transnational and non-state forces. While the U.S. maintains its fixation on the threat of jihadist terror, a new and arguably more pressing set of global issues have emerged -- including climate change, migration, global health pandemics, cybersecurity threats, nuclear proliferation and illicit criminal networks. A 21st-century national security strategy must prioritize these issues and place them front and center in the policymaking process.

But in both focus and capabilities, the United States is increasingly ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with these emerging challenges. Instead of charting a desperately needed new course, current U.S. national security strategy -- driven by inflated conceptions of U.S. power and interests -- is impeding the need for real and lasting reform. At a moment in history when the changing dynamics of global politics demand a new foreign policy toolbox and mindset, the United States remains handcuffed by a national security infrastructure and strategy that is deeply mired in 20th-century thinking.

Yesterday, I did a short piece for the Huffington Post on whether health care reform would affect our Middle East policy:

Obama -- to the surprise of many, myself included -- has been weak on narrative. As of a couple week ago, the emerging narrative, at home and abroad, was that he was weak, aloof, and lacked the courage of his convictions. Now, a new narrative is being created, and it's been interesting to watch it gain currency in real-time. Marc Ambinder seems to have both captured and propelled the new storyline (one that appears to have little grounding in objective reality):

And it fortifies, indirectly, the argument that Obama is uniquely courageous: his stubbornness in the face of public opinion, in the face of advisers who begged him to move on, in the face of a revolt from his base, is based upon his own conviction that what he's doing is the right thing to do, primarily, and upon electoral politics secondarily.

(Does anyone still doubt that passing health care was in Democrats' electoral interest?). Ambinder continues: "But don't ever, ever call the guy a wimp." This is the new storyline. Obama the tough guy. And now Obama the tough guy -- rather than the dour, feckless Obama of two weeks ago -- will be conducting U.S. foreign policy.

In my column this week for AOLNews, I argue that on the seventh anniversary of the Iraq War it's critical that policymakers draw the right lessons from that conflict . . . and it's not that they should learn to do counter-insurgency more effectively:

Read the whole thing here.

More than you think, actually.

1.  An international boost. Israeli, Russian and Chinese leaders and elites have all let it be known more or less quietly that they treat Obama as if he is weak abroad because they perceive him as weak at home.  I heard a fabulous story about a senior Iranian official explaining off-the-record to a Westerner how Obama wouldn't accomplish anything this year "in analysis that would have sounded right at home on FOX."  Those elites follow American politics closely and will understand that this is a big, big win.  They'll also get the message that Obama doesn't go away easily.

2.  Momentum.  Internationally, it looks as if this long drawn  out process will close just before we finally get a new START Treaty, a mark of both serious steps down the road to reducing the nuclear threat and a success in renovating the US-Russian relationship.  That in turn will be followed by a signature Obama initiative, the 43-nation Nuclear Security Summit, which will build new momentum for international action against the supply side of nuclear materials.  After that, Iraq will confound the skeptics by putting a government together -- not elegantly, but successfully.

3.  Space and Oxygen.  As my colleague Paul Eaton discussed with the Times' Peter Baker earlier this weekend, many international issues have been off the agenda while health care burned bright.  There will be more bandwidth for other, merely vital, issues now -- from Afghanistan to foreign assistance reform to human rights and democratization.  This has a downside, though:  with the healthcare debate lost, the opponents of a sane, pragmatic foreign policy will have more oxygen to ramp up the volume on Iran and other issues. 

4.  Ambition.  Just the progress to this point threw Obama's approval rating back over 50%.  Progressives both in and outside government have been needing a little boost of energy.  This moment should give us lots of case studies about 1) how the Administration likes to work and will work when the crunch is on and 2) how to advocate to the Administration effectively -- and ineffectively.  (HT to Adam Serwer on that approval number -- and I know Adam's got plenty of ideas for putting the ambition to good use...)

A lot of us act as if democracy being a good thing is so self-evident that it needs no further elaboration. Most Americans, I’m sure, agree that democracy is a good thing. But it’s not always easy to articulate why, in part because most of us have never experienced its opposite. 

I can’t even begin to convey the daily travails of living under autocracy. If I was living in, say, Jordan and things got really bad, I could always just leave. I have an escape clause. Hundreds of millions of Arabs don’t. I will never be able to truly comprehend the powerlessness they feel, the helplessness that is the inevitable product of living under a society where others all too often determine your fate, and without your consent.

My father grew up under the brutality of Nasser regime in Egypt. He was apolitical, probably because he had to be. That was the price of success – not to question, not to conceive of what a different society might look like. If there is one thing such rulers feared more than anything else, it was citizens who were capable of imagination. It took my father years to become comfortable exercising his right to vote. It took just as long - 8 years of political awakening under Bush - to realize what his vote meant.

In any case, how does this powerlessness manifest itself? That is what I turn to now. I'll just relay a simple, and relatively trivial, anecdote. When I lived in Jordan in 2008, I frequented a Starbucks on Wakalat street, in a posh area of Sweifieh. I would park my laptop, get some drip coffee, and write. Needless to say, I would occasionally need to use the bathroom. Even though this street was meant to be a magnet for Jordan's young, secular elite (with Mango and Zara stores), there were two badly-maintained public bathrooms. Perhaps more problematically, neither had any soap. If this was the U.S., we might contact the relevant local authority and inform them there wasn't any soap. But, in Jordan, it was unclear what was to be done. Was there a relevant "local authority" and, if there was, how did one contact it or get it to listen to you, particularly as it would have been an unelected, and therefore unaccountable, body?

Because I couldn't answer these questions, I took matters into my own hands and bought a bar of soap and put it on the sink. I was proud of myself for fighting back in my own little way. Until I came back the next day and saw that my bar of soap was no longer there.

A friend just told me that his flatmate, a British citizen named Ayman Najafi, is facing a month in jail and deportation for allegedly kissing someone in a Dubai restaurant. I met Ayman a couple months ago in Dubai and we hung out a bit. It’s weird to find out that someone you know is being tried – and going through an undoubtedly difficult personal ordeal – for what he has told the court was nothing more than a peck on the cheek. This is more than a bit frightening: most American expats living in the Gulf, myself included, kiss on the cheek as a customary greeting with members of the opposite sex. Even that, now, can be grounds for arrest.

Most, if not all, Arab countries lack what we would call “rule of law.” Invariably, there is perpetual confusion regarding what is allowed and what isn’t, and, perhaps more importantly, who it’s allowed for. Not all citizens are treated equally, to say nothing of situations where the majority of legal residents aren't even citizens in the first place. I live in Qatar now, and I find that no one knows for sure the exact rules on “public indecency.” When I lived in Jordan, the matter of criticizing the monarchy – something I’ve done on a number of occasions – was always a bit hazy. When did it become illegal, and how exactly would know when you had crossed the mysterious “red line”? One time, an American friend of mine living in Amman didn’t get the red lines right: he was wisked away by the secret police, blindfolded, and interrogated for taking pictures outside a government building.

This is the trouble with countries that are far from democratic, where the “citizen” is at the mercy of arbitrary rules that are often imposed at a whim by an always shifting assortment of largely unaccountable leaders. What this produces is fear mixed with uncertainty - a toxic combination - the sense that everything you’ve earned can be taken away from you in a moment. And you will probably not be granted anything resembling due process.

Dubai has been trying to have it both ways: essentially importing/buying/ and otherwise appropriating what they think makes the West great without accepting the liberal democratic institutions which served as the catalyst and foundation for much of that success. This is a recipe for a unique, and ultimately destructive, kind of schizophrenia.   

Now that Josh Rogin has given us a window into the post - Biden-Netanyahu pressure being applied by House Minority Whip Eric Cantor, I want to parse the prominent this-undercuts-efforts-on-Iran piece of the argument. The way I see it, the administration's current diplomatic full court press is laboring mightily to send a strong international message that Iran faces a choice is between implementing the agreed October 1 uranium deal or being isolated. Whether or not conservatives share this assessment -- and I've heard Robert Kagan credit the effort with making Iran the issue, rather than the US -- it is a separate analytical question to ask how US-Israeli relations play into the dynamic. In that light, it's hard to see how tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv pose make it any harder to keep the pressure on Iran.

The name of the game in the nuclear diplomacy and the push for a new UN sanctions resolution is to gain the support of key governments that are reluctant to apply strong pressure on Iran. It feels silly to have to say it, but Israel does not fall into that category. Politics, whether domestic or international, is about expectations and surprises. It's a surprise and thus a significant development when, say, Russia calls for sanctions on Iran. Israel's position on the matter of Iran's nuclear program is, um, pretty well known.

In fact, when framing the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically, you could argue that Israel's security -- while always a prominent concern for the United States -- it is not the best basis for building a broad international coalition. (Why do I feel like I'm, in the words of Denzel Washington's character in Philadelphia, "explaining it to you like you're four"?) Anyone who believes we can line up a lot of international support on the grounds of ensuring Israel's security needs to get out more. Again, the issue isn't America's reasons for stopping Iran's nuclear program but the rest of the world's reasons, which have to do with the breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation norm, a wider regional arms race, and heightened instability in the Middle East.

This is obviously a tricky moment in the US-Israeli relationship and the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Trying to claim that the new tensions undercut the Iran effort is a stretch, at best, and intellectually dishonest at worst.

Is it just me, or does it seem really bizarre to be considering backpedaling on counterterror policy at the same time that it's having notable success in finding, killing, or capturing terrorists (oh, and also getting credit for it in the polls)? Here's my real question: do progressive poliitical figures realize how a shift to military commissions would undercut progressives' ability to present an alternative to tough-talking conservatives? I see an astounding disconnect between the way that "going to the dark side" was so discredited just a few years ago, and yet somehow its arguments still carry so much weight in the current debate.

Why am I so exercised about this? Well, let's look at what was said on the Sunday shows on the subject:

Well, obviously there are a series of things that have to weigh. You are right, the original decision was to try him in New York. Local authorities were receptive there at the beginning, they changed their view on that. That has to influence our thinking. The question becomes what are their -- what possible venues would there be? And is it worth reviewing the entire decision? The attorney general said at the beginning, when he announced those -- the venue and the trial in Article 3 courts that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, under the protocols that he and the Department of Defense had developed, could have been tried in either a military commission or an Article 3 court. So we have a range of options.

White House Senior Advisor David Axelrod on CNN’s “State of the Union”

It's not just about KSM coming back into military court, it was a major misstep to put him in civilian court in NY, it made no sense. We need laws on the books that will allow terrorist detainees to be held without trial, give them due process, treat them as prisoners, not common criminals.

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) on ABC’s “This Week”

When I put these two together, what I come up with is that reversing the civilian trial decision would be a big fat, "what were we thinking?" What progressives really should be saying is "we refuse to let our justice system be terrorized." What a shameful spectacle for such a strong republic -- a two-centuries old system of government by law -- to go to such lengths and give a bunch of gruesome glory-seekers special treatment. Should we really be pulling these guys (and gals too, we know now) out of the shadows in which they hide and then give them a venue all their own? We've got this totally backwards; this is a chance for the United States to show the contrast between the majesty of justice being done and despicable sadists with the delusion that they can remake the world by murdering innocents.

Supposedly, a lot of this horse-trading is focused on a deal to close the Gitmo detention facility. Again, does this really make sense, to remove a symbol of misguided US efforts to work outside the bounds of law at the price of another fear-driven end run? If Senator Graham believes Gitmo should be closed, then there shouldn't be a need to trade for it.

While we're at it, since when is every defendant or prisoner in our justice system a common criminal? Is this a flaw that we're just noticing? Do we need a new system to deal with mass murderers? And this is the real point, the military commissions have a troubled history and virtually no track record of success in prosecuting terrorists. It really is ridiculous that a court system that has proven its ability to prosecute terrorists, including handling sensitive evidence, should be discussed so skeptically. It should be the other way around.

I've been meaning to write something about Ross Douthat's really toxic op-ed in the New York Times today about Iraq, but Daniel Larison has done my handiwork for me. Douthat argues that: 

Our nation might be less divided, and our debates less poisonous, if more artists were capable of showing us the ironies, ambiguities and tragedies inherent in our politics — rather than comforting us with portraits of a world divided cleanly into good and evil.

Yes, the problem might be that we do not have artists capable of rendering contemporary architects of a war of aggression that was based on shoddy intelligence, ideological fervor and deceit in a sufficiently subtle, even-handed manner. If only Hollywood were better at portraying the depth and complexity of people who unleashed hell on a nation of 24 million people out of an absurd fear of a non-existent threat! Life is so unfair to warmongers, is it not? Then again, the reason our debates are so poisonous and our nation so divided might have something to do with the existence of utterly unaccountable members of the political class that can launch such a war, suffer no real consequences, and then reliably expect to be defended as “decent” and “well-intentioned” people who made understandable mistakes. The unfortunate truth of our existence is that villains do not have to come out of central casting for comic book movies. They are ordinary, “decent” people who commit grave errors and terrible crimes for any number of reasons. Many great evils have found their origins in a group’s belief that they were doing the right thing and were therefore entitled and permitted to use extraordinary means.

Today in the Washington Post, Michael O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan have written one of the strangest and most confusing op-eds about Afghanistan (and that really is saying something). Its an effort to 'pop' five myths about the war in Afghanistan; but instead it relies on strawman arguments that are practically tangential to the war in Afghanistan.

As a general matter, I'm way too smart (or cowardly or prudent or chicken) to say very much publicly on Israel and the Palestinians. The progressive foreign policy wonk community has many genuine Middle East experts to do that, including on this blog.

Speaking of which, a few weeks ago Joel Rubin summarized his trip to Israel and the Herzliya conference with some insightful reflections on Israeli politics. After the past week's sad spectacle, I want to offer just one thought (that'll get the proportion just about right). The more I ruminate over the problem of how to draw forth international cooperation on the world's big problems -- my full-time preoccupation -- the more I recognize the vital interplay between international politics and domestic politics. Obviously the dynamic has always been there, but given powerful current trends of diffusion of power, dilution of authority, and political leaders' limited freedom of action, it's all the more important now.

Which leads me to my question for the day. Thinking of the Israeli settlements, what is the relationship between perceived domestic political constraints and policy imperatives? What do you do when the irresistible force of a necessary foreign policy action meets the immovable object of a domestic constituency? We usually assume the domestic political constraint is the trump card, don't we. That's the nature of democracy, right? Domestic accountability is real; international accountability, not so much. I dunno, but I think we're going to run into this question more and more often. We should probably give it some thought.

[Bonus question: the title of this post was also the name of a classic Dupont Circle eatery. Anyone remember it?]

Spencer Ackerman is doubling down on the notion that Bob Gates is the BEST. SECDEF. EVER. Personally, I think these kinds of lists don't tell us very much. While I suppose Gates is in the top tier, it's just too early to tell . . . and it's a bit of a stretch to argue that his defense budget was "one of the bravest ever." Not terrible, sure. But brave . . . 

Spencer Ackerman has offered a thoughtful response to my earlier post on the lack of strategic thinking emanating from the Obama Administration and his comments give me an opportunity to clarify my thoughts. Spencer, perhaps in a glass half full sort of way, sees a method to the Obama Administration's madness, but I think he tends to place far too much on emphasis on words rather than actions.

Secretary of Defense Gates caused a buzz in 2007 when he declared the need for a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security.” But nowhere did he call for the Pentagon to shed any responsibilities. Indeed, in his next breath, Gates made clear “I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense this year.” At the same time, he noted the incongruous sight of “field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils.” Gates remarked that these skills will need to be “institutionalized and retained” in the military. 

We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power. 

We must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner. And we must not shrink from the tug of war -- no pun intended -- that inevitably plays out between policymaking and strategy execution. Such interplay is healthy for the republic and essential for ultimate success.

There was a pretty interesting article in the Washington Post today about Hillary Clinton's tenure at State Department and it pretty much confirmed my suspicions about our Secretary of State - she's a great public diplomat and administrator, but not much of a strategic thinker.

As Stewart Patrick noted, she struggles with priorities and questioned whether she has a "grand strategic vision." This was basically part of the deal when Obama picked her; Hillary would serve as a great "face" for America to the world; she would invest time and energy in public diplomacy, something that was critically important after the tumult of the Bush years.  But at the same time it was hard to expect much from her from a strategic standpoint. After all, she doesn't have an IR or even foreign policy background and doesn't appear to have spent a lot of time thinking about the future of American foreign policy.

It was very striking, for example, that the article recounted the experience of a young State Department FSO who was pushing the idea of engaging with "non-governmental power centers in Pakistan" while Clinton expressed skepticism. The story has a happy ending as the FSO was promoted, but the fact that the Sec State didn't agree about the importance of this issue is surprising. At a time when non-state actors are rising in importance - and Pakistan's non-governmental sector has been at the forefront of pushing for democratic change and adherence to the rule of law - it's hard to understand Clinton's skepticism. If this anecdote is any indication, she seems to be quite the foreign policy realist (although granted it's hard to draw too much of a conclusion from just one anecdote)

It wouldn't necessarily be a bad thing to ask the Secretary of State to focus on public diplomacy if President Obama had placed strategic thinkers in other areas of the national security bureaucracy, but he hasn't. Jim Jones and Bob Gates are obviously smart men, but one doesn't get the sense (particularly from the former) that they are focused on recalibrating US strategy. Indeed, one could fairly ask where are all the Obama campaign aides that were pushing the idea of a new mindset for American foreign policy - because they don't appear to be in the higher reaches of Obama's foreign policy team.

If you look at Obama's foreign policy to date, this has clearly been a problem. You have John Brennan saying back in August that we need to get away from the jihadist terror fixation that defined the Bush years . . . and yet then you have Obama sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan and spending the lion's share of his foreign aid request in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.  We're now 14 months in to the Obama presidency and we still haven't seen a national security strategy, or the results of the QDDR process - just a QDR that continues the US reliance on military power and the overly broad definition of US global interests.

I realize that it's a lot to expect for things to change overnight and clearly the process of changing the mindset of American foreign policy is the work of generations. But I do worry that Obama has failed to put the pieces in place to realize this goal and that he seems intent, at least for now, to nibble around the edges of American foreign policy. But at a time when a new orientation for the way America's interacts with the world is desperately needed indefinitely delaying more systemic change is a recipe for continued strategic drift. Obama has surrounded himself with smart, competent individuals in his key foreign policy positions - but smart and competent is not what America needs today.

Sunday was a good day for Iraq but it is unwise to draw overly broad conclusions based on this one day. And I am holding off on commenting about the government formation process until we get official results from the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC). But I did want to comment on two very important points because they have often shaped and warped the nature of commentary and analysis on last Sunday’s elections.

First, the question of Sunni participation has become garbled with the passage of time, perhaps due to Iraq’s unorthodox political calendar in 2005, when the country held three nationwide votes in succession: a January 2005 parliamentary election for a transitional national assembly, which was tasked with drafting a constitution; an October 2005 referendum to ratify Iraq’s constitution; and a December 2005 parliamentary election, which resulted in the seating of the current parliament and the selection of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Sunni Arab participation in the first of these elections was abysmally low. This was the result of an announced boycott of the political process by various Sunni Arab political and insurgent groups and the very real threat of retaliation against those who dared to vote in Sunni Arab areas. The effects of this boycott were magnified due to the fact that the country was organized into one electoral district as opposed to province by province voting. This was done for administrative reasons due to the inability to organize a more complicated election at that time, but the choice had very grave consequences for the political process and only served to amplify the lack of Sunni Arab participation.

This was not the case in the December 2005 elections when Sunni Arabs turned out to vote in numbers that corresponded or exceeded the levels of turnout in other provinces. Of course, Sunni Arabs also turned out in other mixed areas of the country, but the demonstration of Sunni Arab participation in those elections is most clear when looking at the results from the four Sunni-majority provinces (the demographics of the contested province of Tameem (or Kirkuk) are something of an unknown, although the Kurds almost certainly constitute a majority at this time): Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddeen.

Here are the official numbers from that election as released by IHEC:

The bottom line is that Sunni Arabs participated in the December 2005 elections. Keep that in mind next time you hear that Sunni Arabs boycotted the previous parliamentary elections because it is not accurate.

Second, I wanted to address the issue of voter turnout and participation. Most stories have led with the percentage of voters who turned out on Sunday, citing the approximately 62% released by IHEC. But this number is not particularly useful for comparative purposes and is, in fact, somewhat misleading. This is a result of the increase in voter registration rolls since 2005. This has been a politically-sensitive issue, particularly in Kirkuk, but without getting into too many details, the method for registering voters has changed since that time and is now based on passive registration. As such, the more relevant figure for comparison’s sake is the total number of voters. As you can see above, that number for in-country voting was under 12 million in December 2005. But according to an IHEC representative, total voter turnout on Sunday exceeded (Arabic) 12 million after figuring in 272,000 out-of-country votes. So the level of in-country participation appears to have held steady as opposed to suffering a serious decline, which has been the general implication of much of the press coverage.

For the last week, Gregg Carlstrom has done an impressive job of highlighting all the reasons why U.S. observers should avoid chest-thumping over the wave of arrests of Taliban leaders by Pakistani authorities. Responding to a rather sanguine piece by Bruce Riedel in the Daily Beast on the benefits of this crackdown for the war effort in Afghanistan, Carlstrom has this to say:

On the Taliban arrests, there are two major theories about Pakistan's motives. One says Pakistan rounded up "moderate" Taliban leaders, those who favored reconciliation talks, so they would be replaced by a more "extremist" faction loyal to the ISI. The other argues that Pakistan plans to use the detained "moderates" as conduits back to the Taliban. (I guess there's a third theory, that the arrests stem more from Obama's diplomacy than Pakistani self-interests, but I find that dubious.)

Both of these theories are good for Pakistan. One is good for the United States. Neither is good for Afghanistan: In both scenarios, Afghan interests will be subjugated to Pakistani interests during reconciliation talks.

One of the main critiques of the previous administration’s Pakistan policy was that it paid little mind to understanding Pakistan’s motivations. This inattention allowed President Musharraf to play a double-game with the U.S., extending assurances that he was committed to routing the Taliban with one hand, while actively working against U.S. policy for the sake of Pakistan’s interests with the other.  It would be a shame if this administration forgot that lesson, all because Pakistan decided to arrest some militants for reasons that are a mystery to us.

That said, I think it's a mistake to look at Pakistan's possibly nefarious intentions and write off the possibility that its crackdown may yet accrue some long-term benefits to Afghanistan. After all, regardless of what you think about Pakistan's motivations, it's pretty safe to say that with these arrests, there has been a change in its behavior.  A tactical change, perhaps, but still a change.  There may yet be an opportunity here for the U.S. and Afghanistan to press that shift to their advantage.  Whether that's doable will depend on a range of factors.  Some of those are within our control. A great many more are not.  One thing you can say with confidence: failing to consider what drives Pakistan to act would, in all likelihood, doom any such effort from the start.  

Steven Brooke and I have a new article out in Policy Review suggestively titled “Promoting Democracy to Stop Terror, Revisited.” We make the case for a causal relationship between the lack of democracy in the Middle East and the incidence of political violence and terrorism. If such a relationship exists, then the case for supporting democracy abroad becomes not only more important, but more urgent. In others words, it cannot keep on being postponed until we have single-payer healthcare or until Mr. Ahmadinejad cools down. We will have to live with terrorism but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do what’s necessary to make its occurrence less likely.

There is a trend in progressive circles toward separating support for democracy abroad from any explicit national security rationale. This, we argue, would be a costly mistake. Put differently, we believe there is a strong empirical basis for the claim that our safety and security, and that of our allies, is directly tied to prospects for political reform in the Arab world.

And from the perspective of politics (as opposed to policy), democracy promotion needs a national security rationale, otherwise politicians simply won’t care – and, currently, they don’t.

We began conceptualizing and writing this article long before President Obama demonstrated his relative lack of interest in democracy promotion. Some have grown accustomed to calling Obama a “realist,” of some sort at least. However, realists are capable of aggressively supporting democracy abroad – as long as they recognize it as being critical to U.S. national security interests. And that is what we tried to do here - to assume nothing and make the national security case for democracy promotion, something we hope would appeal to “realists” and “non-realists” alike.

In the coming days, I’ll be writing more on the empirical side of our argument. Steven and I approached the piece from the standpoint of the political scientists we are. To our surprise, we  found that quite a few past studies on the “tyranny-terror link" are plagued by rather straightforward measurement problems, one example being F. Gregory Gause’s oft-cited 2005 Foreign Affairs article "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism."

For those who like teasers, here's one from our article:

Any long-term strategy must take into account an emerging body of evidence which shows that lack of democracy can be a key predictor of terrorism, and correlates with it more strongly than other commonly cited factors like poverty and unemployment. If understood and utilized correctly, democracy promotion can become a key component of a revitalized counterterrorism strategy that tackles the core problem of reducing the appeal of violent extremism in Muslim societies. It has the potential to succeed where the more traditional, hard power components of counterterrorism strategy have failed.

The link between lack of democracy and terrorism also has consequences for American domestic politics. It provides a unifying theme for Democrats and Republicans alike, one that honors our ideals while helping keep us safe and secure. To the extent that politicians have had difficulty selling democracy promotion to the American people, the “tyranny-terror link” provides a promising narrative for U.S. policy in managing the immense challenges of today’s Middle East.

As they say, though, read the whole thing.

Believe me, as scary as it is for you to read that headline it's even more depressing for me to write it! I've just started writing a weekly column for AOLNews and in my sophomore effort I argue that we're still operating in a global environment created by George Bush . . . and that will be the case for some time.

Americans may not fully appreciate the damage wrought by the Bush years in how America is perceived as well as its diminished moral authority and political suasion. These problems can't be fixed overnight and may have permanently affected U.S. interests, capabilities and power around the globe. Moreover, the obsessive focus of the Bush years on terrorism not only masked the rise of rival states and the growing importance of a number of transnational issues, but it shielded the United States from its own decline in relative power and influence.

What can Obama do to repair this damage?

He needs to focus on creating a new global architecture for dealing with challenges that are increasingly transnational in nature; on rebuilding civilian agencies to extend U.S. influence and engagement; and on reorienting the country's foreign policy and national security decision-making toward non-military approaches to international affairs. But above all, he needs to take a long, hard look at how the U.S. defines its global interests and perhaps recognize that America can no longer afford to be engaged so robustly in every global challenge.

Read the whole thing here

There's a lot to say about the potential shift of the KSM trial from the civilian courts to a military commission, and a lot that's been said. First off, the good people at Human Rights First tell us not to give up the fight; as long as this still seems to be in play, we should all call the White House and tell the administration to stick to its guns and prosecute the cases in our regular justice system. [You'll have to wait until Monday business hours to reach the WH comment line by phone, but meanwhile you can send a message through the web site.]

Then there's excellent analysis on this blog -- Michael Cohen parceling out the culpability for this horrible mess, and Pat Barry asking whether national security eminences like Colin Powell will be as ready to help fight the next policy battle. For my part, I want to emphasize what a major concession to fear-based politics this move would be. This would represent not merely a tactical retreat, but a strategic defeat. If ever there was an issue on which progressives should be playing offense, this is it.

When it comes down to it, all these shrill chicken little cries show the right wing's lack of confidence in American strength. For all our supposed pride in our system of government, the implicit argument for military trials is that the system can't handle these 100-feet-tall terrorists (the ones we already have in custody, remember). Never mind that our regular court system has a much better track record; at latest count, the score is Judiciary 200 - Military Commissions 3.

I mean, where does this go next? What is the next level of toughness that will be a test of whether we're sufficiently building up, er, taking the terror threat seriously? At this point, "tough on crime" is the new "soft on crime." Next thing we know, the right wing will insist that terror suspects be remanded to the custody of Delta Force.

But I digress. The point is that the far right has tossed aside any consideration of effectiveness, track record, or principles of the rule of law. This country has a political system in which the military reports to civilian masters (in a word, us) -- fighting our wars and defending our security and interests. In the terror trial debate, it seems like the military is treated as a sort of toughness bank; we need some toughness, let's get it from the military. The implication is that the civilian governing authorities, which are supposed to be broader in function and ranking above the uniformed services, can't handle the custody and prosecution of a handful of death-loving, glory-seeking sadists.

As we build up the terrorists into some kind of superhumans, are we losing sight of how this diminishes us? It seems to me that this shows a profound lack of faith in our system, our values. Think of the contradiction at work here: America is a mighty and upstanding nation; it should cower in fear.

The thing about worst-case scenarios is that they are a slippery slope toward darker and darker predictions. Where do you stop? What keeps them moored in reality? And this is the really disturbing thing, the politics of the terror threat are propelling this great nation toward a policy based on a freak-out.

The U.S. has more than 200,000 troops engaged in conflicts across the Middle East and Southwest Asia, has grave concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction there, depends heavily on oil exported from the Persian Gulf and is attempting to end the "clash of civilizations" mentality that has plagued American-Muslim relations for the past decade.

All of these facts have a direct impact on American national security interests.

Therefore, with the imperative of protecting American national security in mind, President Obama concluded in 2009 that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would help to bring stability to that region while supporting America’s long term security interests.

Importantly, this position did not conflict with either the Israeli or Palestinian public’s position on peacemaking.  It is well understood that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians support a two state solution and are willing to make territorial compromises to get there.

It is also important to note that the administration’s position on Middle East peacemaking did not take place in a vacuum. Obama’s national security philosophy overall is rooted in the pursuit of policy goals through active American diplomacy, engagement and pragmatism.

And it now turns out that this is also a winning approach domestically, as it has become clear that Americans trust the president on national security. Yet even more importantly, Americans want to see results.

If there has been a lesson from the past year out of the health care debate, it is that Americans like to see their presidents both set and accomplish goals. The lack of a health care bill on the president’s desk, despite his calls for one, has hurt the president politically.  On the other hand, the decision to send more troops to Afghanistan — and its implementation — has helped the president politically.

The numbers bear this out. Don’t ask me. Ask Gallup, whose January 2010 poll corroborates this view.

In that poll, Obama scored better with the American public on national security issues than he did on domestic issues. Specifically, 49 percent of all Americans approved of Obama’s handling of terrorism and 47 percent of foreign affairs, compared to 40 percent for the economy and 37 percent for health care.

Nonetheless, despite the policy strengths and political support for Obama’s pursuit of Middle East peace, Israel’s staunchest defenders in Washington failed to strongly support him when he needed it most, thereby helping to doom the centerpiece of his national security policy on the Middle East in 2009.

Why is that? In particular, why did these groups and individuals politically undercut the Obama administration’s efforts to restart the peace process, especially when its resolution was so clearly aligned with American national security interests?

Ultimately, while the Palestinians are not blameless for the diplomatic stalemate, it is the Israelis and Americans who hold the overwhelming power in this relationship — meaning that the Americans and Israelis carry the main burden of resolving the conflict. It is therefore time for the United States. to expect more out of Israel when it comes to supporting American national security goals.

Yet unfortunately, the most recalcitrant American opponents of a restarted peace process, as well as the silent majority of Americans who enabled the pushback against the Obama approach, missed the forest for the trees.  They made arguments about why Israel couldn’t be expected to do what the president was asking them to do on settlements and negotiations, and instead never took into account the impact that this would have on American national security.

In a healthy relationship, both sides give a little. This truth was clearly lost on these Obama opponents, whose actions helped neither Israel nor the U.S. Obama’s approach is good for Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States, and it is past time for America’s Israel supporters to stand with the Obama administration in helping it to achieve its Middle East peace goals.

The moment is urgent. American security priorities are being damaged daily by the lack of a resolution to the conflict. The failure to have Middle East peace undermines American diplomatic credibility in the region, gives an excuse to extremist groups to foment anti-Americanism, and hampers America’s ability to be the guarantor of regional security and stability.

This situation must be reversed.  The status quo on the Middle East is a victory only for those who oppose American national security priorities.  The status quo is also a recipe for domestic political failure. Just look at the health care debate, which if it has taught us anything, it is that good policy seen to its conclusion is good politics.

It is time therefore for the United States to forge a Middle East peace in order to advance its national security interests, and it is time for American supporters of Israel to help the administration complete the job.

(This piece first appeared in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle here.  The author's views are his own and do no necessarily reflect those of the National Security Network.)