In the next few weeks, the administration will be announcing which states will be awarded funds from $8 billion dedicated for high-speed rail (HSR) development in the stimulus package. Right now, 259 applications from the states valued at $57 billion are chasing the recovery plan money. The administration’s decision to devote considerable resources to developing HSR underscores its commitment to bring bullet trains to the U.S. But unless it makes the right decisions about where to put the money and what policies to follow, the new enthusiasm for HSR could be just the latest false start in a long, disappointing history.
Last spring, President Barack Obama unveiled his vision for a national HSR network. The president conjured up an image of a 21st-century train infrastructure, “a system that reduces travel times and increases mobility…reduces congestion and boosts productivity…reduces destructive emissions and creates jobs.” The administration also put forward a rail policy that, rather than laying track coast to coast, would concentrate on heavily populated corridors where short distances between cities would let faster trains compete effectively with cars and airplanes.
Since then, the administration has called on states to submit plans for HSR competitive grants. Congress, meanwhile, added $2.5 billion to the HSR pot for fiscal year 2010, and it remains possible that the House and Senate will add billions more in a second jobs stimulus, focusing on infrastructure, likely to be taken up this winter.
For decades, high-speed rail has been a fantasy, mired in bureaucratic, regulatory and market inertia. But with the renewed push for it by the administration, the high-speed rail future is beginning to take shape. The benefits of high-speed rail are enormous. For one, HSR is a big step toward energy independence and a post-carbon future. HSR corridors operated with nonpolluting electric locomotives could reduce carbon emissions by as much as six million pounds annually.
HSR also has a strong track record of jumpstarting economic development along its path. Fast, efficient transportation could revitalize depressed cities and transform regional economies. And while the creation of an HSR network lies in the future, it will put people to work immediately. Eighty percent of the cost of HSR is in infrastructure-building and land acquisition, while 20 percent goes for the trainsets and stations that passengers use. New rights of way need to be built now for HSR corridors that are projected to be operational in a few years – meaning tens of thousands of jobs that can’t be exported.
The question that we now face is: How do we get there from here?
The choice that the Obama administration and Congress face is simple: modest incrementalism versus a truly transformative vision. The administration’s commitment to fund high-speed rail is a step in the right direction, but it’s not the end of the process. Lest the allocation of stimulus funds to HSR become President Obama’s own “Mission Accomplished,” the administration needs to remain engaged, proactive, and forward-thinking in shepherding high-speed rail to completion.
With HSR, President Obama can leave a lasting imprint on the American landscape and economy. But that legacy can only be secured if the administration is willing to make bold decisions and confront a tired political culture. If we really are serious about making the high-speed rail future a reality, the old ways of doing business will not suffice.
Tags: high-speed rail, Infrastructure, Railroads, stimulus, Transportation
[...] Reutter has written an informative piece about high-speed rail for the Progressive Policy Institute. It’s got a really excellent overview of HSR around the [...]
Mr. Reutter:
I’ll provide you the same comments directly that I left on Yglesias’ site:
“I don’t think a lot of careful thought went into this report.
Reutter makes this important (and true statement):
“There’s an old railroad saying that the best way to make a train run fast is to make sure it doesn’t run slow.”
And then goes on to conclude that the US needs to focus on dedicated track systems with high top speeds. It is completely illogical.
He also completely mis-characterizes the German HSR system. The Germans have built a number of dedicated new high speed lines, but the ICE system is built on a foundation of upgraded legacy tracks…exactly like the Acela and the Midwest Proposal.
While the Florida plan does have some merits, to me (as a transportation planner) it is by no means a slam-dunk. The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) is one of the better plans IMO. I think that Reutter confuses the distinction between the long-term MWRRI vision and the short term plans. The short term plans are three lines:
-Madison-Milwaukee-Chicago
-St Louis-Springfield-Chicago
-Detroit-Michigan Corridor-Chicago
The vast majority of this is extremely shovel ready, and most of the important projects will enable dedicated high speed rail infrastructure down the line.
North Carolina and Virginia also have good plans, as does Washington State (crossing the border to Portland, OR). California’s plan is great, but if allowed to, it could suck up all of the available funds. I think that would be a disaster on both political and policy terms. Pennsylvania’s plans are technically good, but I think they should be in line behind states that haven’t benefited as greatly from Amtrak capital money of the decades.
To be clear about the differences between the MWRRI long term and short term plans:
Long term vision:
http://www.midwesthsr.org/images/network/mwrrs700.gif
Less than half of this network is being pursued in the short term. You also have to look at the map and understand that the plan was created in the late 90s and early 00s, when most looked at the plan as pie-in-the-sky-fantasy. It was planned to be built with millions; had they envisioned billions being available, I think there would have been a more aggressive plan.”
There are a number of other worthwhile comments on that blog post that I didn’t repeat–namely the intelligence of investing money in a system that is short-distance and auto-oriented at its termini.
Jason — Your comments miss a major point of my report, namely, that private freight railroads own 99% of the existing U.S. rail plant. Operating high speed passenger trains on these lines in the Midwest and elsewhere — with freight trains running on them — is operationally difficult and poses serious safety risks. Check out the US DOT Inspector General report, “Root Causes of Amtrak Train Delays,” which finds that 58 percent of Amtrak’s (already-slow) long-distance trains arrive late largely because of freight train congestion.
Overseas, the government owns the railway infrastructure and thus can divert freight trains from trunk lines and develop higher speed passenger routes. This is not the case here, where private carriers such as Canadian National and CSX have shown no interest (in fact, have been hostile) to faster intercity Amtrak service.
The consensus overseas today is that passenger and freight trains don’t mix. This is equally true in the U.S., where rail freight traffic is expected to grow substantially over the next 35 years. Building dedicated lines for passenger trains and freeing existing railways to expand freight traffic will greatly benefit the economy and environment, and is what PPI recommends as national policy.
I understand that aspect of your report. I’ve read the IG’s report. I think you are confounding the difference between mainline traffic and metropolitan traffic. The fact is that the 2 out of the 3 lines in the MWRRI phase I are practically devoid of freight traffic today. Half of the other line (Milwaukee to Madison) is in a similar state. In Michigan, NS is trying to unload the Michigan Line because it is only used for an occasional local delivery. UP’s Chicago to St Louis line may see increased freight traffic due to a new intermodal terminal in Joliet, but UP maintains a number of other routes into Chicago and is today without many freight trains. For the CP line between Milwaukee and Chicago, there are numerous parallel routes that could accommodate through freight if capacity becomes a problem.
In the eastern half of the nation, there are numerous instances of former mainline railroads that are practically devoid of freight traffic. (A result of the industry restructuring that occurred in the last 50 years.) Most of these lines are currently single tracked, a few are even abandoned (Petersburg-Raleigh). These lines can be quickly and easily upgraded and converted to passenger-dominated operations, while still allowing infrequent or nighttime local deliveries. While these lines will not likely ever be used for trains faster than 150 mph (and without grade separation above 110 mph), they can form the backbone of a national network. This is largely what German did in the early years of its ICE network.
Where you are absolutely correct about the need for dedicated passenger tracks is in accessing the metropolitan cores. In many cases, these areas are responsible for delays to Amtrak corridor trains. For instance, Amtrak’s Michigan service has a bear of a time negotiating South Chicago and NE Indiana. Once east of Porter, IN, there is no freight interference. Fortunately, most of the ROW needed to build such infrastructure in Chicago exists.
Unfortunately, your report doesn’t discuss the problem, promoting a HSR plan that avoids it completely by remaining auto-oriented at its terminals. I’m pretty bearish on Florida’s potential to change the land use/transportation system in its first phase. I’m afraid it will be underutilized because it effectively doesn’t go anywhere. That last mile (or 10) is the most important one. When Florida connects the 85 mile line to its downtowns and extends it to further destinations, it will be a great system.
In effect, I think that you think my point of view is arguing for a far too incremental direction. I have the same critique of your point of view: Florida’s early plans are a half a system.
Return to your table about average speeds and the quote about not going slow. Siting in rush hour highway traffic in a cab after being dropped off at the airport slows down your average trip speed. The train might look good because it gets you to your station without delay, but if the station isn’t where you need to go, delays will ensue. In the case of the midwest, it doesn’t matter if the states had proposed new ROW with 220 mph top speeds, or the incremental 110 mph that they have pursued, if they can’t get capacity into Chicago, both will fail. Much of the funding that midwest states are requesting is going to solving that very problem.
for instance, see (http://recovery.illinois.gov/documents/Applications/CREATE-P1-rev2-082109.pdf)
(Page 3 starts applicable material.) This is about Englewood Flyover, a necessary project to achieve dedicated passenger rail tracks in Chicago. Hopefully this project gets funded; I would be surprised if it didn’t.