Peter John Cannon is the Governance, Strategy and Terrorism Director of the Henry Jackson Society.
Executive Summary:
- The USA has now announced a troop surge in Afghanistan, with an additional 30,000 troops due to be deployed. This will bring the level of US troops to 100,000.
- This announcement came after considerable delay from Barack Obama, during which time the USA’s allies were left waiting for the outcome of a Whitehouse policy review.
- When Obama made the speech promising the additional troops, he also stated that US forces would begin to withdraw in July 2011, threatening to undermine the mission by indicating a lack of long-term resolve and undermining confidence in the viability of the Afghan state.
- However, the surge provides the coalition with its best, and last, opportunity to defeat the Taleban. Opinion within Afghanistan shows increased optimism about the future. A new operation against the Taleban, Operation Moshtarak, is showing early signs of progress.
- The Afghan mission is too important for NATO allies not to do their utmost to secure success. Any premature withdrawal would be disastrous. The exit strategy must be dependent on the security situation within the country.
In a speech on 1st December 2009, US president Barack Obama set out the largest US escalation since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. He announced the sending of a further 30,000 troops, to be deployed over the next seven to eight months. This will bring the US total to 100,000, close to the number of Soviet troops in the country during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. This followed ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal's call for an additional 40,000 troops, and a subsequent 92-day Whitehouse review of Afghanistan policy. General McChrystal, in a statement from Kabul, welcomed the announcement as providing him with "a clear mission and the resources to accomplish our task."[i]
The US Surge – Too Little, Too Late?
The delay between Obama’s setting out of his Afghan strategy last March and his announcement of the deployment of a further 30,000 troops drew much criticism and many accusations of ‘dithering’ in the US. John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in the Los Angeles Times that: “Obama's agonizing, very public reappraisal of his own 7-month-old Afghanistan policy epitomizes indecisiveness.”[ii] However, it was not only US commentators who were scathing. Even the British government was critical, with Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth naming the “period of hiatus while McChrystal's plan and his requested uplift has been looked at in the detail to which it has been looked at over a period of some months” as one of the factors damaging public morale and support for the war.[iii] “To be accused of dithering by Gordon Brown's government: what could be more shameful?” commented Bruce Anderson in the Independent.[iv]
It was not only the dithering that was the issue. The NATO allies of the US were kept in the dark while Obama conducted his review of US Afghan strategy, so that the British government was effectively reduced to guesswork in trying to assess the future direction of the Afghan campaign.[v] While the fighting continued, Britain and other allies were left without any firm idea of the future of the war. US, British and allied troops had to continue to fight and die against the Taleban while the whole future of the mission was in doubt, as it was clear that without a surge in troops, the scope for success would be limited. Obama would later try to justify his protracted review by arguing that: “There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period.” Yet the problem was not the immediate denial of necessary resources or extra troops on the ground, but the fact that there was no clear indication of any commitment by the United States to send further troops, and therefore no clear indication of the future direction of the campaign. Instead, the whole prospect of a US troop surge was called into question. Counterinsurgency advisor David Kilcullen argued: "It sends a message of indecision and uncertainty which has an effect on allies, and has a huge effect on the British political debate and has huge impact on the Afghans."[vi] The surge was not a foregone conclusion that could be relied upon, as is shown by the fact that when it was announced Obama promised an additional 30,000 troops, in contrast to the 40,000 which General McChrystal had called for.
Given Obama’s indecision and his evident lack of regard for Britain and other allies, it was perhaps apt that Gordon Brown announced the sending of another five hundred British troops before the US president made his announcement. [vii] This announcement increased British troop levels to 9500. Brown’s justification for the troop increase was that the earlier preconditions which the Government had set out had now been met. For example, other allies had begun to increase their contributions, with eight countries promising additional troops. These additional troops will help to ease the pressure on British forces in Afghanistan, amidst concerns that British forces have been spread too thinly. However, the British increase, despite being part of a broader coalition-wide deployment, will not be enough to fundamentally affect the direction of the Afghanistan campaign. That relies on the contribution from the US.
It is not only the delay before the announcement of the surge and the neglect of the USA’s allies which gives cause for concern. Immediately after saying that “it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan,” Obama declared: “After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.” He later specified the date for the beginning of the withdrawal: “additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.”[viii]
Although Obama gave assurances that “we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground”, the overall message that could be taken from the speech was that the United States intends to try one final push and then to get out. Obama emphasised that he “had a goal that was narrowly defined” and that “the days of providing a black cheque are over”. This hardly inspires confidence in the administration’s commitment to Afghanistan and to seeing the campaign through to a successful conclusion. The announcement of the intended withdrawal date, presumably to win support at home, threatens to undermine the whole surge strategy, and at the very least to loom over the conflict from now on. For the first time since 2001, the leading military power in Afghanistan has set a date for leaving. The Taleban will know that if they can continue the struggle until then, then not only may they be able to deny a victory to NATO forces, but they need only wait until they are gone before having their best opportunity yet to regain power in Afghanistan. Afghans, meanwhile, have little assurance of security beyond July 2011, and may therefore be more likely to contemplate collaborating with the Taleban rather than fighting them. This is particularly the case for those with knowledge of the kind of reprisals which the Taleban have a record of doling out to those who have previously crossed them. John McCain commented: "We need to make it clear to the enemy that we're going to succeed and we are going to stay as long as necessary to succeed."[ix] That was precisely what Obama’s speech did not do. Instead, he gave the enemy advance notice of when the United States would be withdrawing. McCain added: "The way that you win wars is to break the enemy's will, not to announce dates that you are leaving."[x]
British Strategy in Afghanistan
The announcement of the withdrawal date has also effectively put a time limit on the missions of other NATO allies. To their credit, several figures in Britain have distanced themselves from the July 2011 withdrawal deadline, refusing to be bound by the 18 month timeframe. Chief of the General Staff General Sir David Richards estimated that a British military presence would be required for up to five years.[xi] His predecessor, General Sir Francis Richard Dannatt, also stated that it would take three to five years before British troops were able to return from Afghanistan.[xii] Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague commented: ““You can’t really fight a war according to a time limit. We wouldn’t have got very far in the Second World War if we were only prepared to fight until 1942.”[xiii]
While this was going on, British forces were preparing a major offensive to follow last Operation Panther's Claw, which involved securing river and canal crossings for ISAF in Helmand. Around 1,000 British troops are likely to focus on the area of Nad-e-Ali, in a bid to secure parts of Helmand where coalition forces have not had a significant presence. In an attempt to win the support of the people in the area, the operation was preceded by a political offensive from Gulab Mangal, the Governor of Helmand and a key British ally.[xiv]
The US surge, meanwhile, raises the possibility of US forces taking control of parts of Helmand province. British forces may pull out of the upper Helmand valley and concentrate on the biggest population centre around Lashkar Gah, in central Helmand.[xv] Defence Secretary Bon Ainsworth confirmed in Parliament that he was encouraging Major-General Nick Carter, the British commander in Afghanistan, to look at “a concentration of British effort in part of our current area of operations and some handing-on to American forces.”[xvi]
Reasons for Cautious Optimism
The additional 30,000 troops announced will take the total level of forces from 112,000 to 142,000. This gives US forces much greater flexibility in how they are deployed. Additional troops can be deployed to protect population clusters across the country, such as Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Herat and Jalalabad. It is likely that many will be ‘partnering’ Afghan forces in joint security operations, in addition to the work of US military trainers.[xvii] David Kilcullen, who was involved in the troop surge in Iraq, argued that the Taleban had proved effective in dealing with gradual increases in coalition troop numbers, but they would find a large surge more challenging.[xviii]
A major new offensive against the Taleban has now been launched in the form of Operation Moshtarak, with Afghan troops supported by British and US forces driving the Taleban out of positions in central Helmand. At a recent summit in London, it was agreed that priority should be given to the ‘Afghanisation’ of the mission, with Afghan security forces taking over a greater share of the responsibility. This is reflected in Operation Moshtarak, in which 60% of the troops being deployed are Afghan. British generals have reported that this operation, which has been successful in its initial stages, represents the “end of the beginning” in Afghanistan. The Taleban have thus far struggled to launch significant attacks in the British sector of Nad-e-Ali. In some places the Taleban flag has been taken down for the first time in years, and replaced with the flag of Afghanistan.[xix] The launch of this offensive happily coincided with the capture of the Taleban’s top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in the Pakistani city of Karachi.[xx]
An opinion poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News and ARD of Germany showed that Afghans are increasingly optimistic. Of more than 1,500 Afghans questioned, 70% said they believed Afghanistan was going in the right direction, compared to only 40% a year ago. The poll also showed continuing, and increasing, support for the presence of NATO forces. 62% supported the presence of NATO forces, and 68% supported the presence of US forces specifically, compared to 59% and 63% respectively one year ago.[xxi] 61% support the build-up of forces.[xxii] When asked when they wanted NATO forces to begin to leave, only 22% wanted this to happen in less than eighteen months time. 25% wanted forces to being to leave in eighteen months time, as announced by Obama, while 21% wanted them to stay longer and a further 29% said that it should depend on the security situation.[xxiii]
This contrasts strongly with those who have argued that the presence of NATO forces is an ‘occupation’ which the Afghan people do not support. For example, anti-war activist Salma Yaqoob, following her appearance on the BBC's Question Time, recently argued: "From British politicians there's absolutely no acknowledgment of Afghan people's suffering, or the fact that their lives are not better-off because of the west's intervention – although that is the lie that continues to be told."[xxic] Her claims are directly contradicted by the testimony of the Afghans themselves. One of the most striking revelations of the BBC-ABC-ARD poll was that 83% of Afghans believed that the original US-led invasion of Afghanistan was a good thing.[xxv] Far from regretting the presence of Western troops and wanting them out of the country, the polling evidence suggests that Afghans support their presence and are far more worried about them leaving too soon. A premature withdrawal from Afghanistan would not only be a betrayal of the Afghan people, it would also be immensely damaging to the standing of the West in the region and in the eyes of the world. It would also, most obviously, allow Al-Qaeda terrorists to re-establish themselves in Afghanistan.
Some critics of the Afghan war have seized on recent reports that US military intelligence estimated that there were fewer than one hundred Al-Qaeda fighters still present in Afghanistan,[xxvi] and have claimed that the argument that we are defending ourselves against Al-Qaeda no longer holds true. Yet it should be blindingly obvious that the reason for the reduced Al-Qaeda presence is the presence of NATO troops. And the presence of less than one hundred Al-Qaeda fighters still constitutes a significant threat. As it is widely recognised that Al-Qaeda’s main presence is in neighbouring Pakistan, it should also be obvious that if NATO troops withdraw before Afghan forces have complete control of Afghan border areas, Al-Qaeda could very easily come back in greater numbers. Beyond the threat posed by Al-Qaeda specifically, any premature withdrawal from Afghanistan which allowed the Taleban to gain power poses the risk of fatally undermining neighbouring Pakistan, which is battling its own Taleban insurgency and terrorist campaign. This would raise the spectre of the doomsday scenario whereby the Taleban could get their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Not only is the Afghan campaign essential, but it is winnable. It would be wrong to believe that the mission was doomed because NATO forces were being defeated militarily. The Taleban have been driven back in parts of Helmand and in other areas, and are consistently beaten when it comes to military battles.[xxvii] This needs to continue, and also needs to be accompanied not only by the training and strengthening of Afghan forces, but by sustainable political solutions that can ensure effective governance and securities throughout the country. While this will be a major challenge over the next eighteen months, we have Afghan allies such as Gulab Mangal, who has been supporting British forces and combating both the Taleban and the poppy trade.
Despite the delay in the announcement of the US surge, the extra troops which are being provided present the coalition with its greatest opportunity for finally securing victory over the Taleban and securing the Afghan state. Given the stated intention of a US withdrawal from 2011, this may be the coalition’s only opportunity. The announcement of the withdrawal date casts a shadow over the surge and threatens to undermine it. It is essential that ISAF forces do genuinely and seriously base their timetable for withdrawal on the security situation within Afghanistan, and not on political pressures to bring troops home and to abide by arbitrary timetables and fixed target dates. US figures such as General McChrystal and defence secretary Robert Gates have indicated that this is the intention. The time-limited surge that has been announced is the only option which we have to work with. All NATO allies must do their utmost to secure a successful outcome within this time frame, as this is a mission which is too important for NATO to do anything less.
FOOTNOTES
[i] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/02/barack-obama-afghanistan-strategy-war
[ii] http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18?pg=3
[iii] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/6648419/Bob-Ainsworth-criticises-Barack-Obama-over-Afghanistan.html
[iv] http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/bruce-anderson/bruce-anderson-why-the-public-are-wrong-over-our-mission-in-afghanistan-1821272.html
[v]http://www.spectator.co.uk/spectator/thisweek/5549783/a-special-form-of-disrespect.thtml
[vi]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/12/obama-us-troops-afghanistan-kilcullen
[vii] http://page.politicshome.com/uk/brown_confirms_afghan_troop_increase.html
[viii] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html
[ix]http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8390466.stm
[x] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/02/barack-obama-afghanistan-strategy-war
[xi] http://www.google.com/hostednews/ukpress/article/ALeqM5heVy0eh3RUus1g-WFxtzs2EsTPFg
[xii] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8407190.stm
[xiii] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6981587.ece
[xiv] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/6947724/British-forces-in-Afghanistan-prepare-for-another-Panthers-Claw.html
[xv] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hoAhFBBerb-EAFrdSz0R4MC7iy5w
[xvi] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100111/debtext/100111-0001.htm
[xvii] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/world/asia/23military.html
[xviii] http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/5565328/the-case-for-40000.thtml
[xix] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7289943/Afghanistan-Traces-of-hope-in-Helmand.html
[xx] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7028598.ece
[xxi] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8448930.stm
[xxii] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/six-more-western-troops-die-as-surge-increases-casualties-1864831.html
[xxiii] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8448930.stm
[xxiv] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/05/wootton-bassett-salma-yaqoob
[xxv] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8448930.stm
[xxvi] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/AR2009111019644.html
[xxvii] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6903529.ece