Program on Market Design

Paul Milgrom, Co-Director
Muriel Niederle, Co-Director


The Program on Market Design, led by economics professors Paul Milgrom and Muriel Niederle, promotes research and intellectual exchange among scholars doing empirical, theoretical, and experimental research into the ways that the rules of an auction, exchange, or other markets affect performance. The program draws on Stanford faculty members’ experience as advisors in setting rules for electricity, radio spectrum, and timber auctions, as well as their participation in recent attempts to establish new kinds of electronic markets. The program sponsors periodic conferences and provides research support for faculty and students.

Publications

Heterogeneous effect of residency matching and prospective payment on labor returns and hospital scale economies
Galina Besstremyannaya, February 2015
Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage
Jonathan LevinLiran EinavJay BhattacharyaVilsa Curto, December 2014
Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Jonathan LevinAndrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz, September 2014
Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce
Jonathan LevinLiran EinavNeel SundaresanMichael Dinerstein, August 2014
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
Fuhito KojimaAlvin RothParag Pathak, April 2013

Projects

Complex Preferences in Matching Markets and Auctions, 8/1/14 - 8/1/15 PI: Alvin E. Roth

Sloan Research Fellowship, 9/15/13 - 9/15/15 PI: Fuhito Kojima

Economics of Internet Markets - NSF, 9/1/12 - 8/31/15 PI: Jonathan D. Levin