Warning. Ed Luttwak got the 1991 Persian Gulf War wrong– but that doesn’t stop him from being an expert. Here are Luttwak’s thoughts on dealing with Iraq, from Commentary.
He does articulate the crucial question (yes, it has been said many times but that’s because it is so essential):
The greater question, however, is neither military nor diplomatic but rather political and strategic: what, in the end, do we wish to see emerge in Iran? It is in light of that long-term consideration that we need to weigh both our actions and their timing, lest we hinder rather than accelerate the emergence of the future we hope for. We must start by considering the special character of American relations with the country and people of Iran.
His review of the Khomeinists’ takeover is good. He describes the other factions in Iran (many secular) as a ” broad coalition of the deluded.” The fanatical clerics took control, then proceeded to enrich themselves.
Luttwak’s description of the regime’s corruption is dead-on:
Too many clerics have used their official government positions, or their control of confiscated property placed in Islamic trusts, to enrich themselves and their families. Too many have operated scams of all kinds, diverting oil revenues or overcharging the government not only to fund the hugely swollen theological schools whose hordes of pious idlers must be fed and clothed but also for their personal benefit. The most notorious of them all, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a low-ranking cleric by trade, twice president of the Islamic republic from 1989 to 1997, perennial candidate for another term, chairman of the unelected but powerful “Expediency Discernment Council,” and a top adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, is widely believed to have become Iran’s richest man.
Under the Shah, corruption in government contracting notoriously added some 15 percent to the cost of everything that was bought, from fertilizers for the ministry of agriculture to helicopters. Now the graft is more like 30 percent; the family and cronies of the Shah, it turns out, were paragons of self-restraint as compared with the clerics. They now form an entire class of exploiters, with the result that a bitter anti-clericalism has become widespread in Iran as it never was before.
Having lost all its moral authority, the regime must survive on the power of coercion alone, derived from the brutish part-time Basij militia of poor illiterates and the full-time Pasdaran Inqilab, or “Revolutionary Guards,” whose forces are structured in ground, air, and naval combat units but whose men can still be sent into action as enforcers against protesting civilians. With the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the first non-cleric to win Iran’s presidency and himself a former engineering officer in their ranks, the Pasdaran have become an important political faction as well as a military force, a political gendarmerie, and a business conglomerate.
It is one more symptom of the regime’s degeneration that, although the Pasdaran are well paid by local standards, they complement their salaries by engaging in both legal and illegal business, from manufacturing to contraband across the Persian Gulf. The Pasdaran’s naval arm operates fast patrol boats from seven Iranian ports and the Halul oil platform. They are used to smuggle in products from foreign hulls or from the port of Dubai, not only embargoed items for national purposes but also perfumes and other luxury products for private money-making.
Persian culture and the Islam promoted by clerical fanatics collide (which is another regime weakness):
The cultural dimension of their identity is especially significant for the Persians of the Iranian diaspora. This vast and growing group comprises a handful of political exiles and millions of ordinary people who could have prospered in Iran, and made Iran prosperous, but for their refusal to live under the rule of religious fanatics. Their cultural identity is what gives them a strong sense of cohesion quite independently of the Islam they were born into. While only a few have converted to Christianity, or are seriously engaged in the Zoroastrian revival that is promoted by some exiles, the majority have reacted to the extremism of Iran’s present rulers by becoming, in effect, post-Islamic—that is, essentially secular but for a sentimental attachment to certain prayers and rituals.
In this, the exiles are presaging the future of Iran itself.
Luttwak argues that most Iranians do not see themselves as enemies of the US (they are, he suggests, future allies). The flaiging, corrupt mullahs want to be bombed– believing it will solidify their fraying hold on power. Finally, Lutwak believes the Mullahs are years away from a bomb.
Readers of my columns and this website know that for several years I’ve been advocating US, European, and international action to aid Iranian dissidents. The mullahs fear their own people. The mullahs believe a US or Israeli strike will swell domestic Iranian support (the Galtieri government in Argentina thought taking the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 would do the same for its domestic political support). The key issue is how long until the Iranians get an employable nuclear weapon. In January Jim Dunnigan and I concluded we have an 18-month to three year window (there’s an Instapundit podcast from February where Dunnigan and I discuss it– I do not have a link at the moment.) Luttwak says we are years away. Dunnigan and I gave a window for action based on the best open source evidence we can find. We could well be wrong, though the caveat is employable weapon (which means delivery systems as well as a nuke that will properly detonate). Iran does receive a political boost (and threat boost) by merely announcing it has a weapon (though that weapon may not be operational).
Amir Taheri in the NY Post has a different view from Luttwak. Taheri asks “Let us return to the central question in all this: Why does the Islamic Republic want a nuclear arsenal?”
His answer:
The Islamic Republic, as the embodiment of the Khomeinist revolution, had assumed a messianic mission to conquer the Middle East and, later, the whole Muslim world, in the name of its brand of Islam. By the mid ’80s, Khomeinist groups were active in 30-plus Muslim countries, while the Islamic Republic was engaged in a brutal war with Iraq.
The leadership in Tehran realized that there was one power that would not allow it to “export revolution” and dominate the Middle East. That power was, and remains, the United States…
…With the fall of the Taliban in Kabul and the Ba’ath in Iraq, the old balance of power in the region has been shattered. President Bush wants to create a new Middle East that is democratic and pro-West. In such a Middle East, there would be no place for a regime like the one now in place in Tehran. The Islamic Republic is determined to sabotage Bush’s plan and, instead, create a new Middle East that is anti-American, Islamist and controlled by Tehran. These conflicting ambitions make war a theoretical, if not an immediate, inevitability.
The Khomeinist leadership believes that it could hope to win in any prolonged conventional conflict if only because U.S. public opinion, as the Iraq experience has shown, lacks patience and is unprepared to accept even low casualty rates. That leaves tactical nuclear weapons as the only way for the United States to break the will of the Islamic Republic in any war. Thus the mullahs’ move to develop their own deterrent.
A United States that is unable to fight on the ground for any length of time and deterred from using nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation would, so the mullahs hope, do what it has often done: run away, leaving Iran to emerge as the regional superpower.
Taheri (former editor of the Iranian newspaper, Kayhan, sees three possible “futures”:
The Middle East is passing through the most decisive moment in is history since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The options are clear. One is to let the Khomeinist regime dominate the region and use it as the nucleus of an Islamic superpower which would then seek global domination. The other is to go for regime change in Tehran as a strategic goal. (A third option - creating an Irano-American co-dominium in the region - might not be acceptable to the Arabs and Turkey, let alone Israel.)
Taheri doesn’t offer any guess on how long it will take the mullahs to obtain an operational nuclear device. He simply believes they will do so. I don’t think Luttwak disagrees with this.
As I see it, the question is, can Iranian dissidents and opposition parties topple or thwart the fanatical clerics in three years, if that is the date the mullahs will deploy an operational nuclear weapon? On the “nay side” of the ledger are Russia, China, and oil prices. The mullahs have a lot of cash to buy friends. Russia and China want to make trade and gas deals. Also on the nay said: the mullahs have the secret police, the mobs, and the guns inside Iraq.
On the “yea side”: The regime is brittle. It knows the majority of the Iranian population does not support it (80 percent in some estimations). Afghanistan and Iraq are evolving more open political and economic systems– and these nations are next door. Moreover, Tehran must consider the military capabilities of New Iraq. There’s a time line working there are well. A modernized Iraqi Army is an army capable of effective offensive action (especially if provided with US air support).
Oh yes. Read both Luttwak and Taheri’s articles.