Jonathan Bendor

Walter and Elise Haas Professor of Political Economics and Organizations

Professor of Political Science (by courtesy), School of Humanities and Sciences

Phone: (650) 723-4480

Email: bendor_jonathan@gsb.stanford.edu

Academic Areas: Political Economy

Jonathan Bendor's research focuses on three areas: 1) theories of bounded rationality - how cognitive constraints affect decision making; 2) the evolution of cooperation and of norms of collective action; 3) the study of bureaucracy - institutional methods of easing cognitive constraints faced by individual decision makers.

Bio

Jon Bendor is the Walter and Elise Haas Professor of Political Economics and Organizations at the Graduate School of Business. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1979, having earned all of his degrees at the University of California, Berkeley. He is a Professor of Political Science, by courtesy, and also teaches in Stanford's Public Policy Program. He was director of the GSB's Doctoral Program for four years. He teaches the MBA course on negotiations and plans to write a (short) text on the subject.

Bendor was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1999-2000 and in 2004-2005. He is in the Who's Who in Economics (4th ed.) and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Academic Degrees

PhD, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1980, BA 1972, MA 1973. 

Professional Experience

At Stanford since 1979.

Professor of Public Policy and Public Management, GSB, Stanford University, 1994 - 1999; Associate Professor of Public Policy and Public Management, GSB, Stanford University, 1986 - 1994; Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Public Management, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1979 - 1986.

Selected Publications

  • Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government: University of California Press, 1985
  • A Behavioral Model of Turnout with Daniel Diermeier and Michael Ting: American Political Science Review, 2003
  • Computational Models in Political Economy with Daniel Diermeier and Michael Ting: MIT Press, 2003
  • Aspiration-Based Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Games: An Overview: International Game Theory Review, 2001
  • Theories of Delegation: Annual Review of Political Science, 2001

Working Papers

  • 1548: The Evolution of Norms
  • 1533: Reinforcement Behavior in Repeated Games
  • 1221: Condorcet Dynamics
  • 1183: Characterization of Solution Concepts in Standard Evolutionary Games
  • 1392R: Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program
  • 1107: When in Doubt . . . : Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Dilemma
  • 1115: The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
  • 1182: The Emergence and Stability of Cooperation
  • 1627: A Behavioral Model of Turnout
  • 1655: Theories of Delegation in Political Science
  • 1877: The Empirical Content of Adaptive Models
  • 845: Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action

Awards and Honors

  • Fellow, 2004, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
  • Fellow, 2004, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
  • Robert H. Durr Award, 2001, Midwest Political Science Association
  • Fellow, 1999, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
  • Heinz Eulau Award, 1998, American Political Science Association

Courses Taught

  • GSBGEN 202: Critical Analytical Thinking
  • OB 381: Conflict Management and Negotiation

Centers/Programs

Affiliations

  • Faculty Director: PhD Program
  • Member: American Journal of Political Science (1998 - 2001)
  • Member: American Political Science Review (1995 - 2001)
  • Member: Stanford University Press (2000 - 2003)