- The Experience
- The Programs
- MBA Program
- MSx Program
- PhD Program
- Executive Education
- Stanford Ignite
- Research Fellows Program
- Summer Institute for General Management
- Stanford LEAD Certificate: Corporate Innovation
- Stanford Innovation & Entrepreneurship Certificate
- Executive Program for Nonprofit Leaders
- Executive Program in Social Entrepreneurship
- Executive Program for Education Leaders
- Stanford go.to.market
- Faculty & Research
- Insights
- Alumni
- Events
You are here
Broadcasting Opinions with an Overconfident Sender
Broadcasting Opinions with an Overconfident Sender
International Economic Review.
2004, Vol. 45, Issue 2, Pages 467-498
We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but multiple equilibria may arise, and asymmetric equilibria might be more informative than the symmetric equilibrium even if the prior is symmetric. Although overconfidence on the part of the sender reduces informativeness in some cases, it may also eliminate less informative equilibria and lead to better information transmission. Overconfidence can also improve the informativeness of the message when broadcasting is costly.