SWJ Blog publishes news and commentary on the goings on across the broad community of small wars practitioners, thought leaders, and pundits. Longer, original articles published via Small Wars Journal also feed through SWJ Blog.
JFCOM Likes Navy IW Plane - Greg Grant, Defense Tech.
The quest for a low-cost, low-tech, irregular warfare aircraft to provide ground pounders with long loitering, on-call recon and strike got a big boost recently when Joint Forces Command’s Gen. James Mattis threw his support behind the Navy and Air Force “Imminent Fury” effort.
Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that he was taking a personal interest in the classified project, being run chiefly out of the Navy’s Irregular Warfare Office, that is looking at small turboprop aircraft for ground support. The sought after design falls somewhere between the Vietnam era OV-10 Bronco and A-1 Skyraider. It must stay aloft for a long time for surveillance needs but also have the punch to provide precise fire support when needed; a true “over the shoulder” aircraft for small ground units doing distributed operations in remote locations.
Mattis thinks using top-line fighter jets for close air support to troops patrolling rural villages in Afghanistan is overkill. As he diplomatically puts it: “Today’s approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system of systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight,” he told the SASC...
More at Defense Tech.
Moving Artillery Forward:
A Concept for the Fight in Afghanistan
by Major Joseph A. Jackson
Download the full article: Moving Artillery Forward
The United States Army is no stranger to mountainous and high-altitude war fighting. American history contains many instances of successfully executed mountain conflicts. Central to this success was the movement and use of artillery in direct support of those campaigns. The first notable American instance of moving artillery across mountainous terrain occurred when Colonel Henry Knox’s Continental Army soldiers wheeled, sledged, and levered the guns from Fort Ticonderoga across the Berkshire Mountains in the winter of 1776. These fifty-nine assorted cannon became the deciding factor in General George Washington’s siege of Boston. Other notable campaigns include the U.S. Army operations in the Italian Alps during WWII, the Taebaek Range of Korea, and the Annamite Range in Vietnam. Each of these locations and conditions provides ample instruction on artillery use in mountain warfare; yet this time fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan is proving to be a greater challenge than anticipated.
Strategists and commanders who consider employment of artillery in Afghanistan should take a fresh look at history, doctrine, and tactical concepts. Doing so will ensure artillery can employ optimally, and in sufficient strength, and of the correct caliber to create the tactical conditions for success. Without a significant increase in firepower delivered by a correspondingly lightweight and maneuverable field howitzer, the long-range fight in Afghanistan will devolve into an even deadlier and protracted conflict.
Solely relying on technology and precision munitions incrementally applied across the current arsenal will not achieve the conditions to exploit and pursue the insurgent fighters ever higher and farther into the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Operational planners, artillery professionals, congressional staffers, and military acquisition officers should examine these relevant histories, review doctrine, and consider their implications. These sources serve as a guide to develop successful and sustained operational approaches to combat the Afghan insurgency. They also provide a reference for adaptive tactics and procurement requirements for weapons needed in protracted high-altitude mountain warfare.
Download the full article: Moving Artillery Forward
Major Joseph A. Jackson is a U.S. Army Field Artillery officer with deployment and combat experiences in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He earned a bachelor’s degree in history and Russian from Purdue University and master’s degrees from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Major Jackson is presently serving his second tour in Afghanistan with the NATO Training Mission, (NTM-A).
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Every so often Small Wars Journal receives master theses or articles based on a master thesis written at our professional military education institutions. We recently received two of particular interest and share them with you here
A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David S. Clukey, U.S. Army.
Abstract:
Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.
No Child Left Behind: COIN Strategies to Deny Recruitment of Adolescent Males in the Southern Philippines - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major Herbert A. Daniels, U.S. Army.
Abstract:
Severing the link between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jolo population is critical to destroying the terrorist organization. The U.S. support to Philippine Security Forces (PSF) has helped to capture or kill the ideological cadre of the ASG but fails to prevent younger rebels from taking their place. While PSF continue to aggressively pursue the ASG, the U.S. has provided abundant assistance to improve the livelihood of the Jolo population. Positive results from the U.S.-supported development can be observed through increased access to healthcare and education. However, the strategy may fail to target a key demographic of the Jolo population, adolescent males, who currently make up approximately 80% of the ASG’s estimated population of 400 rebels. To prevent their recruitment by the ASG, operations and development on Jolo must not marginalize adolescent males. The warrior traditions of the native Tausugs on Jolo present a challenge when it comes to addressing the needs of adolescent males and encourages their participation in the security and development of Jolo vice participation in rebellious or illicit activities.
Also see:
SWJ Theses Time – (Part I)
Turning a COIN Problem into a Solution – NPS Thesis at SWJ
A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare
by Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan
Download the full article: A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare
Taliban Warfare has occupied news headlines in the global information expanse for over a decade. It is also a topic of choice for academics and scholars. However, the subject is often viewed and analyzed in a subjective rather than objective manner. It is mostly looked at across the prism of terrorism - atrocities and crimes against humanity committed by a group of non-state, though not stateless, bandits. Seldom has a theorist or practitioner picked up the pen to draw on the military aspects of the war so as to reach correct conclusions as to how could this war come to an acceptable-by-all end. This line of thought and reasoning might hold good for a given category of politicians but the students of military strategy and those involved in kinetic operations in a counterinsurgency campaign remain bewildered on the nature of the war. There is a need to understand Taliban as people, not monster, and as warriors not gangsters. Likewise, Taliban Warfare is required to be understood in correct military perspective rather than a mere act of crime, terrorism or banditry.
Download the full article: A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare
Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan hails from Pakistan and is pursuing a Masters in Strategic Security Studies at National Defense University, Washington D.C. He has served in the low intensity conflict zone bordering Afghanistan. His research papers and op-eds frequently appear in prestigious military magazines and national newspapers. He writes on current affairs, security issues and military strategy.
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Editor's Note: in many small wars situations, it is impossible to over-estimate the value of intimate local knowledge or to replicate thorough local cultural understanding. However, just because we'll never get it perfect doesn't mean you can't get it better. Here's how one unit expanded and applied their local knowledge. Consider these techniques as a force multiplier (+/- quality control?) for your local SMEs.
The Tribal Configuration Matrix
by Jeffrey A. Sinclair, Colonel US Army, Bud P. Cook, Ph.D., and Hamad Abdelnour,
BS/EE
Download the full article: The Tribal Configuration Matrix
Nearly every military commander in Iraq and Afghanistan developed some form of process to analyze indigenous populations to determine agendas and motivations in geographical centers tied to security. In the past five years success in this effort has been mixed based upon the level of violence in any given area and often the level of experience and talent among ground forces or the analysts that support their efforts.
In 2008 I was introduced to a unique tool in the early development phase by my assigned Human Terrain Team. This data call system known as the Tribal Configuration Matrix (TCM) established the first documented baseline for effects based operations in our Brigade’s Operational Environment. This tribal network tool resulted in a reconfiguration of the brigade staff to full time effects groups focused on tribal networks in lethal and non-lethal targeting, the new Rule of Law, and political party influences under the recently elected provincial governments. The unique understanding of the sub-tribal powers and their relationships allowed the brigade to rapidly shift from COIN to Foreign Internal Defense and cement the gains of the previous five years through functional relationships with tribal and institutional leaders.
Download the full article: The Tribal Configuration Matrix
Col. Jeffrey A. Sinclair is the Commanding Officer of the 172nd Infantry Brigade headquartered in Grafenwohr Germany. He has served in Afghanistan and Iraq as a Task Force and Brigade Combat Team Commander.
Bud P. Cook, Ph.D. is a former Human Terrain Team Social Scientist assigned to the 172nd Infantry Brigade at FOB Kalsu Iraq. He is currently a Senior Social Scientist with Tech Project Inc.
Hamad Abdelnour is a Human Terrain Team Research Manager and is currently OCONUS.
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Via Foreign Policy's Joshua Keating on Tom Ricks's The Best Defense - The Best Defense has won the 2010 Digital National Magazine award for best blog! We second Joshua's take on Tom's efforts - Congratulations to Tom as well as the incredible community of readers who've helped make this blog a must-read.
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Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:
Topics include:
1) Is this what defeat looks like?
2) Reining in rogues? Or stifling initiative?
Is this what defeat looks like?
On March 13, in two separate but seemingly coordinated attacks, gunmen in Juárez, Mexico, killed two employees of the U.S. Consulate, along with the husband of one of the employees. They were gunned down in their cars while returning from a children's party. Although in recent years U.S. citizens and government employees have died in the crossfire of Mexico's drug wars, this deliberate attack on U.S. government employees in Mexico signals a further escalation in the conflict. FBI agents investigating the murders guessed that the murders were meant to "send a message" to both the Mexican and U.S. governments.
The vast majority of the killings in Juárez and elsewhere in Mexico are the result of gangs battling for control of drug distribution markets. But the escalation of Mexico's violence began in December 2006 when President Felipe Calderón decided to attack the drug cartels which in his view were challenging the state's authority. The government's offensive has resulted in a complex, multisided, and violent scramble for markets, coercive power, and political influence.
What message did the gunmen intend to send with the murder of the consulate workers? It is a message easily recognized by students of irregular warfare. Insurgents competing with the government for influence over the population have pain as one of the principal tools in their toolbox. Apply the pain in a terrifying manner against even the most imposing symbols of authority -- in this case the U.S. government -- and political results may follow.
In Juárez, this tactic might be working.
Click through to read more ...
Continue reading "This Week at War: Is This the Week Mexico Lost the Drug War?" »
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From Tal Afar to Marja:
Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions
by Bing West
Download the full article: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions
The seizure of Marja in Helmand Province was the largest operation in the Afghanistan war, conducted by approximately 2,500 American and 1,500 Afghan troops versus 400-800 insurgents. Chris Chivers of the New York Times moved with Battalion 3-6, Mike Phillips of the Wall Street Journal with 1-6, Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post with 1-6 and with the brigade headquarters. I went up to Now Zad, began the operation with 1-6 and spent most of the month in southern Marja with Task Force Commando, comprised of 40 Marines and Special Forces and 400 askars and police. Marja marked my third embed with Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) units.
The basic question is whether the seizure of Marja was sui generis, with few techniques of general applicability, or was an example, like Tal Afar in the Iraq war, with wider implications.
Let’s look at what happened, why, and what carries forward?
Download the full article: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions
Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine, has made two dozen extended trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. The author of The Village and The Strongest Tribe, he is currently writing a book about the war in Afghanistan.
Continue reading "From Tal Afar to Marja: Applying COIN to Local Conditions" »
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Developing a Common Understanding of Unconventional Warfare by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, US Army, Special Operations Command Central, in the latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly.
The current USSOCOM- and USASOC approved UW definition is significant for several reasons. First and foremost, it provides instant clarity to decisionmakers. With clarity come credibility, confidence, and trust, all of which are essential in the relationship between the special operations community and senior decisionmakers. Secondly, this definition brings a degree of accountability previously absent from this topic. Specifically, it ensures that individuals and organizations possess the associated professional knowledge and operational capabilities to claim proficiency in UW.
Developing a Common Understanding of Unconventional Warfare at JFQ.
*Hat tip to Colonel Dave Maxwell
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