Study finds DC teachers are improving performance under Rhee's evaluation system

October 17, 2013
WTOP

A new study shows that public school teachers in the District of Columbia are improving their performance because they're motivated by the possibility of substantial pay raises or because they don't want to get fired.

Previous studies of pay-for-performance systems in public schools have found little to no correlation between merit-based pay and teacher performance.

But the school system in the nation's capital is unique for the complexity of its teacher-evaluation system. Teachers are scored based on classroom observations, student test scores and other factors. Those who do well can get big raises, and those who fare poorly are fired.

Thomas Dee of Stanford University, one of the study's authors, said the district's incentives are more effective because it's not just offering cash for test scores.

Click to read full article originally posted on WTOP.

CEPA Publications

Thomas Dee, James Wyckoff

Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This study presents novel evidence on this topic based on IMPACT, the controversial teacher-evaluation system introduced in the District of Columbia Public Schools by then-Chancellor Michelle Rhee. IMPACT implemented uniquely high-powered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance (i.e., several structured observational measures as well as test performance). We present regression-discontinuity (RD) estimates that compare the retention and performance outcomes among low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold that implied a strong dismissal threat. We also compare outcomes among high-performing teachers whose rating placed them near a threshold that implied an unusually large financial incentive. Our RD results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by 0.27 of a teacher-level standard deviation. We also find evidence that financial incentives further improved the performance of high-performing teachers (effect size = 0.24).

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